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Abstract 
This study comprises a discursive analysis of the underlying assumptions, rhetorical 
devices and the latent agendas masked within: (i) the burgeoning international ICT, 
poverty and development literature; (ii) the policy agendas of the major players in 
international development; and (iii) the ICT, poverty and development discourse of 
the post-apartheid South African government.   
 
The aim of the study is to move beyond the current enthusiasm for derivative 
description and technological determinism, and to introduce a deeper, more balanced 
understanding of the relationship between ICT, poverty and development.  The 
critique of the prevailing approach is rooted in the understanding of power, 
knowledge and discourse as outlined in the theory and methodology of Michel 
Foucault, and engages with theoretical debates about development, the ‘information 
society’ and the social implications of technology.  The study draws upon approaches 
from critical theory and social studies of technology, but is undertaken from within 
the cross-disciplinary school of development studies. 
 
Careful attention is paid to particular narratives, themes and issues, and how they are 
articulated in the ICT, poverty and development discourse.  The aim is to map out 
how a particular model of development, with a focus on ICTs, has been constructed 
by the post-apartheid South African government.  This model of development serves a 
normative purpose, both in terms of the types of interventions required and the desired 
outcomes.  It is concluded that government seeks to present state ICT initiatives as 
neutral, scientific and outside of political conflicts.  This discourse masks class 
interests and does not take account of elite groups and their interests in importing 
development schemes.  Furthermore, ICTs are strongly associated with modernisation 
and Western rationalism, and are part of a technically-rational and technologically-
determinist agenda that focuses on the ‘digital divide’ and the ‘information society’.  
ICTs are seen as a technical solution to underdevelopment, one in which development 
is reduced to solving the information deficit of the poor.  The net result is that the 
complex and deeply embedded political and economic factors which structure and 
shape poverty and inequality are made invisible and are therefore unquestioned.   
 
 iv
South African ICT policy is entering a state of considerable flux with a wide range of 
ICT-related projects, programmes, policies and strategies underway by a number of 
national government departments.  The post-apartheid South African government has 
embraced the ideology that ICT represents modernisation and is seen as a key 
technology for alleviating poverty.  In much of government technicist rhetoric we find 
an implicit belief in an unproblematic causal progression from ICT innovations to 
social change.  Technological complexities, complex social processes and 
independent human agents are not seriously considered.  The study offers guidelines 
for policy-makers to assist in re-conceptualising ICT, poverty and development and 
for devising national pro-poor ICT strategies that will be effective and responsive to 
development priorities.  The work of Amartya Sen is a useful basis for considering 
capabilities in a much broader developmental context than the traditional conception 
of development.  It is also used for examining whether the dominant configurations of 
ICTs are consistent with the social goal of empowering the poor. 
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie studie behels ŉ diskoersanalise van die onderliggende aannames, retoriese 
instrumente en die latente agendas wat verskuil is in (i) die ontluikende internasionale 
IKT, armoede en ontwikkelingsliteratuur; (ii) die beleidsagendas van die hoofspelers 
in internasionale ontwikkeling; en (iii) die IKT, armoede en ontwikkelingsdiskoers 
van die post-apartheid Suid-Afrikaanse regering. 
 
Die doel van die studie is om verby die bestaande entoesiasme vir afgeleide 
beskrywing en tegnologiese determinisme te beweeg en ŉ dieper, meer gebalanseerde 
begrip vir die verhouding tussen IKT, armoede en ontwikkeling daar te stel.  Die 
kritiek teenoor die heersende benadering is gewortel in die insigte oor mag, kennis en 
diskoers soos uitgebeeld in die teorie en metodologie van Michel Foucault en betrek 
teoretiese debatte oor ontwikkeling, die ‘inligtingsgemeenskap’ en die sosiale 
implikasies van tegnologie.  Die studie steun op perspektiewe oor kritiese teorie asook 
sosiale studies oor tegnologie, maar word onderneem vanuit die inter-dissiplinêre 
skool van ontwikkelingstudies. 
 
Daar word noukeurig aandag gegee aan spesifieke relase, temas en vraagstukke en die 
artikulering daarvan in die IKT, armoede en ontwikkelingsdiskoers met die doel om 
aan te dui hoe ŉ bepaalde model vir ontwikkeling, met ŉ fokus op IKT’s, deur die 
Suid-Afrikaanse regering gekonstrueer is.  Hierdie ontwikkelingsmodel dien ŉ 
normatiewe doel ten opsigte van beide die tipe intervensies wat vereis word en die 
gewenste uitkomste.  Dit blyk dat die regering poog om die IKT-inisiatiewe aan te 
bied as neutraal, wetenskaplik en losstaande van politieke konflik.  Hierdie diskoers 
versluier klassebelange, en neem nie elitegroepe en hulle belange in die invoering van 
ontwikkelingskemas in ag nie.  Daarbenewens word IKT’s sterk geassosieer met 
modernisasie en Westerse rasionalisme en is deel van ŉ tegnies-rasionele en 
tegnologies-gedetermineerde agenda gefokus op die ‘digitale skeiding’ en die 
‘inligtingsgemeenskap’.  IKT’s word gesien as ŉ tegniese oplossing vir 
onderontwikkeling, met ontwikkeling dan gereduseer tot ŉ oplossing vir die 
inligtingsagterstand by die armes.  Die netto resultaat daarvan is dat die komplekse en 
diepgewortelde politieke en ekonomiese oorsaaklike faktore wat onderliggend aan 
armoede en ongelykheid is, onsigbaar is en derhalwe onbevraagtekend gelaat word. 
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Die Suid-Afrikaanse IKT-beleid is besig om ŉ baie vloeibare fase te betree met ŉ wye 
reeks van IKT-verwante projekte, programme, beleide en strategieë aan die gang by ŉ 
aantal nasionale regeringsdepartemente.  Die ideologie dat IKT verteenwoordigend is 
van modernisasie en gesien word as ŉ sleuteltegnologie vir armoedeverligting is deur 
die Suid-Afrikaanse regering aangegryp en baie van die regering se tegnicistiese 
retoriek reflekteer ŉ implisiete geloof in ŉ onproblematiese oorsaaklike progressie 
vanaf IKT-vernuwings tot sosiale verandering.  Geen ernstige oorweging word 
geskenk aan tegnologiese kompleksiteite, komplekse sosiale prosesse en onafhanklike 
menslike agente nie.  Die studie stel riglyne voor om beleidmakers behulpsaam te 
wees in die rekonseptualisering van IKT, armoede en ontwikkeling en die ontwerp 
van nasionale IKT-strategieë wat effektief vir en reponsief op ontwikkelingsprioriteite 
vir die armes sal wees.  Die werk van Amartya Sen word gebruik as ŉ nuttige basis 
vir die oorweging van vermoëns in ŉ baie breër ontwikkelingskonteks as die 
tradisionele seining van ontwikkeling.  Dit word ook aangewend vir ŉ ondersoek na 
die vraag of die dominante konfigurasies van IKT’s in ooreenstemming is met die 
sosiale doelwit van bemagtiging van die armes. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Methodology 
 
1.1 Background 
Efforts to harness the power of information technologies to foster poverty alleviation 
and socio-economic development in general long predate the advent of the Internet 
and the World Wide Web (Dutton, 1996; Hudson, 1984; Shields & Servaes, 1989).  In 
areas as diverse as public sector reform, private sector development, education, 
health, the environment and agriculture, developing countries have sought to use 
radio, television, computers and related technologies to increase access to 
information, to build skills, to share knowledge and to make institutions and markets 
more transparent and effective (Avgerou & Walsham, 2000; Bhatnagar & Bjørn-
Andersen, 1990).  Yet it was the technological developments (i.e. Internet-mediated 
global connectivity; advances in the power and speed of computers; innovations in 
software and applications; and the spread of affordable mobile telecommunications) 
of the final decade of the 20th century which seemed to hold out the hope that 
information and communication technologies (ICTs)1 could have a truly 
transformative effect on the development process and on the hopes of millions of the 
world’s poorest.   
 
In contrast to critics who have said in effect that the poor “can’t eat computers” 
(Schwab, 2001:3), the UNDP (2001) and the World Bank (1999) have taken the 
position that ICTs can and should be enlisted in the pursuit of growth and poverty 
alleviation in the Third World.  The UNDP, for example, states unequivocally: 
“This [Human Development] Report is about how people can create and use 
technology to improve human lives, especially to reduce global poverty” 
(UNDP, 2001:27). 
 
This position summarises a new consensus in both national and international 
development circles, and demonstrates the widespread recognition of ICTs for 
development as a field of activity.  The response from the development community 
                                                          
1 The term information and communication technologies (ICTs) reflects the technological convergence 
between digital computing, telecommunications and broadcasting.  Whereas computers were largely 
focused on the processing of information, ICTs undertake both processing and communication of 
information. 
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has been that, while there are many challenges, ICTs can be tools for development 
(FAO, 2002; GTZ, 2002).  They can directly improve the quality of human life in 
areas such as health, nutrition, education, culture and community.  They can also 
support human development indirectly by stimulating economic growth, with 
applications in areas such as commerce and finance (UNDP, 2001).  ICTs are 
perceived as revolutionary tools that are transforming society in all aspects of social, 
economic and cultural life.  The question then becomes, how can governments 
leverage the potential of ICTs as a force for development? 
 
As the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, states: 
“A technological revolution is transforming society in a profound way.  If 
harnessed and directed properly, information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) have the potential to improve all aspects of our social, economic and 
cultural life.  ICTs can serve as an engine for development in the 21st century, 
and as an effective instrument to help us achieve all the goals of the 
Millennium Declaration…Yet the majority of the world’s population has yet 
to benefit from the new technology” (Annan, 2003:n.p.). 
 
By and large this view has been inspired by the conviction that the acquisition and 
distribution of information is essential to human empowerment and that, if people 
have better access to this basic resource, this would greatly benefit their standard of 
living.  Because of the perceived critical importance of information, the development 
community has repeatedly expressed its concern about the unequal access to 
information and its related technologies around the world (James, 2002). 
 
Evidence shows that new ‘digital’ sources of information and knowledge, while 
benefiting the minority of the well-off and the educated, are bypassing the less 
educated and the poor (Moodley et al., 2002; UNDP, 1999).  Is the widening gap in 
the access to and provision of ICTs reason for concern?  And is it relevant for the 
poor?  The poor suffer from material deprivation, as well as low levels of education 
and health; they are often powerless vis-à-vis political and social institutions; and they 
have a limited ability to make choices and to lead the life that they value (Chambers, 
1999).  Lack of access to ICTs in developing countries has not traditionally been 
viewed as a deprivation in the way that lack of food, basic health care and shelter 
have been.  However, several authors (Grace et al., 2001; Spence, 2003) and 
international donor agencies (World Bank, 1999; UNDP, 2001) have claimed that 
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access to ICTs can have a direct impact on raising living standards and the quality of 
life of the poor, and an indirect impact on poverty alleviation through growth and 
productivity.   
 
Poverty is considered to be more than a lack of material well-being.  It also reflects 
poor health and education, deprivation in knowledge and communication, inability to 
exercise human and political rights and the absence of confidence, dignity and self-
respect.  Human development implies that poor people’s capabilities are enhanced, 
their choices expanded and their lives enriched.  This is achieved by expanding 
human capabilities, freedoms and ‘functionings’ (Sen, 1999).  It would seem logical 
to conclude that better access to a resource as basic as information would greatly 
improve standards of living.  It is, however, very difficult to provide solid empirical 
evidence to support this conclusion.  As Roche and Blaine (1996:2) aver, “the long-
term impact of IT on developing countries remains highly speculative”. 
 
From the mid-1990s some commentators (see Panagariya, 2000; Negroponte, 1996) 
predicted that developing countries could ‘leapfrog’ several stages of technological 
and economic development, benefiting from the new ICTs to build a new sector of 
economic opportunity, tackle their education and health challenges in new ways, and 
give their leaders and citizens instant access to global knowledge and best practice.  
Further, many analysts (see, for example, Talero & Gaudette, 1996; Bhatnagar, 2000; 
Giovannetti, Kagami & Tsuji, 2003) believe that ICTs could have a major impact on 
the intractable problems of poverty, and that the power of these new technologies 
offer previously unimaginable opportunities for economic and social development, 
even in the poorest countries. 
 
International organisations and national governments (such as South Africa) reflected 
this optimism in their programmes, with a surge of interest in ICTs throughout the 
development community.  For example, many international initiatives have been 
launched recently, including the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Digital 
Divide Initiative (GDDI); the G8’s Digital Opportunity Task (DOT) Force; the UN 
ICT Task Force; the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) under the 
auspices of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the UN; the 
 4
Global Knowledge Partnership (GKP)2; and the Development Gateway project 
initiated by the World Bank.  These coalitions are providing a substantial global push 
for ICT diffusion.  Further, all of these initiatives aim to: (i) reduce the ‘digital 
divide’; (ii) strengthen existing efforts in traditional development sectors from health 
and education to agriculture and the environment; and (iii) enable developing 
countries to create new economic opportunities through the innovative deployment of 
ICTs.  Programmes proliferated to help developing countries: (i) assess their readiness 
for the new technologies and networks; and (ii) develop strategies to deploy ICTs and 
to adapt the technology to their specific needs.  However, the multiplication of 
initiatives coupled with excessive enthusiasm and unrealistic expectations by Third 
World governments (including South Africa) and the international donor community, 
have resulted in some confusion on the role that ICTs can play in the development 
process and a general feeling that not enough evidence yet exists of the positive 
impact of ICT in tackling poverty-related issues (Heeks, 2002a, 2002b). 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Those who enthusiastically embrace ICTs for development tend to operate within a 
modernisation discourse (Cohen, DeLong & Zysman, 2000; Negroponte, 1996), 
while sceptics are influenced by dependency and post-colonial discourses of 
development (Hamelink, 1996, 1997; Main, 2001; Wade, 2002).3  Both perspectives 
operate with a liberal notion of knowledge as separate from power.  We argue that a 
more fruitful approach is to analyse the role ICTs play in the power-knowledge nexus 
of Foucauldian discourse analysis (Foucault, 1980).  An ongoing tension exists within 
development theory between the desire to formulate universally valid principles and 
formal models (based on a stylised version of the development theory of the West) 
and the need to understand the great variety of actual experiences and potential 
alternatives for development in different societies.  This is clearly encapsulated in the 
ICT, poverty and development debate.  The fact remains that solutions to 
                                                          
2 The GKP is a ‘network of networks’ with a diverse membership base comprising public, private and 
not-for-profit organisations from both developed and developing countries.  The partnership was born 
as a result of the 1997 Global Knowledge Conference, and the secretariat is hosted by the government 
of Malaysia. 
3 The ‘dependency’ scholars argue that developing countries are in danger of locking themselves into a 
new form of electronic dependency on the West as they introduce increasingly complex software and 
hardware systems that they have little or no capacity to maintain for themselves and that become 
crucial to the very functioning of their corporate and public sectors. 
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development problems must be found in the ‘contextuality’ of development as a 
product of particular historical processes. 
 
A major blind spot in the international development literature on ICT, poverty and 
development has been the articulation of the knowledge-power nexus.  Yet we know 
from the work of Dutch (Frissen, 2000a; Snellen, 1994; Snellen & Van De Donk, 
1998; Zuurmond & Snellen, 1997) and German (Lenk, 1994, 1997; Brinckmann & 
Kuhlmann, 1990) public administration and public policy scholars that technology, 
power and politics are inextricably interwoven.  Further, there is a gap in the critical 
understanding of the pro-poor potential of ICTs, imbued by the principles of 
participation and social and economic justice, and geared to expanding human 
capabilities (Sen, 1999).  The idea that we are now living in an ‘information society’ 
has become widely accepted by the South African government, certainly within policy 
debates (see Chapters 5 and 6).  Yet, what exactly this term means is not always clear.  
There is debate about whether we have entered a ‘new’ Information Age, or are 
simply witnessing the effects of a new and powerful technology on historically 
determined social structures (Webster, 1995; Thomas, 1995; Edge, 1995; Lyon, 
1995).  Both strands in the debate do accord information a special place in 
understanding contemporary society, but differ with respect to their perception of the 
relationship between technology and social change. 
 
A number of problematic assumptions pervade the discourse on ICTs for 
development.  The first is that it seems to be assumed that technology issues are 
apolitical, that ICTs represent “the march of progress and that the only downside is 
the absence of the ticket for the journey” (Loader, 1998:6).  Yet, we cannot assume 
that technologies are value-neutral, since all technologies have both beneficial and 
damaging effects (Webster, 1995; Loader, 1998; Burkett, 2000; Thomas, 1995; 
Muller, 2000).  There also appears to be a technological determinist assumption that 
technology is separate from society and acts to define social structures and human 
interaction (Heeks, 2002a).  Moreover, international development has had to 
recognise that models of progress based on the developed world do not transfer 
directly to the developing world, yet it seems that in the realm of ICTs for 
development this lesson is largely forgotten.   
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The post-apartheid South African government has placed ICTs at the centre of the 
national agenda for social and economic development (Mbeki, 1996; PNC on ISAD, 
2003). The question of whether the application of technologies to improve 
information and communication access can increase the capabilities of disadvantaged 
and poor people is central to whether the new ICTs (particularly the Internet) will 
support or undermine real development.  Technology appears in the ICT for 
development discourse as a politically neutral force with the power to develop, and 
without which people are classified as ‘information-poor’.  One effect of this 
discourse is to render poor people passive and dependent, as objects to be developed, 
rather than as active agents of development.    
 
The real test of the success of ICTs in development efforts is whether they ultimately 
contribute to reducing poverty and inequality, thereby improving the lives and 
livelihoods of the poor.  Two important questions emerge from the debate: (i) Who 
will have access to ICTs and the networks formed? and (ii) Who will have control not 
only of the technology and its application, but of data gathered and processed, and of 
information exchanged via different modes?   
 
1.3 Goals, Assumptions, Premises and Research Questions 
The notions that ICTs lead to the ‘death of distance’, create a ‘level playing field’ in 
which the small and the new compete on equal terms with the large and the well-
established, and permit leapfrogging to a ‘knowledge economy’ and an ‘information 
society’ have been receiving wide currency in the development arena (World Bank, 
1999; UNDP, 2001; Panagariya, 2000; UNCTAD, 2002).  The aim of this study is to 
move beyond the current enthusiasm for derivative description and technological 
determinism that characterises much of the ICT, poverty and development literature, 
and to introduce a deeper and more balanced understanding of the relationship 
between ICT, poverty and development.   
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to scrutinise the ICTs for development discourse of 
the South African government, focusing on the common assumptions that are made 
and their implications.  Problematising this discourse and its assumptions should not 
be seen as a negation of the potential role of ICTs for development initiatives, but 
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instead a critique of the apolitical technological determinism underlying this 
discourse.  The two main objectives of this dissertation are to: (i) critically analyse the 
post-apartheid South African government’s discourse on ICTs in order to unmask 
submerged assumptions and interests regarding the nature and role of ICTs for 
poverty reduction; and (ii) to propose an alternative rethinking of ICTs for poverty 
alleviation.  The dissertation will argue that assumptions of technological determinism 
and a view of technology as a neutral tool for development underlie the dominant 
ICTs for development discourse.  The use of technology as an index of development 
reproduces the binary between the developed and the underdeveloped that has been 
critiqued within the field of development.  The challenge is to reorient this technology 
to socially embedded and locally-led development that affirms and makes use of the 
information, knowledge and experience that poor people have, and so to restore the 
agency to those rendered passive in ICTs for development efforts. 
 
The dissertation rises to meet the challenge put forth by Robert Wade: 
“The current campaign to promote the uptake of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) in developing countries and to get aid 
donors to redirect their aid budgets needs devil’s advocates to challenge what 
John Stuart Mill once called ‘the deep slumber of a decided opinion’” (Wade, 
2002:443). 
 
The dissertation will draw on this line of critique and apply it to the focus on ICTs for 
development that is becoming increasingly important in debates about development at 
the international, national and local levels.  The critique will be rooted in the 
understandings of power, knowledge and discourse as outlined in the theory and 
methodology of Michel Foucault (1980, 1982, 1991).  In this dissertation we aim to 
problematise and critique the dominant model of development.  But this critique alone 
is not sufficient; we will also ask how ICTs can be used for development rather than 
simply technologically-driven modernisation. 
 
The dissertation aims to explore the potential of ICTs to enhance development and 
reduce poverty in South Africa.  The argument will be situated within a power-
knowledge framework and in broader critiques of development as catching up to an 
ideal represented by the advanced, highly industrialised countries of the North.  We 
aim to show that the ICTs for development discourse draws on catch-up models of 
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development and defines a category of people as ‘information-poor’ because they do 
not have access to this technology.  The dissertation will be guided by three primary, 
yet inter-related, research questions.  These are:  
 
1. What is the relationship between ICT, poverty and development? 
2. Can ICTs contribute to poverty alleviation and social equity? 
3. What is the nature of the South African government’s discourse on ICTs for 
development, and what are the ways in which it operates in society? 
 
The goals of this study are to: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Highlight the complexity and contested nature of the notion of ICT, poverty and 
development; 
Situate rapid advances in ICTs in a broader debate about development and the role 
of information in development and poverty alleviation; 
Critically analyse the South African government’s ICTs for development 
discourse, with a particular focus on the impact of state discourse on poor and 
marginalised communities; and 
Propose an alternative, pro-poor conceptualisation of ICTs for development that is 
built on the foundation of Sen’s (1999) ‘capability’ approach. 
 
The study is premised on the belief that: (i) technology, in and of itself, is neither 
positive nor negative (Kranzberg, 1985), what Heidegger (1977:33) refers to as “the 
ambiguous essence of technology”; and (ii) the deployment of ICTs is the 
consequence of human choices which are themselves constrained and shaped by 
social context.  Simply put, ICTs are context-dependent, i.e. they are contingent on 
uses and applications in particular contexts.  The ICT socio-technical system (i.e. 
people, context, processes and technology) provides both a set of possibilities as well 
as an array of risks and challenges.  Social factors shape the technology, which in turn 
shapes the social environment and there are complicated feedback loops between the 
two.  Further, the changes that are brought about through the introduction of a 
technology are not inevitable.   
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As Freeman (1992:224) states, all innovations are “social and not natural phenomena; 
all of them are the result of human actions, human decisions, human expectations, 
human institutions”.  The position of this study is that any technological innovation 
that is claimed to support development and which disempowers the already poor, no 
matter its technical elegance or economic rationality, is usually harmful.  We do, 
however, acknowledge the inherent ‘messiness’ of the empirical reality of 
development and the fact that contradictory outcomes are an essential part of social 
reality.  Concepts such as modernisation and technological progress have recently 
come under criticism from a variety of theoretical viewpoints (Ferguson, 1990; 
Escobar, 1995a; DuBois, 1991; Munck & O’Hearn, 1999).  Post-structural theorists 
have deconstructed notions of progress and modernisation calling for a focus on 
context and culture-specific knowledge and technologies.   
 
The study makes the following assumptions: (i) technology is socially ‘shaped’; and 
(ii) the direction and nature of technological development does not necessarily follow 
some inevitable trajectory, but rather is a component of a complex, multi-dimensional 
system of social, cultural, political and economic change.  The dissertation will 
engage with theoretical debates about the ‘information society’ and technology as 
socially embedded.  The common theme running through the dissertation will be the 
problematic nature of apparently neutral assumptions about technological 
development and the emergence of a ‘new’ information society.  Failure to address 
these assumptions may lead social scientists to become complicit in distracting 
attention away from the very ‘real’ global economic, social and cultural inequalities, 
to ‘virtual’ inequalities, which merely hide an unwillingness to address the core 
failings of the ‘development’ paradigm. 
 
Our concern is with the development industry’s, and more specifically the South 
African government’s, discourse on ICT for development and ICT for poverty 
reduction and not the grand issues of development and poverty in their entirety.  The 
sine qua non of the dissertation is the interconnectivity between ICTs, poverty and 
development in the South African government’s discourse and not government’s 
poverty and development policies tout court.  The focus, therefore, is on ICTs and in 
particular its interweaving in the poverty and development policies and vision of the 
South African government. 
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In sum, this study sets out a discursive analysis of the underlying assumptions, 
rhetorical devices and the latent agendas masked within the ICT, poverty and 
development discourse.  We pay careful attention to particular narratives, themes and 
issues, and how they are articulated in the discourse.  The aim is to map out how a 
particular model of development, with a focus on ICTs, has been constructed by the 
post-apartheid South African government.  This model of development serves a 
normative function, both in terms of the types of interventions required and the 
desired outcome.  The starting point of this discourse analysis is the assumption that 
power is productive of subjects and models of the social world (Foucault, 1982; 
Billig, 1987).  By analysing discourses and the subject positions produced, identities 
(such as that of being ‘information-poor’) can be challenged and new possibilities 
imagined when a topic is approached with a political and theoretical agenda (Parker et 
al.,1997; Potter & Gergen, 1989). 
 
1.4 Personal Motivation for the Study 
As the Section Head of the ICT component of the Knowledge Management Research 
Programme at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the researcher is 
responsible for assessing the analytical and evaluative claims of the ICT for 
development advocates and, more generally, the ‘information society’ thesis.  The 
researcher’s job entails managing and leading ICT projects with the objective of 
generating evidence-based, policy-relevant findings for government and international 
development agencies.  The researcher, therefore, has a profound intellectual interest 
in the topic under investigation.  It is within this context that his PhD topic has 
emerged and indeed been sustained.   
 
Over the last 10 years the researcher has noticed (i) the increasing inclusion of ICTs 
as important elements of developmental strategies and interventions; (ii) 
unprecedented levels of investment in ICTs by major aid agencies and governments, 
often at the expense of alternative forms of initiative; and (iii) that technological 
determinism is hegemonic in the ICT for development discourse.  Discourses are the 
public or outward expression of (usually) unstated or implied ideological positions.  
Discourses connote values and these values are often assumed to reflect general 
endorsement.  It is characteristic of discourses that they occur as self-evident truths or 
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facts and therefore act to occlude oppositional or resistant discourses.  The occlusion 
of counter-discourses is largely true of the evolution of the state ICT for development 
discourse in South Africa.  There appears to be no space, for example, for a discourse 
that advances the idea that the introduction of ICT for poverty reduction may not 
necessarily be shared by some, or all, of the people they are meant to reach.   
 
Problematising government’s ICT for development discourse should not be seen as a 
denial of the potential benefits of ICTs to contribute to development, but rather it (i) is 
a critique of the apolitical technological determinism and the modernisation induced 
idea of technical progress as a linear ‘stages of growth’ trajectory; and (ii) serves to 
underline the fact that discourses rest on ideologies, that ideologies are values and that 
values are not always shared automatically by all stakeholders in an enterprise.  In a 
situation where critical choices must be made regarding the allocation of scarce 
resources, the importance being accorded to ICTs needs to be interrogated.  Exclusive 
emphasis on ICT projects, at the expense of careful analysis and consideration of the 
broader economic, social and political elements that interact to improve the lives of 
individuals, is likely to result in unanticipated failures and wasted resources.  
Moreover, the absence of ‘power’ from explicit discussion of ICT for development 
results in faulty analysis and poor policy.   
 
Developing at the end of the 19th Century in an era of rapid capitalist industrial 
expansion and the rise of powerfully intrusive states, Touraine (1988: Chapter 1) 
maintains that the social sciences have been overly preoccupied with positivistic 
explanation and unduly shaped by an emphasis on order and control.  This has left 
little room for human agency and on the individual actor in social science theories.  
To regain relevance, applicability and validity in the social sciences, Touraine (1988) 
urges social scientists to become participant-observers.  As Section Head for the ICT 
thrust at the HSRC the researcher has been a participant-observer in numerous 
government ICT forums, e.g. the Government Information Technology Officers’ 
Council (GITOC), the Knowledge and Information Management (KIM) sub-
committee, the Universal Services Agency (USA), the Presidential National 
Commission on the Information Society and Development (PNC on ISAD), the 
Department of Communication’s electronic commerce discussion process and various 
discussion colloquia on telecommunications, ICT convergence policy, etc. 
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In respect of the Presidential Commission, the author was the lead researcher as well 
as Project Manager of a large-scale ICT, poverty and development project for the 
PNC.  The PNC is a high-level policy think-tank in government and reports directly to 
the President.   Moreover, as a representative of the HSRC the researcher was recently 
part of a Department of Science and Technology delegation to Italy and Switzerland 
which looked at the challenges of state policy-making at the interface between 
science, technology and society.  Collectively, these experiences have been a rich 
source of data gathering for the dissertation. 
 
This study thus draws on the researcher’s wealth of experience as a ‘participant-
observer’ in numerous national government led and international donor agency driven 
discussion forums on ICT for development.  By attending and participating in 
government and aid agency led committees, round table conferences, meetings and 
other forums for discussing ICTs in a development context, the researcher has been 
exposed to the currents of thinking in government and in international aid agencies on 
ICT vis-à-vis poverty and development.  By operating as a reflexive critic and a 
participant-observer the researcher is well positioned to (i) question the highly 
problematic set of assumptions underpinning government’s ICT for development 
discourse; (ii) enrich the ICT for development debate; and (iii) offer a profound 
interrogation of government’s ICT for development discourse. 
 
1.5 Approach  
1.5.1 Critical Theory 
In critical research more generally it has been suggested that there are several major 
weaknesses in social theory (Boje, 2001).  Two key themes in particular are 
emphasised.  They are emancipation and power relations (Valero-Silva, 2001:1). 
Traditionally, critical theory has been described as a form of historical materialism 
and is much influenced by issues of class, ethnicity and gender.  Critical theory tends 
to view situations through a lens of local domination by powers-that-be, with the 
potential for localised resistance.  Hegemony is a characteristic, with conflict and 
contradictory tensions featuring in the analysis.  It is generally agreed that critical 
theory has substantial (though not exclusive) roots in the Frankfurt School of the late 
1920s (Valero-Silva, 1996:63-65).  This intellectual movement was a reaction to the 
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perceived domination of thinking at the time by positivism and can be understood 
against a backdrop of a post-Enlightenment, Modernist social context.  Key thinkers 
include Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, Jürgen Habermas and 
Herbert Marcuse (Tully, 1999; Walsham, 1993). 
 
The Frankfurt School identified taken-for-granted assumptions about aspects of their 
contemporary society and argued that their form and nature were shaped by existing 
social and historical contexts (Lyytinen & Klein, 1985).  They also highlighted that 
the very ways in which such shaping was recorded and represented were themselves 
the product of their time, and could (and should) be called into question (Boje, 2001).  
This has given rise to critical theory’s claim to be able to mount a self-critique of its 
own knowledge claims as well as offer a critique of social conditions.  Underlying the 
focus of the Frankfurt School was the desire not only to expose inadequacies in 
society, but also to encourage reflection upon and emancipation from such 
inadequacies as were identified (Ashenden & Owen, 1999).  
 
It has been said that critical research has grown in popularity as a response to 
disillusionment with traditional forms of inquiry (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992:3).  
Critical research in practice has developed over time into a broad church that extends 
beyond traditional forms of critical theory. Consequently, we need a broader 
definition of what it means to be ‘critical’ (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000).  If all this 
should sound daunting, even inconsistent, Alvesson and Willmott (1992:3) draw 
attention to the fact that critical theory has always encouraged the creative borrowing 
of ideas from different schools of theory and practice.  The common thread is usually 
the emancipatory interest rather than the detailed following of any one particular 
theorist.  The language of critical theory emphasises ‘emancipatory intent’ because it 
acknowledges that an emancipatory outcome cannot be guaranteed.  Hence, the focus 
is on process rather than outcomes.  Any approach that claims an emancipatory intent 
should be able to promote participation and take account of unequal power relations. 
 
Foucault’s work has been variously labelled as post-structuralist (Boje, 2001) and 
post-modern (Walsham, 1993).  One explanation for this could be the way in which 
his ideas tend to be applied within philosophical contexts at variance with Foucault’s 
own original roots.  This may especially apply to translation of his ideas into contexts 
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involving material technology.  Foucault challenged an idea central to critical theory, 
viz. that relations of power are not something negative in themselves and something 
from which one must be emancipated.  Rather he argues that there are often aspects of 
power that are beneficial for the stakeholders involved (Foucault, 1972).  Indeed, he 
does not believe that there can be a society without relations of power, by which he 
means power in the sense of trying to conduct or influence the behaviour of others.  
He also argued that any production of knowledge contains within itself the potential 
for contradictory outcomes (Foucault, 1972).  For instance, generating insights into a 
set of power relationships with the intention of opening up the relationships can 
actually result in their becoming more entrenched and inscribed.  Thus, emancipatory 
intentions do not always lead to desired outcomes.  It is partly for this reason that 
many researchers have emphasized the usefulness of Foucault’s approach in 
conducting critical inquiry (Boje, 2001). 
 
We argue that Foucault’s thinking, especially its self-critical capacity, and his  
recognition of the role of unequal power relations and the potential for contradictory 
outcomes is particularly salient for this study.  We focus particularly on Foucault’s 
analyses of power relations and the forces of domination that result from inequalities 
in power. 
 
1.5.2 Discourse Analysis 
The approach taken in this study can be described as discursive, in the sense that it 
stems from the recognition of the importance of the dynamics of discourse and power 
to any study of development.  Discourse analysis creates the possibility of: 
“stand[ing] detached from [the ICT, poverty and development discourse], 
bracketing its familiarity, in order to analyze the theoretical and practical 
context with which it has been associated” (Foucault, 1986:3).   
 
This is the task that the present study seeks to accomplish.  Discourse can be defined 
as an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to 
phenomena (Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996).  Discourse analysis requires explicit and 
systematic attention to texts, policies, strategies, projects, programmes as well as 
social and historical contexts (Fairclough, 1992; Backhouse, Henderson & Dudley-
Evans, 1993; Watts, 1993).  That every truth is a claim to power and every power is a 
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centre of truth is the point of discourse analysis and part of a post-modern 
understanding of knowledge.   
 
For Foucault the importance of discourse is its position at the interface of power and 
knowledge.  Following Foucault (1972; Rabinow, 1991), discourse refers to a 
complex relationship between power and knowledge and a radical reading of 
subjectivity in the sense that through discourses individuals become ‘subjects’.  
Discourse, then, is “the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of 
objects during a given period of time” (Foucault, 1972:33).  Discourse analysis seeks 
to reveal the power relations which enable and are enabled by the discourses 
themselves.  This is where Foucault’s contribution is important, because he explored 
the ways in which discursive orders come into being and thereby ‘normalise’ certain 
forms of subjectivity through a dualistic process of ‘Othering’.4   
 
Following Foucault (1984:100), power-knowledge relationships are transmitted and 
produced through the medium of discourse.  Foucault (1990) points out that we 
should not imagine a world of dominant and dominated, or accepted and excluded, 
discourses.  Using the notion of the “tactical polyvalence of discourses”, Foucault 
argues that we should think instead of a: 
“complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument 
and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of 
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” (Foucault, 1990:100-
101). 
 
Discourses produce power-knowledge relations that are characterised by inequality.  
There are two tasks the intellectual in the narrow sense can perform.  The first is to 
provide an analysis of the “specificity of the mechanisms of power” and to examine 
the intellectual assumptions and power structures which constitute the nexus within 
which the contending parties stake their claims (Foucault, 1980:145).  The second 
task for the intellectual in the narrower sense is to develop an analysis and critique of 
what Foucault calls the “regime of truth”.  Shiner explains: 
“In Western societies, for example, ‘truth’ is centred in scientific discourse 
and institutions; it is central to economic production and political power; it is 
widely circulated; it is produced and disseminated by great economic and 
                                                          
4 Said’s (1995) Orientalism, for example, explicitly used Foucauldian discourse analysis to explore the 
ways in which imperial power and literary representations were bound together. 
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political apparatuses like the university, the media, or the army.  In this system 
of truth there are many forms of excluded and subjected knowledge.  Those 
who occupy the lowest status in various institutions or conditions of life – the 
patient, inmate, prisoner, welfare mother, labourer, student – all find their 
knowledge discounted.  They are part of a system of power which invalidates 
their discourse, occasionally by blatant denial, but continuously by a set of 
implicit rules concerning what sorts of concepts and vocabulary are acceptable 
and what credentials and status are requisite for one’s discourse to count as 
knowledge” (Shiner, 1982:384; adapted from Foucault, 1977:207). 
 
Every society, Foucault claims, has a kind of political economy of truth which says 
what kinds of discourse are true, what the mechanisms and sanctions are for 
distinguishing true from false, the techniques for acquiring truth and the status of 
those who are empowered to say what is true (Foucault, 1980:131).  In The 
Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, Foucault (1972) 
describes not only the way intellectual rules exclude some kinds of discourse and 
validate others, but also suggests how this order becomes an institutional exercise of 
power.  For Foucault (1980:115), a discourse allows for certain ways of thinking 
about something and thereby excludes others.  It is thus discourse, and not the 
individual subject, that produces knowledge – indeed the subject is the product of 
discourse.  The discursive formations that transmit and produce power relations are 
potentially reversible:   
“Discourse transmits and produces power, it reinforces it, but also undermines 
and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (Foucault, 
1990:101). 
 
In the post-apartheid era the new ICTs have come to acquire great power and 
dominance in the South African government’s development and poverty discourse.  
This dissertation seeks to explore, through discourse analysis, the ways in which ICTs 
have come to dominate the development agenda by analysing the rise of the power of 
ICTs, its nature and the ways in which it operates in society.  The study attempts to 
analyse in Foucauldian terms the manner in which the power of ICTs operates and to 
problematise the ways in which this informs the development agenda globally, but 
more specifically of the South African government in the post-apartheid era.  The 
theoretical framework revolves around Michel Foucault’s path-breaking work on the 
exploration of the relationship between power and knowledge, and the discursive 
practices linked to these. 
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Discourse is not just words, and words are not “wind, an external whisper, a beating 
of wings that one has difficulty in hearing in the serious matter of history” (Foucault, 
1972:209).  Discourse is not the expression of thought; it is a practice, with 
conditions, rules and historical transformations.  To analyse ICT, poverty and 
development as a discourse is to “show that to speak is to do something – something 
other than to express what one thinks” (Foucault, 1972:209).  Changing the order of 
the discourse is a political question that entails the collective practice of social actors 
and the restructuring of existing political economies of truth.  In the conclusion of his 
most complex work, The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault wrote: 
“A change in the order of discourse does not presuppose ‘new ideas’, a little 
invention and creativity, a different mentality, but transformations in a 
practice, perhaps also in neighbouring practices, and in their common 
articulation.  I have not denied – far from it – the possibility of changing 
discourse” (Foucault, 1972:209). 
 
This transformation demands not only a change in ideas and statements, but the 
formation of nuclei around which new forms of power and knowledge might 
converge.  The central requirement for a more lasting transformation in the order of 
discourse is the breakdown of the basic organisation of the discourse, that is the 
appearance of new rules of formation of statements. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
1.6.1 Discourse Analysis 
Discourses are, according to Foucault (1972:49), “practices that systematically form 
the objects of which they speak”.5  Foucault (1980) observes that citizens of 
democratic states are controlled less by violence or the economic power of the boss or 
the landlord than by the pronouncements of expert discourse, organised in what he 
calls ‘regimes of truth’, i.e. sets of understandings which legitimate particular social 
attitudes and practices.  The term ‘discourse’ has gained wide contemporary currency 
and is perhaps in danger of becoming all things to all people.  The crucial issue is to 
avoid the idea that it is a purely linguistic term, as in most incarnations of ‘discourse 
analysis’ (Van Dijk, 1985).  Henriques et al. explain discourse as follows: 
                                                          
5 During his career Foucault covered an astonishing range of topics, characterised by shifting methods 
and purposes.  This study focuses only on his theorising about discourse, particularly the central idea of 
the power-knowledge complex operating in discourse.  For a critical assessment of Foucault’s oeuvre 
see Hoy (1986), Rabinow (1991) and Dean (1994). 
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“[Discourse] is regulated and systematic.  The systematic character of a 
discourse includes its systematic articulation with other discourses.  In 
practice, discourses delimit what can be said, while providing the spaces – the 
concepts, metaphors, models, analogies, for making new statements within 
any specific discourse…The analysis which we propose regards every 
discourse as the result of a practice of production which is at once material, 
discursive and complex, always inscribed in relation to other practices of 
production of discourse.  Every discourse is part of a discursive complex; it is 
linked in an intricate web of practices, bearing in mind that every practice is 
by definition both discursive and material” (Henriques et al., 1984:105-106). 
 
Discourse can be defined as a systematically organised set of statements which give 
expression to meaning and “organizes and gives structure to the manner in which a 
particular topic, object, process is to be talked about” (Kress, 1985:7).  Discourse is 
socially constituted both in the sense that it helps sustain and reproduce the social 
status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it (Wodak, 1996).  
Discourse analysis from a wide range of disciplines has shown how, for example, 
gender is constructed and women are silenced (Mohanty, 1991; Butler, 1992), how 
colonial visions of those outside the West are elaborated in language as the ‘other’ 
(Said, 1985) and how notions of class are connected in the ways we speak (Andersen, 
1988).   
 
Discourse is shaped by relations of power and invested with ideologies.  Jaworski and 
Coupland argue that: 
“discourse analysis offers a means of exposing or deconstructing the social 
practices which constitute ‘social structure’…It is a sort of forensic activity, 
with a libertarian political slant.  The motivation for doing discourse analysis 
is very often a concern about social inequality and the perpetuation of power 
relationships, either between individuals or between social groups, difficult 
though it is to pre-judge moral correctness in many cases” (Jaworski & 
Coupland, 1999:6). 
 
Key issues of discourse analysis include its questioning of objectivity and its interest 
in the practices which produce apparent objectivity, normality and factuality.  Probing 
texts in order to discover hidden meaning and value structures is of prime importance.  
Critical discourse analysis aims at uncovering the ways in which ideology and 
discourse are intertwined (Johnstone, 2002). 
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Fairclough’s (1995b) method of discourse analysis is based on three components, viz. 
description, interpretation and explanation.  Linguistic properties are described, the 
relationship between the productive and interpretative processes of discursive practice 
and the text is interpreted, and the relationship between discursive and social practice 
is explained (Fairclough, 1995a:97).  Fairclough (1992) advances four arguments in 
favour of text analysis: theoretical, methodological, historical and political.  His 
theoretical foundation is that social structures such as class relations are in a 
dialectical relationship with social activities and the texts are a significant form of 
social activity.  As a methodological justification for the great importance of text 
analysis, Fairclough (1992) points to the increasing use of texts as sources of data.  
His historical foundation is that texts are good indicators of social change.  This 
consideration refers to intertextuality and the linguistic heterogeneity of texts: texts 
give evidence of lasting processes such as the redefinition of social relationships and 
the reconstruction of identities and of knowledge (Fairclough, 1995a).  For Fairclough 
(1995a), an understanding of text analysis, that is the analysis of content and texture, 
provides a counterbalance to strongly schematic types of social analysis which take 
too little account of the mechanisms of change.  His fourth foundation is political and 
relates to the critical orientation in discourse analysis: social control and power are 
exercised with increasing frequency by means of texts, so text analysis becomes an 
important part of critical discourse analysis. 
 
As Fowler (1996:10) suggests, discourse analysis goes “beyond the formal structure 
of language as an abstract system, toward the practical interaction of language and 
context”, along the lines of ideology, power and inequality (Caldas-Coulthard & 
Coulthard, 1996).  In this sense language is seen as a social practice, as a mode of 
action that is always socially situated “in a dialectical relationship with other facets of 
‘the social’…it is socially shaped, but it is also socially shaping, or constitutive” 
(Fairclough, 1995a:131).  From this viewpoint discourse is seen as constitutive of 
social reality in a general sense.  The critical component of discourse analysis denotes 
a concern with critiquing the manner in which the ‘social’ is produced and sustained 
through language.  This concern places an emphasis on identifying power relations 
and demystifying the processes that produce and reproduce these relations and 
eventually lead to significant social changes.  Discourse analysis argues that there is a 
degree of ‘distortion’ in language that functions to create and maintain power 
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imbalances.  The discourse analyst seeks to expose these misrepresentations via the 
examination of discursive events.  Discourse can be seen as an opaque power object 
which discourse analysis aims to make more transparent.  Through examining 
discourse, power inequalities are exposed.  However, it is important to note that the 
focus on misrepresentation does not simply assume that there is a problem of having 
something be represented as distorted: “there is not necessarily any true reality that 
can be unveiled by critical practice, there are simply relatively varying 
representations” (Fowler, 1996:4). 
 
State discourse, or “rational, legitimate…practices which are authoritatively backed” 
by government (Roberts & Sarangi, 1999:15), provides a set of possible statements 
about how a particular topic, object or process is talked about.  These discourses are 
then mobilised to justify institutional decisions about resource and task allocation.  As 
part of a critical project, this study focuses on the interpretation of power relations and 
other expressions of dominance that entail the privileging of certain interests over 
others.  Critical interpretation requires scrutinising representations which appear self-
evident, natural and unproblematic.  Legitimated discourses dominate and thus 
interventions on the part of government carry an aura of ‘truth’.  Discourse analysis, 
therefore, demystifies what is taken to be ‘common sense’ by defamiliarising it and 
signalling its functions and consequences in sustaining the social order.  The 
demystification sets the conditions for possible emancipation and social change.  
Discourse analysis, thus, sees itself as politically involved research with an 
emancipatory requirement: it seeks to have an effect on social practice and social 
relationships (Van Dijk, 1997).  Jaworski and Coupland (1999:35), for instance, urge 
discourse analysts “to see themselves as politically engaged, working alongside 
disenfranchised social groups”. 
 
1.6.2 The Foucauldian Power-Knowledge Complex 
For Foucault (1991:Chapter 1) the practices of power are judged more by the 
effectiveness with which subjects internalise their effects than by the extent to which 
they conform or comply with them.  In that sense power is not so much above us, as 
around and among us.  It is an immanent not an external force; or put another way, it 
is conceived as inseparable from its effects.  In Foucault’s (1980, 1982) writings 
power is said to work through indirect techniques of self-regulation which make it 
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difficult to constitute oneself in ways other than those directed.  Foucault 
(1991:Chapter 1) suggests that power is concerned with the techniques which govern 
the possible limits of action.  Power for Foucault (1991:6) is best understood as a 
form of ‘government’ which works through a multiplicity of actions and reactions, 
rather than through a simple domination/resistance binary.  On this understanding, 
power reaches deep inside an institution in an immanent rather than a hierarchical 
fashion, composing and recomposing all manner of arrangements in space and time, 
although not in any direction orchestrated by a centralised power.  Power, in this 
sense, may be loosely considered to be everywhere, but it is more accurately 
described as diffuse and embedded in particular institutionalised spaces.  Foucault’s 
(1982:1) notion of power is one of a normalising rather than a subjugating force 
which works on, not over, subjects. 
 
According to Foucault (1980, 1982), power produces, among other things, 
knowledge, and the two concepts are welded together in a single entity: ‘power-
knowledge’.  The exercising of power opens new relations of power and creates new 
objects of understanding or rational inquiry, whereas knowledge immediately 
presupposes and constitutes power relations.  Moreover, in producing knowledge, 
power produces truth.  Truth denotes an abstract “system of ordered procedures for 
the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements” 
(Foucault, 1980:133).  One example of this sort of truth is the scientific method, 
which is of fundamental importance in contemporary Western society.  DuBois 
explains: 
“At the discursive level, this ‘episteme’ distinguishes not truths from 
falsehoods but ‘what may from what may not be characterised as scientific’.  
The episteme, in turn, is connected to the power relations that define and 
maintain it and to the grid of power that it gives rise to and legitimises, 
forming a ‘regime’ of truth.  Knowledge, then, arrives in consciousness 
following a filtering: not only must particular statements submit to the regime 
of truth, but only they, from a multiplicity of possible statements, are 
constructed by it…When these discourses conform with the regime of truth – 
when the latter validates or approves the former – then certain discourses or 
bodies of knowledge are admitted into the category of ‘true knowledge’.  In 
this process a ‘whole set of knowledges’ is rendered suspect, discredited, 
excluded, and ‘disqualified’ while another, in the case of development, 
becomes the basis for policy formation” (DuBois, 1991:7). 
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Foucault uses the phrases “archaeology of knowledge” (Foucault, 1972:4) and 
“genealogy of power” (Foucault, 1980:23).  Genealogy is the analysis of how one 
constellation of power-knowledge relations is displaced by another.  Foucault’s 
analysis is a critique of the liberal-humanist separation of power and knowledge, and 
simultaneously a critique of the Marxist view of power as economic exploitation and 
class domination.  Foucault (1980:Chapter 1) rejects both the liberal tradition and the 
totalising discourse of Marxism because they imply that there can ultimately be a 
knowledge untainted by relations of power.  Foucault is concerned with three key 
questions relating to power: (i) Who has power? (ii) How is it exercised? and (iii) 
What are its effects? 
 
The relationship of power and knowledge is neither unidirectional nor exterior.  For 
Foucault (1979:194) there is “no power relation without the correlative constitution of 
a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at 
the same time power relations”.  Foucault (1982) has shown that what we most 
readily recognise as ‘power’ is the more or less stable, yet continually renegotiated, 
ossification of sets of relations, or lines of force, in Deleuze’s (1986, 1992) 
terminology.  Power is, in other words, a complex strategic situation (Foucault, 1982).  
In Foucault’s (1987:12) schema, repression and domination represent extreme 
versions and limiting cases of the operation of power – they involve a fixing of power 
relations in such “a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical”.   
 
In Foucault’s (1982) terms power is relational and contingent.  What we typically 
recognise as ‘power’ is the ossification of sets of relations forming a complex 
strategic situation.  Foucault is not concerned with normative judgements about 
whether or not the operation of power is ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  Power effects may be 
judged as positive or negative, but these do not automatically flow from Foucault’s 
understanding.  Foucault merely provides a framework for sharpening our 
understanding of contemporary relations of power.  These power relations are 
frequently cast in terms of binary oppositions such as ‘developed-underdeveloped’, 
and they are largely grounded in the logic of exclusion.  Individuals are inserted into 
systems of knowledge which judge their capacities and which justify and require both 
outside intervention and the actions of the individuals on themselves (Foucault, 
1979:185). 
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Knowledge is inseparable from power (Foucault, 1977:27).  All forms of knowledge 
are intimately connected to power relations and therefore truth: 
“isn’t outside power…Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general 
politics’ of truth; that is, the types of discourses which it accepts and make 
function as true” (Foucault, 1980:131).   
 
Foucault systematised power in a way which distinguishes him from much post-
modern thinking.  Unlike post-modernists such as Rorty (1992) and Lyotard (1984), 
he does not see power as having a locus of sovereignty, but posits the alternative 
thesis that “power is exercised from innumerable points” (Foucault, 1990:94).  
Modern power, for Foucault, is insidious, its relations of power not visibly emanating 
from a sovereign source, but masked as forms of truth and knowledge: 
“[A] moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, 
constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and 
unstable…Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1990:93).   
 
Foucault is concerned with an oppositional “struggle against power, a struggle aimed 
at revealing and undermining power when it is most invisible and insidious” 
(Foucault, 1977:208).  The insights offered by Foucault appear to be very germane to 
our understanding of issues of exclusion, power and knowledge – all fundamental to 
development theory and practice.  Taylor (in Hoy, 1986:92), however, argues that 
Foucault’s model lacks the “idea of liberation”, that it offers no real hope of resisting 
or overturning domination.  This criticism is only valid “if the world does indeed 
operate according to the universal values and abstract model implicit in the reformist, 
liberal political strategy” espoused by Walzer and others (Racevskis, 1993:103).  
Racevskis argues that: 
“talk of freedom is meaningless unless thought is freed from its 
philosophically, politically, and ethically imposed confinement and thus is 
given the opportunity to realize the historical contingency of the real” 
(Racevskis, 1993:103).   
 
Foucault’s great accomplishment, according to Bernauer, has been to: 
“free thought from a search for formal structures and place it in an historical 
field where it must confront the singular, contingent, and arbitrary that operate 
in what is put forward as universal, necessary, and obligatory” (Bernauer, 
1990:19). 
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Foucault’s discourse cannot claim to impose a programme or to recommend a correct 
line of action.  The value of his work is attributable to its manner of questioning itself, 
of questioning the very tradition that has given rise to it.  For Foucault there are two 
kinds of operations of knowledge: (i) one conscious, rational, visible but superficial, 
serving to promote official goals and programmes; and (ii) the other unconscious, 
unobtrusive but most influential, determining moral norms and legitimating 
epistemological principles and standards  (Rabinow, 1991; Morris & Patton, 1979; 
Scott, 1990).  What makes Foucault’s theorising effective is his ability to avoid 
ontological or essentialising notions of power.  Foucault’s work may be seen as a 
“testament to sustained critical rationality with political intent” (Rabinow, 1991:13).  
An important point to consider is that Foucault was never prescriptive.  He aimed to 
provide the tools for opposition but did not suggest who should use them, or to what 
ends.  Nevertheless, his work consistently developed and argued a theory of 
knowledge and power in discourse.  
 
Foucault’s (1977, 1979, 1980) political problematic centres on the interlinking of the 
practices and techniques of power with the production of knowledge.  As Dean puts 
it: 
“[O]ne finds in Foucault less the thesis of the mutual superimposition of 
knowledge onto power than an operating method that can pick out the fine 
stitching of many different forms of knowledge within the threads of power 
relations and organised systems of practices.  If one was to put this into a more 
general thesis it would be of the interconnection and irreducibility of 
knowledge to power and power to knowledge” (Dean, 1994:162). 
 
Foucault (1977:26-28; 1979:82-83) maintains that power is to be analysed at multiple 
points of its exercise rather than simply in terms of the historical development of state 
institutions and the language of legitimacy, law and sovereignty.   He refers to this as 
the ‘microphysics of power’ which emphasises practices of government6, and should 
be seen as productive of forces, relations and identities, rather than as manifest in 
interdiction and operating by repression and deduction (Bernauer & Rasmussen, 
1988).  Foucault’s thoughts on power and government make possible a differentiated 
analysis of forms of power relations, and an analytic of resistance to power relations.  
Rather than a theory of the state, Foucault (1980) proposes to analyse the operation of 
                                                          
6 Governmental practices problematise certain objects of knowledge (e.g. poverty) in so far as they are 
implicated in the exercise of power. 
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governmental power, the techniques and practices by which it works, and the 
rationalities and strategies invested in it.  Foucault  is concerned with the question of 
how particular types of power relations enable the state to act as a centralised, unified 
locale, and the implications of this for the conduct of life of the governed (Burchell, 
Gordon & Miller, 1991). 
 
Knowledge can be said to be dominated by the primacy of discourse.  Discursive 
relations are relations of power.  Power relations serve to make the connections 
between the visible and the ‘sayable’ (the two poles of knowledge), yet they exist 
outside these poles.  Deleuze summarises Foucault’s treatment of power in the 
following terms: 
“Power is a relation between forces, or rather every relation between forces is 
a power relation…Force is never singular but essentially exists in relation with 
other forces, such that any force is already a relation, that is to say power: 
force has no other subject or object than force…It is ‘an action upon an action, 
on existing actions, or on those which may arise in the present or in the 
future’; it is ‘a set of actions upon other actions’.  We can therefore conceive 
of a necessarily open list of variables expressing a relation between forces or 
power relation, constituting actions upon actions: to incite, to induce, to 
seduce, to make easy or difficult, to enlarge or limit, to make more or less 
probable, and so on” (Deleuze, 1986:70). 
 
Power, then, is not essentially repressive; it is not possessed, but is practised.  In 
Foucauldian terms, we should think of power not as an attribute (and ask ‘what is 
it?’), but as an exercise (and ask ‘how does it work?’).  In addition, forces have a 
capacity for resistance such that power is only exercised in relation to a resistance, 
each force having the power to affect and be affected by other forces.  For Foucault, 
resistance to power is part of the exercise of power.   
 
Power is a series of relations between forces and knowledge is a series of relations 
between forms.  Power and knowledge are mutually dependent and exist in a relation 
of interiority to each other (Foucault, 1977).  Although Foucault accords power a kind 
of primacy, power would exist without knowledge, whereas knowledge would have 
nothing to integrate without differential power relations.  Another critical aspect of 
power, and one implicated in the power-knowledge nexus, concerns subjectivity.  
This is crucial because in Foucault’s account of power the formation of subjects is 
‘part and parcel’ of power’s productivity.  Foucault (1982:208) writes: “My 
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objective…has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our 
culture, human beings are made subjects”.  Subjects’ actions take place in discourse, 
and subjects themselves are produced through discourse.  The interrelationships 
between power, knowledge and the subject are so systematic that it makes little sense 
to consider each component separately; they all condition, and form the conditions 
for, each other. 
 
The Foucauldian account of power makes sense of the emphasis in 20th century social 
theory upon ideology as the key means through which social relations of power and 
domination are sustained (Gramsci, 1971; Althusser, 1971; Hall, 1982), and the 
commonsense normalcy of mundane practices as the basis for the continuity and 
reproduction of relations of power.  Foucault has shown how modern ‘biopower’ rests 
upon technologies and techniques of power which are embedded within the mundane 
practices of social institutions (e.g. schools, asylums or prisons) and are productive of 
social subjects.   
 
A central problematic that this study grapples with is how a variety of strategies of 
power and knowledge apply themselves to the field of ICT, poverty and development.  
It is a central thesis of the present study that discourse analysis adopting the 
Foucauldian power-knowledge framework is effective because it calls for permanent 
criticism and is able to exercise perpetual vigilance and scepticism toward the claims 
of government to prescribe the meaning of ICT, poverty and development.   
 
1.6.3 Methodological Framework 
In this study the analytical framework of Foucauldian discourse analysis is used 
consistently for both the theoretical and empirical components of the research.  
Discourse analysis methodology is used to explore and unpack the discourse reflected 
in: (i) the burgeoning international ICT, poverty and development literature; (ii) the 
policy agenda of the major players in international development; and (iii) the ICT, 
poverty and development discourse of the South African government that is currently 
becoming increasingly prevalent in the national political arena.  The discourse 
analysis methodology employed in this study does not focus on purely linguistic 
approaches to discourse analysis which might, for example, focus in the first instance 
on constructions such as phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics 
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(vide Van Dijk, 1985).  Rather, the analysis presented in this study is grounded in a 
Foucauldian power-knowledge framework.  Moreover, the study draws upon 
approaches from critical theory7 and social studies of technology, and locates itself 
within the cross-disciplinary school of development studies.8   
 
Crush (1995:5) notes that “the texts of development have always been avowedly 
strategic and tactical – promoting, licensing and justifying certain interventions and 
practices, delegitimising and excluding others”.  In this study the focus is on an 
ensemble of ICT, poverty and development texts generated by government in an 
attempt to understand how the category of the ‘information-poor’ is produced and 
how this category of subjects become embedded in a particular model of 
development.  Discourse analysis involves detailed reading and rereading of the 
selected texts (i.e. government statements, speeches, policy and discussion documents 
and interview transcripts).  Two interrelated stages will be followed.  First, the search 
for patterns in the texts9, both in terms of difference and consistency; and second, 
analysing and interpreting the functions and effects of the categories identified.  To do 
this a careful coding procedure will be followed (Potter & Wetherell, 1992; Parker, 
1992; Kendall & Wickham, 1999).  In line with Billig et al. (1988), a sample of 
extracts will be presented as the clearest exemplars of the themes identified in the 
larger qualitative data set.  Recurrent themes were identified and then for each theme 
a number of extracts illustrating the theme were selected by the researcher.  In 
selecting sections of a text for analysis, the analyst looks for identifiable 
configurations of discursive practice consisting of discrete, unique utterances, or 
phrases within a particular ‘order of discourse’10, i.e. ICTs for poverty reduction.  
Order of discourse refers to a relatively stabilised configuration of discourse practices 
(Fairclough, 1993:138).  The aim here is to organise an unwieldy body of discourse 
into manageable passages of text on the basis of the following themes: 
                                                          
7 The term critical theory is used here in a generic sense for any theory concerned with critique of 
ideology and the effects of domination, and not specifically for the critical theory of the Frankfurt 
School. 
8 Development studies is concerned with policy-relevant research and is cross-disciplinary in nature, 
the core disciplines of which are economics, anthropology, sociology, geography and political science.  
In essence, development studies is dedicated to understanding problems of poverty and inequality 
within local communities, national political and economic systems and in the international system. 
9 The term ‘text’ is used here to refer to both written texts and transcripts of spoken interaction 
(Fairclough, 1995a). 
10 To use Fairclough’s (1995a:10) phrase. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
The types of information and knowledge that are valued in the ICT, poverty and 
development discourse; 
The expected benefits of ICTs for reducing poverty and inequality; 
The subjects of development in the ICT for development discourse; these subjects 
are usually referred to as the ‘information-poor’ in the discourse; and 
The model of development advocated as well as the developmental outcome of the 
ICT policies. 
 
The discourse analysis literature points to certain issues of validation that need to be 
considered when conducting such an analysis.  First, the analysis should provide a 
sense of the coherence of the texts, letting the reader see how the discourse fits 
together and how it functions and produces effects  (Potter & Wetherell, 1992).  
Second, the focus should be on the definitions or meanings of terms as used within the 
texts, rather than assuming standard dictionary definitions.  This allows the analysis to 
make evident the categories that are being produced within the discourse itself.  Third, 
the analysis should not only solve problems, but also create new ones as new ways of 
understanding an issue emerge.  As such, the analysis should attempt to form a base 
for the generation of novel explanations and understandings (Potter, 1996; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1992; Parker, 1989, 1992; Potter & Gergen,1989).   
 
Crush (1995:3) notes that the “discourse of development, the forms in which it makes 
its arguments and establishes authority, the manner in which it constructs the world, 
are usually seen as self-evident and unworthy of attention”.  Similarly, Ferguson 
(1990:xiv) states that, “like ‘goodness’ itself, ‘development’ in our time is a value so 
firmly entrenched that it seems almost impossible to question it, or to refer it to any 
standard beyond its own”.  The methodological gain of approaching such issues from 
a power-knowledge framework, using discourse analysis, is to add a level of 
reflexivity to development studies, and in this way to open the politics of development 
to a more profound engagement, and potentially to reopen alternatives to the current 
development paradigm (Banuri, 1990a, b; Nederveen-Pieterse, 1998, 2001).   
 
However, based as it is on an ontology of the social world as discursively constructed, 
such an approach risks an avoidance of real issues of power and exploitation.  It may 
divert attention from relations ‘on the ground’.  In that case, we risk slipping from 
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determinism into discursivism, i.e. reading too much into texts and overrating the 
importance of discourse analysis.  Such critiques have also been advanced against 
Foucault’s theory itself, not only when used in the more applied field of development 
studies (Titscher et al., 2000).  If we assume, following Foucault, that all social 
relations are power relations producing various regimes of truth, how are we to 
choose between one form of society and another? (Sarup, 1992).  Foucault claims 
that, rather than attempting to provide ‘solutions’ or simply another regime of truth, 
we should direct our attentions at deconstructing what is and make evident the 
conditions of possibility for the present organisation and understandings of society.  
He states that:  
“critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this 
then is what needs to be done.  It should be an instrument for those who fight, 
those who resist and refuse what is.  Its use should be in processes of conflict 
and confrontation, essays in refusal.  It doesn’t have to lay down the law for 
the law.  It isn’t a stage in programming.  It is a challenge directed to what is” 
(Foucault, 1991:84).   
 
We may wonder how such a stance could facilitate the emergence of an alternative 
imaginary of development to that of the dominant Western, developed-world cultural 
parochialism.  From the perspective of development studies, or perhaps we should say 
a concern about relations of exploitation and for those living in poverty, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to argue for the value of such a discursive approach when taken 
to its logical conclusion as exemplified in Foucault’s quote above.  However, it is still 
possible to make use of the methodology to challenge what is given, to problematise 
development practices, which have failed to improve the lives of the world’s poor.  
Nicos Poulantzas (described by Sarup, 1992) does this by arguing for an 
understanding of Foucault’s work as offering theories of specific techniques of power 
operating in specific circumstances, but he rejects the more general theoretical project 
and the problems of extreme discursivism that Foucault’s work embodies.  Similarly, 
Nederveen-Pieterse (2001) argues that we need to employ a variety of approaches in 
an attempt to understand development and to propose alternatives to the dominant 
binary model: 
“Development is too complex to allow partial approaches to have their 
way…to be precise, development is struggle over the shapes of futures, a 
dramatic and complex struggle” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2001:xii). 
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This is the position that will be adopted in the dissertation.  Foucault’s methodology 
will be used to problematise the ICT, poverty and development discourse as a means 
of understanding the production of particular types of subjects and the development 
models into which they are inserted.  Following Nederveen-Pieterse (2001), it has 
been assumed that the reflexivity facilitated through this methodology must be 
politically enabling and so reconstruction must accompany deconstruction11: 
“Reconstructions are ways ahead, contextual and time bound, forward options.  
In time they will yield another set of deconstructions and by then other 
reconstructions will emerge, which is the way of things” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 
2001:xii). 
 
The argument presented in the dissertation will draw on the theoretical work of 
Michel Foucault, but will resist the extreme focus on textuality that this position can 
imply.  As such the argument will embody both deconstructions and reconstructions.  
The radical challenge is to rethink the categories of the ICT, poverty and development 
discourse, in order that ICTs might be appropriated in ways capable of subverting the 
current hierarchical structure and to allow, pace Tucker (1999:1), the “alternatives 
that human ingenuity is capable of imagining and implementing” to emerge.  This is 
an open-ended political agenda, involving both action and inquiry and implies a shift 
in focus away from simple unlinear development processes, to an embracing of 
complexity, diversity and development as a multifaceted process with a variety of 
potential outcomes. 
 
The texts for the discourse analysis were drawn from two sources: (i) government 
media releases, speeches by government officials, and policy and discussion 
documents relating to the theme of ICT, poverty and development (see Appendix 2); 
and (ii) interview transcripts.  For the latter the researcher conducted 18 semi-
structured, one-on-one personal interviews with senior government officials (see 
Appendix 1 for the questionnaire that was used).  Three interviews were conducted 
with senior civil servants from each of the following six national government 
departments: (i) Department of Communications (DoC); (ii) Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI); (iii) Department of Public Services and Administration (DPSA); (iv) 
                                                          
11 Deconstruction emerged from structuralism as part of the post-structuralist package of critical work 
on texts (Derrida, 1976, 1983).  Deconstruction is used to reframe (even subversively) the dominant 
concepts in a discourse (vide Parker, 1988; Sampson, 1989; Shotter & Gergen, 1989; Parker & Shotter, 
1990). 
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Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) department; (v) 
Department of Science and Technology (DST); and (vi) State Information 
Technology Agency (SITA).  These six departments were targeted for interviews 
because they have a clear stake in national ICT policy, and are regarded as the major 
players in the ICT, poverty and development policy debate.   
 
The qualitative research interview was used as one method of data generation 
(Bewley, 2002).  The appropriate style for interviewing depends to some extent on the 
goal of the study.  For this study a less structured style was adopted with a view to 
allowing the interviewee the freedom to describe and explain government policy on 
ICT, poverty and development.  Random, statistical criteria were not employed for 
selecting interviewees, because it was deemed to be inappropriate for a qualitative 
study of this kind, where the pool of potential interviewees is limited.  Since the 
researcher has conducted research in government before and has extensive research 
experience in the field of ICTs and public policy, he used his experience and network 
of contacts to identify (and secure interviews with) senior government officials who: 
(i) are working in critical national government departments; and (ii) are very 
knowledgeable about the topic under investigation. 
 
Since discretion was absolutely vital, interviews were not tape-recorded; instead 
handwritten notes were taken.  A tape recorder would have seriously inhibited 
interviewees and would have resulted in the majority of officials refusing to 
participate in the study.  All interviewees were promised confidentiality.  Revealing 
the interviewees’ names and positions would compromise confidentiality, and would 
jeopardise the reputation of the researcher.  It was understood that interviewees could 
refuse to answer questions if they so desired.   
 
The current of discourse theory pursued in this study makes overt use of Foucault’s 
(1972, 1980) descriptions of discourse and the power-knowledge framework.  For 
Fowler discourse analysis means: 
“a careful analytic interrogation of the ideological categories, and the roles and 
institutions…through which a society constitutes and maintains itself and the 
consciousness of its members…All knowledge, all objects, are constructs: 
criticism analyses the processes of construction and, acknowledging the 
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artificial quality of the categories concerned, offers the possibility that we 
might profitably conceive the world in some alternate way” (Fowler, 1996:3). 
 
The purpose of the study is to identify and analyse a set of salient themes which will 
provide an organising framework for making sense of government’s discourse on 
ICT, poverty and development.  Essentially, the study aims to interrogate and 
deconstruct the intellectual and epistemological foundations of the South African 
government’s ICTs for development discourse.  In this study the texts used for 
analysis include: (i) already available texts, which are in the public domain; as well as 
(ii) texts generated during interviews with senior government officials.  Policy texts 
can be interpreted in many different ways.  Policy texts might be accepted as 
‘straightforward’ and the messages they convey taken as facts rather than rhetorical 
statements.  The ‘preferred reading’ embedded within policy texts encourages us to 
think of policies as generally ‘good’.  The goal of this study, however, is to develop a 
critical understanding of government’s ICT policies, highlighting challenges, tensions 
and possible problems inherent in them. 
 
The texts were scanned for themes and these were analysed.  Sections or extracts 
within the collected material (the corpus of texts) were then selected for assessment, 
in line with the overall aims of the study.  The units of analysis consisted of a textual 
passage or extract (which may be a single word, a phrase, a sentence or a group of 
sentences, or some other unit of ‘talk’) from one or more texts, which illustrates a 
particular theme (e.g. technological determinism, ‘digital divide’, ‘information 
poverty’, ‘information society’, etc.) that is central to the study.  Since in text analysis 
it is always relevant categories within a text that are analysed, the unit of analysis is 
that unit which seems, to the researcher, to be relevant for the particular text as a unit 
to be investigated.   
 
Discourse analysis should become a variant of action research, in which the internal 
system of any discourse and its relation to others is challenged.  It alters, and so 
permits, different spaces for manoeuvre and resistance.  The goal of this study is to: 
(i) understand and interpret the South African government’s discourse on ICT, 
poverty and development; (ii) provide a critique of the ideology in the which the ICTs 
for development discourse is grounded; and (iii) identify and develop arguments 
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around a number of concepts, themes and theories that are germane to the South 
African government’s ICT, poverty and development discourse.  The main concern is 
to reveal power relations and other political and social elements of asymmetry 
(Wetherell, 1998; Mey, 2001).  A critical orientation is not meant to be merely 
deconstructive; reconstructing social arrangements is also a goal. 
 
1.7 Impact 
Research on ICT, poverty and development, using the discourse analysis 
methodology, is uncharted territory in South Africa and internationally.  There is a 
dearth of literature that offers critical perspectives on the underlying discourse in the 
‘information society’ and development debate.  Therefore, by tracing the links 
between various positions on the role of ICTs in development, and broader debates on 
development, knowledge and power, the dissertation makes an original contribution in 
the field of ICT, poverty and development.  Hence, the research is likely to have an 
impact on government departments, aid agencies, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and academics who are involved in work on ICT, poverty and development.   
 
The research challenges the received wisdom of mainstream development theory and 
practice by arguing that the potential to use ICTs for meaningful, equitable 
development will not be achieved if a unlinear model of change and progress is used, 
which is based on the assumption that ‘underdevelopment’ is a function of knowledge 
deficiency.  The recipe of development through information delivered via ICTs sits 
comfortably within a long tradition in Western thought that seeks the solution of the 
worlds ills - and ultimately, salvation - in technological breakthroughs (Noble, 1997; 
Wertheim, 1999).  However, these usually fail to deliver because we fail to recognise 
that ‘relations of power’ tend to direct the benefits of new technologies to the already 
privileged.  Rather, understandings of ICTs must be locally situated, the socio-
technical system in which ICTs are being used clearly understood and creativity 
encouraged, thus allowing ICTs in context to become revealing of new possibilities.  
Such a focus, it is hoped, will enable us to think differently and creatively in order to 
make the best and most appropriate use of the ICT resources that now exist without 
assuming that there is necessarily a universally applicable development model for 
doing this.   
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The knowledge-power nexus employed in this research debunks development models 
framed by modernisation theory by arguing that simple claims about the links 
between ICTs and progress are not correct - and in some cases may be dangerously 
wrong.  An important contribution of this research is that it aims to gain a reflexive 
understanding of the relationship between ICT, poverty and development.  It is 
envisioned that this would make evident areas of research to be pursued in the future 
and thus serve to highlight certain issues that are important if we hope to make the 
best use of ICTs for development in South Africa.  The dissertation will present an 
original framework for rethinking ICT, poverty and development, and will provide a 
set of guidelines for ICT (and for information) use in poverty alleviation work in 
South Africa. 
 
The research calls into question the current static view of knowledge and power in the 
ICT, poverty and development debate.  By employing Foucault’s power-knowledge 
complex, we add a different dimension to the debate.  By analysing the forces at work 
in a field of power and knowledge, we open up possibilities for re-conceptualising the 
potential of ICTs for social justice, distributional equity and poverty alleviation. 
 
1.8 Structure of the Dissertation 
The structure of the dissertation is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 reflexively discusses the dominant meta-theories of development and 
presents a schematic overview of new perspectives and middle-range theories in 
development.  Further, we subject the notion of ‘poverty’ and ‘development’ to 
discursive analysis.  This has been approached from the perspective of a Foucauldian 
power-knowledge framework.  We then critically engage with the post-structuralist 
critique of development.   
 
Chapter 3 focuses on theories and explanations of the concept of the ‘information 
society’, and the understanding of technology as socially located rather than a neutral 
tool.  In addition, we provide a critique of Manuel Castells’s conception of the 
‘Network Society’ and the rise of the ‘Fourth World’.   
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Chapter 4 provides an overview of the ICT, poverty and development literature, with 
a view to identifying and critiquing the main themes underlying it, as well as 
explaining its ideological underpinnings.  Apart from exploring the complex links 
between ICT, poverty and development, we will also review international trends in 
ICTs for development. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a historical overview of government-led ICT initiatives and 
policies in South Africa since 1994 and an outline of the institutional mechanisms and 
structures that were put in place to implement policy.   
 
In Chapter 6 government’s ICT policies and discussion documents, as well as 
interview transcripts, are subjected to critical discourse analysis.  The purpose of this 
is to deconstruct government’s ICT, poverty and development discourse apropos a 
number of dominant themes, by grounding it in a Foucauldian power-knowledge 
framework. 
 
Chapter 7 attempts to create a framework for re-framing the ICT, poverty and 
development discourse in South Africa.  The challenge is to find ways of using this 
technology for locally-led and socially embedded learning and change processes that 
recognise the agency of the subjects of development.  Further, we discuss the key 
policy issues for the South African government if it is to engage with the radical 
challenge of rethinking the categories of the development discourse, with a particular 
focus on ICTs for reducing poverty and inequality, in order that ICTs might be 
appropriated in ways capable of subverting the current hierarchical structure and 
promoting equitable, pro-poor development.   
 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the study.  This chapter summarises the main empirical 
and theoretical results emanating from the study and recommends a number of areas 
for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Theories of Development and ‘Development as Discourse’ 
 
2.1 Development Theories 
In this section we briefly explore the recent historical and intellectual evolution in 
scholarly thinking about theories of development.  We will briefly provide a historical 
review of the major, and often competing, theoretical approaches that have dominated 
development studies, starting with classic development theories informed by the 
‘development project’ of the Cold War.  The objective is neither to be comprehensive, 
nor is it to offer a critical assessment of the major theories of development.12  Rather, 
we argue that development theories have ethical and value dimensions and can benefit 
from explicit discourse analysis.  Indeed, as is well known, the rise of development 
studies in the social sciences was as much a political as a scholarly affair.   
 
Development has long been equated with modernisation and Westernisation and 
studied as a straightforward economic growth issue (Escobar, 1995a).  In this sense 
development is usually identified as the processes of economic growth, 
industrialisation and modernisation that result in a society achieving a high per capita 
GDP (Apter, 1967).  Goulet explains the origins of managed Third World 
development as an ‘industry’ and the notion of the West as a blueprint or model for 
Third World development: 
“[D]evelopment, as a vision of a better life and a process of deliberate change 
to attain it, emerge[d] after World War II as a universal national goal.  
Europe’s reconstruction with Marshall Plan aid made it seem that rapid 
development could also be gained in the Third World through a massive 
infusion of financial and technological resources, and the transfer of 
institutional models and dynamic ideas from rich to poor countries” (Goulet, 
1996:1). 
 
It is, therefore, not surprising when Brett (2000:4) states that “developmental 
programmes have failed more often than they have succeeded” primarily because of 
the imposition of inappropriate external models, and when Streeten (1994:13) asserts 
                                                          
12 For a more comprehensive review of the history of development theory, the reader is referred to 
Booth (1985); Toye (1987); Hettne (1995); Brohman (1996); Dickenson et al. (1996); Cowen & 
Shenton (1996); Leys (1996); Preston (1996); Schuurman (1993a); Todaro, (2000); and Streeten 
(1995). 
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that “it is development itself that interferes with human development”.  Similarly, 
Goulet (1971) argued that so-called ‘development’, owing to its costs in human 
suffering and loss of meaning, can amount to anti-development.  He argued that 
development needs to be redefined, demystified and thrust into the arena of moral 
debate (Goulet, 1971:xix). 
 
Development implied the spread and consolidation of a capitalist economy and 
society into the underdeveloped regions.  The unproblematised assumption was that 
capitalism would generate development.  The relationship between intellectual 
production and actual power relations and political projects was never more clear than 
in modernisation theory (Gendzier, 1985).  It guided the thinking of Western 
governments, international development agencies and many policy-makers in the 
Third World.  The post-structural turn in European philosophy and social science in 
the 1970s had by the 1990s influenced development theory and research in a major 
way, under the various appellations of post-structuralism, post-modernism, post-
developmentalism and post-colonialism (Escobar, 1995a; Sachs, 1992; Kincaid & 
Portes, 1994).  The post-structuralist school is discussed in Section 2.1.3. 
 
2.1.1 Classic Development Theories 
Early economic development theory13 was but merely an extension of conventional 
economic theory which equated ‘development’ with growth and industrialisation.  As 
a result, Latin American, Asian and African countries were seen mostly as 
‘underdeveloped’ countries, i.e. ‘primitive’ versions of European nations that could, 
in time, ‘develop’ the institutions and standards of living of Europe and North 
America.  As a result the ‘stage theory’ mentality of economic development 
dominated discussions of economic development.  As later made famous by 
Alexander Gerschenkron (1966) and, more crudely, Walt W. Rostow (1956), the stage 
theories argued that all countries passed through the same historical stages of 
economic development and that current underdeveloped countries were merely at an 
earlier stage in this linear historical progress, while First World (European and North 
American) nations were at a later stage.   
                                                          
13 Early development theorists included economists such as Bert Hoselitz (1952), Simon Kuznets 
(1954), W. Arthur Lewis (1954) and Hla Myint (1967). 
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More enlightened attempts to arrive at an empirical definition of the concept of 
‘underdevelopment’, as exemplified by the work of Hollis Chenery (1960), Simon 
Kuznets (1954) and Irma Adelman (1961), led to the general conclusion that, while 
there were not explicit ‘linear stages’, countries tended nonetheless to exhibit similar 
patterns of development, although some differences could and did persist.  The task of 
the development economist, in this light, was to suggest ‘short cuts’ by which 
underdeveloped countries might ‘catch up’ with the developed and leapfrog over 
stages. 
 
By equating development with output growth, early development theorists, prompted 
by Ragnar Nurkse (1953), identified capital formation as the crucial component to 
accelerate development.  The celebrated early work on the ‘dual economy’ by W. 
Arthur Lewis (1954) stressed the role of savings in development.  Although capital 
formation never really left the field, the meaning of the term mutated somewhat over 
time.  T.W. Schultz (1961), drawing upon his famous Chicago School thesis, turned 
away from physical capital accumulation to emphasise the need for ‘human capital’ 
formation.  W. Arthur Lewis (1964) and Hans Singer (1998) extended Schultz’s 
(1961) thesis by arguing that social development as a whole (notably education, 
health, etc.), by improving human capital, were also necessary prerequisites for 
growth.  In this view industrialisation, if it came at the cost of social development, 
could never be self-sustaining.  However, it was really only in 1969 that Dudley Seers 
(1969) finally broke the growth ‘stranglehold’ in development theory.  Development, 
he argued, was a social phenomenon that involved more than increasing per capita 
output.  Development meant, in Seers’s (1969) opinion, eliminating poverty, 
unemployment and inequality as well.  As the world environmental crisis became 
evident in the 1980s, this debate took a new twist as the very sustainability of 
economic development was questioned (see Section 2.1.2.4). 
 
Economists such as Albert Hirschmann (1958) became disillusioned with ‘stages of 
growth’ reasoning and stressed the need for country-specific analyses of development.  
Further, a ‘structuralist’ thesis began to germinate, which called attention to the 
distinct structural problems of Third World countries.  One of these distinctive 
features was that, unlike the process of European industrialisation, Third World 
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industrialisation was supposed to occur while these countries existed alongside 
already industrialised Western countries and were tied to them by trade. 
 
The Latin American economist, Raúl Prebisch (1959, 1963), formulated the famous 
dependency theory of economic development, wherein he argued that the world had 
developed into a ‘centre-periphery’ relationship among nations.  The Third World was 
regressing into becoming the producer of raw materials for First World manufacturers 
and were thus condemned to a peripheral and dependent role in the world economy.  
Dependency theory (and the later world-systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein 
[1987] which subsumed the dependency paradigm) shifted the focus from culture and 
alleged national character as explanations of underdevelopment to structural forces 
shaped over time by the dynamics of the world economy.  In contradistinction to the 
dualism of modernisation theory, the appropriate unit of analysis became the larger 
capitalist world system and its historical formation. 
 
A radical version of the theory espoused by neo-Marxian economists such as Samir 
Amin (1976) and André Gunder Frank (1967) argued that poor countries exiled to the 
periphery of the world economy could not develop as long as they remained enslaved 
by the rich nations of the hegemonic centre.  The only solution was to de-link 
completely from the world economy.14  The milder version of dependency, pioneered 
by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979), was 
more useful.  Cardoso and Faletto (1979) maintained that under capitalism both rich 
and poor countries could grow but would not benefit equally.  As advocated by the 
UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), this version was a mixture of 
protectionism and Keynesianism that became known as import substituting 
industrialisation (ISI).  Behind a tariff wall, with generous state subsidies, an active 
fiscal policy and a certain degree of central planning, poor countries could lessen their 
dependency on the centre and develop autonomously.   
 
Dependency theory’s tendency towards teleological and functionalist explanation, the 
rigid state structuralism associated with the model, its zero-sum realist interpretation 
of world political and economic dynamics and development potential, and its inability 
                                                          
14 Only Albania and North Korea attempted the policy of de-linking from the world economy, with 
(predictable) adverse consequences. 
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to explain more recent changes under globalisation, represent major limitations.  
Although there were some periods of rapid growth in countries such as Mexico and 
Brazil, even the most ardent advocates of ISI came to recognise that the policy was 
not the panacea they had claimed it to be.   
 
In response a neo-liberal countermovement initiated by, inter alia, I.M.D. Little 
(1982), Deepak Lal (2000), Bela Balassa (1981) and Anne Krueger (1990) began to 
gain adherents.  Neo-liberalism is a doctrine of laissez-faire capitalism grounded in 
neo-classical economic theory, and the assumptions of monetarism, modernisation 
theory and the doctrine of comparative advantage, legitimated by the globalist rhetoric 
of free trade, growth, efficiency and prosperity (Sachs, 1989; Williamson, 1990).  
Development is generally defined as economic globalisation.15  Put simply, neo-
liberals have developed a negative view of state action and the political process.   
 
The neo-classical counterrevolution school argued that the emergence of huge 
bureaucracies, state regulations and ‘bad’ economic policies have suffocated private 
investment and distorted prices making developing economies extremely inefficient 
(Krueger, 1974; Balassa, 1982).16  The ills of unbalanced growth, dependency, 
poverty, etc. were all ascribed to the dirigiste policies of Third World governments 
(Bhagwati, 1979).  To remedy this situation ‘structural adjustment’ was promoted, 
which included privatising state-owned enterprises; promoting free trade and export 
expansion; welcoming investors from developed countries; and eliminating 
government deficits, price distortions (in factor, product and financial markets) and 
over-valued exchange rates (Bauer, 1984; Lal, 2000).  By the early 1990s neo-
liberalism had become a hegemonic ideology of development encapsulated in the so-
called ‘Washington consensus’ on the virtues of free markets and globalisation 
(Williamson, 1993). 
 
There are five major weaknesses with the neo-liberal paradigm.  First, “the usual 
understanding of a dichotomy between the state and globalization is an illusion, as the 
                                                          
15 Interestingly, both neo-Marxian structuralists and neo-liberals point to fast East Asian development 
and the disastrous African experience as proof of their directly opposing theses (Wade & Veneroso, 
1998). 
16 This is in stark contrast to dependency theorists who regarded underdevelopment as an externally 
induced phenomenon. 
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processes of global restructuring are largely embedded within state structures and 
institutions, politically contingent on policies and actions, and primarily about the 
reorganisation of the state” (Amoore et al., 1997:186)  .  The point being made here is 
that the state is actually at the very heart of the politics of globalisation and as such 
the state can play a positive role in the development process.  The ‘bringing the state 
back in’ literature of the 1980s (see Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985), for 
example, characterised states as independent actors in themselves and placed 
geopolitics at the centre of analysis.  The state’s ability to perform a positive role, 
however, is not guaranteed by definition but depends on its organisational 
characteristics including, inter alia, the quality of its personnel, the degree of its 
internal cohesion and the degree of its autonomy or insulation from rent-seeking 
pressures (Jessop et al., 1991).  Second, neo-liberals overemphasise competition and 
trade liberalisation at the expense of human capital formation and investment in 
physical infrastructure (Toye, 1987).  Third, there are many areas in which the 
operations of ‘free markets’ are flawed by asymmetric control of information (Stiglitz, 
1998).  This points to the importance of institutions and social norms in shaping 
market outcomes.  This, in turn, justifies social and governmental action at both the 
micro and macro levels, and opens the way to a more explicitly normative theory of 
development.   
 
Fourth, many developing countries are so different in structure and organisation from 
their Western counterparts that the behavioural assumptions and policy precepts of 
traditional neo-classical theory are questionable and often incorrect.  Competitive 
markets simply do not exist, nor, given the institutional, cultural and historical context 
of many developing countries, would they necessarily be desirable from a long-term 
economic and social perspective (Önis, 1995).  Fifth, there is no unique path for 
development in terms of specific policies or institutions.  There are a variety of paths 
depending on the country’s initial characteristics, its ideological and cultural heritage, 
plus a number of other factors.  Hence, to propose a universal formula for success as 
neo-liberals do is certainly not warranted (Portes, 1997). 
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2.1.1.1 The East Asian Model 
Scholars (Evans, 1987; Wade, 1990; Gore, 1996) have long debated the causes of the 
spectacular economic success achieved by the East Asian newly industrialising 
countries (NICs) (i.e. Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore), as well as 
the lessons that other developing countries can learn from this development 
experience.  The World Bank and neo-liberal economists have argued that the main 
lesson to be learnt from the East Asian NICs is that free markets, free trade and an 
export-oriented development strategy are the key to economic success (Krueger, 
1985; Balassa, 1989).  Thus countries which had pursued protectionism and ISI 
policies came in for heavy criticism from the World Bank, IMF and advocates of neo-
liberal economic policies (Krueger, 1985; Balassa, 1989; Lal, 2000; Corbo, Krueger 
& Ossa, 1985).  This has generated many debates and the neo-liberal interpretations 
of the NICs’ economic success has been challenged and shown to be flawed (Toye, 
1987; Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1994).  It is now generally accepted that the success of 
the NICs was largely a result of the crucial role played by the state, which also at 
times involved selective protectionist policies (Wade, 1988; Gore, 1996).  Even the 
World Bank (1993) has come to admit, albeit reluctantly, that the state was heavily 
involved in the NICs’ development process.  Thus the key developmental issue is not 
‘getting prices right’ as argued by neo-liberal policy-makers but getting ‘statecraft’ 
right (Dietz & James, 1990). 
 
Wade (1990, 1996) argues, convincingly in our view, that the remarkable success of 
the East Asian dragons in bringing about rapid economic growth was not due to their 
pursuit of ‘free market’ policies per se, as claimed by the World Bank, but rather the 
innovative ‘governing and co-ordination’ of the market by the ‘developmental’ state.  
Thus, the state played a central role in determining the path of development that was 
followed.  Despite a strong export orientation, the East Asian economies were not 
from their early stages of development fully integrated with the world economy.17  
Rather, integration was strategic, tailored to specific sectoral needs and their level of 
                                                          
17 South-East Asian economies such as Malaysia are much more open in terms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and other capital inflows than the East Asian NICs.  Malaysia, for example, has 
adopted a much less demanding policy regime, which relies less on interventionist industrial policies 
and more on conservative macroeconomic management, as well as liberal trade and FDI policies.  On 
these grounds the South-East Asian model is often recommended to other developing countries as 
easier to imitate (World Bank, 1993). 
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industrial and economic development, and sequenced accordingly.  Moreover, 
strategic integration was not only confined to trade relations but also extended to 
technology transfer.  Government policy had a major influence in sectors such as 
electronics: (i) promoting joint ventures; (ii) screening imported technologies; (iii) 
bargaining over local content agreements; and (iv) in the process firmly embedding 
MNCs in a national industrialisation strategy. 
 
In 1997, however, the East Asian ‘miracle’ economies, with an acknowledged record 
of economic success, suddenly and simultaneously suffered an extraordinary reversal 
that justifies the term ‘economic meltdown’.  The World Bank (1991) ascribed the 
crisis to excessive government intervention.  The irony is that when these countries 
were successful, the model was interpreted by the World Bank and IMF as one of a 
minimalist state in which the government provided only the overall framework for 
private enterprise to flourish.  The World Bank and the US Treasury argued that close 
government-business relations led to ‘crony capitalism’ and lack of transparency, 
which in turn led to excessive investment in unprofitable or marginal projects (Kay, 
2002).  In essence the neo-liberal argument claimed that the underlying model of 
‘guided capitalism’ bred complacency, cronyism and corruption (Singh & Weisse, 
1999).  Hence, as a condition for the multi-billion dollar bailout packages, the IMF 
requested fundamental reforms in their economic systems to eradicate market 
‘rigidities’ and ‘heavy’ state intervention (Wade, 1998). 
 
Although there was a close, consultative relationship between government, business 
and the financial system, an important characteristic which distinguished the East 
Asian model from other dirigiste states was that the government provided assistance 
to the corporations only in return for adherence to strict performance standards 
(Amsden, 1989; Amsden & Singh, 1994).  Further, the East Asian governments have 
sought not ‘close’ but what might be called ‘strategic’ integration with the world 
economy, i.e. they have integrated up to the point where it has been useful for them to 
do so.  For example, during its high growth, developmental phases, South Korea 
(1970s and 1980s) integrated with the world economy in relation to exports, but not 
imports; with respect to science and technology but not finance and multinational 
investment (Chakravarty & Singh, 1988).   
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Korean business conglomerates (Chaebol) were used as a vehicle for government’s 
drive for rapid industrialisation and technological catch-up.  In effect the Korean 
government was willing to share risks with the enterprise.  In his seminal work  
Williamson (1975) pointed out that the internal allocation of capital by conglomerates 
may in many circumstances be more efficient than an external capital market.  The 
latter is often subject to speculation, asymmetric information and myriad other market 
inefficiencies.  However, financial liberalisation of the mid-1990s fundamentally 
changed the Korean economic system (Wade, 1998).  High debt/equity ratios without 
the government’s active involvement in risk taking made the corporate system fragile.  
Furthermore, it was accentuated by the fact that not only was overt government 
control over corporate borrowings (particularly abroad) and investment abandoned, it 
was not replaced by adequate prudential regulation.  Thus the crisis has arisen in large 
measure through financial liberalisation that involved the abandonment of the 
essential tenets of the East Asian model of development. 
 
2.1.2 New Perspectives 
A myriad of new perspectives and middle-range theories (as opposed to meta-
theories) emerged in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  However important feminist, basic 
needs and ‘voices of the poor’ (bottom-up) approaches are to development, they do 
not in themselves constitute new development paradigms.  Rather, they draw on one 
or a combination of meta-theories in the social sciences.   
 
2.1.2.1 Human Development 
There was a growing realisation that the ‘human’ dimension of development was 
being neglected at the expense of growth.  The ILO summarised the position:  
“[I]t has become increasingly evident, particularly from the experience of the 
developing countries, that rapid growth at the national level does not 
automatically reduce poverty or inequality or provide sufficient productive 
employment” (ILO, 1976:15). 
 
Dissatisfaction with the pace and direction of economic growth, and with the severe 
problems of social inequity, increasing poverty and dualism in the economies of 
developing countries, led development planners to re-examine strategies emphasizing 
capital-intensive, export-oriented industrialisation (EOI).  From the 1970s the ‘growth 
maximization and trickle down’ agenda was challenged on a number of fronts: 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The inappropriateness of the GDP as the primary indicator of development (Seers, 
1983); 
Employment objective: various ILO missions (e.g. to Colombia, Kenya and Sri 
Lanka)  led by Dudley Seers (1983) in the 1970s, stressed the need to look to the 
traditional, rural areas for expanded employment opportunities; 
The importance of integrated rural development planning (World Bank, 1975; 
USAID, 1974); 
‘Redistribution with growth’ advocates (Chenery et al., 1974); 
The ‘basic needs’ school (ILO, 1976; Streeten et al., 1981); 
Amartya Sen’s (1999) ‘capabilities’ approach; 
Human development approach (UNDP, 1990); 
‘Voices of the poor’ school (Chambers, 1983). 
 
A reappraisal of the mainstream development paradigm led to the emergence of a 
populist ‘voices of the poor’ school.  It originated from a number of different sources 
which increasingly converged during the late 1970s (Watts, 1993).  In essence it 
entailed a rejection of the classic, top-down, technocratic, and state-led model of 
technology transfer.  There was a realisation that the previous models were not 
working and development should be promoted by alternative approaches.  A strong 
case was made that knowledge about poverty should focus on the understandings of 
poor people and the concepts that they utilise.  This approach has, in the main, been 
associated with the work (i.e. participatory rural appraisal and rapid rural appraisal) of 
Robert Chambers (1983, 1999).  Chambers (1999) poses the question “Whose reality 
counts?” and advocates the position that much more emphasis must be given to the 
perspectives and understandings of poor people themselves in international 
development.   
 
The ‘basic needs’ school, on the other hand, argued that the poor need access to a 
bundle of essential goods and services to overcome basic deficiencies in their 
standards of living and to satisfy their ‘basic human needs’ (ILO, 1976; Streeten et 
al., 1981).  This strategy is concerned with meeting the needs of the poor as a 
legitimate goal per se, aside from its contribution to productivity; and it emphasises 
the restructuring of production so that the poor have greater access to basic goods and 
services despite their disadvantages in the market.  Education, nutrition, health, 
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sanitation and employment for the poor were the central components of this approach, 
reflecting an acknowledgement that the benefits of development did not necessarily 
‘trickle down’ to those who needed them most (Stewart, 1985; Streeten, 1984).  The 
success of China and Cuba provided evidence that basic needs approaches could be 
effective in alleviating or eliminating absolute poverty.  They provided less 
impressive evidence, however, that basic needs strategies could, alone, increase 
productivity or stimulate economic growth (Paine, 1976; Lee, 1977). 
 
Building on Streeten’s (1984) basic human needs strategy, Sen (1999:76-85) argues 
that the goal of development is to expand people’s ‘capability’ to do things that they 
value.  Sen (1985) puts forward a view of poverty which derives from the idea of 
failure to be able to take a full part in human society, but which sees this as a matter 
of lack of choice or capability rather than simply material living standards.  Capability 
refers to a person’s or group’s freedom to promote or achieve valuable ‘functionings’.  
Functioning relates to the achievement of a person, such as being literate, being 
nourished, etc.  Capability, on the other hand, is the person’s ability to achieve 
valuable functioning (Sen, 1984:497).  Sen (1992:42-46) states that the selection of 
capabilities on which to focus is a value judgment that is to be made explicitly and in 
many cases through a process of public debate.  In these terms development means 
not just combating or ameliorating poverty, but restoring or enhancing basic human 
capabilities and freedoms.  By redefining the space for assessing development in 
terms of capabilities, Sen critiques the conventional conceptualisation and 
measurement of development.  In doing so the capability approach brings a theory of 
‘value’ and ‘ethics’ for assessing human well-being and deprivation. 
 
The focus on equity and on ‘basic needs’ inspired the UNDP (1990) to focus on 
human development and the creation of the Human Development Index (HDI), which 
combines life expectancy, adult literacy, health and education measures together with 
per capita GDP to calculate an overall index of development success.  The objective 
of this was to put people at the centre of development, not incomes: 
“[P]eople are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of development 
is to create an enabling environment for people to live long, healthy and 
creative lives…Human development is a process of enlarging people’s 
choices.  The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be 
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educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Additional choices include 
political freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respect” (UNDP, 1990:1).   
 
In terms of the UNDP’s approach, human development concerns widening human 
choices, while incomes are merely a means, not an end in themselves.  Further, there 
are many paths to human development success including: poverty-reducing growth, 
equitable distribution of income and well-targeted social expenditures. 
 
As a result of the failure of the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) stabilisation policies, UNICEF 
called for ‘Adjustment with a Human Face’ (Cornia, Jolly & Stewart, 1987).  The 
UNICEF study: (i) draws on 10 country case studies and UNICEF experience to 
illustrate the severity of the debt crisis and point to ways to avoid or alleviate the ill-
effects of economic adjustment on vulnerable groups; and (ii) addresses, as its main 
issue, the question of how economic growth translates, or fails to translate, into 
human development (Cornia, Jolly & Stewart, 1987).  The UNICEF study 
underscores that policies to protect the vulnerable can and must become part of 
national planning even when the economy is in difficulties.  The strategy of 
‘Adjustment with a Human Face’ combines the promotion of economic growth, 
protection of the vulnerable and macro-economic adjustment.  
 
An important caveat to this section is that populist rhetoric can be useful for 
repackaging development styles by verbally addressing fundamental structural issues 
of inequality and power, but in practice by pursuing ‘business as usual’.  Re-labelling 
projects, ‘putting old wine in new bottles’, and using its appealing vocabulary allow 
new claims to be made upon funds and justify the exercise of control in old ways. 
 
2.1.2.2 Gender and Development 
Feminism and gender studies have helped to reinvigorate the sociology of 
development in the late 20th century with the still burgeoning literature on Women in 
Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD) and Gender and 
Development (GAD) (Mies, 1994; Tinker, 1990).  Placing gender at the centre of 
theorisation, feminist development theories have reoriented development discourse 
and practice.  These theories have been crucial in exposing the ‘invisibility of women’ 
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in earlier theories of development and the uneven impact of development processes on 
men and women, as well as on sectors of the population differentiated by class, race 
and ethnicity.  They have also broken new theoretical ground with exploration into a 
changing sexual division of labour and into the mechanisms through which 
production and reproduction are linked in such ways that they produce not only 
gender inequality but also unequal development and international asymmetries 
(Fernandez-Kelly, 1994). 
 
2.1.2.3 Institutional Theories of Development 
In the 1990s institutional theories of development were beginning to emerge based on 
the ‘new institutional economics’ and the ‘new political economy’ (Bates, 1988; 
North, 1990).  The emerging institutional theory of development does not constitute a 
break with the dominant neo-liberal paradigm, but is rather an enrichment of it.  This 
theoretical work largely embraces the essential tenet of rational choice theory, which 
postulates that social behaviour (and hence outcomes) may be explained by the 
interplay of individuals pursuing their own best interests and ‘preferences’ on the 
basis of rational choices and available information.  The central idea of the new 
institutionalism is that what makes for an efficient economy is a set of institutions that 
permits individuals to benefit personally from doing what will also serve the material 
interests of society as a whole (Leys, 1996).  In simplified terms, the institutional 
approach to development attempts to ascertain how institutional arrangements and 
their modification may constrain or enhance the economic behaviour of agents and 
hence impede or contribute to development processes (Nabli & Nugent, 1989).  
However, to the extent that institutions are products of cultures and alleged national 
characters, the approach has brought us back full circle to the focus of classical 
modernisation theory (Biggart & Guillen, 1999). 
 
Leys points to a major flaw in the explanatory power of the institutional approach: 
“[W]e cannot explain in terms of the ‘paradigm’ how any particular set of 
institutions that existed in the past or exist today in a given country came into 
existence” (Leys, 1996:37). 
 
Despite this shortcoming, the World Bank’s (1991, 1994) World Development Report 
for 1991 and 1994, for example, relied extensively on the theories of North (1990) 
and Bates (1988) in their discussion on infrastructure and legal structures.  Further, 
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the recent emphasis of the international development agencies on ‘good governance’ 
clearly reflects the influence of institutional thinking.   
 
2.1.2.4 Sustainable Development 
Increasing concern about the inappropriate and ineffective use of natural resources in 
developing countries and the declining quality of the physical environment also led to 
the search for new approaches to development during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
The conceptual origins of sustainable development can be traced back to an early 
1970s environmental discourse about ‘the age of scarcity’ and ‘the limits to growth’ 
(Meadows et al., 1972; Ward & Dubos, 1972; Hirsch, 1977), when the impact of 
Rachel Carson’s (1962) landmark study of environmental problems in the US 
prompted new research agendas and the establishment of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP).  The quest for an alternative, ecologically 
sustainable and socially just development trajectory for the South led to radical 
formulations such as ‘grassroots development’ (Illich, 1969); ‘pro-peasant 
development’ (Das, 1979); ‘eco-development’ (Glaeser, 1984); ‘people-centred 
development’ (Korten & Klauss, 1984); ‘participatory development’ (Cohen & 
Uphoff, 1980; Chambers, 1983, 1992); and so forth.  While these early sustainable 
development models varied, they shared a number of common features: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
                                                          
A Gandhian18 emphasis on equity, basic needs, self-reliance and local control over 
the use of local resources; 
A general preference for small-scale enterprises, emphasising community and 
village-based designs; 
Shared values of solidarity with future generations, social justice and ecological 
balance; 
An affinity for ‘appropriate’ or ‘intermediate’ technologies, designed with local 
inputs and know-how; and 
A propensity for political decentralisation and political openness to enable popular 
participation and to incorporate local knowledge and traditions of stewardship. 
 
18 Pertaining to, or characteristic of Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), Indian political leader and social 
reformer. 
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The UN World Commission on Environment and Development (UNWCED), chaired 
by Gro Harlem Brundtland (1987), in its report Our Common Future, offered the 
following definition of sustainable development: 
“Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland, 1987:1). 
 
The Brundtland (1987) report gave unprecedented prominence to the principle of 
sustainability.  The next major event was the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) (or Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which 
produced Agenda 21 (Sitarz, 1993), the international blueprint for sustainable 
development.  Unlike the Earth Summit, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD), which took place in Johannesburg between 26 August and 4 
September 2002, was never intended to develop new conventions or to renegotiate 
Agenda 21.  Rather, the WSSD was given the mandate of implementing existing 
promises and commitments, such as those made in Rio and in the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (OECD, 2001).  Emanating from the Millennium 
Declaration, the MDGs bind countries to do more in the fight against inadequate 
incomes, widespread hunger, gender inequality, environmental deterioration and lack 
of education, health care and clean water.  They also include actions to reduce debt 
and increase aid, trade and technology transfers to poor countries (UNDP, 
2003:Chapter 1).  The Plan of Implementation (WSSD Secretariat, 2002a) and the 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (WSSD Secretariat, 2002b) 
was negotiated and adopted by the intergovernmental committee.  These documents, 
together, are intended to frame the ‘official’ approach to sustainable development in 
the foreseeable future.  The Plan of Implementation was designed specifically to 
generate a set of targets, timetables and concrete action plans that would make 
sustainable development happen. 
 
The absence of new commitments and innovative thinking, particularly on global 
environmental issues and how they threaten development in all countries, is probably 
the most significant weakness of the Plan of Implementation.  What the Plan of 
Implementation could have been and what it actually became were often significantly 
affected by the alteration of a few simple words.  Each word and phrase change 
gradually shifted the Plan from a promising document outlining commitments and 
 51
obligations to one filled with voluntary options and choices, and may actually have 
‘watered down’ principles affirmed in the Rio declaration.  Despite a call for 
examination of the relationship between trade, environment and development, the 
WSSD failed to signal how development co-operation and expanding international 
trade could be directed to serve the goals of sustainable development.  The inability of 
governments to agree on: (i) reform of the existing global environmental governance 
system; (ii) effective institutional mechanisms and effective means of 
implementation; and (iii) how to ensure effective financing of sustainable 
development, makes meaningful accountability on these issues unlikely. 
 
Where Brundtland (1987) was vague, Agenda 21 (Sitarz, 1993), the WSSD Plan of 
Implementation (WSSD Secretariat, 2002a) and the World Development Report 2003 
(World Bank, 2003) discarded discourses of scarcity and limits19, and emphasised 
that: (i) the best way to end poverty is to promote economic growth; (ii) in order to 
promote poverty alleviation, free trade should be the engine of renewed economic 
growth; and (iii) technological innovations, investment in research and development 
(R&D) and technology transfer offer the best hope for liberation from the constraints 
of a finite biosphere.  Hence, ‘sustainable development’ has become conflated with 
‘sustained economic growth’.  Thus, growth maximisation and environmental 
preservation can be mutually enhancing.  In other words, neo-liberalism is not 
inimical to sustainable development.  It is not surprising, therefore, that several 
observers have raised the concern that the sustainable development discourse has been 
captured by the grand universalising project of neo-liberal globalisation, and in 
practice is just as undermining of distributive equity, social justice and poor people’s 
rights and livelihoods as the mainstream modernisation development agenda (Korten, 
1995; Campbell, 1993; Brecher & Costello, 1994; Karliner, 1997).  This is clearly 
reflected in the following two quotations: 
“Modernism, and its more recent manifestation as development, have betrayed 
progress…while a few have attained material abundance, resource depletion 
and environmental degradation now endanger many and threaten the hopes of 
all to come…Modernism betrayed progress by leading us into, preventing us 
from seeing, and keeping us from addressing interwoven environmental, 
organizational, and cultural problems” (Norgaard, 1994:2). 
 
                                                          
19 Thereby, averting the question of Northern over-consumption. 
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“[L]ocal experiences of western development in many localities of the third 
world have been closely associated with the dissolution of indigenous cultural, 
political, and economic systems; with increased inequalities in life chances 
between genders and among classes…and with deterioration in, and removal 
of access to, the biophysical environment” (Porter & Sheppard, 1998:2). 
 
It would seem that most official agendas envisage little fundamental change, focusing 
on promoting more efficient resource and energy evaluation and use, recycling and 
reduced pollution broadly within existing parameters rather than on radical changes to 
lifestyles and economic systems.  At the extreme, sustainable development has 
become a convenient slogan to signal political correctness without the corresponding 
commitment to change.  The dominant modernist ethos, and its contemporary 
incarnation as neo-liberalism, is still for the most part promoting an agenda of 
economic efficiency, articulated largely through privatisation and liberalisation 
programmes. 
 
2.1.3 The Post-Structuralist Critique of Development 
Many writers have identified an impasse in development theory and praxis, linking 
this to the growing diversity of the so-called Third World, the collapse of communism 
and perceived crisis of Marxist analysis, and the failure of a great deal of radical 
development theory (be it Marxism or dependency theory) to offer constructive 
alternatives to neo-liberal orthodoxy.20  There have been many texts (for example, 
Booth, 1994; Schuurman, 1993a; and Nederveen-Pieterse, 2000, 2001) in recent years 
urging us to ‘rethink’ development and to move ‘beyond’ the perceived impasse in 
this area of knowledge and practice.  Authors like Sachs (1992), Escobar (1995b) and 
Rist (1997) have expressed deep dissatisfaction with ‘business-as-usual’ and standard 
development rhetoric and practice. 
 
Over the past fifteen years there has been a turn to the work of Michel Foucault to 
develop a more fundamental critique of the will to power which informs development 
as discourse  (Escobar, 1985; Ferguson, 1990; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997; Esteva & 
Prakash, 1998; Rist, 1997; Sachs, 1995; Schuurman, 2000).  The label that has been 
                                                          
20 See Alvares (1992); Apffel-Marglin & Marglin (1990); Booth (1994); Crush (1995b); Dallmayr 
(1996); DuBois (1991); Escobar (1985, 1988, 1992, 1995a, 1997); Esteva (1987); Esteva & Prakash 
(1998); Ferguson (1990); Lummis (1991); Nederveen-Pieterse (1991, 1998); Latouche (1996); 
Rahnema & Bawtree (1997); Rist (1997); and Sachs (1990, 1992, 1995).   
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attached to this critique is ‘post-development’ or the post-structuralist critique of 
development.  Post-development is not a homogeneous concept.  While these authors 
hold certain assumptions in common, it is clear that much divides them.  Referring to 
the post-development idea in the singular therefore runs the risk of caricaturing a 
number of different writers’ ideas.21  This is even more the case given post-
development theory’s widespread commitment to diversity and pluralism.  However, 
we still believe that there are certain key ideas which are sufficiently unified to be 
identified in the singular.   
 
Writings grouped under the heading of ‘post-development’ are, as the term implies, 
critical of development as it has been practised since WWII.  Further, most of this 
writing is in some ways inspired by Foucault and tends to see development as a 
discourse that orders and creates the object that it purports to address.  The writings 
directly inspired by Foucault have served to illuminate the political and power aspects 
of what was earlier seen as a neutral and practical problem, viz. how to deliver 
development to poor people.  The power of post-development thinkers such as 
Escobar (1995a, b), Esteva and Prakash (1998), Rahnema and Bawtree (1997) and 
Sachs (1995) is the fresh challenges that they offer to the neo-liberal mainstream in 
development economics, and their prescient warning that we should not be 
complacent about the failures of development, or about the power relations that 
inform particular constructions of ‘the development project’ (Cooper & Packard, 
1997).22   
 
Escobar’s (1995a) Encountering Development has undoubtedly been the most 
important post-structuralist intervention in the field of development studies and he has 
emerged as the pre-eminent advocate for the deconstruction of development 
discourse.  Escobar (1995a:40) maintains that the development discourse “determines 
what can be thought and said”.  Escobar’s (1995a, b) work takes its lead from 
Foucault (1980), Gramsci (1971, 1985) and Said (1995), and concerns itself with the 
ways in which Western accounts of development set out to normalise the West’s 
‘Other’ in the name of reason or progress, but always for particular political ends.  As 
                                                          
21 Much of the post-structuralist impulse in development studies rests upon the notion of discourse, 
although it needs stressing that there is much variation within this body of theory.  
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Escobar (1995a:16), notes, “the process of deconstructing and dismantling has to be 
accompanied by that of constructing new ways of seeing and acting”.  The argument 
is that the act of deconstruction opens up fissures in dominant discourses and thereby 
creates the conditions for imagining alternative political spaces.  The systematic 
discourse coterminous with development is the means by which the “Western 
developed countries have been able to manage and control and, in many ways, even 
create the Third World politically, economically, sociologically, and culturally” 
(Escobar, 1985:384).  It is rooted in the values and assumptions that constitute the 
perception of a world comprised of developed and developing nations.   
 
Drawing upon Foucault’s work on representation, knowledge and power, Escobar 
(1995a) argues that development should be understood as a historically specific 
representation of social reality which  permits particular modes of thinking and doing, 
whilst disqualifying others.  This involves specific forms of knowledge, systems of 
power which regulate practice and subjectivities by which people recognise 
themselves as developed or underdeveloped.  Escobar (1995a) offers a powerful 
manifesto against the ‘magic formula’ of development and a draft for a ‘cultural’ 
political economy.  Escobar borrows from Michel Foucault as well as other post-
modernist, feminist and environmentalist thinkers to insist that beneath development’s 
optimistic and emancipatory façade has lain a project to control, manage and 
dominate “in the name of science, progress, and freedom” (Escobar, 1995a:85).  
Escobar (1995a:vii) concludes that a major crisis has befallen development due to its 
“failure and the increasing opposition to it by popular groups in the Third World”. For 
Escobar (1995a, b), the ways of changing dominant discourses lie in bottom-up 
grassroots social movements and the new forms of knowledge they generate.23  
 
Most post-development writings have focused on the development apparatus itself: 
how it constructs and orders the reality in which it seeks to intervene.  Thus Grillo 
(1997:20) has argued that the writings of Escobar and others portray development as: 
“a monolithic enterprise, heavily controlled from the top, convinced of the 
superiority of its own wisdom and impervious to local knowledge, or indeed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
22 See Cooper & Packard (1997) and Cowen & Shenton (1996) for an understanding of ‘development’ 
in terms of the history and politics of knowledge. 
23 For Crush (1995b) the changes envisaged have more to do with the ways we speak and write about 
development. 
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common-sense experience, a single gaze or voice which is all-powerful and 
beyond influence”.   
 
Kiely (1999:48) asserts that “post-development discourse tends to imply a passive 
Third World, simply having its strings pulled by the all-powerful West”.  This is a 
critique that has been levelled against discourse analysis more generally.  In 
conversations together, Trombadori criticises Foucault for a “lack of individuating 
real subjects who are capable of determining a relation of power: in the context of the 
tensions of a discursive formation or of a particular apparatus in which knowledge 
and power are intertwined”, and asks, “who struggles against whom?” (Foucault, 
1991:18-19, emphasis in original).  It is certainly true that the focus of these writings 
is very much on the discourse of the developers, how they portray and construct the 
object to be developed.  Long (1992) and Arce and Long (2000) make the important 
point that the spread of hegemonic discourses such as development is always played 
out in local encounters and through human agency.   
 
Manzo (1991:8 ) cautions that even the most radically critical discourse can slip “into 
the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest”.  
She goes on to argue that “the pervasiveness of ‘logocentric’ thinking in the field of 
development studies explains why subversive counter-discourses are not taken more 
seriously” (Manzo, 1991:8).24  Gardner and Lewis (1996:157) argue that “the 
relativism of post-modernist approaches is in danger of collapsing into depoliticised 
irresponsibility” and that “the deconstructionalist stance…makes active involvement 
in processes of change difficult”.  “There is…a danger in simply standing back and 
critiquing development from a discourse angle: after identifying overlapping, 
conflicting discourses, one is tempted to ask – so what?”  (Robinson-Pant, 2001:323).  
As Gee (1999:8) states emphatically, “discourse analysis must have a ‘point’”.  
Escobar (1995a) has been criticised for being too negative about ‘development’ yet 
suggesting no alternative (see Gardner & Lewis, 1996; Grillo & Stirrat, 1997).25  
Nederveen-Pieterse (2000) and Schuurman (2000), for example, state that post-
                                                          
24 The concept of ‘logocentrism’ was developed by Jacques Derrida and refers to the imposition of a 
hierarchy on familiar dichotomies (Hoy, 1996). 
25 Escobar’s (1995) devastating critique of conventional developmentalism is not matched by an 
exposition of an alternative vision; even his final chapter does little more than eulogise new social 
movements as representing the way forward. 
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development offers an interesting critique of the development apparatus, but it does 
not point to a way forward. 
 
We believe that the lack of instrumentality in much post-development theory is not in 
itself a weighty argument against the analysis.  Post-development attempts to 
demonstrate why development interventions do not work and this must be kept 
separate from a call for alternatives.  As Nustad (2001:488) argues: “If one retains 
faith in development, analyses that demonstrate that the premises on which an 
intervention is based do not hold surely must be of relevance”.  While cognisant of the 
shortcomings of the post-development writers such as Escobar, we are nonetheless 
sympathetic to certain elements of the post-structuralist critique, particularly its stress 
on contingency and questioning of the neutrality of technocracy.  A major strength of 
the post-development approach is that it correctly argues that development practice is 
far from being a neutral process and may represent entrenched social and political 
interests.  According to Brigg (2002:422), “taking the post-development critical 
impulse seriously requires moving away from the colonisation metaphor to a closer 
understanding of the operation of power through development, including its 
productive modality”.   
 
By drawing inspiration from the ‘discursive turn’ in the social sciences, post-
development effects a move away from the centring of economic relations which 
characterise neo-liberal, political economy, regulation school and other variants of 
development studies.  In doing so it initiates a wider critique of development than has 
hitherto been possible.  The post-development school offers new ways of 
understanding what development is and does, and why it seems so difficult to think 
beyond it.  In time this might also constitute “a point of resistance and a starting point 
for an opposing strategy” (Foucault, 1990:101).  
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2.2 Poverty as Discourse 
Galbraith (1990) not only sees poverty as an inhumanity in itself, but also as the 
source of oppression and conflict.  A particularly graphic description of what is meant 
by poverty as lack of choice was given more than 30 years ago by Denis Goulet: 
“The prevalent emotion of underdevelopment is a sense of personal and 
societal impotence in the face of disease and death, of confusion and 
ignorance as one gropes to understand change, of servility towards men whose 
decisions govern the course of events, of hopelessness before hunger and 
natural catastrophe.  Chronic poverty is a cruel kind of hell, and one cannot 
understand how cruel that hell is merely by gazing upon poverty as an object” 
(Goulet, 1971:23). 
 
Jean-Philippe Thérien (1999:723) has pointed to the emergence over the last decade 
of two competing interpretations of international poverty that he has dubbed the 
‘Bretton Woods paradigm’ and the ‘United Nations paradigm’.  The former is 
associated with the discourse and practices of the international organisations initially 
conceived at Bretton Woods in 1944, namely the IMF, the World Bank and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its successor, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).  The latter corresponds to the discourse and practices of the UN 
and, in particular, those of its specialised agencies such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), whose mandates are related to 
economic and social issues.  Both paradigms explicitly seek to incorporate 
globalisation26 into their thinking but differ significantly in their analysis of the 
impact that it had upon international inequality and development. 
 
Perhaps, unsurprisingly, given their function as the main international agencies of 
liberal capitalism, the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) take a broadly optimistic 
view of the historical achievements of post-World War II (WWII) development: 
“Over the last five decades, average per capita incomes in developing 
countries have more than doubled.  The GDPs of some economies have more 
than quintupled…There has been a ‘green revolution’ in South Asia, an 
‘economic miracle’ in East Asia, Latin America has largely overcome its debt 
crisis, and substantial gains in health and literacy have taken place in Africa” 
(World Bank, 1995a:10). 
                                                          
26 We follow Held et al. (1999:7), who conceive of globalisation as “an essentially contingent historical 
process replete with contradictions” that is reconfiguring global power relations in ways that cannot be 
predicted and therefore need to be researched. 
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Future prospects are also deemed to be good, provided that the countries either adopt 
or maintain the ‘market-friendly’ package of policies recommended by the 
international financial institutions.  Yet, as Thérien (1999) has noted, the BWIs did 
come to concede in the 1990s that ‘zones of extreme poverty’ still exist in the world 
economy and they have moved to make ‘poverty alleviation’ one of their current 
watchwords.  Much of the World Bank’s (1995b, 2000) investment lending and the 
majority of its SAPs are now poverty focused.  In a similar vein the IMF has made the 
financing of social safety nets a standard part of its macroeconomic programmes.  
However, it is important to stress that the attention paid to poverty by the BWIs 
derives from a distinctly different worldview from that which drove the development 
debate in the 1970s and 1980s.  For the BWIs poverty does not derive from 
asymmetrical inequalities in the structure of the global political economy, but is 
“more the result of a temporary misadaptation of markets” (Thérien, 1999:732).  The 
cause is perceived to be domestic, not external.   
 
Thus poverty is treated by the World Bank as a consequence of “country-specific 
imbalances, policy errors, or political difficulties” (World Bank, 1995b:5).  It must 
therefore be countered with selective measures addressed to particular states and 
situations, not with global reforms that might challenge the core principles of the 
international economic order.  In sum, the vision is deliberatively restrictive and 
clearly political in its attempt to limit the range of possible, acceptable action.  Hulme 
and Shepherd spell out the problems with this approach: 
“A particular problem of contemporary poverty analysis, seeking to rapidly 
reduce poverty headcounts in an era of globalization driven by a neoliberal 
vision, is to see ‘the poor’ as those who are not effectively integrated into the 
market economy.  This leads to a focus excessively on the role that market 
forces can play in poverty-reduction…there are two problems with [this 
approach]…First, such a focus will not meet the needs of all the different 
types of poor people.  Second, such an approach encourages a focus on those 
poor whom the market can ‘liberate’ from poverty but neglects the needs of 
those who need different forms of support, policy changes, or broader changes 
within society that take time.  The chronic poor – those who have experienced 
poverty for long periods, or perhaps, all their lives – are likely to be neglected 
in such an era given the multiple factors that constrain their prospects and the 
likelihood that market-based factors may contribute to their continued 
deprivation” (Hulme & Shepherd, 2003:404). 
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The World Bank’s website grandly proclaims that “Our dream is a world free of 
poverty”, pledging to commit the Bank’s “financial resources, highly trained staff and 
extensive knowledge base” to empowering the poor through such irreproachable 
strategies as the pursuit of ethnic and gender equality, environmental sustainability, 
accessible primary education and widespread community health care (World Bank, 
2002:n.p.).  The World Bank has been outstandingly successful in securing the 
adoption of this programme by other international organisations and by governments 
around the world.  In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, successive 
development White Papers produced by DFID in 1997 and 2000 adopt and promote 
the World Bank agenda (DFID, 1997, 2000).  Inclusive development, ‘pro-poor 
institutions’ and community initiatives are all invoked, differences respected and 
inequality deplored (World Bank, 2000:6).  Behind these apparently progressive aims, 
however, there stands a commitment to a project that Karl Marx once described as 
“the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market” (Marx, 1963:Chapter 
32).  The assault on poverty given pride of place in World Bank propaganda has been 
premised upon the adoption of policies that would extend the scope of the world 
market and the global reach of capitalism.   In this context, the World Bank’s 
outwardly progressive anti-poverty strategy far from being a shift away from the neo-
liberal revolution is, in reality, a means to completing it. 
 
In comparison the UN paradigm remains closer to the radicalism that drove much 
thinking on international development questions in the 1970s.  Yet it, too, has moved 
on from the framework of these discourses to embrace and promote as its central idea 
the notion of ‘global poverty’.  While recognising the extent of the social and 
economic progress generated by post-war development policies, the UN position 
emphasises the unequal distribution of the fruits of development.  As stated in the 
declaration adopted by the UN Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen 
in 1995, “we are witnessing in countries throughout the world the expansion of 
prosperity for some, unfortunately accompanied by an expansion of unspeakable 
poverty for others” (UN, 1995:6).  In other words globalisation is openly recognised 
as generating winners as well as losers.  The liberalisation of trade and finance is 
understood to have reduced the capacities of national governments to shape the social 
order within the countries over which they preside, producing the ‘states of disarray’ 
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that the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) has argued are the 
social effects of globalisation (UNRISD, 1995). 
 
As can be seen, then, both the Bretton Woods and the UN paradigms offer strongly 
divergent accounts of the problem of international poverty and development.  They 
are grounded in different institutional complexes and are sustained by different power 
blocs of markedly uneven weight within the current world order.  The former is very 
much the orthodoxy of our time; the latter perhaps constitutes something of the 
critical opposition. 
 
2.3 Development as Discourse 
In this section the concept of ‘development as discourse’ is opened up and is 
deconstructed to reveal the power-knowledge framework underlying it.  The concept 
of development as discourse can provide a way into acknowledging and analysing the 
complexities of development, rather than reducing everything to a simple policy 
equation or model.   Using the conceptual lens of development as discourse, we aim 
to expose the idea of development “as a construct rather than an objective state” 
(Gardner & Lewis, 1996:1).27  Considering development as discourse shifts attention 
onto the power relationships both at local and international level between developers 
and developed, and onto the rules that influence how development is carried out or 
which practices are valued.  The concept can provide those involved in development 
with greater insight into the dynamics of power and knowledge at both field and 
policy level, but may not in itself provide a direct solution for those suffering from 
inequality and poverty. 
 
Grillo states that: 
“Discourse …includes language, but also what is represented through 
language.  A discourse (e.g. of development) identifies appropriate and 
                                                          
27 Following Sen (1999), we take development to mean the expansion of people’s capabilities, i.e. 
increasing the possibilities for more people to realise their potentials as human beings through the 
expansion of their capabilities for functioning.  According to Sen’s (1999) ‘capability approach’, 
development should be about the enrichment of human lives, not in the sense of purely economic 
progress (‘having more things’) which is achieved at great social cost, but rather that of having the 
freedom to choose between different ways of living.  Sen (1985) thus views poverty in terms of lack of 
choice or of capability: poverty meaning the failure to be able to take a full part in human society.  In 
these terms development means not just combating or ameliorating poverty, but restoring or enhancing 
basic human capabilities and freedoms. 
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legitimate ways of practising development as well as speaking and thinking 
about it” (Grillo, 1997:13). 
 
Significantly, discourse also implies analysis of what is excluded, what cannot be said 
or done.  What we are talking about here is ‘development’ as a regime of 
representation: “the manner in which Development constructs the world” (Crush, 
1995a:2) or “the ways in which development discourse constructs the object of 
development”  (Grillo, 1997:19). 
 
An important caveat is that there are many overlapping discourses, rather than just 
one Development Discourse.  As Robinson-Pant makes clear: 
“To use the concept creatively involves: being aware of many overlapping, 
rather than one, development discourse, exploring what is included (and how) 
and excluded by certain discourses, who influences a discourse and above all, 
analysing how and why discourses can change” (Robinson-Pant, 2001:324). 
 
Categorising a type of development discourse as ‘the development discourse’ is 
therefore dangerous because it oversimplifies and misrepresents complex discursive 
fields.  Development is after all a hybrid discipline with a diversity of contested 
discourses.  This notwithstanding, development, as Nederveen-Pieterse (1991:14) 
reminds us, “tends to be short for the Western development model…The perspective 
remains linear, teleological, ethnocentric”.  Similarly, Crush (1995a:9) argues that 
development theory “has rarely broken free from linearity, from organic notions of 
growth and teleological views of history”.  For Esteva (1992:9), “the metaphor of 
development gave global hegemony to a purely Western genealogy of history, 
robbing peoples of different cultures of the opportunity to define the forms of their 
social life”.  As McMichael puts it: “The development project had offered a universal 
blueprint for national economic development” (McMichael, 1996:147, emphasis 
added).  What these authors are referring to is the dominant mainstream development 
paradigm of ‘development as modernisation/Westernisation’, i.e. the venerated 
external aid/technical transfer approach to problems of underdevelopment.28  The 
resistant, pervasive and deeply embedded nature of the dominant development 
paradigm is underscored by DuBois: 
                                                          
28 Modernisation is an overarching meta-theory, which is firmly rooted in the discourses of intellectual 
modernism, and seeks to provide singular, universal explanations for poverty and underdevelopment 
and prescriptions for overcoming them. 
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“The effectiveness of radical criticism is diminished because even such 
alternative frameworks of policy formulation fail to penetrate deep enough to 
confront the most fundamental assumptions embodied in the dominant 
development paradigm.  To put it more bluntly, strategies have been changed, 
but the foundations of contemporary development ideology are being 
reinforced.  Above the polemics and disagreements over policy, which appear 
to distinguish the sundry schools of thought in development studies, there 
exists a profound unity…in the definition and identification of these problems 
of underdevelopment” (DuBois, 1991:2). 
 
The term ‘dominant paradigm’ is used here to refer to the body of Western-derived 
theories that related to the social organisation of Western Europe and the United 
States.  These theories share the common theme of modernisation of underdeveloped 
economies from a state of pre-modernity.  Dominant Western-derived theories of 
development became the basis for development efforts in developing nations for over 
half a century.  Rogers remarks: 
“This conception of development [the dominant paradigm] grew out of certain 
historical events, such as, the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the United 
States; the colonial experience in Latin America, Africa, and Asia; the 
quantitative empiricism of developed nations; American social science; and 
capitalistic economic/political philosophy” (Rogers, 1993:35). 
 
An influential view of post-WWII development was Rostow’s (1971, 1991) theory of 
economic growth.  Advancing dichotomous traditional and modern theories of 
societies developed by Tonnies (1957) and Durkheim (Hughes, Martin & Sharrock, 
1999; Preston, 1996), American economist Walt W. Rostow classified society into 
five sequential stages: (i) traditional society; (ii) establishment of preconditions for 
take-off; (iii) take-off into sustained growth; (iv) the drive to modernity; and (v) the 
age of high mass consumption.  Rostow’s growth-stage theory introduces the ideas of 
sequential stages of development.29  Implicit in this model is the evolutionary but 
irreversible nature of development.  Similarly, the orthodox development paradigm 
espouses a linear view of progress according to which developing countries are on an 
evolutionary trail blazed by the industrialised economies.  Orthodox development 
theory has accepted uncritically the notion that progress in the Third World is 
identical to a progressive emulation of the social, political and economic institutions 
in Western countries (Banuri, 1990a).   
                                                          
29 Modernisation theory competed with communism in a world split by the Cold War.   Rostow, the 
author of the classic of modernisation theory, The Stages of Economic Growth (1971) subtitled his 
book An Anti-communist Manifesto. 
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The classic aim of development has been modernisation or catching-up with the 
advanced industrialised countries.  More or less synonymous with the post-WWII 
‘Golden Age’ was the view that technology represented the solution to development.  
During these decades the dominant motif for development among the newly 
independent countries was modernisation with a strong technological dimension.  
Thus, according to Smelser, modernisation consists of various interrelated technical, 
economic and ecological processes involving “in the realm of technology, the change 
from simple and traditionalized techniques towards the application of scientific 
knowledge” (Smelser, 1968:126, emphasis in original). 
 
Development is, in the Foucauldian sense, a particular discourse which does not 
reflect but actually constructs reality.  In doing so, it closes off alternative ways of 
thinking and so constitutes a form of power.  In this way “the ‘Third World’…is 
produced by the discourses and practices of development since their inception in the 
early post-World War II period” (Escobar, 1995a:4).30  Crush (1995a:22) claims that 
“the power of development is the power to generalize, homogenize, objectify”.  
Objectification rooted in binary oppositions of an ‘either-or’ kind is a sine qua non of 
the development paradigm, e.g. ‘underdeveloped (or ‘developing’ or ‘less developed’) 
and ‘developed’.   
 
In 1949 Harry S. Truman in his inaugural presidential address, argued that there was a 
need for the countries of the ‘modern’ world to solve the problems of the 
underdeveloped areas: 
“More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching 
misery.  Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease.  Their economic 
life is primitive and stagnant.  Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to 
them and to more prosperous areas.  For the first time in history humanity 
possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these 
people…I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the 
benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their 
aspirations for a better life…What we envisage is a program of development 
based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing…Greater production is the 
key to prosperity and peace.  And the key to greater production is a wider and 
more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge” 
(quoted in Rist, 1997:249-250). 
 
                                                          
30 Although it can be traced back to at least the 19th century, it was in the post-WWII period that the 
idea of development was made explicit (see Rist, 1997; Leys, 1996). 
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Truman’s address is a very clear statement of the basic thinking behind the idea of 
development.  The Third World (as it came to be known) was regarded as backward 
and primitive, but these problems could be overcome by following a similar path of 
development to that of the Western, civilised world.  Indeed, this path would be 
traversed more easily because the West could share the benefits of material prosperity 
and scientific knowledge with the ‘backward’ areas, and so hasten the transition to 
modernity.  Above all, this could be achieved through an increase in production in 
underdeveloped areas, and this in turn could occur through the introduction of rational 
scientific methods. 
 
Since WWII the West has provided the model by which to measure the progress of 
the rest of the world.  Banuri (1990b) suggests that the intellectual dominance of the 
Western model has derived not from its inherent and unequivocal superiority, but 
rather from the political dominance of those who believe in its superiority, and who 
have been able to devote attention and resources to legitimising ‘modernisation-as-
Westernisation’.  Eisenstadt (1966:1) bluntly asserts:  
“Historically, modernization is the process of change toward those types of 
social, economic, and political systems that have developed in Western Europe 
and North America”.   
 
The net result of the Western style ‘modernisation-as-development’ project is the 
marginalisation of criticism and the foreclosure of more appropriate, alternative paths 
of development.  Although there is a diversity of views about what modernisation 
means, the following features are at its core: 
“On the economic side, industrialization and urbanization, as well as the 
technological transformation of agriculture; on the political side, 
rationalization of authority and the growth of a rationalizing bureaucracy; on 
the social side, the weakening of ascriptive ties and the rise of achievement as 
the basis for personal advancement; culturally, the ‘disenchantment’ of the 
world (to use Max Weber’s terminology), the growth of science and 
secularisation based on increasing literacy and numeracy” (Marglin, 1990:2). 
 
Development policy is shaped by arguments, or discourses, based on knowledge 
claims.  The shaping of policy depends ultimately not on ‘surface’ characteristics of 
rationality, but on a deeper dynamic of power and knowledge within and between 
discourses.  In his influential book, The Anti-Politics Machine, Ferguson (1990:259) 
stipulates that “development discourse typically involves not only special terms, but a 
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distinctive style of reasoning, implicitly (and perhaps unconsciously) reasoning 
backwards from the necessary conclusions – more ‘development’ projects are needed 
– to the premises required to generate those conclusions”.  Ferguson’s (1990:87) 
thesis holds that ‘development discourse’ represents the depoliticisation of poverty 
issues, whereby the reproduction of development agencies and the spread of 
bureaucratic state power are effected through a conceptual apparatus which translates 
a reality of non-technical problems into ‘simple, technical problems’ for which the 
“apolitical, technical ‘development’” intervention is then seen as appropriate, thus 
masking “extremely sensitive political operations” (Ferguson, 1990:256).  Similarly, 
Crush (1995b:xii) laments the “technocratic depoliticized language of international 
development” and Mitchell (1995:149) asserts: “Development is a discourse of 
rational planning”. 
 
Discourse analysis makes us aware that development is not simply theory or policy, 
but in either form is discourse.  Discourse analysis involves meticulous attention to 
development texts and utterances, not merely as ideology but as epistemology.  Thus, 
it involves sociology of knowledge not only in terms of class interests (as in 
ideological critique), but also in terms of an inquiry into what makes up an underlying 
‘common sense’ (Apthorpe & Gasper, 1996; Rew, 1997).  Nederveen-Pieterse 
(2001:14) cogently argues that:  
“The methodological gain of discourse analysis is to add a level of reflexivity, 
theoretical refinement and sophistication to development studies, and thus to 
open up the politics of development to a more profound engagement …[but 
we must be careful not to]…risk slipping into discursivism, i.e. reading too 
much into texts, or textualism, and overrating the importance of discourse 
analysis, as if by rearranging texts one changes power relations” (Nederveen-
Pieterse, 2001:14, emphasis in original). 
 
Nederveen-Pieterse’s (2001) warning is a perceptive one, since development 
discourse is contested and, above all, ideological and political.  Just changing the 
language of development or of developers cannot alter the underlying structural 
inequalities.  The objective of this study is not to embark on a sustained literary 
analysis based on the premise that language ‘is all there is’.  Rather, we take the view 
that the language of development is never self-referential, but is instead constructed 
within social fields of knowledge and power.  Political economy, for instance, has a 
real existence and is not reducible to the texts that describe and represent them.  The 
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challenge, therefore, is to situate the texts of development in their geo-political, 
historical and social context and to decode the “subtleties of contextual presence in 
texts” (Cunningham, 1994:45), and to be cautious of reducing life to language and 
obliterating the relations of power, exploitation and inequality that order society and 
history (Palmer, 1990). 
 
In the discourses of development produced by Western hegemony, knowledge and 
power are intricately interwoven.  The central thesis of developmentalism is that 
social change occurs according to a pre-established pattern, the logic and direction of 
which is known.  Those who declare themselves furthest advanced along its course 
claim privileged knowledge of the direction of change.  Having said that, discourse 
analysis is but one way of looking at development, only part of the toolbox.  Its power 
lies in making development thinking more reflexive.  This reflexivity should, 
however, have a political edge and refer to collective feedback loops that generate and 
inform collective action challenging existing power relations. 
 
The major concern is “to deconstruct development, to unpack its claims and 
discourses, and once that is done, to deconstruct the deconstruction, for 
deconstruction is a never-ending task” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2001:163).  The 
implication of the analysis so far is that by deconstructing development discourses, 
new relationships between developer and developed can be initiated: how developers 
construct the ‘poor’, for example, not only affects the kind of interventions provided 
but how field level staff interact with these groups of people.  Deconstructing 
discourses can lead to new ways of writing, thinking and even practising 
development.  This section has explored the ways in which the concept of 
development as discourse can enable us (both developers and developed) to adopt a 
more critical perspective on development interventions.   
 
According to de Sousa Santos (1995:ix), “the paradigm of modernity has exhausted 
all its possibilities of renovation”.  We now need to embark on a process involving 
“the creative metamorphosis of old forms into new ones, the transposition of universal 
theories and concepts into locally relevant forms of understanding and the rendering 
of ahistorical frameworks into concrete forms of explanation” (Calderón, Piscitelli & 
Reyna,  1992:35). 
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2.4 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 sets out a discursive analysis of the theories of development.  We used 
Michel Foucault’s post-structuralist work on power, knowledge and discourse to 
attain a radical reading of subjectivity in the development discourse (Mohan, 1997; 
Said, 1995).  As a set of relations which objectifies and structures marginality and 
reproduces networks of power, development is thus a particularly fitting subject for 
discourse analysis.  The term ‘development’ embodies competing political aims and 
social values and contrasting theories of social change.  The theoretical heritage of 
mainstream development is linked to the modernisation school which assumes that 
social change is unidirectional, progressive and moves society from industrial (or pre-
industrial in the case of least developed countries) to post-industrial.   
 
The chapter also discussed the post-structuralist critique of development.  According 
to the post-structuralist critique, there is an impasse in development studies which is 
said to have arisen as a result of widespread disillusionment with conventional 
development and development failure; the crisis and eventual eclipse of the various 
strands of socialism as alternative paths; the growing economic diversity of countries 
within the Third World; increasing concern with the need for environmental 
sustainability; the increasing assertiveness of voices ‘from below’; and the rise of the 
post-modern challenge to universalising theories and conventional practices of 
development (Blaikie, 2000; Schuurman, 1993a).  Post-development thinking has a 
lot of useful insights into the derivation of terms and the politics of the way they are 
used.  Post-development writers, despite some romanticising of pre-industrial 
societies (see, for example, Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997), do not deny the need for 
change.  What they argue is that in order for change to be undertaken differently, it 
needs to be conceived literally in different terms.  The post-development literature has 
posed two key questions that needs to be critically addressed: What form should 
development take? and What role can development play in reducing poverty? 
 
The rationale underpinning the deconstruction of development theory is that it is a 
prerequisite for its subsequent reconstruction.  Reconstruction is critically important if 
we are to address what David Korten (1995:21) calls the “global threefold human 
crisis” of “deepening poverty, social disintegration and environmental destruction”.  
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Indeed, the main reason to uphold the continuing importance of the idea of 
development is the vital need to address these issues.  Thus, there is still a need for 
action to tackle poverty.  Frantz Fanon, author of the Wretched of the Earth 
(1961:254), urged the Third World not to just imitate the ideologies, institutions and 
socio-economic structures of the West, because such an imitation would “be almost 
an obscene caricature”.  Rather, he  advocates that Third World countries must craft a 
viable alternative development model based on the realisation of human potential that 
is appropriate for their needs and circumstances (Fanon, 1961:255).   
 
The complex relationship between ICT, poverty and development is the focus of this 
dissertation.  In later chapters we will explore facets of the rhetoric and language of 
the ICTs for development discourse.  The objective is to show how the discourse 
surrounding ICT, poverty and development is: (i) replicating and extending a 
markedly Western worldview (based on the assumption of linear evolution along a 
Western trajectory) into the development sphere; (ii) normalising a dominant set of 
economic and political assumptions underpinning the dominant development 
paradigm; (iii) structuring marginality and replicating a wider discourse of 
marginalisation; and (iv) being framed within a broader discourse of modernisation 
and development, which is based on the assumption that a deficiency in knowledge is 
partly responsible for underdevelopment. 
 
The chapter is important because it lays the foundation for critiquing the certainties 
and universalising modernising ethos which continue to characterise mainstream ICT, 
poverty and development thought and policy.  Moreover, it sets the scene for the use 
of the Foucauldian power-knowledge framework addressed by discourse analysis to 
demonstrate: (i) how ICTs have become embedded in the conception and practice of 
mainstream development; and (ii) how the prevailing discourse masks31 submerged 
assumptions and interests regarding the nature and role of ICTs for development in 
the Third World.   
  
 
31 Ng and Bradac define masking as: “[T]he rendering of reality so as to make it appear different from 
the ‘actual’ way of the world.  Masking…presents…information in an incomplete or partial way under 
the cover of one or more literary masks…which cover particular aspects of reality by presenting or 
foregrounding other aspects of reality” (Ng & Bradac, 1993:145). 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Perspectives on the ‘Information Society’ and 
Social Studies of Technology 
 
3.1 Towards Conceptualising the Information Society 
3.1.1 Background 
In recent years the concept of the information society has been high on the political 
agenda of Western countries and their allied international organisations (see, for 
example, Bangemann, 1994).  At the highest level policy-makers have been 
concerned with the development of national and global strategies to arrive at the 
information society (Wajcman, 2001).  Within this context the concept of the 
information society encompasses the development and integration of high-speed 
communication networks and a set of core services and applications into global 
integrated networks.  Such networks potentially provide fully interactive access to 
network-based services within countries and across national borders.  The 
development of such an information infrastructure is expected to have important 
beneficial impacts on society as it stimulates economic growth and productivity, 
creates new economic activities and jobs, and improves quality of life (Martin, 1995; 
May, 2000; Zacher, 2000).  Although the context in developing countries differs 
markedly from that in the West, the above scenario has often been extrapolated as the 
appropriate trajectory for the development of the information society in developing 
countries (Van Audenhove et al., 1999). 
 
The dramatic advances in computer and telecommunications technologies such as the 
Internet, virtual reality and multimedia applications are increasingly regarded as 
ushering in a new form of society, i.e. the ‘information society’ (Servaes & 
Heinderyckx, 2002).  The force for change is provided by the synthesis of formerly 
disparate technologies such as personal computing, digital telecommunications, 
virtual reality, nanotechnologies and biotechnologies, as well as a range of 
multimedia applications and software which enable the creation, communication and 
dissemination of information in ways which transcend modernist conceptions of time 
and space.  The information society is considered to be a new social and economic 
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paradigm restructuring the traditional dimensions of time and space within which we 
live, work and interact.  Policy-makers are encouraging us to join the information 
superhighway at the nearest junction or risk being excluded from the social and 
economic benefits of the ‘information revolution’.  That senior policy-makers have 
become fervent evangelists of the capabilities of ICTs to revolutionise societies is 
seemingly unquestionable: non-participation in the creation of the information society 
is quite simply not a serious option (Wajcman, 2001).   
 
Webster (1995:Chapters 1-2) has classified five dimensions of the information society 
concept.  These are based on technological, spatial, economic, cultural and 
occupational criteria.  The technological dimension naturally emphasises the technical 
capabilities of ICT innovations.  It is assumed that the application of ICTs will 
permeate all aspects of life, along with breakthroughs in processing information and 
communication.  In the spatial dimension the focus is on connecting localities with 
ICT networks.  These networks are considered to have dramatically changed the 
organisation of time and space.  The core criterion of definitions based on changes in 
economic or occupational structures is the dominance of the ICT sector in the spheres 
of employment and production.  Finally, according to the cultural definition, we are 
living in a culture that is more engulfed by information than ever before. 
 
The history of the concept of the information society appears in a variety of sources, 
including the work of social scientists such as Daniel Bell (1973, 1988) and Alain 
Touraine (1971).  Whilst differing significantly in the contributions they make to the 
debate, they all share the notion that society is being transformed by a revolution in 
ICTs, which is creating an entirely new social structure.  Such advocates suggest that 
we are witnessing the demise of the industrial age with the replacement of capital and 
labour as the chief resources of economic growth by information and knowledge as 
the primary means of development.  For evidence of the emergent information age 
they would claim that traditional manufacturing industries no longer dominate the 
generation of national wealth in advanced societies.  In contrast, the information 
industry is rapidly expanding in terms of employment, investment and market share.   
 
The idea that advanced industrialised countries might be moving to a post-
industrialised society first took hold in the United States in the 1960s within a context 
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of increasing prosperity and automation.  The main proponents of this approach 
supported a historical model of development in the leading economies based on shifts 
in the composition of output and labour from agriculture to manufacturing to services 
to information activities (Bell, 1973; Porat, 1977; OECD, 1981).  Many writers tried 
to quantify the extent of progress countries were making toward achieving an 
information society by counting the number of people employed in information-
related occupations, which was defined in various ways (see Beyers, 1989; Kling, 
1990).32  Apart from change in employment, other factors associated with the 
information society included the diffusion of IT within society, the expansion of 
institutions dedicated to the creation and manipulation of information, and the growth 
in universal public information services (Katz, 1988). 
 
It would appear that the idea of the information society has its roots in the literature of 
‘post-industrialism’, a popular social science notion of the 1960s and 1970s which 
heralded the end of the industrial capitalist era and the arrival of a ‘service’ or 
‘leisure’ society.33  According to Bell (1980), by shortening labour time and 
diminishing the role of the production worker, IT actually replaces labour as the 
source of ‘added value’ in the national product.  Bell (1973) asserted that IT enhances 
the planned nature of knowledge production and its productivity.  Bell’s (1973) 
‘postindustrial society’ theory argued that organised knowledge was becoming the 
key ingredient in value-added and therefore in economic growth.  It is important to 
stress that for Bell (1973) it was not information and knowledge in general that were 
the key, but the application of Weberian34 rationalisation to the production of 
knowledge itself.   
 
                                                 
32 Simply aggregating occupations and counting totals, for instance, tells us nothing about the really 
significant information workers in society, nor does it enable us to differentiate the most important 
dimensions of information work (Webster, 1994). 
33 Especially the version of post-industrialism associated with Daniel Bell (1974).  Bell (1980) argues 
that the information society is developing in the context of post-industrialism.  He forecasts the growth 
of a new social framework based on telecommunications which “may be decisive for the way economic 
and social exchanges are conducted, the way knowledge is created and retrieved, and the character of 
work and occupations in which men [sic] are engaged” (Bell, 1980). 
34 Pertaining to, or characteristic of the German sociologist and political economist Max Weber (1864-
1920) or his philosophy or writings. 
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3.1.2 Perspectives on the Information Society 
In contrast to the optimists (such as Stonier, 1983; Toffler, 1991; Masuda, 1990; 
Jarillo, 1993), scholars such as Bloomfield and Coombs (1992) and Gandy (1989) 
provide a critical analysis of issues such as power, control and surveillance associated 
with ICTs.  Frissen (2000a:72), for instance, argues that ICTs are “a new strategy in 
the exercise of power which is being added to the bureaucratic arsenal”.  Further, 
Zuboff (1988) argues that information systems make discipline easier by extending 
monitoring facilities.  Beniger (1986) calls this the ‘control revolution’, thus 
emphasising the Orwellian35 properties of ICTs.  The pessimists challenge the 
optimistic accounts of utopian thinkers by implicating ICTs as technologies of 
control, surveillance, disinformation, propaganda and inequality.  Pessimistic 
commentators are convinced that ICTs lead to social control, dehumanisation and 
invasion of personal privacy, as opposed to the freedom, empowerment and equality 
promised by the optimists.  It should be clear that the optimists and pessimists are 
both engaged in what are essentially technologically determinist debates (i.e. ICTs are 
powerful, autonomous force acting on society) about social impacts of ICTs. 
 
In addition to the optimistic/pessimistic dichotomy, information society theorists can 
also be divided into: (i) those who endorse the notion of an information society as 
being an absolute break from the previous form of society (Bell, 1979, 1990; Poster, 
1990, 1994; Piore & Sabel, 1984; Goddard, 1992; Hirschhorn, 1984; Castells; 2001; 
Porat, 1978); and (ii) those who insist that we have only had the ‘informatisation’ of 
established relations (Schiller, 1987; Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1993; Giddens, 1985, 
1991; Webster, 1995, 2000).  The former stress the primacy of change whereas the 
latter focus on the primacy of continuity, i.e. ‘informatisation’ is the continuation of 
pre-established relations.  According to Webster: 
“On the one hand there are those who subscribe to the notion that in recent 
times we have seen emerge ‘information societies’ which are marked by their 
differences from hitherto existing societies.  Not all of these writers are 
altogether happy with the term ‘information society’, but in so far as they 
argue that the present era marks a turning point in social development they can 
be described as its endorsers.  On the other hand there are scholars who, while 
happy to concede that information has taken on a special significance in the 
                                                 
35 Characteristic or suggestive of the works of the English writer George Orwell; especially pertaining 
to or characteristic of the kind of totalitarian society portrayed in his futuristic novel Nineteen Eighty-
Four, which was published in 1949. 
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modern era, insist that the central feature of the present is its continuities with 
the past” (Webster, 1995:4-5, emphasis in original). 
 
Commentators have increasingly begun to talk about ‘information’ as a defining 
feature of the modern world.36  Much attention is now devoted to the ‘informatisation’ 
of social life: we are told that we are entering an ‘information age’ where a new 
‘mode of information’ predominates (Castells, 1998b, 2001).  Castells, in his trilogy 
The Information Age (1996, 1997, 1998a), depicts the present epoch as one in which 
the ‘information flows’ of a ‘network society’ transform relationships and ways of 
doing things.  Bell (1974) and Schiller (1987), in their very different ways, have been 
arguing for over a generation that information and communication issues are at the 
heart of post-war changes.  Schiller (1987), for example, argues that information both 
expresses and consolidates the interests of corporate capitalism.  
 
There are two common beliefs about the social impact of ICTs: first, a total socio-
economic transformation is predicted; and second, this transformation is generally a 
good and progressive movement.  The arrival of the information society appears as an 
entirely natural event, the outcome of progressive tendencies within Western 
industrial societies.  But granting it this ‘natural’ status forecloses debate over and 
action towards any alternatives to that dominant society.  It may be ‘revolutionary’ in 
its consequences, such that it represents a new era in human history.  But it is 
simultaneously the obvious and logical way forward.  Webster (2000) and Garnham 
(2000) challenge the assertion that technological innovations in information and 
communication have been an independent variable, giving rise to a new and 
distinctive information society that is radically discontinuous with earlier forms of 
social organisation.  Webster (2000) avers that technological choices are broadly 
understood as outcomes of social integration processes, and that the intensive 
contemporary ‘informatisation’ of social institutions is consistent and continuous with 
the trajectory of development of capitalism and the nation-state. 
 
                                                 
36 Early proponents of this view include: Masuda (1985:623), who envisaged an information society of 
which the axis would comprise information values rather than material ones, and an economy in which 
knowledge capital would predominate over material capital; and Stonier (1983), who perceived the 
dawning of a new information age for Western society, one as different from the industrial period as 
that period was from the Middle Ages. 
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Webster (1995) goes on to state that there is much rhetoric and a sense of fait 
accompli around the notion of an emergent information society.  He notes that 
information society theorists are characterised by a shared reliance on technological 
determinism of various hues.  He makes the valid and important point that there is no 
linear causality between more information and a new society.  He argues that 
information society theorists of the schism school single out “technology/technique as 
a primum mobile of change (which is over-simplistic) while simultaneously 
presuming that this technology/technique is aloof from the real world of value beliefs” 
(Webster, 1995:219).  For Webster (1995) information society theorists of the schism 
school are actually guilty of what they have attempted to avoid, viz. decontextualising 
and objectifying one aspect of social change whilst ignoring many others.  
 
The changes characterised by many commentators as announcing the ‘information 
society’ (Castells, 1996; Reich, 1992; Drucker, 1993) are better seen, not as heralding 
a new type of society, but as the continuation, consolidation and extension of 
capitalism.  While there is undoubtedly change taking place - and at a speed and with 
a reach hitherto unimaginable - it is for the most part a matter of the continuity, 
consolidation and extension of established relations.  Indubitably, information and 
knowledge, as well as advanced communications and computing technologies, are an 
integral element of these developments, but it would be wise to resist any notion that 
these are the cause, or even privileged factors, in the present maelstrom.  Following 
Webster (1995) and Lyon (1988), while there has undoubtedly been an information 
explosion, it is premature to conceive of an information society.  We should rather 
emphasise the ‘informatisation’ of established relations. 
 
3.1.3 Assessment 
The idea of an information society has been criticised on various levels by Lyon 
(1988).  Lyon (1988) draws our attention to three ideological aspects inherent in the 
notion of the information society.  The first is that the use of this seemingly 
descriptive term obscures the vested interests of those promoting the spread of ICTs.  
Information is often assumed to be free and owned by all, yet this is not the case in 
the real world.  Second, underlying contradictions of those who gain and those who 
lose, as with any other means of production, are not adequately considered when one 
focuses at the level of the information society.  Third, the arrival of the information 
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society is presented as a natural event and this forecloses debate about and action 
towards any alternative to this form of society: 
“The point is not to deny that it is happening, but rather to examine how it is 
orchestrated and by whom, to what purpose, and with what methods and 
effects” (Lyon, 1995:69). 
 
Preceding from the previous discussion, it is clear that the precision of the information 
society concept is open to question.  Garnham (2000), for instance, argues that the 
concept of the ‘information society’ fails as theory because it is internally incoherent 
and unsupported by evidence.  The term is not very helpful because it is largely 
meaningless and the vision bears very little, if any, relation to any concretely 
graspable reality.  It therefore does not operate as a useful concept for theoretical 
analysis, rather it operates as an ideology.  Garnham explains further: 
“Rather than serving to enhance our understanding of the world in which we 
live, it is used to elicit uncritical assent to whatever dubious proposition is 
being put forward beneath its protective umbrella” (Garnham, 2000:140). 
 
Though as a heuristic device the term ‘information society’ has some value in 
exploring features of the contemporary world, it is far too inexact to be acceptable as 
a definitive term.  In fact, the further one moves from grand national ICT plans and 
from futuristic forecasts of conditions prevailing within the information society, and 
the nearer one gets to actual social analysis in which technology is not perceived as a 
quasi-autonomous force acting upon society, the more questionable the concept of an 
information society appears. 
 
The new technologies are announced by futurists such as Toffler (1991) and Naisbitt 
(1998) and it is unproblematically presumed that this announcement in and of itself 
heralds the ‘information society’.  Such accounts of the information society adopt an 
apolitical attitude towards technological development.  ICTs are not value-neutral and 
their increasing pervasiveness within societies will have both beneficial and 
disadvantageous consequences.  A second and related disconcerting feature of the 
information society rhetoric is its deterministic quality.  This is the often unstated 
contention that technology is somehow independent of society and acts to define 
social and economic structures as well as determining modes of human action. 
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Our understanding of the complex relationship between the restructuring of capitalist 
modes of production and its technological consequences for social structural change 
are still relatively underdeveloped.  Whilst we cannot but be impressed by the changes 
being driven (although not determined) by informatics applications, it is still far from 
clear that these represent a distinct break with past capitalist societies.  The apolitical 
and frequently deterministic accounts of the information society ideologues, by 
envisioning the future of their virtually constructed realities, may well be guilty of 
overlooking the material impoverishment of large numbers of the world’s population 
by those both better equipped to take advantage of ICTs and also use it for the 
protection of their privileged position: a social and economic process which has much 
in continuity with previous epochs. 
 
There are a number of thinkers who envisage the arrival of an information society as 
something comparable to the agricultural or industrial revolutions.  Machlup and 
Mansfield (1983), Bell (1973) and Porat (1978) put forward the so-called ‘march 
through the sectors’ thesis, in which economic development occurs in a series of 
sequential and discrete movements between first agricultural and industrial societies, 
and then, industrial and information societies.  The technological determinism 
framing such explanations of change has been discredited time and again in social 
science circles (Dutton, 1996, Wyatt et al., 2000).  Contra to this trend, Perelman 
(1998) argues that ICTs simply reinforce existing capitalist power relations.  All that 
has happened is that the dominant forces in capitalist society have found new avenues 
of exploitation and new technological means by which to pursue them.  The primary 
driving force behind the extension of the network architecture that has been adopted 
by global capital is to allow global corporations to make larger profits and this process 
directly excludes a majority of the world from the newly emerging power structures. 
 
However, in the last few years there has been a step away from prioritising 
technology as the centre-piece of change.  The focus now appears to be on 
information/knowledge, rather than ICTs, as the key source of change.  It is noticeable 
that the shift towards emphasising information still retains deterministic 
presuppositions (Webster & Robbins, 1998).  In sum, announcements of the 
information society have typically been shrouded in vague statements about the ‘ICT 
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revolution’37 and its supposedly profound impact on contemporary societies.  Just 
what has changed, and what is principally responsible for the change, remains elusive. 
 
3.2 Manuel Castells’s The Information Age 
3.2.1 The ‘Network Society’ Thesis 
Castells’s (1996, 1997, 1998a) magisterial study is the most serious and sustained 
attempt yet to give the information society a firm theoretical as well as empirical 
grounding.  Castells finds his main inspiration in the work of Daniel Bell (1974) and 
Alain Touraine (1988) on post-industrialism, along with Nicos Poulantzas’s (2001) 
neo-Marxist writings.  However, Castells does not really abstract his findings into 
stringent theory comparable to, for example, Giddens’s Modernity and Self-Identity 
(1991).   
 
Over the last 15 years radical sociologists such as Beck (1992), Giddens (1990), Hall, 
Held and McGrew (1992), Harvey (1989, 1996) and Poster (1984, 1990) have 
attempted to offer their own critical understanding of a society that is globalised 
and/or informatised.  However, it is Manuel Castells (1996-1998) in his monumental 
work, The Information Age, who has captured the imagination of scholars with his 
radical notion of a globalised ‘network society’.  Castells has the following to say 
about the network society: 
“A network-based social structure is a highly dynamic, open system, 
susceptible to innovating without threatening its balance.  Networks are 
appropriate instruments for a capitalist economy based on innovation, 
globalisation, and decentralised concentration; for work, workers, and firms 
based on  flexibility, and adaptability; for a culture of endless deconstruction 
and reconstruction; for a polity geared towards the instant processing of new 
values and public moods; and for a social organisation aiming at the 
suppression of space and the annihilation of time.  Yet the network 
morphology is also a source of dramatic reorganization of power 
relationships…The convergence of social evolution and information 
technologies has created a new material basis for the performance of activities 
throughout the social structure.  This material basis, built in networks, 
earmarks dominant social processes, thus shaping social structure itself 
(Castells, 1997:470-471). 
 
                                                 
37 We would argue that widespread usage of the term ‘ICT revolution’ obscures the extent to which 
actual change has been, and continues to be, incremental. 
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The objective of this section is not to attempt to cover all of the substantive issues that 
Castells raises in his grand meta-narrative of the Information Age, which attempts to 
present a comprehensive view of the current-day global society in all its political, 
economic, social and cultural aspects, as well as its developmental tendencies.  The 
scale of such an undertaking is clearly beyond the scope of this study.  Rather, we will 
provide an overview of Castells’s work from the perspective of  his conceptualisation 
of the information society.   
 
Firstly, we will give an overview of the basic argument of The Information Age, 
which is organised in three volumes.  Volume One, The Rise of the Network Society 
(1996), provides an economic and sociological analysis of informationalism, which 
Castells describes as a new phase of capitalism.  Castells theorises on the changing 
nature of time and space (the ‘space of flows’ as opposed to the ‘space of spaces’)38 in 
the current era and puts forth his concept of the culture of real virtuality, which has 
been created by the Internet.39  Castells’s point is that it is within the framework of 
timeless, placeless, virtual symbolic systems that we construct categories shaping our 
behaviour.  In Volume Two, The Power of Identity (1997), Castells’s central 
argument is that globalisation and the proliferation of ICT have fundamentally 
undermined the institutions of civil society upon which the modern democratic order 
was founded and led to a new form of societal organisation, viz. the network society.  
This has resulted in the dissolution of existing shared identities and in reaction to this, 
the emergence of numerous singly focused resistance identities.  Finally, Volume 
Three, End of Millennium (1998), examines some of the social and political outcomes 
                                                 
38 One of Castells’s most notable and controversial ideas is the hypothesis that the new technologies 
have spawned a new experience of space and time; one characterised by a logic of networks and flows 
and of ‘timeless time’ rather than of people and places.  Castells’s conception of space-time 
compression and intensification, the increasing socio-geographic stretch of ‘society’, and the increasing 
domination of space over time follows from the work of Harvey (1989).  The ‘space of flows’ acts as 
the material support for time-sharing practices and dominant social arrangements.  The space of flows 
is seen as dissolving time “by disordering the sequence of events and making them simultaneous, thus 
installing society in eternal ephemerality” (Castells, 1996:467). 
39 According to Castells (1996:478), “information is the key ingredient of our social organisation 
and…flows of messages and images between networks constitute the basic thread of our social 
structure”.  Since ‘informationalism’ and the logic of information society pervade every aspect of life 
and consciousness, the network society also signals a shift to what Castells (1996) calls the culture of 
real virtuality, i.e. the replacement of stable formations of place, identity and nation with malleable, 
fungible ‘flows’ drawn across borders.  The ‘culture of real virtuality’ is a system in which people’s 
material and symbolic existence is fully immersed in a world of virtual images that become the 
experience itself. 
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of these generative processes, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of 
Asian economies, the geography of social exclusion and the global criminal economy. 
 
In his trilogy, The Information Age (1996, 1997, 1998a), Castells attempts to 
understand how technology, the economy and society are changing.  Castells attempts 
to construct a grand theory of technology-driven social change.  The central thesis is 
that a new techno-economic paradigm based on information networks has generated a 
new mode of development.  This new mode of development, which he calls 
‘informationalism’, is driven by ‘the action of knowledge upon knowledge’ and is 
oriented towards technological development and further knowledge generation.  This 
can be contrasted with the previous industrial mode of development which was 
oriented towards energy use and growth.   
 
Since IT networks provide the material foundation for Castells’s society, networks 
become the major structural form through which social power is formulated and 
exercised.  Power resides in social networks whose members can exploit the ability of 
IT systems to flexibly adapt to new opportunities.  The organisational morphologies 
most suited to informationalism are the ones that can behave like networks and switch 
and adapt to bring workers and managers online as they are needed.  The flexibility 
and adaptiveness of this new organisational morphology, and its dependence on ICT, 
means that the traditional importance of geographical location is being superseded by 
flows of information. This priority of ‘flows’ over ‘spaces’ means that 
competitiveness and relative development depend on being part of networks rather 
than being located in particular places.   
 
Castells argues that at the end of the 20th century a transformation of the social 
landscape of human life as profound as the industrial revolution was taking place.  
Castells traces the origins of the new global order in the intersection of three 
developments: the world-wide crisis in the political economy of capitalism in the 
early 1970s, the ICT revolution underway at the same time and the cultural 
transformations then being expressed in the so-called ‘new social movements’.  None 
of these developments, Castells shows, is reducible to the others or in some sense 
prime.  But the crisis of capitalism is the precipitating factor in the narrative.  The 
crisis is itself complex, taking different forms in different countries and regions, 
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though the reaching of limits of the Keynesian model of economic development, 
disturbing mixed patterns of productivity growth and the infamous oil crises are 
always involved.  Whatever its precise components, the crisis is experienced as a 
crisis of profitability.  In capitalist economies driven unrelentingly by the profit 
motive and geared towards maximising the competitiveness of their constituent 
economies, capitalists tried all available means to increase profits, including reduction 
of production costs, especially labour costs.  But the preferred strategy, Castells 
argues, was the broadening of markets and the fight for market share to absorb a 
growing capacity in the production of goods and services. 
 
Castells discusses at length the new geography of social exclusion and the power 
dynamics structuring the network society.  These two themes are briefly discussed 
below. 
 
3.2.1.1 Social Exclusion 
The concept of networks is used by Castells (2001) to explain the growing social 
inequality within and between nations.  The ability to take part in networks, and the 
position one takes in them, is partly determined by one’s cultural capital, which is, in 
turn, related to one’s education level.  Castells (1998a) provides a devastating critique 
of growing economic and social polarisation which has resulted in pockets of 
systematic social exclusion he terms black holes of informational capitalism (Castells, 
1998a:162).  These black holes largely overlap with areas whose people lack the 
equipment, tools or training to access or use ICT.  This is part of a broader 
polarisation between generic labour, i.e. those who have non-reprogrammable skills 
and thus can be replaced by other workers or machines, and self-programmable 
labour, i.e. those who through education have acquired the capability to constantly 
redefine the necessary skills for a given task and to access the sources for learning 
these skills. 
 
Castells (1998a:Chapter 2) introduces the concept of the ‘Fourth World’, and includes 
under this one term Africa and the inner-city ghettos of the United States.40  Castells’s 
                                                 
40 In this age of informationalism Africa suffers from what Castells (1998a, 2001) calls ‘technological 
apartheid’.  Africa is kept out of the information revolution because of various modern shortcomings, 
including an unreliable supply of electricity, a shortage of telephone lines and a lack of human and 
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Fourth World reveals the extent to which the phenomena traditionally associated with 
the less developed countries are global, i.e. produced by universalising processes and 
found everywhere.  The author attributes the growing inequality in developing 
countries to the rate of rural-urban migration and the growing inequality in the 
industrialised countries to the various declines in the welfare state, wage levels and 
labour’s bargaining power.  The Fourth World is a world of rising inequality and 
social exclusion that is part and parcel of informational capitalism.  The analyses of 
‘Africa’s plight’, of ‘dual America’, of the over-exploitation and slaughter of children 
the world around, and of the shanty-towns in the mega-cities of Asia and Latin 
America, reveal the “black holes of informational capitalism” (Castells, 1998a:162).  
These black holes “concentrate in their density all the destructive energy that affects 
humanity from multiple sources” (Castells, 1998a:162).  In them, the “homeless, 
incarcerated, prostituted, criminalized, brutalized, stigmatized, sick and illiterate” are 
killed as subjects of the network society even before they die prematurely and often 
violently (Castells, 1998a:162). 
 
The socially excluded lack positions within networks, and lack the power to enter 
them, and consequently form the excluded social underclass at the national level and 
the excluded Fourth World at the level of nation states.  “The rise of informationalism 
in this end of millennium is intertwined with rising inequality and social exclusion 
throughout the world” (Castells, 1998a:70).  While the historic causes of their 
exclusion vary from case to case, they nevertheless form an entity, the Fourth World, 
because they all entered the Information Age in positions in which their exclusion is 
reinforced by the structural dynamic of informationalism.  The new ability is to 
effectively switch off areas which are viewed as non-valuable from the perspective of 
the dominant social logic, embedded in the ‘space of flows’, which has created black 
holes of informational capitalism: regions from where there is, statistically speaking, 
no escape from suffering and deprivation. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
technical support.  The region’s inability to keep up with the rest of the world’s technology also leaves 
its commodity production lagging behind the rest of the developing countries. 
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3.2.1.2 Power  
In the network society power lies in “information exchange and symbol manipulation, 
which relate social actors, institutions and cultural movements” (Castells, 1998a:368).  
Power resides in institutions that exploit ICT networks to transmit inter-linked 
cultural codes.  As a result power has drifted away from the traditional institutions of 
the labour union, the political party and the geographically constrained nation state 
towards global investment banks, news networks and NGOs like Greenpeace. 
 
For Castells (1998) power has become primarily a matter of symbolic manipulation; 
elites are ephemeral and situation specific, while classes decline in significance.  In 
opposition to the Net, i.e. the universalism and instrumentalism of global networks, 
stands the Self, i.e. the individual defined and self-defined increasingly in terms of 
primordial identities (gender, race, religion and ethnicity) and engaged in identity 
movements that have become the central arena of political struggle in this end-of-
millennium time.   The antithesis of the Net is a social reaction to the way modern 
informational capitalism strips away identity.  The instrumentalising and globalising 
nature of economic life disrupts older forms of community and creates the need for 
people to reinvent themselves.  They typically do this by building on new social 
movements. 
 
3.2.2 A Summary and Critique 
The main theme of Castells’s (1996, 1997, 1998a) work is the emergence of a new 
society, a ‘network society’, that is fundamentally different from societies of the past.  
This contemporary society has emerged as a result of a number of processes 
converging in the last half of the 20th century including, most importantly, the 
restructuring of capitalism and the introduction of new ICTs.  Both of these processes 
have reacted to, facilitated and accelerated processes of globalisation.  They also 
operate inexorably on each other.  The force of these processes has been so great that 
Castells (2001) postulates a fundamental change in social relations, in cultural milieus 
and in the form and experience of power in society. 
 
Each mode of development is said to possess a structurally determined performance 
principle around which technological processes are organised.  According to this 
schema, the most recent informational mode of development is oriented towards the 
 83
accumulation of knowledge and higher levels of complexity in information 
processing.  Castells (1998b) claims that the defining characteristics of the new 
technological paradigm that has emerged is its pervasiveness, flexibility, networking 
logic and informational nature.  The basic theme is that the transition from industrial 
society to an informational society, in which the creation of wealth is based on the 
production, manipulation and control of information, leads to massive changes in all 
areas of human life.  Within societies it leads to the disruption of traditional forms of 
work and even of family life.  It also leads to greater inequalities between social 
groups, regions, countries and continents, with the increasing wealth and power of 
those with access to the new technology, and the increasing impoverishment of those 
excluded from it. 
 
By assembling the morphological elements of the information/network society, 
Castells (1996, 1997, 1998a) wants to establish that he has discovered not just some 
socio-economic consequences of technological change, but a new mode of human 
existence developing out of a new mode of production, albeit within capitalism.  
While Castells (1996:5) goes to great lengths to deny being a technological 
determinist, the theory that technology determines the mode of production, which, in 
turn, determines social relations clearly is.  In Castells’s trilogy there is no serious 
analysis of how society influences technology.  The technological determinism and 
reductionism seriously constrain the explanations on offer in the trilogy.  The 
technological reductionism reveals itself in an over-emphasis on ICTs and the 
constant invocation of networks as underlying causal mechanisms even for 
phenomena in which evidence of their causal presence is dubious.  ICT networks are 
important but they do not, and cannot, explain everything.  Techno-economic 
paradigms are cumulative and build on one another, and are not alternatives that 
displace all previous generations of technology (see Dosi et al., 1988; Archibugi, 
Howells & Michie, 1999; Archibugi & Michie, 1997; Lundvall, 1995). 
 
Moreover, Castells’s argument that informational capitalism is necessarily a ‘new’ 
form of structural exclusion within a ‘new’ form of society is questionable.41  While 
                                                 
41 The academic debates centre on whether the information society should be understood as a new 
social system or merely an extension of past social forms.  Lyon (1995:56) notes that we should ask 
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the new ICTs have impacted on our society and forms of social organisation, this does 
not necessarily mean that a ‘new society’ with ‘new’ forms of exclusion has emerged.  
Instead this new technology has put additional strains on people who are already 
living within the global structures of poverty.  It is premature to focus exclusively on 
the new ‘black holes’ that are emerging when we have yet to deal with long-term and 
resilient social structures that have created poverty far wider than simply ‘information 
poverty’.  Information poverty is nothing new, but rather an additional dimension of 
being poor. 
 
Castells provides, at best, an incomplete picture of the social processes he studies.  
Technological change is not governed simply by its own internal logic.  The factors 
influencing the rate, directions and specific forms of technical change are social, 
cultural, political and economic as well as technical.  It is to this theme that we now 
turn. 
 
3.3 Social Shaping of Technology 
Edge critiques traditional approaches to the social analysis of technical change, 
emphasising the extent to which such approaches “imply a technological determinism, 
use a simplified linear model of the innovation process, tend to treat the technology as 
a ‘black box’, and are preoccupied with the ‘social impacts’ of a largely 
predetermined technical ‘trajectory’” (Edge, 1995:14, emphasis in original).  
Following MacKenzie (1984) and Winner (1977), Edge defines technological 
determinism as: 
“a belief…which holds that technical change is a prime cause of social 
change, and that technical innovations are themselves ‘uncaused’ – in the 
sense that they arise only from the working out of an intrinsic, disembodied, 
impersonal ‘logic’, and not from any ‘social’ influence” (Edge, 1995:14, 
emphasis in original).   
 
In other words, technological determinism is the notion that technological 
development is autonomous of society; it shapes society, but is not reciprocally 
influenced.  In more extreme varieties of technological determinism, the technology is 
seen as the most significant determinant of the nature of a society.  The reality, of 
                                                                                                                                            
“does IT bring about a new society without precedent, or does it rather help to intensify certain 
processes in today’s society of which we are all too aware”? 
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course, is that technologies do not, in practice, follow some predetermined course of 
development.  Also, although technologies clearly have impacts, the nature of these is 
not built into the technology itself, but varies from one culture to another, depending 
on a broad range of social, political and economic factors (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 
1999). 
 
The main problem with the ‘information society’ idea is the suggestion that 
technology is somehow ‘outside’ society, impinging upon it.  At a lecture entitled The 
Question Concerning Technology, delivered in 1955 in Germany, Martin Heidegger 
made the following prescient remark:  
“[W]e are delivered to [technology] in the worst possible way when we regard 
it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we 
particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of 
technology” (Heidegger, 1977:4). 
 
That said, we should not replace technological determinism with social determinism.  
The view we subscribe to is that the ‘social’ and the ‘technological’ cannot be 
separated.  New technology is as much a social product as the shape of society is a 
technological product.  There is a constant interplay between ‘technology’ and 
‘society’ (Lyon, 1988:viii).   
 
The technical attributes of the new ICTs increasingly dominate explanations of 
contemporary change and development.  There is a discernible tendency to understand 
or conceptualise these technologies in terms of technical properties and to construct 
the relation to the sociological world as one of applications and impacts.  The 
challenge for social scientists is not so much to deny the weight of technology, but 
rather to develop analytic categories that allow us to capture the complex 
interweaving of technology and society.  It would appear that the ‘social shaping of 
technology’ approach is beginning to take root in the social sciences (Klein & 
Kleinman, 2002; Rip, 1995; Pinch & Bijker, 1987; Werle, 1998; Woolgar, 1991).  In 
the ‘social shaping of technology’ approach technical change is no longer seen as 
autonomous or external to society, but as influenced and shaped by its societal 
context.    The social shaping of technology approach ‘serves as a needed corrective’ 
to technological determinism (Winner, 1993). 
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Kling (2000:217) points out that “much of the writing about the social changes that 
these new…ICTs will or could catalyze has relied on oversimplified conceptions of 
the relationship between technologies and social change”.  We would, therefore, argue 
that understanding the place of these new technologies from a sociological 
perspective requires avoiding a purely technological interpretation and recognising 
the embeddedness and the variable outcomes of these technologies for different social 
orders.  Granovetter (1992:53) refers to the argument of embeddedness as: 
“the argument that the behavior and institutions to be analysed are so 
constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is 
a grievous misunderstanding”.   
 
The embeddedness position is associated with the ‘substantivist’ school in 
anthropology, identified especially with Karl Polanyi (1944; Polanyi, Arensberg & 
Pearson, 1957) and with the idea of ‘moral economy’ in history and political science 
(Thompson, 1971; Scott, 1976).  ICTs are embedded in both the technical features and 
standards of the hardware and software, and in actual societal structures and power 
dynamics (Latour, 2000; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999).  Sassen (2002) makes the 
case that electronic space is embedded and not a purely technological event.  Thus 
electronic space is inflected by the values, cultures, power systems and institutional 
orders within which it is embedded.   
 
Anderson (1985:57) argues that when technology is transferred from one society to 
another, it reflects the “social values, institutional forms and culture” of the 
transferring party.  Anderson (1985) explains technology as a social process, where 
technology is embedded in social, cultural and economic relations of particular 
societies.  In this view, technology both reflects and influences the society that 
produces it.  Moreover, although an important influence in shaping society, 
technology is only one among several.  Technological development is seen as being 
shaped by social, economic and political relations which in turn often produce 
indeterminate outcomes.  From this perspective the explanation for the uneven spread 
of ICTs within and between societies is to be sought from a clearer understanding of 
the relationship between technological development and differential opportunities for 
exercising power. 
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3.3.1 The Constructivist Tradition 
Work in the constructivist tradition is concerned with the way organisational, 
political, economic and cultural factors influence the process of technological 
innovation and change (MacKenzie, 1996).42  It provides an alternative to 
technological determinism by proposing that technologies are shaped by the 
conditions of their creation and use.  In other words, technology and society are 
mutually constitutive.  On the other hand, it also denies simple social determinism by 
maintaining that technology does not emerge from a single social determinant.  
Instead technological change evolves through choices (not necessarily conscious) 
between different technological options.  These choices are in turn shaped by social 
factors.  Thus there are always a number of possible outcomes (Williams & Edge, 
1996). 
 
The constructivist approach introduces a concept of technology as interpretively 
flexible, i.e. expressing the notion that technological artefacts are both culturally 
constructed and interpreted (Woolgar, 1996).  Orlikowski proposes the notion of the 
duality of technology: 
“[T]echnology is created and changed by human action, yet it is also used by 
humans to accomplish some action” (Orlikowski, 1992:405). 
 
Based on the application of Giddens’s (1979, 1984) structuration theory, Orlikowski 
(2000) suggests that the notion of technology embodying fixed characteristics and 
thus leading to the perception of technology as an embodiment of structure is 
misleading.  First, because the presumption that technologies embody specific stable 
structures is problematic, as technologies are not static and they are continuously 
modified by their users.  Second, Orlikowski (2000) argues that only technologies-in-
use, when this use is routinised and habitual, can be seen as rules and resources 
(structures), not the technology itself.  That is, the structural consequences of 
technology come through habitual use.  In this study, we see technologies as indeed 
socially shaped and, although embodying certain fixed characteristics, they can be 
(and will be) appropriated and re-interpreted by users in different ways.  This means 
                                                 
42 Within the constructivist tradition there are three main schools: (i) the systems approach (Hughes, 
1986, 1987); (ii) actor-network theory (Callon, 1986); and (iii) the social construction of technology 
approach (Bijker, Hughes & Pinch, 1987; Bijker & Law, 1992). 
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that the consequences of technologies are not pre-determined but are enacted through 
their use.   
 
Technology can only be successful when it makes sense within the existing social 
relations within which it is to function, suggesting the crucial role played by the 
translation and even re-invention of technology into everyday contexts of use (Grint 
& Woolgar, 1997).  This articulation between technologies and the context of use 
through which their meaning and utility are constructed is, of course, a key theme 
within social studies of science and technology (McLaughlin et al., 1998).  The 
‘technical’ is always socially shaped and the socio-technical system can be re-
invented, reconfigured in different contexts and take on greater or lesser degrees of 
‘mutability’ and ‘mobility’ (Mol & Law, 1994; Latour, 2000).  In this way 
technologies reflect the ‘congealed social relations’ (Grint & Woolgar, 1997) and 
heterogeneous networks that inform their construction (Akrich, 1992).  The 
deconstruction of the ‘technical’ to reveal its ‘socially congealed’ properties does not 
mean that the technical has a materiality and functionality that has no value; indeed, 
one might argue that the more technologies are shaped by the social gauntlet of their 
construction, the more robust they are likely to be (Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons, 
2001:Chapter 11). 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
There are two different views regarding the speed and extent of change brought about 
by ICTs in society.  At one extreme, current developments are seen as a continuation 
of the past, while acknowledging that substantive changes, both qualitative and 
quantitative, are taking place in society (Beniger, 1986; Mulgan, 1991; Webster, 
1995).  At the other end, authors such as Bell (1988) and Castells (2001) declare that a 
fundamentally new kind of society (i.e. an ‘information society’) is emerging, in 
which ICTs have an all-pervasive revolutionary potential.  Both strands in the debate 
do accord information a special place in understanding contemporary society, but 
differ with respect to their perception of the relationship between technology and 
social change.   
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It is the contention of this study that we are simply witnessing the effects of a new and 
powerful technology on historically determined social structures (Webster, 2000; 
Thomas, 1995; Edge, 1995; Lyon, 1988).  The study subscribes to Webster’s (1995) 
argument that the assumption that a technological innovation results in social change 
is the wrong point of departure to study technology and society.  Webster (1995) 
proposes that it is misleading to separate the social realm from technology (i.e. to see 
no influence of beliefs and values on technological developments) and then to bring 
these two together when describing the ‘impact’ of technology on society. 
 
In this chapter we attempted to assess both the analytical and evaluative claims of the 
‘information society’ thesis.   In doing this we have aimed to steer clear of the ‘hype’ 
of futurologists such as Toffler (1991) and Naisbitt (1998) and evangelical ‘techno-
boosters’ such as Negroponte (1996) and Tapscott (1996), and have focused more on 
the historical and contextual assessment of the information society concept found in 
the scholarly social science literature.  Scholars like Manuel Castells and Daniel Bell 
have argued that we have or are set to enter an information society based on criteria 
ranging from technology, to occupational changes, to spatial features.  Though these 
criteria appear at first glance robust, they are in fact vague and imprecise, incapable 
on their own of establishing whether or not an information society has or will arrive 
sometime in the future.  The sum of the changes inherent in what proponents refer to 
as the information society, which supposedly amounts to a shift beyond industrial 
capitalism, is at best debatable.  It seems more a matter of faith than hard evidence.   
 
In the next chapter we will show that the ‘hype’ surrounding the information society, 
and the accompanying technological determinism, has filtered into the ICT, poverty 
and development literature.  The ‘technology-driven modernisation’ model of 
development advocated by the ICT optimists is grounded in assumptions of 
technological determinism which allow the complex political factors influencing 
poverty and inequality at local, national and international levels to be hidden, or at 
least to go largely unquestioned.  The implicit assumption that the new technologies 
are apolitical and value-neutral, and that technology is separate from society and acts 
to define social structures and human interaction, is also quite pervasive in the ICT, 
poverty and development discourse of the international donor community and of 
many Third World governments, including South Africa.   
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The problematic nature of apparently neutral assumptions of technological 
development and the emergence of a ‘new’ information society has been underscored 
in this chapter.  Such a purely technological reading of technical capabilities 
inevitably neutralises or renders invisible the material conditions and practices, place-
boundedness and thick social environments within and through which these 
technologies operate.  Failure to address these assumptions may lead social scientists 
to become complicit in distracting attention away from the very ‘real’ global 
economic, social and cultural inequalities, to ‘virtual’ inequalities which merely hide 
an unwillingness to address the core failings of the ‘development’ paradigm. 
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Chapter 4 
ICT, Poverty and Development: A Discursive Analysis 
 
4.1 ‘Digital Divide’ or ‘Development Divide’? 
4.1.1 ICT Diffusion Data 
The ‘digital divide’ has become a primary indicator of unequal opportunity, measured 
in terms like number of telephones, Internet hosts or personal computers (PCs) per 
thousand inhabitants.  The ‘digital divide’ advocates argue that access to the new 
ICTs remains (extremely) unequally distributed across and within societies (Quibria et 
al., 2003:811).43  An overview of the regional digital divide, including not only 
essential products but also essential inputs into the generation and maintenance of 
digital services, is provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below. 
 
The picture sketched in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 is, of course, changing rapidly.  The 
evolution of Internet access has been remarkable.  In Africa the number of Internet 
subscribers grew from under 15,000 to over 400,000 between 1996 and 1999 
(Rodriguez & Wilson, 2000).  In Latin America the figure increased from 5.8 to 13.3 
million between 1998 and 2000 (US Internet Council and ITTA Inc., 2000).  For a 
number of reasons, however, it is hard to know whether a rapid rate of growth in 
access to certain products or services indicates significant progress toward narrowing 
digital divides, among countries or within them.  The figures cited in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2 do not imply a reduction in the North-South divide, since progress remains faster 
in advanced industrial countries than in the rest of the world.  Moreover, until 
research is carried out in specific local settings, there is a paucity of information on 
the kinds of sectors, groups and individuals that are actually gaining access to new 
ICTs in developing countries.  Furthermore, figures such as those in Table 4.1 
measure consumer access, not the effect that increasing use of ICTs may have on the 
economy or on people’s livelihood.  When mobile phones, fax machines, computers 
                                                          
43 ICTs can be defined as “electronic means of capturing, processing, storing and communicating 
information” (Heeks, 1998:3).  ICTs are based on digital information held as binary digits, i.e. 1s and 
0s, and are comprised of computer hardware, software and networks. The term ICTs is used, rather than 
information technology (IT), because it reflects the convergence of digital computing, broadcasting and 
telecommunications.  Whereas IT like computers largely focus on the processing of information, ICTs 
undertake both processing and communication of information.  The new ICTs refer primarily to 
Internet-based technologies and mobile phones. 
 92
and software are imported (as they are in most African, Latin American and Middle 
Eastern countries) there is nothing inevitably ‘developmental’ about their availability.  
And since it is usually costly to use the Internet in developing countries, the figures 
also say little about how frequently the new Internet-based tools are being used. 
 
Table 4.1: Selected technological outputs by region (1992-1997)44 
 
Region Television 
sets 
Mobile 
phones 
Personal 
computers 
Internet 
hosts 
Fax 
machines 
GDP per 
capita (US$) 
OECD 522.57 102.21 195.37 138.25 31.43 20,114 
Middle East 254.87 24.58 32.16 5.31 7.06 8,941 
East Asia 164.08 24.36 46.10 6.26 6.34 6,271 
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
242.03 14.43 20.33 5.69 9.05 5,636 
Eastern 
Europe & 
Transition 
Economies 
288.47 6.34 28.21 6.99 2.27 4,027 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
47.76 1.61 5.05 0.50 1.66 1,972 
South Asia 32.70 0.69 4.72 0.13 1.60 1,764 
Note: Figures for Internet hosts are per 10,000 people; all others are per 1,000 people.  GDP figures are 
calculated at purchasing power parity. 
Source: Calculations based on UNDP (1999) and World Bank (2001) Development Indicators Database 
 
                                                          
44 More recent figures are available for certain variables; however, their accuracy is questionable.  
Therefore, they have not been included in this table. 
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Table 4.2: Selected technological inputs by region (1992-1997) 
 
Region R&D as % of 
GDP 
Technicians Scientists Telephone 
mainlines 
GDP per 
capita (US$) 
OECD 1.8 1,326.1 2,649.1 517.9 20,114 
Middle East 0.4 177.8 521.0 136.5 8,942 
East Asia 0.8 235.8 1026.0 140.3 6,271 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
0.5 205.4 656.6 197.4 5,636 
Eastern 
Europe & 
Transition 
Economies 
0.9 577.2 1,841.3 167.9 4,027 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
0.2 76.1 324.3 24.3 1,972 
South Asia 0.8 59.5 161.0 14.2 1,764 
Note: Technicians and scientists are per 1 million persons; telephone mainlines are per 10,000 persons.  
GDP figures are calculated at purchasing power parity. 
Source: Calculations based on UNDP (1999) and World Bank (2001) Development Indicators Database 
 
Table 4.3: Information and communication infrastructure  
(1995-2001) (per 1,000 people) 
 
Country groups* Personal 
computers 
Internet 
users 
Telephone 
mainlines 
Mobile 
phones 
 1995 2001 1995 2001 1990 2001 1995 2001 
Income Breakdown         
High-income OECD 188 363 34 360 455 574 89 690 
Developing countries 14 34 2 37 52 104 4 94 
Least developed n.a. 4 n.a. 3 3 7 0 8 
         
Region Breakdown         
North America 273 623 68 467 555 660 108 382 
Western Europe 174 325 30 345 445 572 84 747 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 26 81 5 65 130 232 4 199 
East Asia & Pacific 82 158 14 177 148 222 36 278 
Middle East & North Africa 28 62 1 61 89 147 16 163 
Latin America & Caribbean 17 49 1 63 66 145 9 142 
South Asia 0 4 0 4 5 20 1 9 
Sub-Saharan Africa n.a. 12 n.a. 9 9 19 1 30 
Note: n.a.=data not available; 0=less than half the unit shown 
* The classifications are based on the definitions in the World Bank’s (2001) Development Indicators 
database, but all countries with population below one million are excluded.  The group average has 
been calculated when data for at least half of the countries are available. 
Source: Calculations based on ITU (2002). 
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Table 4.4: World Internet users by region (September 2002) 
 
Region No. of Internet users % of total 
Europe 190.91 million 31.5 
Asia/Pacific 187.24 million 30.9 
Canada & USA 182.67 million 30.2 
Latin America 33.35 million 5.5 
Africa 6.31 million 1.0 
Middle East 5.12 million 0.8 
World 605.60 million 100 
Source: Nua.com (2003:n.p.)  
 
Table 4.3 displays data about ICT equipment and its use.  It is apparent that, at 
present, the average developing country does not have large-scale access to ICT 
technology.  The number of PCs and Internet users per 1,000 people is ten times 
higher in the rich countries than in the developing countries.  The number of 
telephones is six times higher, and the number of mobile phones seven times higher.  
But the contrast is even more stark when the rich countries are compared with the 
least developed ones.  The fact is that there are as many Internet users in Finland, with 
a population of 5 million, as there are in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a population of 643 
million.  Table 4.4 shows that Africa accounts for only 1% of the world’s Internet 
users.   
 
The world can be divided into three broad blocks in terms of access to the information 
and communication infrastructure.  The two extreme blocks in terms of ICT density 
are North America and Western Europe, on the one hand, and South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, on the other.  The rest of the world falls in between, East Asia and the 
Pacific being the leading region within this block.  Table 4.3 also highlights the rapid 
growth in the use of PCs, the Internet and mobile phones in the 1990s.  In developing 
countries the number of PCs increased twofold, whereas the Internet and mobile 
phone densities rose twenty-fold in the second half of the 1990s. 
 
Not much is known about the patterns of ICT diffusion across countries and about the 
determinants of its adoption.  The importance of human capital, openness to trade and 
direct investment, telecommunication infrastructure and Internet access costs are 
emphasised in existing studies (Caselli & Coleman, 2001; Lee, 2001; Shih, Kraemer 
& Dedrick, 2001; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002).  But even their impacts seem to be 
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different between the developed and developing countries.  It is evident that given the 
dissimilarities in the production and consumption profiles between these two groups 
of countries, the optimal ways to benefit from ICTs are likely to be different as well.  
More research is needed on the factors affecting the adoption of ICTs. 
 
The enormous gap in the accessibility of basic telephone infrastructure has been 
recognised for many years.  In 1984 the ‘Maitland Report’ set a target for the 
beginning of the 21st century for all the world’s people to be brought within easy 
reach of a telephone, observing that: 
“in the industrialised world telecommunication is taken for granted as a key 
factor in economic, commercial and social activity and as a prime source of 
cultural enrichment…The situation in the developing world is in stark 
contrast…Neither in the name of common humanity nor on grounds of 
common interest is such a disparity acceptable” (Independent Commission for 
Worldwide Telecommunication Development, 1984, Executive Summary).   
 
In 2003, despite the advent of new mobile satellite services and considerable 
investment in some countries, little has changed. 
 
There has been a recent surge of literature on the so-called ‘digital divide’ between 
developed and developing countries (UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 1999; TeleCommons 
Development Group, 2000; UN, 2000).  It is argued that the failure of the South to 
harness the benefits of the ongoing technological revolution in the North places 
developing country populations at an ever increasing disadvantage in a globalising 
world.  The concern for ‘bridging the digital divide’ is often validated by emphasising 
the potential to ‘unleash the power of the Internet’ or indeed the information 
superhighway.  In the words of Bellamy and Taylor (1998:63), “the power of ICTs 
lies in their proleptical vision: one that promises new opportunities”.  The 
development challenges that such generalised debate presents can appear 
overwhelming.  Moreover, rather than highlighting priority areas for intervention, 
‘facts and figures’ about the digital divide tend to obscure and oversimplify complex 
and long-standing development concerns.   
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4.1.2 Discourse on the ‘Digital Divide’ 
The discourse on the digital divide is characterised by an emphasis on the notion of 
(equal) access to the new ICTs, with policies oriented towards the stimulation of the 
adoption of these technologies.  The digital divide discourse articulates a dichotomy 
between ‘information haves’ and ‘information have-nots’, between ‘information rich’ 
and ‘information poor’ and between those who use or benefit from the Internet and 
those who do not (InfoDev & the Centre for Democracy and Technology, 2002:13; 
Roche & Blaine, 1996:6).45  As such the danger exists that the articulation of this 
discourse becomes, and/or remains, a ‘digital myth’ (Frissen, 2000b), which is 
predominantly technology determined, thus reducing the social complexity to the 
virtual binary.  Not only does this dichotomy imply a static approach to technological 
innovation, but it also offers a structuring of the social on the basis of a technological 
criterion.  Wolf (1998:26) argues that the metaphor of the ‘digital divide’ 
“masquerades as a quick fix to social inequality while ignoring the factors that lead to 
inequality”.  Moreover, Mosco (1998) points out that narratives about the ‘digital 
divide’ tend to be simplistic, deterministic and mythical in scope. 
 
‘Digital divide’ type debates tend to focus on large-scale infrastructure development 
and the extension of information and communication services from the centre to the 
periphery.  However, impoverished and marginalised areas in most developing 
countries are far from becoming integrated into ‘global knowledge partnerships’.  ICT 
infrastructure still reflects historical and colonial relationships and Internet 
connectivity tends to strengthen existing inequalities within countries and regions, 
favouring educated urban elites over the rural population (UNDP, 2001). 
 
The notion of a digital divide is, in many ways, unhelpful.  It has given too much 
emphasis to the technology and has thus drawn attention away from the other divides 
and inequalities that hamper development. The digital divide is symptomatic of a far 
more serious development divide, constantly limiting possibilities for progress among 
most inhabitants of the planet.  New ICTs by themselves cannot bridge this divide and 
                                                          
45 The phrase ‘information poverty’ recurs in the literature on ICTs for development as a new form of 
poverty affecting those who are unconnected through ICTs (D’Orville, 2000; Richardson, 1998).  
Ending this form of poverty is the motivation behind many ICT projects in the Third World.  At any 
rate, ‘information poverty’ is nothing new, but merely another dimension of being poor.  Poverty is 
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if not employed in a conscious effort to improve equity, they can worsen it.  It is 
important to recognise the complexity of the problem at hand and to steer clear of any 
simple recipes for progress in the field of ICT, poverty and development.  The 
likelihood that poor people in developing countries can improve their life chances is 
often sharply limited by a complex network of constraints ranging from unresolved 
problems of poverty and injustice in their own societies to the structure and dynamics 
of the global economic system.  When designing ICT programmes in developing 
countries, these broader constraints must be explicitly taken into account.  If the 
surrounding context for proposed innovation is not sufficiently analysed and remedies 
for pressing socio-economic problems addressed, many well-meaning efforts will 
have short lives and minimal results. 
 
4.2 Multilateral ICT Strategies 
Multilateral (and bilateral) providers of development assistance such as the World 
Bank and the United Nations are engaged in urgent policy debates concerning the 
economic growth and poverty reduction potential of ICTs.  ICT is in fact conceived of 
as a new development paradigm by the international donor community (Hilbert, 
2001).  This wellspring of international support for ICTs is a clear indication of the 
ways in which its role is perceived within the development industry.  Among the most 
salient international initiatives are the World Summit on Information Society under 
the auspices of the ITU46; the G-8’s Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force); the 
UN ICT Task Force; UNDP’s Information Technologies for Development Initiative 
(Info21); the World Bank’s Global Information and Communication Technologies 
Department (GICT); and the World Bank’s Information for Development (InfoDev) 
initiative.  The UN ICT Task Force (2002:1), for example, is mandated to: 
“lend a truly global dimension to the multitude of efforts to bridge the global 
digital divide, foster digital opportunity and thus firmly put ICT at the service 
of development for all”.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
increasingly accepted to be multidimensional and therefore strategies at every level need to be more 
flexible to incorporate the heterogeneous contexts and livelihoods of the poor (Carter & May, 2001). 
46 The ITU is organising a World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the aim of which is to 
develop a common vision and understanding of the ‘information society’ and to draw up a strategic 
plan of action for concerted development towards realising this vision (see http://www.itu.int/wsis/).  
The WSIS  aims to bring together Heads of State, Executive Heads of UN agencies, industry leaders, 
NGOs and civil society.  The summit takes place in two stages, first in Geneva in December 2003 and 
then in Tunis in November 2005. 
 98
Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN, links the digital divide to development, 
poverty and inequality when he states: 
“One of the most pressing challenges in the new century…[is to]…harness 
this extraordinary force of ICTs, spread it throughout the world, and make its 
benefits accessible and meaningful for all humanity, in particular the poor” 
(Annan, 2001:1).  
 
As Servaes (2000:xi) remarks in the introduction of Walking on the Other Side of the 
Information Highway, many developing country governments have attributed a 
leading role to ICTs in their strategies for economic growth and are being encouraged 
by multilateral agencies such as the IMF and World Bank to do so.  For example, the 
World Bank’s GICT Department’s mission is as follows: 
“Information and communication technologies…are opening new 
opportunities for developing economies.  These opportunities will assist 
developing countries bridging the digital divide through economic growth, 
increased jobs, and improved access to basic services.  GICT was created to 
leverage the strengths of the World Bank Group in addressing these needs and 
taking advantage of these opportunities” (GICT, 2000:n.p.). 
 
The G-8 Heads of State at their Kyushu Okinawa Summit in July 2000 created the 
DOT Force, whose mandate is to encourage the use of ICTs since: 
“they offer enormous opportunities to narrow social and economic inequalities 
and support sustainable local wealth creation, and thus help to achieve the 
broader development goals that the international community has set” (DOT 
Force, 2001:3).   
 
The UNDP (1999) is another recent high-profile convert to the digital cause.  Thus, 
even those who deal in poverty eradication and sustainable development have now 
come around to accepting a technocratic route to their objectives.  Various recent 
international ICT-related programmes have been initiated in the context of the UN 
system.  ‘ICT for development’ is one of the key areas of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) Internet gateway on Science 
and Technology for Development (UNCTAD, 2003).  This gateway hosts the 
homepage of the UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development 
(UNCSTD), provides continuously updated information on best practice in the 
assessment, transfer, adaptation and mastery of technology, and also offers 
opportunities for partnering and networking in science and technology. 
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Moreover, at its fifth session, held in Geneva in 2001, the UNCSTD selected as the 
theme for its inter-sessional period 2001–2003 ‘Technology development and 
capacity-building for competitiveness in a digital world’ (UNCSTD, 2001).  The 
programme for this inter-sessional period is being carried out by three panels 
addressing specific aspects of the main theme, with particular attention being given to 
the assimilation and application of ICTs for the purpose of enhancing competitiveness 
of developing countries and transition economies.  The first of the panels is studying 
indicators of technological development for ‘stocktaking’ purposes.  The second is 
exploring the link between foreign direct investment (FDI), technology development 
for capacity building and strategic competitiveness.  Lastly, the third panel is 
concentrating on the transfer, diffusion and use of ICTs. 
 
The first panel met in Geneva in May 2002 to identify the most important factors 
affecting technological mastery and development for competitiveness, to attempt to 
measure them, and to provide a rational explanation of their determinants (UNCSTD, 
2001).  In addressing the need for technology indicators it was decided that countries 
should be grouped into those that were ‘catching up’, ‘keeping up’ and ‘getting 
ahead’.  It was agreed that the key objective for collecting a set of indicators was to 
identify concomitant policies and programmes. 
 
Besides the activities of the UNCSTD, it is also important to mention the launch in 
early 2002, by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in partnership with the 
Markle Foundation and in consultation with public and private institutions and 
individual expert partners, of the Global Digital Opportunity Initiative (GDOI, 2003).  
This initiative is attempting to increase the impact of ICTs in achieving developing 
countries’ development goals by building on the strategic framework developed by 
the Digital Opportunity Initiative at the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa. 
 
The G-8 countries, for instance, have emphasised that “IT empowers, benefits and 
links people the world over [and] access to the digital opportunities must, therefore, 
be open to all” (G-8, 2000:1).  The expectation is that the extension of global 
telecommunication networks and the use of the Internet can provide a new means for 
developing countries to benefit from their participation in the global economy.  
Deployment of advanced ICTs is expected to provide a major stimulus for economic 
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growth.  Despite the very substantial gaps in the availability of the new technologies, 
developing countries that do gain access are expected to benefit substantially. 
 
In its 1998/1999 World Development Report, entitled Knowledge for Development, 
the World Bank framed poverty as a lack of knowledge and positioned its poverty 
alleviation objectives in an analysis of the ‘information society’ approach: 
“Knowledge is like light.  Weightless and intangible, it can easily travel the 
world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere.  Yet billions of people still 
live in the darkness of poverty – unnecessarily” (World Bank, 1999:1). 
 
The World Bank’s (1999:1) new approach to development is based on the assumption 
that “poor countries – and poor people – differ from rich ones not only because they 
have less capital but because they have less knowledge”.  The focus on the role of 
knowledge in development processes is the result of new understandings about the 
relationship between economic growth and the application of knowledge.  It assumes 
that knowledge is a neutral, manageable commodity that can be shared freely and 
easily, and that ICTs can provide the appropriate tools for accessing, archiving, 
transferring and communicating information and knowledge.  Critics of the new 
knowledge-based development paradigm argue that this approach to development is a 
convenient vehicle to promote a neo-liberal agenda (Coraggio, 2001; Mehta, 2001).  
The mode of development is linear/evolutionary and entails the diffusion of 
knowledge from more developed to less developed societies. 
 
In May 1996 the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) adopted 
its African Information Society Initiative (AISI): An Action Framework to Build 
Africa’s Information and Communication Infrastructure.  As AISI is viewed as a 
guiding framework for multiple donors, the document may shed some light on the 
way the African ‘information society’ is conceived of by some key players.  AISI is 
seen as an ambitious, long-term programme directed at the utilisation of ICTs to 
stimulate overall economic and social growth in Africa (ECA, 1996a).  It was put in 
place through the collaborative action of a network of partners, among which include 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) and the World Bank.  
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ECA’s African Information Society Initiative suggests that Africa is on the brink of a 
new era, that of the ‘information society’.  AISI defines the information society in 
terms of technological innovations and its potential for change: 
“Africa’s information society [is] a term used to refer to the pervasive benefits 
to all Africans of proactive policies on information and communication 
technologies” (ECA, 1996b). 
 
The prospects for development through the investment in and use of ICTs are 
presumed to be tremendous (Hafkin, 2002).  The reasoning is quite similar to that in 
Western countries.  Prices of new ICTs are becoming increasingly affordable as costs 
continue to fall.  Cheap ICTs offer developing nations the opportunity, not only to 
leapfrog entire stages of development in setting up their own information 
infrastructure and applications (ECA, 1996b), but also to accelerate development in 
all spheres of African economic and social activity (ECA, 1996a).  This is a rather 
optimistic view which puts ICTs and information at the centre of social and economic 
change.  This view seems to be based on four basic, and highly questionable, 
assumptions: (i) that ICTs are neutral and easily transferable; (ii) that information as 
such is neutral (and equals knowledge); (iii) that Africa and its citizens, by means of 
ICTs, have access to information which is necessary and sufficient to accelerate 
development; and (iv) that information will be free or near to free in the ‘information 
society’.  These assumptions correspond with modernisation theory’s perception of 
the relation between ICTs, information and development (Pool, 1990:283).  The AISI 
Action Framework can be criticised on the grounds that it is technologically 
deterministic, does not pay attention to the complexity of social reality and for failing 
to analyse the origins of technological innovation (Tsui, 1991). 
 
The assumption that access to information is necessary and sufficient to accelerate 
development is questionable.  Many problems of development are structural problems 
of distribution and power.  Information as such may have little impact on such 
problems and, indeed, could aggravate them under certain conditions by increasing 
the resources available to urban and rural elites (Hudson, 1984:154).  Furthermore, 
the AISI equates information with knowledge.  The generation and application of 
knowledge depends upon much more than access to a global information 
infrastructure and the information it contains (Mansell & Wehn, 1998:323).   Many of 
the promises made by proponents of ICTs conflate and confuse notions of 
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‘information’ and ‘knowledge’, with these terms often being used interchangeably 
and uncritically.  As the Panos Institute highlights: 
“Knowledge is not the same as information; it is the sense that people make of 
information.  Knowledge is infused with the insights, expertise and capacities 
of those who have it.  People need to be able to make their own sense of 
information – to interpret it, to evaluate it, to reach their own understanding of 
it” (Panos Institute, 1998:n.p.). 
 
The AISI Action Framework does not really deliberate this point, as it mainly seems 
to stress that connectivity to an information infrastructure is sufficient in producing 
applicable knowledge.  An associated assumption underlying the view of the AISI’s 
Action Framework is that information will be available for free or at very low prices.  
This assumption runs counter to an observable evolution of growing 
commercialisation of information (Schiller, 1996:Chapter 1).  The shift observed in 
the last two decades from public service policies towards more market-guided policies 
has already left its mark on the availability of public as well as scientific information 
(Webster, 1995; Hamelink, 1997).  The picture the AISI presents of a future 
information society and the easy road towards its completion is over-optimistic and 
maybe even dangerous, as it presents a view in which investment in the right 
technology seems sufficient for development. 
 
4.3 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
As a result of the power ICTs have gained in the development industry, a particular 
discourse has been generated which functions in a self-perpetuating fashion, leaving 
little or no space for any critique.  This discourse then goes on to feed the power from 
which it derives its existence.  What this section seeks to do is to analyse in 
Foucauldian terms the manner in which the power of ICTs operates and to 
problematise the ways in which this informs the development agenda. 
 
ICTs have been vested with immense power within the development agenda.  As ICTs 
claim this position of power, concurrently a rationale is provided which eulogises the 
specific characteristics of these technologies making them worthy of such investment.  
Chief amongst them are computer networks (Castells, 1996), the quintessential 
manifestation of ICTs, which supposedly: (i) create an equitable ‘information 
society’; (ii) provide ways in which the marginalised can be integrated; and (iii) 
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empower people as individuals and as communities (Negroponte, 1996; ECA, 1996a, 
1996b; G-8, 2000; World Bank, 1999).  This compares interestingly with Foucault’s 
analysis of: 
“a new ‘economy’ of power, that is to say, procedures which allowed the 
effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, 
adapted and ‘individualised’ throughout the entire social body” (Foucault, 
1980:119).   
 
In this reading of the way in which power operates within a society ICTs not only 
wield power in themselves, but also become exemplary vehicles for the exercise of 
power within larger structures.  Their inherent virtues then become the very ways in 
which the pervasive aspect of the exercise of power is accentuated and 
operationalised.  Foucault’s web of power then finds a potent manifestation, perhaps 
not envisaged by him in the terminology he created. 
 
When Foucault (1980:119) spoke of power in its extant form in current social 
structures, he observed that it needed to be “considered as a productive network which 
runs through the whole social body” going on to create systems of self-perpetuation.  
Although his usage of the word ‘network’ could be seen as an inadvertent play on 
words in the context of ICTs, it is this productive aspect of power which needs to be 
analysed further to gain a better understanding of the implications of ICTs being 
projected as a critical vehicle of development.  Foucault (1980:119) contends that: 
“What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that…it 
traverses and produces things, it…forms knowledge, produces discourse”.  The power 
of ICTs indeed does have this productive aspect.  As it operates within the 
development agenda, it produces knowledge and discourse in a myriad of ways.  It is 
this productive aspect of power that operates in a cyclical fashion to accentuate the 
power of ICTs further. 
 
Of late, ICTs have become the vehicle for bringing the ‘light of knowledge’ to those 
that are poor and excluded (World Bank, 1999:1).  A paternalistic assumption is 
lodged in the minds of many of those who push ICTs on developing countries, viz.: ‘if 
poor people could know more of what we already know, their lives could get better’.  
Through such a strategy existing power structures seek to replicate and diffuse their 
notions of knowledge within the larger social body.  In many ways it can be seen as 
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an evangelical exercise.  In practice all it does is further its own cause, while 
simultaneously detracting from issues that are often more fundamental to the 
problems of poverty and injustice. 
 
While the creation of discourse is an essential constitutive element of power, 
Foucault’s analysis of the nature of discourse shows that, while it seeks to be liberated 
from any control, at the same time institutions seek to constrain and control it.  It is in 
this way that it acquires power.  Another form of social exclusion as expounded by 
Foucault (1980) was synthesised in the division created between reason and its other, 
madness (or irrationality).  A manifestation of this division within the context of the 
ICTs for development discourse is the way in which the discourse does not allow any 
dissent  to creep into it.  The language of the discourse is structured in a manner 
which operates within the rather simplistic oppositions of 
development/science/progress versus tradition/reaction/stasis.  If there is hesitance in 
accepting the intrinsic goodness of ICTs in development, it is a sign of being 
retrogressive, of not being able to grasp the importance of the technologies, of being a 
Luddite, and of being anti-developmental. 
 
The premature celebration of ICTs contributes substantially towards the creation of 
the ‘information society’, which ignores the single most important reason behind 
underdevelopment – people are not poor because they are ignorant, but because they 
are embedded in social structures which are deeply unjust – politically, economically 
and socially.  Emphasising a single technology approach for resolving problems 
which are deeply embedded within the social fabric is unlikely to achieve much 
success. 
 
The oft-repeated example which is mentioned in support of introducing ICTs in rural 
areas is the access to information, such as the market prices of agricultural produce on 
a given day to sellers of such produce, that ICT can provide (UNCTAD, 2002; World 
Bank, 1999; UNDP, 2001).  What the example does is to create a very attractive 
image of rural society marching towards progress aided by technology.  In truth, this 
example completely ignores the illiterate landless migrant labourers who are 
important constituents of the rural economy, and for whom no benefits will accrue, 
either directly or indirectly.  Effectively, the introduction of these technologies only 
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strengthens the logic that those who already occupy spaces of privilege within a 
society gain most from any further investment in their area of operation.  
 
Thus, one of the main functions of this discourse is to act as a vehicle for presenting a 
case for change in the way that society must be regulated – a call to action.  Threats 
can be avoided, and opportunities taken, but only if we act now.  The UNCTAD 
(2002), World Bank (1999) and UNDP (2001) reports, for example, construct a crisis 
and a resolution, i.e. new approaches to regulation.  The way in which the crisis is 
constructed becomes a key part of the discourse.  At key points in the debate over 
ICT, poverty and development, the dominant discourse systematically foregrounds the 
nature of the threat as being primarily economic.  The privileging of the economic 
parameters of the debate naturally influences the solutions offered.  The fear is that of 
the Third World falling technologically further behind the advanced industrial 
economies. 
 
The dualism of threat/opportunity is not uncommon in the literature examining the 
impact of new ICTs, especially regarding the Internet (Mansell, Samarajiva & Mahan, 
2002).47  By doing so, the political debate calls upon a discourse of technological 
change that is well established within society and which acts to reduce the 
complexities surrounding the introduction of new technologies to a choice between a 
set of distinct binary oppositions.  The discourse’s binary quality acts to narrow the 
scope of debate by making it much harder to present technologically mediated social 
change as incremental (Hakken, 1999:25).  Rather, we need to be able to talk of the 
ways in which ICTs interact with multiple social, technical, cultural and political 
relations to produce an unavoidably mixed set of outcomes. 
 
Closely tied to the discourse of threat/opportunity is the discourse of technological 
determinism.  The continued strength of technologically deterministic discourse is 
owed, in part, to the simplistic and powerful message it conveys – a vision that is 
easily communicated and can be used to generate emotive and powerful arguments.  
Technological change is not only presented as radical and double-edged, it is also 
                                                          
47 In 1996 the World Bank stated: “If African countries cannot take advantage of the information 
revolution and surf this great wave of technological change, they may be crushed by it.  In that case 
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constructed as unavoidable.  Technology is seen as an external force outside of 
governmental control, which is nominalised (Fairclough, 1992) - that is, constructed 
almost as if it possesses social agency.  The notion is one of technology as an 
exogenous variable to which society and individuals must adapt.  Thus, governmental 
action is restructured to a reaction against the ‘realities’ presented by the new ICTs, 
limiting governments’ responsibility to that of attempting to control a situation they 
had no hand in creating and in which they cannot change the technologically 
determined ground rules (Chilton & Schaffner, 2002).  It is this discourse which has 
been drawn upon most often by neo-liberals in their largely successful attempts to 
deregulate and liberalise the telecoms markets.  Thus, the only relevant information 
policy is one of ‘privatising, liberalising and deregulating’.  
 
Another discourse which runs throughout the debate is the discourse of ‘market 
determinism’.  The market is not only constructed in the liberal pluralist sense - in that 
a free market allows the most effective mediation of power - it is also constructed as 
an unavoidable reality.  In a similar manner to technology, the market is nominalised, 
given social agency and presented as an external force outside governmental control.  
Thus, this discourse interacts with a technologically deterministic discourse to 
construct a set of socio-political relations whereby all governmental action must work 
within the boundaries defined by the market and technology. This construction of the 
inherent limitations in governmental action draws upon a well-established discourse 
of globalisation within society, whereby the role and influence of the state diminishes 
drastically as ICTs facilitate the creation of a powerful global marketplace.  However, 
to date, the evidence to support the demise of state power remains fairly thin on the 
ground.  For example, Weiss concludes: 
“There are now sufficient grounds to suggest that globalisation tendencies 
have been exaggerated, and that we need to employ the language of 
internationalisation to understand better the changes taking place in the world 
economy.  In this kind of economy, the nation-state retains its importance as a 
political and economic actor” (Weiss, 1998:212). 
 
The unavoidable reality of market forces constructed by the deterministic market 
discourse is itself heavily dependent on a deterministic view of technology.  The two 
                                                                                                                                                                      
they are likely to be even more marginalized and economically stagnant than they are today” (World 
Bank, 1996:n.p.). 
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discourses interact with one another, such that it is the power and pervasiveness of 
technology that has facilitated the evolution of the market. 
 
Although usually remaining on the periphery of flows of knowledge and wealth, 
developing countries are nonetheless integrated within global networks of capital, 
production, trade and communication increasingly mediated by ICTs (Castells, 1996). 
This recognition has resulted in: (i) the inclusion of ICTs as important elements of 
developmental strategies and interventions (Gillespie & Cornford, 1997; UNCTAD, 
1997, 2002; UNESCO, 1996); and (ii) unprecedented levels of investment in ICTs by 
major development donors, often at the expense of alternative forms of initiative 
(Jensen, 2001).  The discourse surrounding the appropriate use of ICTs in developing 
countries is thus becoming part of development discourse itself, as macro-level 
development policy options are becoming increasingly linked to the shape of 
technological evolution (Perez, 1988). 
 
The current direction of the ICT, poverty and development discourse, while detracting 
from the fundamental issues of inequality, also causes the diversion of scarce 
resources into a sector whose potential is debatable.  In a situation where critical 
choices must be made regarding the allocation of scarce resources, the importance 
being accorded to ICTs is open to question.  Therefore, a more circumspect approach 
to the promotion of ICTs for development is appropriate.  ICTs can prove to be useful 
in the development arena, but they must be recognised as just another tool rather than 
a ‘technology fix’. 
 
By presenting these discourses we do not mean to suggest that they imply unanimity 
of opinion among the debate’s participants, as it is the very process of discursive 
conflict that requires extensive construction of competing discourses.  Rather, the 
discourses identified dominate the debate by establishing and maintaining what 
Fairclough (1992, 1995:29) refers to as an “order of discourse”.  That is, they 
structure, frame and in some ways restrict discussion by contributing to a set of 
discursive norms or conventions that frame the set of discursive events which make 
up the totality of the policy debate. 
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4.4 The Modernisation Paradigm 
The World Bank (1999) shares the Modernisation School’s view that what prevents 
modernisation in developing countries is a lack of access to the kind of knowledge 
that Western developed countries possess.  The dominant approach to ICTs in 
development has been framed by modernisation theory, which perceived development 
spreading from the West to the rest of the world, crucially aided by modern ICTs.  It 
tends to assume, along with “much scholarship about knowledge and 
development…that the main task is to transfer commoditised chunks of information 
and knowledge from one place to another” (Chataway & Wield, 2000:817). 
 
In an economic context developing countries are often diagnosed as suffering from a 
‘lack of information’, especially relating to the functioning of markets and market 
opportunities (World Bank, 1999).  This perspective is synchronous with neo-liberal 
concerns over globalisation and integration.  To assume that ICTs can help provide 
useful and ‘developmental’ information simply by transcending physical distance at a 
greater speed and reduced cost is to ignore essential phenomenological concerns that 
highlight alternatives to positivism. 
 
The dominant discourse’s ‘belief’ in the potential of ICTs is largely based on the 
assumption that access to ICTs and its content equals economic and social 
development.  This assumption is based on a ‘technology push’ vision which 
emphasises the “technical orientation of ICT-intensive change programs”, and tends 
to steer the debate towards “apolitical and asocial analysis” (Taylor, Snellen & 
Zuurmond, 1997:3).  This view is inspired by a technologically deterministic mindset 
in which technology is seen as the sole enabler of social action.  International 
organisations such as the World Bank, UNDP, UNCTAD, ITU and ECA play an 
important role in the spread of the dominant discourse.  These organisations are able 
to influence policy formulation as well as the actual implementation of ICTs in 
developing countries through several mechanisms, viz. programmes in policy 
assistance; institution-building and private sector support; specific ICT-related 
projects; international and regional conferences; and the dissemination of documents.  
Most activities can be situated in the field of connectivity, technology transfer and 
training.  Little attention is given to the development of information and content.  And 
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only few initiatives contribute to the development of an institutional framework 
putting Africa in a position to regulate, adapt and innovate ICTs to its own needs and 
priorities for sustainable development.   
 
Many analyses of ICTs focus on the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ of 
information and knowledge.  They raise concerns about the exclusion of certain 
groups, nations or social sectors, which are left behind in the so-called ‘information 
revolution’.  The problem is examined internationally as a North-South disparity, or 
sociologically as the result of economic marginalisation.  In either case, it calls for the 
rich (North, power-holders) to include and empower the poor (South, excluded), who 
risk further impoverishment as a consequence of global changes (see Annis, 1991; 
Greenberg & Goodman, 1996; D’Orville, 1996; Cairncross, 1997; IDRC, 1997a, b).  
Strategies then seek improved accessibility through national ICT programmes and 
donor-driven development projects of increasing public awareness, business support 
activities, infrastructural development, etc. 
 
The telos of development stands revealed in the progress-oriented notion of 
development (Apffel-Marglin, 1996).  And it is this ideology of progress which is 
entrenched in the ICT, poverty and development discourse.  The ‘techno-optimists’ 
emphasise the potential of new ICTs to promote the development of the Third World, 
and call for intensive efforts to transfer technologies, management practices and 
organisational processes from the richer countries.  The transfer-of-technology model 
dominates development thinking.  Panagariya even suggests that: 
“given the cost savings offered by Internet technology and the relative ease 
with which it can be provided, they [i.e. developing countries] can now skip 
several stages of technological growth through which developed countries had 
to go.  Stated differently, developing countries are much further inside the 
current technological frontier and, therefore, have larger potential benefits 
from moving to it” (Panagariya, 2000:5). 
 
Similarly, Negroponte (1996) thinks that ICTs have a leapfrogging characteristic that 
will enable the poor to catch up.  For many, the new ICTs promise to leapfrog the 
Third World into post-industrial informationalism (see notably Cairncross, 1997; 
Burton, 1997; Annis, 1991).  As latecomers, developing countries can embrace 
existing technologies developed elsewhere and skip intermediate stages, allowing 
them to save on considerable costs of development.  The ‘leapfrog’ route presumes 
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that progress must follow a predefined Western model of development, and 
technology can help nations jump over intermediary stages in that evolutionary path 
(Giovannetti, Kagami & Tsuji, 2003; Mansell & Wehn, 1998).   
 
The East Asian model of rapid industrialisation and technological catch-up, as 
exemplified by the four dragons, (i.e. Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), is 
frequently put forward as evidence of the transformative potential of ICTs (see, for 
example, UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 1999).  Significantly, these ‘miracle’ countries 
not only expanded at a fast rate, but also did so without any worsening of income 
distribution.  More recently these four countries were followed by emerging South-
East Asian economies such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, which also recorded 
sustained and rapid growth of per capita income, prior to the Asian financial crisis of 
1997.   
 
The Asian dragons and the second-tier NICs like Malaysia have created one of the 
largest markets in the world for telecoms equipment and services.  Jussawalla claims: 
“All four Asian Dragons – Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan – 
invested heavily in their telecommunications sectors and subsequently reaped 
huge benefits in the form of export earnings…They opened up their 
economies to foreign participation by promoting technology transfer and using 
it to their maximum advantage for skill formation.  In fact, the success of these 
countries has brought about a shift in global production trends such that a high 
percentage of IT products, including semiconductors, are now manufactured 
on their shores” (Jussawalla, 1999:222). 
 
How did the four dragons of East Asia learn to innovate in electronics?  According to 
Hobday (1995), within the firms subcontracting, original equipment manufacture 
(OEM) mechanisms acted as a training school for latecomers, enabling them to 
overcome entry barriers and to assimilate manufacturing and design technology.  
Essentially, the needs of export customers drove the pace of learning and acted as a 
focusing device for technological assimilation, adaptation and innovation.  We argue 
that the success of the East Asian dragons can be attributed to a number of virtuous 
and mutually reinforcing linkages between interconnected factors, inter alia: (i) 
government-led capitalist development; (ii) high government investment and 
ownership of industry, with initially substantial foreign aid and little FDI; (iii) 
strategic integration with the world economy; (iv) high private and public investment 
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in human resources and almost no reliance on foreigners; (v) a short period of 
generalised infant industry protection followed by export-led growth combined with 
selective ISI and government promotion of those industries that would become the 
core export industries in the next phase of dynamic comparative advantage; (vi) 
agrarian reform; and (vii) favourable geo-political factors (Kay, 2002). 
 
This success story cannot be generalised to the Third World at large (Cline, 1982; 
Wade, 1996), it originated in a particular context shaped by history, geopolitical 
location, socio-cultural factors and resources, just to name a few factors, which differ 
markedly from the rest of the Third World.  Thus, policy prescriptions based on 
generalising across countries at very different levels of social, economic and 
institutional development are likely to be seriously misleading.  Further, it does not 
take full cognisance of historical and situational relativism and of the multifaceted 
nature of the development process.  It would, therefore, seem highly questionable 
whether the particular history of one country or region can, or even should, be 
emulated by another country or region at another point in history.  Indeed, such 
reasoning would require an ahistorical epistemology.  The East Asian model should 
therefore only be regarded as models of economic development for heuristic purposes. 
 
It cannot be taken for granted that a successful export-oriented ICT industry will 
benefit the broader and pressing development problems of a poor country.  The trickle 
down effect of the impressive success of the Indian software industry is still to be felt 
(Avgerou, 2002; Bhatnagar, 2003).  In addition, although South-East Asian countries 
such as Malaysia and Thailand, through their reliance on FDI, have succeeded in 
high-technology exports, which in large part combine low-skill assembly activities 
with high-technology imported parts, both countries have yet to develop a diversified 
manufacturing base (UNCTAD, 1996).  In particular, their early orientation towards 
electronics contrasts with the slow development of most capital goods industries, such 
as iron and steel, non-electrical machinery, metal products and transport equipment.  
The continued heavy reliance on imports of both capital and intermediate goods 
suggests that the second-tier NICs have still to embark on the kind of upgrading 
process in the medium-technology sectors pursued earlier by the first-tier NICs (i.e. 
the four dragons) (Hentschel, 1992).  Many of the elements of the technological 
infrastructure needed to allow domestic firms to compete in this middle-range of 
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exports are still missing.  These countries have still to put in place a well-developed 
local supplier network, incipient clusters of high-technology activities and an 
adequately trained workforce; they also lack any significant industrial R&D, either 
within the enterprise system or in the public sector (Jomo, 1997).  In the absence of 
these linkages, local firms in key sectors such as electronics continue to concentrate 
on the supply of secondary materials and services, such as packaging and 
transportation. 
 
The lack of comprehensive and integrated industrial policies, as well as of adequate 
human resources planning and other related policies to widen and deepen the skill 
base of the economy, also casts some doubts about the medium-term industrial 
upgrading of the second-tier NICs (Jomo, 1997).  Furthermore, Malaysia’s high 
reliance on FDI is raising concerns about a dualistic economic structure with 
insufficient technological and supply links between the MNC-dominated export 
sectors and the domestic economy (Lall, 1995).  Just as worrying is that the limited 
product diversification of the export sector, the predominance of simple assembly and 
finishing operations and the low level of technological capabilities in this sector have 
given rise to the fear that China, Vietnam and other lower-wage South and South-East 
Asian countries could take away these sources of growth momentum, unless measures 
are introduced to deepen the domestic industrial base and improve the quality of 
workers, managers and infrastructure in line with rising production costs (UNCTAD, 
1996; Jomo, 1997).  The footloose character of FDI and the difficulties in sustaining 
the pace of export growth have been giving rise to serious concerns over the longer-
term growth prospects of these countries, particularly in view of their large current 
account deficits and vulnerability to interruption of capital inflows.  
 
If the optimistic expectations about the impact of advanced ICTs on economic growth 
and development are to be met, the technological gaps between industrialised and 
developing countries, that is the ‘digital divides’, need to be reduced.  This will 
require a rapid process of technological catch-up.  In the absence of any conclusive 
empirical evidence this view rests mainly upon rhetorical arguments about the socio-
economic outcomes that may be associated with the transfer of advanced ICTs.  
Moreover, technological leapfrogging is more difficult to achieve than it first appears 
(Steinmueller, 2001).  If technological leapfrogging is to be successful, it must be 
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feasible to bypass stages of capability building or investment that the industrialised 
countries have had to pass through in the process of economic development.  This 
theory implies a linear and highly predictable set of stages of development (vide 
Rostow, 1971). 
 
Technology is presented as the source of profound and far-reaching change within 
society.  It is seen as the prime generator of the ‘information society’.  What the 
‘information society’ actually represents remains unclear and continues to be a site of 
discursive and social struggle.  Hakken (1999) speaks of the need to critically 
interrogate the concept as a descriptor of change.  He specifically criticises simplistic 
yet widespread notions of an ‘ICT revolution’, which often embody a series of 
presumptions about the impact of technology on society.  He suggests that these 
presumptions act effectively as a block to a disciplined examination of ICTs and 
social change.  Mansell (1993), for example, has examined the way in which political 
rhetoric, which tends to treat technical progress as uniformly beneficial to all facets of 
society, can differ greatly from the reality on the ground.   
 
The promises of the new ICTs are formulated within a broader discourse of 
modernisation and development, which is based on the assumption that a deficiency 
in knowledge is partly responsible for underdevelopment.  This way of looking at 
knowledge and development harks back to the modernisation literature of the 1960s, 
where the main problem was also seen to lie with the diffusion of Western knowledge 
to the rest of the world.  ICTs are regarded as a neutral, transparent media which 
function as a conduit for the information and knowledge required to develop.  Authors 
like Lyon (1994), Davies (1996), Sardar (1998), Escobar (1999) and Shiva (1997, 
2000), however, who are critical of the mainstream development paradigm, find the 
prospect of accelerating the spread of Western knowledge through the new ICTs 
alarming.  They see it associated with social exclusion, surveillance and corporate 
control, and the expansion of the capitalist economy into ever more remote parts of 
the globe.   
 
The pessimistic accounts based on structural analysis of global inequality and 
globalisation of capitalism does, however, offer a glimmer of hope for those who 
want to see the new ICTs being used as a space for empowerment and alternative 
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development visions.  Because the Internet makes possible ‘horizontal, global 
communication’ which is very difficult to censor or control (Castells, 1996:352), it 
can also be used by locally-based and virtual communities to represent themselves, to 
network with progressive NGOs for human-centred development, or to gather support 
for political struggles that challenge national or global elites.  Similarly, Escobar 
argues that ICTs can become sources of empowerment and emancipation as the 
technology offers “unexpected opportunities that groups at the margin could seize to 
construct innovative visions and practices” (Escobar, 1995a:225). 
 
The ICT, poverty and development discourse has been affected by the intimate three-
way association of ICT, modernisation and Western rationalism (Shields & Servaes, 
1989; Avgerou, 2000; Tettey, 2000).  Many ICT designers tend to draw from and 
work within a rationalist tradition (Mundy, Kanjo & Mtema, 2001).  As Frissen states: 
“ICT is an unambiguous artefact of modernisation.  The dominant code of 
meaning attached to, and even embodied in, ICT is functional rationality” 
(Frissen, 2000:157). 
 
More generally, technology is conceived as an objective and rational entity, not as 
something (as described in the previous chapter) that incorporates particular political, 
social and cultural values.  The tendency toward rationality in information system (IS) 
design is reinforced by the rationality of the modernisation agenda that carries 
innovations from industrialised to developing countries.  It is also reinforced by the 
‘discourse of rationality’, i.e. the way in which users and others feel it is only 
legitimate to discuss ICT issues in rational terms, suppressing more political discourse 
(Heeks, 2001, 2003).  This combination can readily be seen at work in the agendas of 
many donor agencies.  For them, the overall purpose of development is the creation of 
economic rationalism within developing country economic systems.  ICTs are seen as 
a key tool in achieving this and become part of a technically rational and 
technologically determinist agenda that focuses on the ‘digital divide’ and on ICT 
infrastructure (Wilson & Heeks, 2000).  Any ICT problems are, in turn, seen as best 
resolved by a resort to market rationality (Heeks & Mundy, 2001; Heeks, Mundy & 
Salazar, 2000). 
 
According to Leo Marx (1999), the historical roots of current utopian views of 
technology are found in the 19th-century Enlightenment ideals of social progress, 
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determinism and positivist epistemology.  This modernist heritage has led to linear, 
simplistic interpretations of how technology impacts on society, thus leaving out the 
complexities of these relationships (Feenberg, 1999).  This type of deterministic 
thinking is embedded in the current hype surrounding ICTs for development.  
However, as historians of technology note that seemingly innocuous technical 
innovations such as mechanical looms, automobiles and piped water systems have 
always had negative, as well as positive, impacts (Marx, 1999; Sclove, 1995).  History 
teaches us that there is not a simple, linear relationship between technological 
innovation and social progress:    
“Global institutions of development have long promoted, either overtly or 
covertly, the linear equation that accumulation of technologies and 
technological knowledge equals ‘success’ in the quest for modernisation.  
Indeed, the Enlightenment belief that technological innovation and/or adoption 
indicates progress is still very much alive at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, with much being prophesied about the potential of ICTs to deliver 
both growth and liberation on economic, social and cultural fronts”   (Marx, 
1997:14). 
 
Extraordinary claims are being made about the new ICTs, particularly the Internet.  
Recent breakthroughs in the fields of semiconductors and digital communications, it 
is said, will soon ensure that sharing information will be both instantaneous and 
relatively costless (Negroponte, 1996; Tapscott, 1996; Gates, 1996, 2000; De 
Kerckhove, 1997).  The world will evolve, in fact is evolving, toward a seamless 
‘information society’, organised in global networks, in which individuals and 
countries can escape the confines of poverty or underdevelopment, simply through 
exploiting new access to information.  Moreover, societies can ‘leapfrog’ over entire 
stages of economic and social re-organisation formally thought to be essential for the 
creation of modern nations.    For example, the UN Social and Economic Council’s 
Committee of Experts on Public Administration is concerned with the issue of: 
“how to create a dynamic culture that could be conducive for developing 
countries to ‘leap-frog’ over stages of development and to reap more rapidly 
the benefits of a nascent knowledge economy” (UNCEPA, 2002:6, emphasis 
added). 
 
For those who engage in day-to-day efforts to improve the life chances of people 
living in poverty, such claims can only provoke scepticism.  They do not reflect the 
real world in which the vast majority of people in the Third World live.  Therefore, far 
from inspiring imaginative new approaches to development policy, they tend to close 
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off avenues of discussion.  The purpose of this study is to re-open the discussion on a 
more realistic note, taking into account the potential of new ICTs to improve people’s 
lives, and the great difficulties thrown up by existing structures of power, patterns of 
resource distribution and social organisation. 
 
4.5 Links Between ICT, Poverty and Development 
This section explores the linkages between the new ICTs and poverty reduction.  Can 
the potentialities of ICTs be exploited to enhance the development prospects of poor 
countries or more particularly the well-being of the poor in those countries?  Some 
clearly believe that technology has a great deal to offer: 
“This new technology greatly facilitates the acquisition and absorption of 
knowledge, offering developing countries unprecedented opportunities to 
enhance educational systems, improve policy formation and execution, and 
widen the range of opportunities for business and the poor” (World Bank, 
1999:9). 
 
ICTs have been recognised as having a role to play in broad-based, cross-sectoral 
poverty-reduction strategies and universal access policies are being promoted to 
improve rural access to ICTs (Kenny, Navas-Sabater & Qiang, 2000).  The World 
Bank (1999) and the UNDP (1999) assert that ICTs have the potential to improve the 
welfare of the poor in a number of ways.  These include: (i) opportunities to increase 
social capital; (ii) improved availability of market information; (iii) creation of new 
economic opportunities; (iv) improved economic efficiency and competitiveness; (v) 
better access to health and education facilities; and (vi) more efficient and effective 
governance (Grace et al., 2001; Analysys, 2000; ILO, 2001).   
 
It is claimed that ICTs can improve governance in three distinct yet overlapping ways 
(Heeks, 2003; Heeks, 2000).  First, they assist decision-makers in the acquisition, 
management and transmission of complex policy information and data, thus creating 
efficiency benefits.  Second, they improve the delivery of government services.  
Third, they empower civil society by raising access to government information and 
facilitating dialogue and public feedback on government projects and performance.  
The combination of these three factors results in potential benefits in sectors such as 
education, health-care and environmental preservation. 
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Between 1995 and 1997 the United Nations Commission on Science and Technology 
for Development (UNCSTD) investigated claims and counterclaims about the benefits 
and risks of ICTs (Mansell & Wehn, 1998).  Members of the Commission’s Working 
Group on IT and Development examined the available evidence on the experiences of 
developing countries.  They found that there are many instances where the use of 
ICTs is bringing social and economic benefits.  However: 
“[T]here are as many instances where ICTs are making no difference to the 
lives of people in developing countries or even having harmful effects…there 
is a very high risk that these technologies and services will deepen the 
disadvantages of those without the skills and capabilities to make the 
investments required for building innovative ‘knowledge societies’” (Mansell 
& Wehn, 1998:1). 
 
Avgerou and Walsham (2000:1) claim that ICTs “offer significant potential benefits 
for socio-economic development” in such fields as business development, transport, 
agriculture, health, education, and human resources and environmental management.  
Moreover, it has been argued that the new technologies can be implemented to 
support democratic decision-making, more effective governance and lifelong learning, 
and to enhance the possibility of sustainable development (Grace et al., 2001).  The 
results are, however, mixed.  While some groups of people in developing countries 
are being empowered through their use of ICTs, others are being disempowered 
(Gómez, Hunt & Lamoureaux, 1999; Heeks, 1999a).  There is a risk that the diffusion 
of ICTs and the transition to knowledge-based development will exacerbate existing 
social and economic problems (Mansell, 1999).  For example, the least developed 
face enormous risks of exclusion because they often lack the economic and social 
capabilities needed to take advantage of innovations in ICTs.  Developing countries 
will need to find ways of combining their existing social and technological 
capabilities if they are to benefit from the potential advantages of ICTs. 
 
While ICTs can improve the delivery of basic services such as health care, they 
require an underlying traditional system with trained medical personnel to interpret or 
make use of that information.  Basic services such as health care, doctors and 
hospitals have to pre-exist before ICTs can be utilised to improve their delivery.  ICTs 
cannot tackle other basic needs such as food, nutrition and access to water supply.  
There are indeed aspects of such basic needs that require the development of physical 
infrastructure, to which ICTs may have little or nothing to contribute.  ICTs can 
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improve the employment situation and help in the education arena (ILO, 2001).  The 
direct employment effect of ICTs in the poorer countries, however, has so far been 
limited and largely been restricted to those with some education (Heeks, 1999a).  
ICTs can improve education through distance education or local (computer-assisted) 
learning systems.  This, however, would require trained and computer-literate 
teachers. 
 
The evidence in support of a strong relationship between investment in advanced 
ICTs by developing countries and economic growth, at least at the macroeconomic 
level, has been found to be very weak (KPMG, 2000; Mansell, 2001).48  According to 
Kraemer and Dedrick (2001) ICT capital shows no significant correlation with 
productivity in developing countries.  Rodriguez and Wilson conclude that: 
“the link between ICTs and society-wide economic progress has been more 
elusive.  Our study confirms what many researchers have found for developed 
countries, namely a lack of association between economic growth and use of 
ICTs” (Rodriguez & Wilson, 2000:2). 
 
Pohjola (2001), for example, investigated the relationship between IT investment and 
growth in 39 countries over the period 1980-1995 and found a paradoxical result.  
Whereas IT investment appears to boost growth in developed economies, the same is 
not necessarily true in developing countries, which need to institute other 
complementary policies to reap economic benefits from such IT investments.  This is 
partly attributable to the fact that it is difficult to establish an empirical link between 
the diffusion of digital ICTs and economic development on the basis of available data.  
It may also be due to the fact that the positive effects of the global extension and 
consolidation of digital networks take time to accumulate (Rodriguez & Wilson, 
2000). 
 
Seen from the perspective of economics, the Internet has been widely regarded as a 
major force likely to raise productivity.  However, at least so far, the identifiable 
                                                          
48 The contribution of ICTs to an economy-wide productivity growth in the US has been the subject of 
a number of recent empirical studies (see Cohen, DeLong & Zysman, 2000).  These productivity 
studies are fraught with many conceptual and data difficulties, and were largely spurred by the Nobel 
Laureate Robert Solow.  In 1987 Solow (1987:36), in a book review, famously stated: “You can see the 
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics”.  The failure of massive investment in IT to 
boost productivity growth has came to be known as the productivity paradox.   
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effects on productivity appear small and largely confined to the US (Graham, 2001).49  
Identifying these effects proves remarkably difficult, especially as there is a host of 
measurement problems involved in assessing the impact of the new technologies on 
output and productivity.  Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind its relatively 
limited effect on conventional growth measures, at least so far.   
 
It has been suggested that developing countries would also experience a similar, even 
a greater, shift in productivity if they incorporated ICTs more comprehensively in 
their production structure (Cohen, DeLong & Zysman, 2000).  How realistic is such 
an idea?  For this to happen, they would require sufficiently well-developed social and 
physical infrastructures as well as conducive policy and institutional frameworks.  As 
data on ICT diffusion indicate (Table 4.3), the diffusion rates in most poor developing 
economies remain abysmally low to make such a transition to the new technology 
regime feasible in the immediate future.  Diffusion would require substantial 
investments in related physical infrastructures as well as human capital much beyond 
the present capacities of many developing countries.  Even if such resources were 
available, the impact would be far from immediate.  These economies would need a 
considerable amount of time to assimilate the technology, reorganise their production 
structures, reconfigure their organisational structures and adjust management 
practices in line with the new technologies.  In the transition period there are likely to 
be substantial adjustment costs in terms of production disruptions and unemployment.   
 
In short, however tantalising the idea of technological leapfrogging may be, it will 
entail a radical development strategy involving an across-the-board adoption of ICTs 
in the economy.  However, such a strategy may not be feasible or desirable for all 
developing countries.  It may not be feasible because it may entail changes in skills 
and organisational structures of these economies much beyond their present 
capacities.  It may not be desirable because many of these activities entail substitution 
of one medium with another, with different implications for labour demand.  Many of 
these substitutions would reduce the demand for unskilled labour, which may not be 
desirable for a country struggling with a large unemployment problem.    
 
                                                          
49 And in fact, one large study showed that sectors of the US economy that have invested most in ICTs 
have seen smaller than average productivity gains (Jorgenson & Stiroh, 2000:125). 
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ICTs can help pro-poor institutions listen to the poor, engage in more meaningful 
dialogue and build consensus and mutual understanding around development 
objectives.  Integrating ICTs into local knowledge and information systems in order to 
address locally identified knowledge gaps and information problems, and encouraging 
partnerships for local appropriation of the technology and content with the necessary 
training and support, are major challenges.  The network architecture that has been 
adopted by global capital can also be used to link the disempowered (Brecher, 
Costello & Smith, 2000:86).  The importance of supporting the voice of the powerless 
and allowing communication between those usually reliant on information from a 
powerful central agency is confirmed by Chambers (1999) and Hamelink (1996).  
Hamelink (1996) uses the idea of human rights to argue for developing the right 
communication as fundamental to all in the ‘network society’.  The ability of the 
powerless to describe their own situation and to share experiences with others in 
similar circumstances is a powerful step in developing strategies to benefit the 
marginalised. 
 
It should be noted at the outset, however, that there is a serious deficiency of strong 
empirical support for this position as of yet.  There are a number of concerns.  First, 
there are reasons to believe that the Internet might act as a technology of divergence.  
Certainly the spread of the new ICTs will create winners and losers.  The rural poor 
are especially vulnerable.  Second, ICT, poverty and development projects are very 
complex and prone to failure (Heeks, 2002b).  Although there are great 
complementarities between ICTs and economic and social progress, there are also 
important trade-offs between equity, well-being and the unhindered development of 
ICTs.  Simple claims about the links between ICTs and progress are therefore not 
correct and may in some cases be dangerously wrong.  While the assertion that 
information is an important focus for sustainable development strategies is not 
particularly contentious, defining the role that information should play is somewhat 
more challenging.  It is not only a question of whose reality (Chambers, 1983, 1999) 
the information reflects, but who is able to make use of that information and for what 
purpose? 
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4.6 Access and Equity 
Governments and donor agencies are working to provide the overt resources, but 
realistically the poor will not own the ICTs, and the poor will be very unlikely to 
control the ICTs or to use the technology hands-on in any significant numbers for the 
foreseeable future.  The main strategy has therefore been to provide ICTs to 
intermediary institutions such as government agencies and NGOs.  The most popular 
model is the ‘telecentre’ with an Internet-linked computer providing a multi-function 
resource. Telecentres provide public access to basic information and communication 
services to poor people who cannot afford private ownership.  A large body of 
literature has examined the rapid growth of ‘telecentres’ in rural areas (Gurstein, 
2000; Roman & Colle, 2002; TeleCommons Development Group, 2000; Richardson, 
1999; Ervin, 1998; Falch, 1998).  These programmes can be divided into two 
categories: (i) privately owned telecentres where local operators cater to business 
demand for limited services such as phone, fax and photocopying; and (ii) 
donor/government/NGO funded Multipurpose Community Telecentres (MCTs) that 
incorporate Internet access, email and other computer applications to existing 
community access telephone centres.  The growth of these centres may signal an 
important shift away from the ‘universal service’ goal of bringing a telephone into 
every household to a more realistic and cost-effective goal of universal community 
access. 
 
The process of the initiation, diffusion and adoption of the telecentre idea has, 
however, been largely devoid of systematic research and planning (Benjamin, 1998).  
It is therefore not surprising that the conceptualisation and deployment of telecentres 
often ignores the needs of the alleged beneficiaries and addresses priorities that are 
not necessarily theirs (Fortier, 2000).  A range of important issues are associated with 
the operation and success of telecentres.  These include: sustainability, community 
relevance, government policy, research, community partnerships, training of 
telecentre management and business planning (Ernberg, 1998a, b; Roman & Colle, 
2002).  And even if access is made affordable, as in telecentres that are (more often 
than not) driven by the not-for-profit sector, much of the information the Internet 
offers is of little relevance to people living in poverty (Heeks, 2002b; Hedley, 1998; 
Main, 2001).  Currently, the overwhelming dominance of English as the principal 
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medium of exchange on the Internet coupled with low-levels of pro-poor content are 
major drawbacks to its use by poor people (Skuse, 2001:10).   
 
How can ICTs be used to support communities in their efforts for social and economic 
development?  Fundamental to this is access to the technology, since without at least 
minimal access, little can be accomplished.  Clement and Shade (2000) identify seven 
discrete levels of ‘access’: (i) governance and policy; (ii) literacy; (iii) social 
facilitation; (iv) service providers; (v) content and services; (vi) software tools; and 
(vii) devices and carriage facilities.  This includes ‘technical’ (telephone connections 
and computers), ‘economic’ (the cost of using and maintaining these systems), 
‘social’ (cultural, education/literacy, and social barriers limiting use of the systems) 
and ‘physical’ access (as for the physically disabled). 
 
If ICT, poverty and development initiatives are to deliver the empowerment of 
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals and communities on which they 
are premised, then it is vital that key issues concerning the broadening of access to 
ICTs are identified and addressed.  While access is consistently identified as a key 
principle in policy discussions, it is not an end in itself.  Access simply enables further 
activities that can only partially be specified beforehand.  There are three main 
questions to address: (i) Access for what purposes? (ii) Access for whom? and (iii) 
Access to what?  The new technologies cannot therefore be easily divorced from 
relations of power based upon existing social and economic structures (Sclove, 1995).  
 
We need to recognise that ICTs can as easily act to reinforce existing patterns of 
exclusion as to provide opportunities for global networking.  Following Samarajiva 
and Shields (1990:100): 
“An adequate theory of telecommunication [and the Internet] and development 
requires an adequate treatment of power.  Banishing power from explicit 
discussion results in faulty analysis and policy”.   
 
Technologies never occur fortuitously; they are always created and implemented 
through funding, R&D, production, improvements, commercialisation and support, 
with purposes that become an integral part of what they are, and can or cannot do.  
Not surprisingly then, dominant social sectors, i.e. those who control both investment 
and most technological development, have the opportunity to select options that are 
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best suited to their own interest, not to a broader, vaguely defined, social progress 
(Stewart, 1978; Noble, 1984).  It cannot therefore be taken for granted that ICTs are 
necessarily beneficial either to a society as a whole or, in particular, to groups already 
exploited and oppressed within a society.  In order to understand the social 
implications of ICTs it is therefore necessary to understand multidimensional 
processes, with ICTs being affected and shaping social relations, throughout their 
development and deployment (Stewart, 1978; Noble, 1977, 1984; Sussman, 1997; 
Feenberg, 1991). 
 
The new ICTs have been introduced into an asymmetric global system and are 
unequivocally an engine of inequality.  The UNDP finds that the “The Internet is 
contributing to an ever-widening gap between rich and poor which has now reached 
‘grotesque’ proportions” (UNDP, 1999:1).  Contra to the UNDP, the World Bank 
(1999) claims that the new ICTs are quite positive and have tremendous equalising 
potential.  The World Bank (1999) points to dozens of stories showing that 
telemedicine, distance education and falling ICT costs are having positive and 
dramatic impacts on the growth prospects of poor people and poor countries.  The 
optimistic claims about the inevitably progressive impacts of ICTs are untested 
empirically and flawed logically.  When ICTs are introduced into a societal context 
already marked by substantial structural inequalities, whether global or domestic, then 
the dispersion of the ICTs are likely to follow these same structural patterns of 
inequality (see, for example, Heeks, 1999a; Castells, 2001). 
 
Even if developing countries gain from ICTs, can we be sure that the poor in these 
developing economies will benefit?  In general, the logic of ICT inequality linkages is 
that when a new technology is introduced into a social setting where scarce resources 
and opportunities are distributed asymmetrically, the greater likelihood is that those 
with more resources will employ them to gain additional ones, including ICTs (Freire, 
1999).  Poor countries have much lower levels of human capital than rich countries.  
They therefore have fewer people with the capacity to work with and benefit from 
ICTs.  These few are likely to benefit disproportionately from ICTs.  Meanwhile, the 
groups of disadvantaged individuals who have not had access even to basic levels of 
education are likely to be out of the race from the start. 
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The potentially devastating impact which unequal ICT access has for people of the 
South should not be underestimated, and yet neither should the equation of 
technology and development be accepted uncritically.  Rather than creating ‘new’ 
dimensions of inequality and poverty, ICTs may actually exacerbate existing 
inequalities (McConnaughey & Lader, 1998).  Yet it is not only a lack of access to the 
technology which is perpetuating existing inequalities; it also has to do with what 
Buffoni (1997) calls capabilities, i.e. the skills and resources (meaning not only the 
economic resources but also cultural and social resources) necessary to enact this 
access.  Yet training people to use technologies in isolation from an identified need or 
desire to use such technologies is proving just as pointless as providing disadvantaged 
groups with the hardware and software to do so (Loader, 1998). 
 
The key issue for both governments and donors is to ensure that ICT access reaches 
even the most marginalised groups, while at the same time ensuring that ICT projects 
meet the needs and demands of the target population.  Under what conditions can 
ICTs be progressive and contribute to greater social equality?  The cardinal challenge 
is to learn how to deploy ICTs reliably to promote human development in a 
sustainable and equitable manner.  ICTs can play an enabling role in the alleviation of 
poverty, but will be of greatest value as a technology to provide information from and 
about the poor.  ICTs may have a greater role to play in giving ‘voice’ to the poor; 
that is, in making the poor information providers more than information recipients.  
There is a general assumption within much writing about ICTs that the poor are 
merely recipients of technology, information and knowledge.  Yet poor communities 
all produce their own information and knowledge.  ICTs can play a positive role by 
allowing that information and knowledge to be more widely disseminated.   
 
Madon (2000) argues that research on indigenous communication has concentrated on 
using indigenous channels to promote exogenous (increasingly ICT-based) 
innovations rather than on the dissemination of indigenous knowledge among 
communities.  This has led to neglect of local initiatives in the design of development 
efforts and threatens the erosion of indigenous and informal systems due to the 
influence of formal, ICT-based, Western-oriented information systems.  Alternative 
strategies must therefore focus not primarily on the technology per se, but on the 
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political relations that shape its social insertion, that is the actual control of both 
information systems and content. 
 
4.7 ICTs for Development: Hope or Hype? 
A growing stream of literature on ICT, poverty and development suggest that too 
many ICT projects in developing countries begin with high expectations for economic 
and social benefits but yield disappointing results (Bhatnagar & Bjørn-Andersen, 
1990; Bhatnagar & Odedra, 1992; Odedra-Straub, 1996).  Estimates by Heeks and 
Davies (1999) suggest that the majority of ICT-based initiatives end in total failure of 
a system that never works; partial failure in which major goals are unattained or in 
which there are significant undesirable outcomes; sustainability failure that succeeds 
initially but then fails after a year or so; or replication failure of a pilot scheme that 
cannot be reproduced.  Heeks (2002b:101) explains that the “high rates of failure” of 
information systems in developing countries can be attributed to ‘design-actuality’ 
gaps, i.e. the mismatch between information system designs and local user actuality.  
An overview of the literature concludes that “successful examples of computerisation 
can be found…but frustrating stories of systems which have failed to fulfil their initial 
promise are more frequent” (Avgerou & Walsham, 2000:1).  One study estimates that 
up to 80% of public sector ICT applications result either in partial or total failure 
(Heeks, 1999b, 2000).  The study suggests flaws in the mechanisms through which 
governments and donors have sought to implement ICT projects in the public sector.  
As Bhatnagar notes: 
“The impact…on administration has been marginal because the task of 
changing the administrative culture is enormous.  Although IT can be a tool 
for decentralized planning, integration across departments and reduction in 
workload, it cannot be the sole instrument of change” (Bhatnagar, 2000:1). 
 
In spite of the high failure rate of ICT projects in the Third World, a great deal of 
hype about ICTs in general, and the Internet in particular, has emanated from a variety 
of sources, including politicians, public servants, academics and the computer and 
telecommunications industries.  The proposition adopted by the techno-optimists is 
open to question.  It is far from clear that ICTs are, or are considered to be by most 
people, a good thing per se.  ICTs, and the uses to which they are put, are subject to 
social shaping and as such lend themselves to the achievement of a variety of possible 
outcomes, the desirability of which is contestable.  What is clear is that for all but a 
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small minority of people ICTs, in and of themselves, have little or no intrinsic 
interest.  There is little needs-based demand for ICTs per se.  The needs-based 
demand that is out there in abundance is a multifarious demand for distinct types of 
information and communication-based content to which ICTs might facilitate access.   
 
It would appear that ICTs have become an icon for modern development, turning use 
of ICTs within development into an end in itself rather than a means of achieving 
other development goals.  The main development objective becomes bringing as 
much technology to as many people as quickly as possible so that they can obtain the 
claimed benefits it provides.  The main development problem becomes inequality of 
access to ICTs.  There are significant development opportunity costs to the 
investments the optimistic technology position promotes.  Investing large amounts of 
resources in ICTs means explicitly not investing them in other development areas.   
 
Chowdhury (2000) expresses the danger of becoming over-enthusiastic about the 
potential of ICTs to address issues of poverty without first considering whether poor 
people themselves will actually have access to these technologies.  Fetishising the 
technology at the expense of people has been challenged by post-development writers 
such as Inayatullah and Milojevic (1999:78): “The ICT hype merely replaces the 
classical opiate of religion and the modernist idea of progress”.  Similarly, Loader 
(1998:6) challenges the hype of ICTs for development, saying that these arguments 
usually assume that technology is value-free and apolitical.  This is not to dismiss the 
possibility of an important role for ICTs in development and poverty alleviation.  It is 
simply to urge caution in terms of assuming a simple causal link between ICT, 
poverty and development. 
 
A nuanced position between those naively embracing ICTs in development and others 
rejecting it as a new form of domination can be found in the work on ‘knowledge 
societies’ by Robin Mansell (Mansell, Samarajiva, & Mahan, 2002; Mansell & Wehn, 
1998; Mansell, 2002; Mansell, 1999; Mansell, 2001; Mansell & Steinmueller, 2002).  
In their book, Knowledge Societies: Information Technology for Sustainable 
Development (1998), Mansell and Wehn provide details on different national policies 
that developing nations can put in place to take advantage of ICTs, while recognising 
the many pitfalls.  Mansell (1999) stresses the role of government in creating an 
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environment in which ICTs can be beneficially applied.  The emphasis is more on 
creating a social infrastructure of organisations and learning than on the physical 
infrastructure.  Developing countries need to build the capacities for developing their 
own applications of ICTs based on the distinctive information and knowledge systems 
that each country possesses.  ICTs can help, but they can also waste resources.  The 
key factor is developing a critical understanding of the role of ICTs in development 
and poverty reduction and developing a purposeful local policy for their use (Mansell, 
Steinmueller & Wehn, 1999).  This study accepts the position of Mansell and Wehn 
(1998).  ICT policy can play a role in supporting national development, but only when 
this ties in coherently with national priorities and a pro-poor agenda. 
 
Mansell (2001) warns against exaggerated hopes of what the Internet can do for Third 
World development, pointing to the institutional and infrastructural prerequisites for 
success.  Similarly Kubicek, Dutton and Williams (1997) and Sussman (1997) suggest 
that the transformative nature of the new ICTs has been exaggerated.  Proponents of 
the latter view urge decision-makers to exercise caution lest they embrace the new 
ICTs too enthusiastically and risk becoming disillusioned when the applications do 
not resolve their development problems.  Others call for the implementation of 
national or regional ICT strategies aimed at maximising the benefits and minimising 
the risks associated with the use of these technologies (Mansell, 2002).  The capacity 
to gain from the availability of the new technologies involves more than a reduction 
of the digital divide between (and within) countries.  The institutional foundations for 
building capabilities that enable people and organisations to absorb the new 
technological systems must also be in place.  The principal conclusion of the Mansell 
and Wehn (1998) study is that national or regional ICT strategies can be designed and 
implemented in ways that maximise the potential of existing resources to use ICTs in 
support of development goals. 
 
At every stage in the discussion of how to use new ICTs for social and economic 
improvement, it is therefore essential to ask not only whether a particular problem is 
amenable to any improvement through the introduction of ICTs, given surrounding 
constraints, but also, assuming that the answer is positive, how to shape the broader 
environment in ways that may make particular applications and services as useful as 
possible in the struggle against disadvantage.  In a more general discussion of the 
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struggle against poverty Lipton (1996) refers to this imperative as ‘the principle of 
joint requirements’, while Wolfe (1996) calls it the ‘integrated approach to 
development’. 
 
It is important to recognise at the outset that the causal relationship between ICT, 
poverty and development is complex, and that ICTs are certainly no panacea.  The 
enthusiasm with which the development community has rushed into ICT-related 
programmes often seems to overshadow the question of precisely how ICTs 
contribute to national development.  Exclusive emphasis on ICT projects, at the 
expense of careful analysis and consideration of the broader economic, social and 
political elements that interact to improve the lives of individuals, is likely to result in 
unanticipated failures and wasted resources.  Unfortunately, technological change 
moves so quickly that it often surpasses substantive analysis, leading to an over-
reliance on anecdotal evidence as justification for ICT projects.  This in turn can lead 
to poorly designed programmes and haphazard implementation schemes that do not 
account for local conditions, resulting in projects which fail to meet their objectives or 
may even harm the welfare of supposed beneficiaries (Mansell, 1999; Fuchs, 1998).  
As Heeks notes: 
“[T]here are finite amounts of money, time and attention.  Investing these in 
ICTs means explicitly not investing them in other development areas.  Yet the 
ICT fetishists have so far been unable to demonstrate how ICT-based 
information represents a more important resource than water, food, land, 
shelter, production, technology, money, skills or power in the development 
process” (Heeks, 1999a:16).  
 
Mundy (1996) raises the important question of whether the specific kinds of ICTs 
introduced by the international donor community are appropriate given the unique 
challenges facing many developing countries, and whether they represent the best use 
of scarce resources.  The challenge of adapting ICTs to local needs and situations is a 
critical element in the ultimate ability of these technologies to benefit local rural 
communities.  Information systems, when properly designed to take local needs and 
skills into account, may greatly increase the efficiency of service delivery at either the 
local or national level.  Further, incorporating local users into the design and 
implementation process is likely to be a major determinant of success.  Roche and 
Blaine concur: 
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“Participation increases the likelihood [that] local skills will be used and 
systems will more closely satisfy needs; it also increases the 
probability…[that]…users will be motivated to acquire those additional skills 
necessary to maximize gains from these systems” (Roche & Blaine, 1996:23). 
 
Kumar and Bjørn-Andersen (1990) and Markus and Bjørn-Andersen (1987) suggest 
that ICT-based systems embody the ideals and values of those responsible for their 
design.  These may be at odds with the cultural norms of poor communities in 
developing countries (Goodman & Green, 1992).  Further, information systems 
designed by ‘outsiders’ can often be irrelevant or of limited relevance to the specific 
conditions encountered in poor communities (Mundy, 1996).  Moreover, the use of 
ICT equipment in poor communities requires access to resources that are scarce, such 
as technical expertise.  Avgerou and Mulira (1996: 233) argue that there is often a 
disconnect between expectations and actual performance of ICT projects in many 
parts of the Third World, typically as a result of an “inadequate supporting 
environment in maintenance and operation skills, and an organizational culture which 
does not permit the technology-based system to be utilized as initially specified”. 
 
It is the contention of this study that in order to retain the ‘hope’ that ICTs can play a 
role in development, it is necessary not to succumb to the seductive ‘hype’ that 
surrounds these technological developments.  In the words of Álvarez and Calás: 
“It is necessary then, to articulate multi-disciplinary and dynamic models 
capable of considering concurrently the multiple…realities, subjectivities, and 
political agendas enabled by information technologies…These approaches 
should recognise the context in which these new realities are appearing, and 
should also be dynamic and proceed beyond simplistic dichotomies” (Álvarez 
& Calás, 1996: 42). 
 
4.7.1 Electronic Government 
The discourses on e-government are often naively technologically deterministic, 
associating desirable states of government institutions to specific technologies 
(Krishna & Madon, 2002).  For example computerisation projects in government 
organisations are often associated with conditions of transparency, accountability and 
democracy on the basis of the technical possibilities of flexible communication and 
access to information off the Internet; as if the historically developed relations 
between a state and its citizens, the power structures within bureaucratic organisations 
and the cultural setting of a country’s institutions can be reformed by new technology.  
 130
Moreover, bureaucracies have shown resilience, retaining their dysfunctional 
characteristics even with ICT and it is quite possible to assimilate ICT into 
bureaucratic, inefficient and authoritarian practices (vide Avgerou & La Rovere, 
2003). 
 
Despite the potential opportunities for the implementation of e-government initiatives, 
there are a number of challenges that could prevent the realisation of these anticipated 
benefits.  As Seifert and Petersen argue: 
“The ambiguous nature of electronic government (e-government) has resulted 
in hype and confusion, with little systematic consideration of the expectations 
and limitations of taking government online” (Seifert & Petersen, 2002:193). 
 
E-government is still very much in an experimental phase in both the First and the 
Third Worlds.  Strejcek and Theil (2002:305) state that, although a number of EU 
states have announced plans to use ICTs to create a more open, accessible and 
transparent administration, there remains “a wide gap between the announcement of 
such an ambitious project and its realisation”.  Britain, for example, through the 
Office of the Electronic Envoy (E-Envoy, 2001; Cabinet Office, 2000) within the 
Cabinet Office, has set explicit targets for making all government services available 
electronically, but according to Swartz (2003), British citizens are reluctant to use 
them and usage of e-government services has not grown in the past two years.  
Writing about the capacity of the Canadian federal government to effectively harness 
ICT, Allen et al. (2001) argue that the necessary transformation in public sector 
governance and accountability is likely to be blocked by an administrative culture that 
is ill suited for e-governance (i.e. an ICT-led reconfiguration of public sector 
governance) and by the way that knowledge and power are redistributed in light of 
new technological realities.  Civil servants may be particularly resistant to cultivating 
the required shifts in skills, values and vision. 
 
The challenges for an e-government transition are many, ranging from questions 
about citizen expectations and varying capabilities to the internal governance 
challenges of whether online services would be organisationally based or functionally 
integrated. The latter pledges of ‘one-stop shopping’ and service integration imply a 
degree of horizontal co-ordination and information sharing that is unlikely in a 
cultural context shaped largely by traditional public service values linked to 
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ministerial (read vertical) accountability (Seifert & Petersen, 2002).  Herein lies an 
interesting quandary. Whereas much of recent public sector management reform has 
been about giving more autonomy to organizational units, e-government requires a 
tremendous amount of central co-ordination to yield system-wide adaptation and 
horizontal action (Fountain, 2001; Taylor & Williams, 1990).  Yet, the unique 
challenge of e-government is not to make misguided pleas for re-centralising planning 
and decision-making within a few central (i.e. lead) agencies, but rather to frame the 
new types of collaborative mechanisms and decentralised decision-making models 
now required to encourage administrative cultural change. 
 
Yet, perhaps the single biggest issue, in the short term, plaguing the government 
online agenda is the internal blockages to better co-ordination and the debate as to 
how best to proceed with the development of the new infrastructure required to link 
online government to its client base across industry and the citizenry.  At the heart of 
the matter is a dispute over contracting and implicit questions of in-sourcing, out-
sourcing and an appropriate private-public mix of ICT solutions (Bellamy & Taylor, 
1998).  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
The hope is widespread that the Internet will provide a powerful new tool in the battle 
against poverty.  These sentiments were echoed in the G-8’s recent Charter on the 
Global Information Society that declared: 
“Information and communication technology (ICT) is one of the most potent 
forces in shaping the twenty-first century…IT is fast becoming a vital engine 
of growth for the world economy…Enormous opportunities are there to be 
seized and shared by us all” (G-8, 2000:1). 
 
In this chapter we examined the extent to which ICTs will affect the quality of life of 
people in developing countries, especially the poorest and most vulnerable among 
them.  The aim of this chapter has been to move beyond the current enthusiasm for 
derivative description and technological determinism, and to introduce a deeper, more 
balanced understanding of the relationship between ICTs and development.  We 
identified some of the major components of the mainstream ICT, poverty and 
development discourse, and shown how the manner of their appropriation and 
discursive deployment amounts to the creation and systematisation of a set of 
 132
discursive relations that support and extend a particular worldview.  It is a worldview 
which is associated with progress and rationality, and is underpinned by the 
assumption of ICTs as a neutral force in development.  Such a worldview offers a 
powerful opportunity to further the interests of technocratic, often mainstream 
stakeholders, acting as a magnifier for dominant discursive interests by creating new 
subjects for objectification.  The prevailing discourse masks submerged assumptions 
and interests regarding the nature and role of ICTs for development.  Indeed, failure to 
examine the underlying assumptions of the ICT, poverty and development discourse 
may lead social scientists to become complicit in distracting attention away from the 
very real global economic, social and cultural inequalities to virtual inequalities, 
which merely hide an unwillingness to address the core failings of the development 
paradigm. 
 
Many commentators have extolled the virtues of the new ICTs in reducing poverty 
and improving the quality of life of Third World citizens.  The chapter’s overall 
conclusion is, however, somewhat circumspect.  While ICTs have the potential (e.g. a 
‘one-stop shop’ in the form of integrated electronic public service delivery)50 to make 
a transformational impact on the lives of the poor, as yet, there is little evidence to 
suggest that any process of overarching transformation is taking place.  While there 
are direct benefits to ICTs, it is not often clear: (i) whether ICTs are more efficient 
and cost effective than traditional means, and (ii) whether the poor, generally, have 
the financial and educational wherewithal to take advantage of the opportunities 
provided by the new ICTs.  A major goal of initiatives to implement ICT applications 
in developing countries is to alleviate poverty.  Another is to ensure that the 
applications are perceived by their users as being useful.  If these goals are not 
achieved there is little point in investing enormous amounts of money in the 
infrastructure for innovative ‘information societies’ in developing countries. 
 
An integrated approach is required which sees ICTs as: (i) socially embedded, whose 
impacts are systematically shaped by contextual factors: political, economic, socio-
cultural and institutional; and (ii) as a means to an end, not as an end in themselves.  
So what is the relevance of ICTs for development?  If development is seen as the 
                                                          
50 A key success factor in achieving e-government is for all citizens to have access to technology and 
the necessary skills to exploit its use. 
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integration of developing countries into the global economy (Castells’s [1996] ‘space 
of flows’) then ICTs are (almost by definition) of central importance.  If the 
‘informatised’ global capitalist society is viewed as largely harmful, then ICTs are to 
be opposed as they can serve as a ‘Trojan Horse’ bringing in elements of exploitation 
and domination.  The global elite (many in rich countries, and a few in poor countries) 
are using these technologies to greatly increase their access to many forms of power.  
Poorer individuals and communities are largely excluded from these networks of 
information and as such are increasingly marginalised.  There are global efforts to 
provide access to these technologies, skills, information and services – but in terms 
that may well further disadvantage poor communities and create new patterns of 
dependency.  In this study, the focus is on human capability development (following 
Sen, 1999) of the poor and it remains an open question whether ICTs will contribute 
to overall positive or negative effects.   
 
Following Heeks (2002a), the claims made by the advocates of ICT for development 
are debatable.  This reflects real gaps in knowledge about the way different kinds of 
ICTs are being used in specific Third World contexts.  Given the newness of many 
digital possibilities, there is often relatively little accumulated experience on which to 
draw.  There thus exists a strong need for a critical and reflexive approach to inform 
the ICTs for development project.  Information is a necessary resource for poverty 
alleviation, but it is by no means a sufficient one.  Equally important are factors such 
as financial credit, skills, production technology, demand for outputs, plus other social 
resources.  All of these have to be borne in mind when assessing the relative priority 
to give to ICTs in the development process.  
 
The next chapter will describe and analyse a raft of South African government ICT 
policy initiatives between 1994-2003.   
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Chapter 5 
The South African Government’s ICT Policies, Strategies, 
Programmes and Projects: 1994-2003 
 
5.1 Prologue 
ICTs and their use for development have been high on the political agenda of the 
South African government since before the first democratic elections in 1994.  The 
African National Congress (ANC) in exile, in the years prior to the elections, 
prioritised ICTs as a key area, and the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) Base Document (ANC, 1994) that formed the election manifesto of the ANC-
led alliance already included references to the importance of ICTs for development.  
The RDP Base Document deals with ICTs in several chapters.  In the chapter on 
‘Meeting Basic Needs’, access to telecommunications is defined as a basic need 
which has to be provided at affordable prices as rapidly as possible.  Further, the 
telecommunications sector is: 
“an indispensable backbone for the development of all other socio-economic 
sectors.  An effective telecommunications infrastructure, which includes 
universal access, is essential to enable the delivery of basic services and the 
reconstruction and development of deprived areas” (ANC, 1994:Section 
2.8.3). 
 
The same reasoning is to be found for ICTs in the chapter on ‘Building the Economy’.  
As is the case for telecommunications, the upgrading of the ICT infrastructure can 
“facilitate an upgrading of education, health care, recreation and other services, by 
improving the quality of information available and providing communities throughout 
the country with access to expertise and usable data” (ANC, 1994:Section 4.6.1-3).  
The ANC strongly believed that the development of an advanced information network 
can play a crucial role in providing access to high-quality services to all South 
Africans.  The vision of ICTs that underlies the RDP Base Document in many ways 
influenced future policy-making in the post-apartheid era.  Although many modalities 
of policy and implementation differ, the main principles concerning the relation 
between ICTs and development barely changed during the period 1994-2003.   
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By 1995 the theme of the ‘information society’ started to surface regularly in political 
discourse and policy documents, and ICTs, including access to ICTs, found 
recognition in both policy formulation and implementation of government 
departments with a clear stake in ICT policy such as the Department of 
Communications (DoC) (previously called the Department of Posts, 
Telecommunications and Broadcasting [DPTB]); Department of Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology (DACST); Department of Public Services and 
Administration (DPSA) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).  The ICT 
policy process had started under the neo-Keynesian economic policy of the RDP, but 
by the time the Telecommunications Act was passed at the end of 1996, the neo-
liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy (Department of 
Finance, 1996) was gradually being implemented. 
 
Key leadership in post-apartheid South Africa, from ex-President Mandela, current 
President Thabo Mbeki, former Minister of Communications Pallo Jordan, former 
Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting Jay Naidoo and Director 
General of the Department of Communications Andile Ngcaba were all convinced 
that ICTs can have a profound impact on raising the standard of living of the 
previously dispossessed communities in South Africa (Cogburn, 1998).  Many ICT 
initiatives started with the stated commitment of then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki 
to transform the country into an ‘information society’.  He formed an inter-
departmental government committee to shape that direction and since then several 
government departments have been spearheading national policies and projects.  The 
South African ICT strategy has been to try and address the concerns raised by the 
‘digital divide’ and the emergence of the ‘information society’ at local, national, 
regional and global levels.  At a national level it has engaged in a series of high-level 
consultative policy processes ranging from telecommunications to e-commerce.   
 
At regional levels South Africa has attempted to share its lessons learned with its 
neighbours, both near and far.  At the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) level South Africa has helped to create a regional body of 
telecommunications regulators called the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Association of Southern Africa (TRASA).  Within TRASA South Africa has helped 
to promote the concept of using its telecommunication policy as a sort of ‘model law’ 
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for the sub-region.  A number of countries have looked to South Africa for guidance 
in establishing independent regulatory bodies and for other aspects of its information 
and communications strategy.  Further abroad South Africa has played an important 
role in the major African regional initiatives, such as the African Information Society 
Initiative (AISI) developed and led by the UN ECA; New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) (Heads of State Implementation Committee, 2001); and the 
Africa Connection led by the Ministers of Communication and supported by the world 
Bank.  Further, since 1997 South Africa has attempted to use the quadrennial Africa 
Telecom conferences as another organising point for African regional leadership in 
the ‘information society’.   
 
There is a great deal of debate over what the dominant ICT strategy for Africa should 
be for confronting the challenges and opportunities of globalisation, and harnessing 
the potential benefits of the ‘knowledge economy’.  There is a strong belief among 
policy-makers in the possibilities of ICTs to accelerate broad-based growth and 
sustainable development, and for reducing poverty not only in South Africa, but in 
Africa as a whole.  The NEPAD document, for example, states: 
“The goals of achieving a Common Market and an African Union can benefit 
immensely from the revolution in information technology.  In addition to 
fostering intra-regional trade, the use of ICTs could also accelerate Africa’s 
integration into the global economy” (Heads of State Implementation 
Committee, 2001:20).   
 
Further, the NEPAD document claims that ICTs can: (i) provide an impetus to the 
democratisation process and good governance; (ii) facilitate the integration of Africa 
into the ‘information society’; (iii) be helpful tools for a wide range of applications, 
such as remote sensing and environmental, agricultural and infrastructural planning; 
(iv) be used to identify and exploit opportunities for trade, investment and finance; (v) 
be used to establish regional distance learning and health education programmes to 
improve the situation in the health and education sectors; and (vi) help towards the 
organisation of an efficient early-warning mechanism, in conflict management and the 
control of pandemic diseases, by providing the tools for constant monitoring of 
tension spots (Heads of State Implementation Committee, 2001:21).  NEPAD deals 
with an array of actions under the rubric of ‘investing in ICTs’.  Emphasis is placed 
on developing partnerships with regional agencies such as the African 
 137
Telecommunications Union (ATU) and Africa Connection to design model policy and 
legislation for telecommunications reform, and protocols and templates for e-
readiness assessment, as well as working closely with development finance 
institutions in Africa (such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa [DBSA] and 
the African Development Bank [ADB]), multilateral initiatives (G-8 DOT Force and 
UN ICT Task Force) and bilateral donors.  A number of key players have been 
promoting the digital inclusion agenda of NEPAD, most notably the UN ECA, the 
NEPAD secretariat (e-Africa Commission) and the ADB.  
 
The NEPAD document can be criticised on a number of fronts, including: (i) the fact 
that its political aims are targeted at satisfying the wishes of G-8 governments and 
donors rather than the realities of heterogeneous African value systems and 
institutions; (ii) at the heart of the programme is a neo-liberal economic framework 
that basically retains structural adjustment programmes while overlooking the 
enormous damage they have done over the past two decades; and (iii) its naïve belief 
in the overwhelmingly positive transformative powers of ICTs, which is likely to lead 
to false expectations.  Moreover, NEPAD has underestimated the enormous challenge 
(particularly resources and political will) of: (i) building African infrastructure; (ii) 
harmonisation of policies and legal frameworks; (iii) organisation and dissemination 
of content, particularly socio-economic, geographic and statistical data; (iv) human 
resources development; (v) electronic government and capacity building initiatives; 
(vi) advocacy to raise awareness; and (vii) research to make ICT relevant to local 
needs. 
 
South Africa has been represented in nearly all of the major international conferences 
and forums addressing ICT-related issues, including the Global Information 
Infrastructure Commission (GIIC), Global Knowledge for Development (GKD), ITU 
World Telecommunication Development Conference (WTDC), and the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).  Often South Africa has 
been thrust into a leadership role at international conferences and sometimes asked to 
‘represent’ the interests and perspective of the developing world.   
 
In 1996 South Africa hosted the Information Society and Development (ISAD) 
Conference.  A year previously then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki had attended the 
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G-7 conference on the Information Society held in Brussels, challenging the rich 
countries to come to South Africa to consider how the impact of ICTs could benefit 
all of humanity.  This led to the ISAD conference in May 1996.  This was an 
international event bringing together the G-7 with over 30 developing countries.  In 
preparation for this South Africa drafted a position paper stressing the importance of 
‘information society’ issues for all developing countries (Cogburn, 1997).  In the run 
up to the ISAD conference tensions over ownership of ICT policy became evident 
between different government departments.  DACST led the process in drafting the 
position paper for ISAD, but Minister Jay Naidoo of the DPTB led the delegation at 
the conference.  As issues of the ‘information society’ were clearly going to increase 
in profile, the DPTB had an interest in extending the remit of its portfolio to include 
wider information access issues and not simply concentrate on telecommunications.  
This shifted the debate away from providing universal access to basic telephony to 
including access to computers and the Internet.   
 
Subsequent to the ISAD conference that took place between 13-15 May 1996, a 
second conference entitled Empowering Communities in the Information Society was 
held from 15-17  May 1996 at Helderfontein (Berlyn, 1996).  At the latter conference 
civil society and government met to discuss progress towards an ‘information society’ 
in South Africa.  The ISAD conference and the subsequent Helderfontein conference 
put the issue of telecom as an infrastructure for providing wider access to information 
systems (such as the Internet) and the ‘information society’ firmly on the national 
political agenda.  This increased the importance of the telecoms sector and the interest 
of different government departments in having a stake in this new arena.  Both 
conferences were instrumental in championing the idea of setting up telecentres and 
Multi-Purpose Community Centres (MPCCs) as a means to provide information, 
communication and other services at the level of the community.  Although the 
definitions of telecentres and MPCCs proposed at both conferences differed to some 
extent, they nonetheless shared the common vision of using such structures to provide 
disadvantaged communities with access to ICT-related services.  This resonated 
closely with the initiative of telecentres that the ITU was championing following its 
conference in Buenos Aires in 1993. 
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South Africa faces complex social and economic challenges as it copes with the 
legacy of apartheid and at the same time sets out to be a significant player in the 
emerging global economy.  It is those challenges that shape the way it aims to exploit 
ICT and transform itself into an ‘information society’.  Addressing the ‘digital divide’ 
has been a major policy objective of the new democratic government in South Africa.    
During the period 1994 to 2003 South Africans have witnessed a major wave of 
reforms in policies driven by the larger concern of increasing inequality and in 
response to the unsatisfied demand for access to ICT infrastructure.  During the period 
1994-2003 the government adopted broad telecom reform measures as well as 
specific regulatory initiatives designed to accomplish universal service obligations 
and facilitate the emergence of competitive markets.   
 
Currently there is no overarching South African government strategy towards creating 
the ‘information society’, though a National Commission on the Information Society 
and Development was recently appointed by the President.  There are, however, a 
wide range of initiatives and policies, which are rapidly proliferating, by various 
national ministries aimed in one way or another towards promoting growth and 
opportunities in ICTs.  In this process one can observe a growing complexity in terms 
of the number of actors and stakeholders involved as well as in the inter-linkages and 
overlap between processes.   
 
The remaining sections of this chapter will attempt to answer the following question: 
what programmes, strategies and policies has the post-apartheid South African 
government developed to promote ICTs?  The objective is to describe national 
government’s ICT initiatives in the post-apartheid era and review progress on 
government-initiated projects wherever possible.  It is important to bear in mind that 
most of these initiatives are still work-in-progress. 
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5.2 Government ICT Initiatives: 1994-2003 
5.2.1 Telecommunications 
Historically, telecommunications in South Africa was introduced and developed by 
South African Posts and Telecommunications (SAPT), a classic state-owned Posts, 
Telephone and Telegraphy (PTT) monopoly.  In 1991 the telecommunications and 
postal operations of the SAPT were separated, with the telecommunications functions 
being vested in Telkom, a new ‘commercialised’ enterprise maintaining a monopoly 
in the provision of fixed telecommunication services.  While operating as a business 
under the authority of the South African Companies Act, the sole shareholder of 
Telkom was the South African government (Kaplan, 1990; Cogburn, 1996, 1998).  In 
1996 a major legislative initiative established a new legal and regulatory framework 
for telecommunications in South Africa (Cogburn, 1998; Horowitz, 2001). 
 
South Africa has embarked on a process of privatisation and liberalisation of 
telecommunications, while simultaneously aiming to extend telecommunications 
services to a larger proportion of the population (Moodley, 2000).  Government has 
followed many other developing countries in undertaking a programme of 
corporatisation, privatisation and liberalisation of telecommunication services.  Under 
such reform programmes regulation by the state is needed for meaningful competition 
to develop.  Government faces the challenge of ensuring conditions for the continued 
growth of the more technologically advanced sub-sectors, while extending 
telecommunication services as widely as possible. 
 
South Africa is characterised by an unequal provision of telecommunication services, 
reflecting the unequal distribution of income along racial lines (Morris & Stavrou, 
1993:529).  The provision of telecommunications in South Africa reflects the racially 
oriented access to all resources under apartheid.  Inequality is reflected in low levels 
of service extension, although parts of the economy are highly sophisticated 
technologically.  Use of the Internet and PCs has spread rapidly within the wealthier 
sections of society (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) and South African companies are at the 
forefront of new technologies for electronic transmission of data and related activities.  
The largest and best known, Dimension Data, has spread through organic growth and 
international acquisitions, and was recently listed on the London Stock Exchange.   
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Table 5.1: Computers and the Internet 
 
 South Africa Upper-Middle 
Income Countries 
 1995 2000 2000 
Personal computers (PCs)    
       Per 1,000 people 27.9 61.8 69.9 
       Installed in education (thousands) 93 365 n.a. 
Networked PCs (%) 34.7 45.9 n.a. 
Internet hosts (per 1,000 people) 1.2 8.4 2.1 
Internet users (thousands) 460 2,400 49,393 
Source: UNDP (2001) 
 
Table 5.2: Growth in Internet users in South Africa (millions) 
 
 Feb 
1997 
Feb 
1998 
Dec 
1998 
Aug 
1999 
May 
2000 
Dec 
2000 
June 
2001 
April 
2002 
Dial-up 
accounts 
n.a.* n.a 0.5m n.a. 0.65m n.a. 1.4m n.a. 
Total 
users 
0.7m 0.8m 1.26m 1.62m 1.82m 2.4m 2.6m 3.17m 
* n.a. = not available 
Source: South Africa online (2002); Media Africa (2003) 
 
In 1996 a new Telecommunications Act (MPTB, 1996) set out the government’s 
approach to achieving more efficient telecommunications services and, at the same 
time, wider provision of fixed-lines.  The Telecommunications Amendment Act of 
2001 (DoC, 2001) legislated the end of Telkom’s monopoly in South Africa, with the 
requirement that a second fixed-line network operator made up partially of the 
communications arm of Transnet (Transtel) and Eskom’s communications subsidiary, 
Esitel, be set up.51  The new approach followed the practice in other countries of first 
undertaking corporatisation and partial privatisation under regulated monopoly before 
allowing competition to emerge. The rationale put forward was the need for a period 
to prepare the utility for competition while supporting greater roll-out of 
infrastructure. 
 
To achieve these goals Telkom was awarded exclusivity in fixed-line voice telephony 
for five years (to 7 May 2002) with a range of conditions on service extension and 
                                                 
51 There is concern that if the telecommunications landscape is merely transformed from a monopoly 
into a duoply, however, the efficiency gains of competition may not be realised, especially if the new 
entrant is another parastatal enterprise expecting protection from the state.   
 142
upgrading of infrastructure.52  In the five-year period to May 2002 Telkom was 
required to provide 2.69 million new working exchange lines to add to the network, 
which amounted to just over four million lines in 1996 (ICASA, 2000:17).  A 
specified number of these new lines (1,676 million) were set aside for areas 
designated as ‘under-serviced’.  Service conditions were set on a range of criteria such 
as the time to install new lines, fault rates and response to complaints.  Financial 
penalties were stipulated for failure to meet any of the targets.  Targets were also set 
in terms of the upgrading of the network, including the digitisation of all exchanges. 
 
As part of the reform process the government sold a 30% stake in Telkom in March 
1997 to a ‘strategic equity partner’, Thintana Communications, formed by the US 
company SBC and Telekom Malaysia.  The details of the shareholder contract remain 
confidential; however, SBC appeared to assume a significant degree of control over 
much of the strategic and operational decision-making, effectively meaning that 
Telkom is driven by private-sector imperatives.  Government also committed itself to 
an initial public offering of shares by early 2002, decreasing its stake to around 
50%.53 
 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act also established the South African 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA), charged with monitoring and 
enforcing the licence conditions.  The parameters for service conditions and pricing 
were stipulated in the Act for a five-year period, limiting the regulator’s discretion.  
The price cap set (a version of the CPI-X formula) allowed for major ‘rebalancing’ of 
local, long-distance and international call charges, while setting the average increase 
at 1.5 percentage points below expected inflation.  This resulted in charges for local 
calls increasing significantly over the period, while international and long-distance 
charges have been reduced. 
 
                                                 
52 Delays in establishing the framework for a second national operator to compete with Telkom means 
that, although Telkom’s fixed-line monopoly ended in May 2002, a competitor is only likely to begin 
operating in 2004. 
53 The Initial Public Offering (IPO) has been postponed to 2003 for various reasons, including 
unfavourable conditions in the international telecommunications market. 
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5.2.1.1 Performance of Telkom 
On the face of it, the provision of telecommunication services in South Africa has 
undoubtedly improved since 1996.  Telkom fell just 11,448 short of the 2.69 million 
target for new lines to be installed between 1997 and 2002 (Telkom, 2002).  The 
network was also almost fully digital by mid-2002 and times for installation and for 
the remedying of faults have decreased dramatically.54  Telkom also appears to be 
more efficient, with the lines per employee measure rising from 75 in 1997 to 125 in 
2002 (Telkom, 2002). 
 
Although Telkom almost met the targets for new lines, the total number of lines did 
not increase by the same amount as lines have been disconnected.  In 2001 and 2002 
disconnections so far exceeded roll-out that the total number of lines actually fell by 
half a million (almost 10%) from 2000 to 2002 (Telkom, 2002).  These 
disconnections were mainly of customers in under-serviced areas and were the result 
of non-payment (Barendse, 2003).  Indeed, since 1998 the total number of fixed lines 
has increased only slightly, with the net increases accounted for by new lines to the 
corporate sector and Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) connections.  
Household survey data also suggest that the net increase in lines is not nearly as great 
as suggested by roll-out figures, especially with regard to lessening inequalities in 
service provision.  In October 1999 just 7% of African households in non-urban areas 
had a telephone (including mobile phones) compared with 86% of white households.  
In urban areas 32% of African households and 88% of white households had a 
telephone.  Roll-out of fixed-lines has not impacted on these inequalities when the 
disconnections are taken into account (Hodge, 2002).  The biggest impact has come 
from mobile phones, which have grown much faster than expectations and in 2000 
surpassed fixed lines (see Table 5.3).55 
 
                                                 
54 For not fully meeting the targets on installation times and times to clear business and residential 
faults Telkom paid fines of R3.3. million in 1998 and R300,000 in 1999.  It expects to pay a fine of 
between R8 and R12 million for falling short of the target for new lines in 2002. 
55 While fixed-line teledensity in 2002 has been estimated at 11.4 per 100 inhabitants, for mobile 
phones it was estimated at 24.9 (Telkom, 2002). 
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Table 5.3: Growth in cellular phone subscribers (millions) 
 
 Dec 
1998 
March 
1999 
June 
1999 
Sept 
2000 
March 
2001 
Aug 
2001 
June 
2002 
Total 
subscribers 
2.55m 3.21m 3.8m 6.7m 8.3m 9.6m 13m 
Source: Cellular Online (2003) 
 
Telkom has been allowed to sharply increase the cost of local calls on the basis of the 
argument that there is a need to move towards more cost-based tariffs in order to 
prepare for competition.  Local call charges were increased sharply by 28% in 1997, 
while between 1998-2002 the cumulative increase in peak-rate local calls amounted to 
a further 97%, or 49% in real terms  (Table 5.4).  Whilst the prices of local calls 
increased, the prices of peak-rate international calls were 32% lower in 2002 
compared with 1998. 
 
The price changes have been justified by favourable comparisons of South African 
prices with other countries such as the UK (ICASA, 2000:18).  But comparisons with 
countries at a similar level of development are not so favourable.  In 2000, South 
Africa had higher charges for local calls and residential rentals than Brazil, South 
Korea and Malaysia (Table 5.5).  When the comparison is made using purchasing 
power parity exchange rates to reflect the equivalent buying power and costs across 
different countries, charges in South Africa are higher than almost all of the countries 
in the sample, including the UK and Germany.  Further, measured as a percentage of 
GDP per capita, residential rentals in South Africa are significantly higher than all of 
these countries. 
 
In addition, while the price of local calls in South Africa has been rising in real terms, 
in most other countries there have been large price reductions, due mainly to 
regulatory decisions.  For example, in Malaysia local calls were more than 50% 
cheaper in 2000 than in 1994.  The large price increases in South Africa between 2000 
and 2002 have exacerbated the relative expense of services in South Africa.  The price  
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Table 5.4: Summary of price changes controlled by licence conditions* 
 
 Jan 1998 
(%) 
Jan 1999 
(%) 
Jan 2000 
(%) 
Jan 2001 
(%) 
Jan 2002 
(%) 
Cumulative 
change 
1998-2000 
(%) 
Real 
cumulative 
price change 
(%)** 
Permitted price increase 
(CPI – 1.5) 
5.1 7.3 2.0 5.4 4.0   
        
Change in effective price of 
rentals  
       
   Residential 12.0 11.0 3.0 10.9 3.0 46.3 10.2 
    Business 15.0 13.0 4.2 9.5 4.2 54.5 16.4 
        
Change in effective price of 
calls 
       
Local (0-50km)        
   Peak 25.6 10.7 10.5 16.3 10.5 97.4 48.8 
   Off-peak 0.0 16.0 10.9 18.3 10.9 68.8 27.2 
National (50-100km)        
   Peak 0.0 9.8 0.9 1.8 0.9 13.8 -14.2 
   Off-peak 0.0 10.7 1.7 3.6 1.7 18.6 -10.6 
National (>100km)        
   Peak -8.5 1.8 0.2 -1.1 0.2 -7.5 -30.3 
   Off-peak -4.7 7.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 1.5 -23.5 
International        
   Peak -5.4 -7.5 -11.6 0.0 -11.6 -31.6 -48.5 
   Off-peak -11.5 -4.8 -6.7 0.0 -6.7 -26.7 -44.7 
Megaline C Tariff (2 Mbit 
link) 
25.5 24.6 22.9 7.8 -10.0 85.4 39.7 
* Deflated by CPI for previous year 
** Prices are as set in January for the calendar year ahead 
Source: ICASA (2003) 
 
Table 5.5: International price comparisons (2000) 
 
 3 minute 
peak-
rate 
local call 
(US$) 
Residential 
monthly 
rental 
(US$) 
Business 
monthly 
rental 
(US$) 
Residential 
rental as 
% of GDP 
per capita 
(US$) 
3 minute 
peak-
rate 
local call
(US$-
PPP)* 
Residential 
monthly 
rental 
(US$-PPP) 
Business 
monthly 
rental 
(US$-
PPP) 
Brazil 0.04 7.7 12.0 2.3 0.05 10.2 15.9 
Chile 0.12 10.8 10.8 2.9 0.29 26.0 26.0 
Germany 0.10 10.0 10.0 0.5 0.08 7.5 7.5 
South 
Korea 
0.04 3.5 3.5 0.5 0.05 4.5 4.5 
Malaysia 0.02 5.3 9.2 1.8 0.05 12.4 21.5 
South 
Africa 
0.09 9.0 12.0 3.6 0.20 19.8 26.4 
UK 0.18 15.1 23.4 0.7 0.18 15.0 23.2 
USA 0.00 20.8 41.8 0.7 0.00 20.8 41.8 
* PPP = purchasing power parity exchange rate 
Source: Calculated from ITU (2000); PPP exchange rates from World Bank (2000) 
 
increases have undoubtedly worked against extension of services and account to a 
large extent for the high levels of disconnection.  Although average incomes place 
South Africa in the upper-middle-income developing country bracket, in 1996 45% of 
the population were below the South African defined poverty line of R353 per month 
(UNDP, 2000). 
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Telkom increased the price of digital 2 mega-byte lines required by large company 
networks by more than 20% each year from 1998 to 2000.  These lines are the 
capacity required by its competitors for providing data services and the price increases 
indicate either that they were previously priced significantly below cost or that 
Telkom abused its monopoly position to disadvantage competitors in value-added 
services where it had not been granted exclusivity.56  Similar issues have arisen in 
Internet service provision.  Telkom has repeatedly threatened to cut-off independent 
service providers on the basis that they are infringing Telkom’s monopoly in voice 
telephony through the resale of line capacity or the possibility that users are engaging 
in voice-over Internet protocol.  Meanwhile, Telkom owns an Internet service 
provider in competition with the independent providers.  The regulator, i.e. the 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) has not been able 
to resolve these issues and they have come to court many times. 
 
The effect of corporatisation, partial privatisation and regulation has meant a shift in 
the orientation of Telkom’s management, despite government retaining a majority 
equity stake.  The Telkom strategy has involved moves to strengthen the commercial 
position of the company, including the rapid introduction of new technologies.  It has 
also involved a clear pricing strategy aimed at maximising returns and strengthening 
Telkom’s competitive position vis-à-vis potential rivals.  The shift to a more profit-
oriented strategy is evident in the steep rises in local call charges as well as sharp 
increases for the use of high bandwidth lines for data transfer.  The negative impact of 
price changes on users is evident in the disconnection rates, while the increased prices 
for data lines constrain the growth of this sector and its related businesses. 
 
Against the spatial as well as racial legacy of apartheid, the dimensions of the future 
growth path depend to an important extent on the telecommunications infrastructure.  
But while the number of telephone lines in South Africa rose from 8.3 per 100 
inhabitants in 1989 to 11.4 in 2001, in Malaysia lines increased over the same period 
from 8.0 per 100 to 19.9, and in Chile from 5.0 to 23.9 (ITU, 2000, 2002).  
Performance in terms of residential main lines per 100 households has been even 
worse, with very small increases in South Africa compared with three and four-fold 
                                                 
56 The price cut at the beginning of 2002 immediately before the introduction of competition further 
suggests the exertion of its monopoly power during the exclusivity period. 
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increases in Malaysia and Chile since 1989.  Clearly, the existing unequal income 
distribution in South Africa hampers service extension, but addressing these 
inequalities requires access to infrastructure.  It is notable that Brazil, which has 
similar levels of income inequality to South Africa, has also performed much better in 
terms of penetration rates (Table 5.6). 
 
Table 5.6: International comparisons of provision and  
investment in telecommunications 
 
 Brazil Chile Malaysia South Africa 
Mainlines per 100 population, 2001 21.7 23.9 19.9 11.4 
Residential lines, % of main lines, 2000 71.4 73.2 73.5 56.0 
Residential lines per 100 households, 2000 41.6 64.0 64.5 27.9 
Mobile phones per 100 population, 2001 16.7 34.0 39.9 21.0 
Telecoms, fixed-line investment, 2000 (% of revenue) 34.8 43.1 23.4 18.3 
Revenue per mainline, 2000 (US$) 822 754 596 1368 
Source: ITU (2002) 
 
In South Africa the main mechanism used to increase the provision of 
telecommunication services was the cross-subsidy implicit in the exclusivity given to 
Telkom for 5 years.  The barring of competition in international and long-distance 
calls allowed Telkom to continue generating profits from these market segments to 
support the expenses of increased service provision.  But investment by Telkom has 
not been particularly high by international comparison, while revenue per line has 
greatly exceeded the comparator countries of Brazil, Chile and Malaysia (Table 5.6).  
The South African experience highlights the weaknesses of the cross-subsidy 
approach, where it is combined with a shift to private incentives governing service 
provision.  Profit maximisation means that there is no incentive to examine the 
sustainability of services – the targets will be met in the cheapest way possible with 
little regard to high rates of disconnection, which means a continued bias to urban and 
peri-urban areas. 
 
Although Telkom (2001:n.p.) itself may claim that “[f]ew would disagree that 
telephony penetration is a key ingredient in economic growth and development”, the 
evidence indicates that Telkom does not employ such criteria.  Lines are cut-off due 
to short-term profitability considerations and price increases impact negatively on the 
affordability of the service.  Government’s desire to realise a high return from further 
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sales of its equity reinforces tendencies to pursue short-term profitability over longer-
term development goals.   
 
The combination of private ownership and regulation has not addressed the challenge 
of extending affordable telecommunications to the population as part of redressing 
entrenched inequalities.  With the shift to profit maximisation by Telkom the trade-off 
of exclusivity for service extension targets has been self-defeating.  Profit 
maximisation has meant hikes to local call charges and rentals, making the services 
less affordable to precisely those groups who are the target of increased extension.  
The exclusivity has, however, contributed to Telkom being a highly profitable 
enterprise.  It has upgraded its network and strengthened its competitive position. 
 
5.2.2 South African Information Technology Industrial Strategy (SAITIS) 
The most significant overall initiative for promoting growth and opportunity in the 
ICT sector was the DTI’s SAITIS (DTI, 2000a) project.  This project was a 3-year 
US$ 3.5 million policy development initiative, originally conceived in 1995 by Jay 
Naidoo, then Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting.  The project 
was sponsored by current President Thabo Mbeki (then Deputy President) and thus 
had support at the highest levels of government.  The idea for this project emerged out 
of discussions emanating from the ISAD Conference which South Africa hosted in 
Johannesburg in 1996.  As part of the preparations for this conference the need for an 
overarching government strategy towards the ‘information society’ was identified. 
 
The formal project itself was launched in 1999, though by this time its goal had 
narrowed from promoting an ‘information society’ to focusing on the ICT sector: “To 
develop a strong South African ICT sector to contribute to sustainable economic 
growth, social upliftment and empowerment” (DTI, 2000a:1).  It was launched as a 
bilateral development assistance project between the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) and the DTI, with consulting firm 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers providing management, research and technical assistance to 
the project.   
 
Government, industry, trade unions, academia and a range of other sectors were 
represented on a 37-member stakeholder Advisory Committee meeting and a Project 
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Steering Committee.  Working groups were established for the ICT industry, ICT 
usage, human resources and innovation.  In addition, a series of workshops were 
conducted around capital mobilisation, infrastructure, international markets, women 
in ICT, small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs), and management skills, 
along with provincial workshops designed to generate a greater appreciation for the 
status of ICT companies in different parts of the country.  The project produced a 
broad ‘baseline study’, which conducted research on trends in global ICT industries, 
analysed the current status of the industry in South Africa, and identified broad 
opportunities for development of the industry.   
 
The most important output of the SAITIS project was the preparation of a detailed 
policy framework for guiding the development of South Africa’s ICT sector.  It was 
acknowledged that in an era of globalisation and increased competition “the main 
challenge for countries outside of the developed world is to become increasingly 
proactive rather than reactive in the development of their indigenous ICT sectors” 
(DTI, 2000a:1).  Accordingly, the overarching goal of this framework is to nurture “a 
robust, growing and sustainable South African ICT sector that directly supports, and 
contributes to, the GEAR challenge of sustainable economic growth, social upliftment 
and empowerment” (DTI, 2000a:2).  There are two main thrusts to the framework, 
namely, “the development of the ICT sector and exploiting the capabilities of ICT in 
developing other sectors of the economy” (DTI, 2000a:19). 
 
Concerning the goal of achieving a “robust, growing and sustainable South African 
ICT sector with equity”, several different objectives and strategies are highlighted.  In 
particular, four major objectives are put forward for developing South Africa’s ICT 
sector.  First, the need to build local capacity in terms of the key players in the 
economy, namely large locally-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises, multi-
national corporations (MNCs) and SMMEs.  Second, the framework seeks to establish 
an enabling policy that would make South Africa an attractive environment for 
investment in the ICT sector.  Third, the framework aims to build a world-class 
support infrastructure for the ICT sector.  Fourth, it aims to promote exports and 
facilitate the capture of a growing proportion of the global ICT market by South 
African enterprises (DTI, 2000a:23). 
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The very nature of the SAITIS project is focused on broad strategic directions, 
leveraging other existing programmes and building a greater understanding of 
development in the ICT sector.  The extent to which the framework has an impact on 
building the ICT sector will depend on how the broad objectives are translated into 
actual policy initiatives and the resources that are used to back them up.  One thing 
that is clear, however, is that very little attention is being paid to any of the potentially 
disruptive impacts of ICTs (see, for example, Benner & Brownstein, 1999; ILO, 
2001).  The portions of the strategy focused on stimulating usage of ICTs in different 
sectors of the economy and among community organisations make no reference to 
any disruptive elements this strategy may have.  In discussions about promoting the 
adoption of ICT in other sectors, no mention is made of trying to do this in ways that 
expand and promote employment, rather than replace employees.  The SAITIS project 
almost entirely neglects any possible negative implications of the diffusion of ICTs 
and minimises opportunities for implementing ICTs in ways that can maximise 
economic competitiveness without job loss.  Despite a stated concern with socio-
economic development and addressing inequality, these policies largely fail to address 
the social problems associated with ICTs. 
 
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges for South Africa’s ability to harness ICTs 
comes in the form of human capacity.  There is a severe shortage of persons with the 
skills necessary for growth in the economy in general, and in the ICT industry in 
particular (DTI, 2000a, b).  This shortage is seen as the result of apartheid policies as 
well as a continued lack of co-ordination between the education system and the labour 
market (DTI, 2000a).  The SAITIS (DTI, 2000a) study also argues that this problem is 
exacerbated by the shortage of blacks qualified in the field of study relevant to the 
ICT sector (DTI, 2000a). 
 
It is important to note that in the process of focusing on developing an industry 
strategy, the explicit goal was to directly support and contribute to government’s 
GEAR (DTI, 1996) macroeconomic strategy.  The GEAR strategy, despite a stated 
goal that includes social upliftment and empowerment, is a highly controversial policy 
that prioritises public sector fiscal austerity and deregulation in the process of 
international integration over domestic social programmes (see Section 6.1.1).  This 
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narrowing of social goals is also reflective in the process of developing the SAITIS 
industry strategy. 
 
5.2.3 White Paper on Science and Technology 
During 1995 and 1996 DACST undertook a green paper-white paper process to 
develop a new science and technology policy.  The White Paper (DACST, 1996) was 
presented in November 1996 and forms the basis of the present National System of 
Innovation (NSI).  According to the White Paper, government has an important role to 
play in creating a stimulating environment in which science and technology lead to 
innovation, prosperity and improvement in the quality of life.  The document 
proposed the restructuring of institutions of science and technology, and their 
financing mechanisms, to promote their more effective use in terms of national 
development.  Five priority themes were identified: 
 
1. The promotion of competitiveness and employment; 
2. Improving people’s quality of life; 
3. The development of human resources; 
4. Promoting environmental sustainability; and 
5. Promoting the ‘information society’ (DACST, 1996). 
 
The White Paper states: 
“South Africa currently lacks a national policy to facilitate the country’s 
optimal integration into the global information society and outlining clear 
responsibilities, goals and targets.  This is a serious defect in our overall 
innovation drive and must be remedied as soon as possible.  Information 
society planning must now take place at the highest levels within South Africa 
to develop a national vision, policy and strategy for meeting our specific 
needs” (DACST, 1996:1). 
 
This prioritisation led to a reallocation of research funding, including an ‘information 
society’ focus.  An Innovation Fund was set up, as recommended in the White Paper. 
This has, since its inception, included an ‘information society’ focus.  It is significant 
to note that both the ISAD position paper and the White Paper on Science and 
Technology called for a consultative green paper-white paper policy process on the 
‘information society’.   
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5.2.4 Universal Service 
One of the objectives of the ANC-aligned groups that emerged at the National 
Colloquium on Telecommunications, held in November 1995, was that a body should 
be set up to focus on providing telephones to the disadvantaged section of the 
population in the country.  The RDP, for instance, stated: 
“Telecommunications is an information infrastructure and must play a crucial 
role in South Africa’s development programmes.  The RDP aims to provide 
universal affordable access for all as rapidly as possible within a sustainable 
and viable telecommunications system; to develop a modern and integrated 
telecommunications and information technology system that is capable of 
enhancing, cheapening and facilitating education, health care, business 
information, public administration and rural development, and to develop a 
Southern African cooperative programme for telecommunications.  In terms of 
the RDP, telecommunication services must be provided to all schools and 
clinics within two years” (ANC, 1994:Section 2.8). 
 
It was argued that the usual forms of regulation that had been established in other 
countries would not focus sufficiently on ensuring universal access (Horowitz, 2001).  
This position was pushed strongly by the Post Office and Telecommunications 
Workers Association (POTWA).  The body proposed to address this concern became 
known as the Universal Service Agency (USA).  The USA is a statutory body 
established by the Telecommunications Act No. 103 of 1996 (MPTB, 1996).  
Launched in 1997, it was given the responsibility for ensuring universal access to 
telecommunication services (voice, fax, Internet, etc.).  The USA defines universal 
access as: 
“A telephone within a reasonable distance.  The ultimate aim would be to have 
universal service for all in South Africa, but this will not happen soon.  A 
more realistic goal is to provide telecommunications where everyone in the 
country can have access within 30 minutes’ travelling.  This can only be 
achieved with co-operation from business, government and the broader 
community” (USA, 2003:n.p.). 
 
The first chapter in the White Paper on Telecommunications addresses 
“Telecommunications and Development in South Africa” (MPTB, 1996:7).  This 
chapter outlines the need for a Universal Service Agency:  
“It will be important to keep in mind the concern…that classic approaches to 
managing the implementation of telecommunications policy would not be 
sufficient to keep the focus on the goal of universal service long enough to 
redress the existing imbalances.  The apartheid system left the vast majority of 
black South Africans, particularly in rural communities, without access to 
basic communications services…The potential development impact of 
telecommunications would be limited; the opportunity would be lost for South 
 153
Africa to leapfrog traditional stages of development through the use of 
telecommunications to foster the application of new information technologies” 
(MPTB, 1996:8). 
 
The White paper goes on to say: 
“Members of historically disadvantaged communities, and particularly those 
in rural areas, must be the immediate targets for the delivery of universal 
service.  The universal service agency is a South African response to this very 
particular South African social, economic and political environment” (MPTB, 
1996:9). 
 
The Telecommunications Act stipulates that the USA will promote universal service, 
monitor and research, and manage the Universal Service Fund (USF).  To help 
develop universal access, the USA rolled out an ambitious programme to establish 
hundreds of telecentres within the first two years, with funding provided by the USF 
and augmented from the international donor community.57  However, the actual 
implementation of these centres proved more difficult than originally thought.  
Although the USA managed to set up 65 telecentres by 2001, it is largely accepted 
that it did not deliver on its original promises (Benjamin & Dahms, 2001).  Further, as 
the USA mainly focused on implementation, it largely neglected its mandate in terms 
of research and policy preparation.  The internal capacity of the USA was not 
sufficient to cope with its plans and commitments, nor was the skills mix the correct 
one for the changed focus to an implementation agency. 
 
The 65 USA telecentres fell into one of four categories:  
 
1. 21 not operating: basically the telecentre has shut down and is not functional; 
2. 12 partial with phones: the centre is operating, but only with telephone services, 
i.e. effectively a phone-shop; 
3. 2 partial without phones: the centre is operating, but with no phone connection, 
and therefore no fax or Internet connection.  However, it has computers and a 
photocopier; and 
                                                 
57 In addition to community telecentres, the South African Post Office (SAPO) together with the DoC 
has initiated a programme called Public Internet Terminals (PITs) to contribute to its universal access 
goals.  PITs are stand-alone kiosks where people can access the Internet, as well as personalised 
services in terms of e-commerce, distance education, e-government, etc.  After a test phase, it bid out 
the design and implementation to the private sector.  These services have yet to be evaluated and are at 
a very early stage of roll-out. 
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4. 30 phone and computer: the centre offers both computing and telephone services 
(Benjamin, 2002; Benjamin & Dahms, 2001). 
 
The USA proclaimed the telecentres as a means of providing access to 
telecommunications and other information services.  However, the USA does not 
appear to have been clear what this meant beyond supplying ICT equipment.  It is a 
truism in the field of ICTs for development that the equipment is a tool and not an end 
in itself.  The potential value of ICTs for poor communities lies in the information and 
not in the technology.  However, the USA did not: (i) develop or support information 
services; (ii) encourage information brokerage; (iii) conduct information needs-
analyses; or (iv) supply training and templates for developing local information.  21 of 
the 65 USA telecentres were not operating at all in 2001.  The primary reasons for not 
operating were as follows: (i) burglary/theft; (ii) lack of power supply for rural areas 
off grid electricity where generators or other alternative supplies were not possible; 
(iii) telephone lines not supplied by Telkom; (iv) lack of skills to operate the 
computers and/or no demand for the computers; (v) unskilled or otherwise 
incompetent management; (vi) financial problems stemming mostly from inability to 
pay Telkom bill; and (vii) major tensions in the community between different factions 
over who should own the telecentre led to the centre closing down (Benjamin, 
2002:56). 
 
Only 49% of the telecentres had working telephones.  Just under half (47%) of the 
telecentres had both computers and phones working, though all had been provided 
with this equipment from the start.  This evidence emphasises the difficulties of 
maintaining ICT equipment in rural areas and townships, combined with the 
difficulties of centralised procurement.  Repair and maintenance problems were also 
mentioned (Benjamin, 2000; Benjamin & Stavrou, 2000).  It would appear that full 
USA telecentres are not an appropriate model for poor communities, if the intention is 
to supply only telephony.  The investment is too large.  Payphones or Vodacom-type 
phone-shops provide a better model for telephony provision.   
 
In the telecentres without computer-literate staff, the computer-based services were 
rarely used.  In a number of telecentres the computers and modems gathered dust and 
were never connected.  Scanners and overhead projects were rarely used.  By far the 
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most popular service was telephony followed by the use of the fax and photocopier.  
The demand in rural communities appears to be largely for telephones on the basis of 
the evidence from the studies conducted by Benjamin (2000, 2002) and Benjamin and 
Stavrou (2000).  Based on the analysis of the USA telecentre experience, the evidence 
shows that electronic information services were not prioritised by poor communities 
themselves.  Most of the USA telecentres have been found to be weak or failing.  
Without greater support they are very unlikely to be sustainable.  Their long-term 
viability is uncertain, especially as replacement equipment will be needed. 
 
The telecentre model was regarded as too sophisticated (and unaffordable) for many 
rural communities, where basic telephony is more of a need than Internet access.  The 
growth in cellular telephony has changed the face of telecommunications in South 
Africa.  The advent of prepaid cards has increased rural access in particular.  This has 
never been taken into account in redefining universal service and access.  The USA’s 
telecentres found that they were competing with cellular telephony in many areas 
where this had not even been considered a few years ago, when the USA was planned.  
Benjamin laments that: 
“Much of the community ICT work in South Africa seems more interested in 
the technology than people.  To use American slang, we ‘dig’ all the 
broadband, multi-media, real-time, interactive systems before seeing how they 
will be applied.  There is a ‘dig-it-all’ divide – a division between the hype of 
the technology and how it can be used by people in poverty…Placing a few 
more computer centres in poor areas might benefit a fortunate minority with 
the ability to learn, get jobs and leave those disadvantaged areas.  However, to 
use ICT to benefit wider development will require a different agenda” 
(Benjamin, 2002:69). 
 
The telecentre approach is concerned only with access to infrastructure, yet it is 
becoming increasingly evident that infrastructure is but one aspect of access. Simply 
having ICT infrastructure in a community does not mean that people will have the 
skills or capacity, the finances, or even the need to use the technology.  In addition, 
for access to ICTs to be optimised for economic purposes parallel development 
strategies such as micro-lending and skills development schemes needs to be 
deployed.  Further, the local economic environment needs to support the introduction 
of ICTs, and the policy and regulatory environment needs to be supportive of large-
scale community ICT use.  Community access to ICTs is most likely to be meaningful 
where it offers access to public and community services mediated by ICTs.   We need 
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to see access as far more than just the availability of technological infrastructure and 
consider how the technology may be useful in the particular context in which it is to 
be used.  Provision of infrastructure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
ICTs to play a role in sustainable development efforts. 
 
5.2.5 ICTs and Schools 
In February 1996 the Ministry of Education commissioned a group of experts to 
develop a national framework and strategic plan for technology-enhanced education.  
The result of the commission’s deliberations was a report called Technology 
Enhanced Learning Investigation in South Africa (TELI Strategic Planning 
Committee, 1997).  The main thrust of the TELI report was that technology as such 
would not contribute to the quality of education.  It should become part and parcel of 
the whole educational system, which meant that changes would have to take place at 
all levels of the system.  The Ministry and the sector broadly welcomed the TELI 
report, even though it would not be developed into a concrete policy document.  
Nonetheless, it resulted in the establishment of the National Centre for Educational 
Technology and Distance Education in early 1997. 
 
TELI identified 6 ‘lead’ projects which can serve as an effective platform to create a 
‘technology-enhanced learning network’.  These projects are as follows: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Supporting curriculum development and delivery in three key areas at Grade 8 
level; 
Delivering technically oriented vocational education in three areas of national 
priority, combining on and off the job training; 
Developing a generic information literacy course for use in schools, community 
centres, industry-based training sites and other appropriate sites of teaching and 
learning; 
Professional development of educators in the use of technologies in education and 
training; 
Training and supporting managers of learning centres of different kinds; and 
Running a pilot provincial project to test new strategies for introducing 
technology to support the management and administration of education and 
training. 
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A study in 1996 showed that only 2,000 (out of 27,000) South African schools had the 
electricity, telephone lines and computers necessary even to contemplate the use of IT 
in their educational processes (EPU, 2000).  Current estimates suggest that of the 
28,798 schools in South Africa, only 5,000 have computers, and of these only a 
fraction have Internet access (DoE, 2003).  Deployment remains patchy, 
uncoordinated and constrained by cost and support barriers.  Table 5.7 provides a 
snapshot of the uneven diffusion of computers in schools in the nine provinces.   
 
Table 5.7: Computers in schools by province (2000) 
 
Provinces Schools with 
Computers 
Schools with Computers 
for Teaching/Learning 
Learner/Computer 
Ratio 
Eastern Cape 8.8% 4.5% 373:1 
Free State 20.6% 8.6% 181:1 
Gauteng 82.5% 41.4% 65:1 
KwaZulu-Natal 18.6% 10.0% 228:1 
Mpumalanga 8.7% 8.7% 298:1 
Northern Cape 57.3% 25.3% 95:1 
Limpopo 11.3% 4.6% 463:1 
North West 21.7% 7.6% 254:1 
Western Cape 78.3% 45.2% 66:1 
National 24.4% 12.3% 164:1 
Source: DoE, 2003 
 
To address this challenge several initiatives are underway in South Africa.58  The 
most important are Gauteng Online and the Khanya Project of the Western Cape 
government.  Further, the national Department of Education (DoE, 2003) is planning 
to construct a national education portal.  In the foreword to the Strategy for 
Information and Communication Technology in Education, the Minister of Education 
states emphatically: 
“Advances in information and communication technology (ICT) globally are 
rapidly expanding the learning opportunities and access to educational 
resources beyond those immediately or traditionally available.  It is therefore 
critical that our education and training systems takes advantage of these 
technological changes.  The programme for improving the quality of education 
cannot be based on ‘whether we should introduce ICT in teaching and 
learning’ but ‘how we can successfully introduce ICT in schools’” (DoE & 
DoC, 2001:3). 
 
                                                 
58 However, there is a lack of a coherent and systematic plan for implementing ICTs in South African 
schools. 
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This assumes that there are teachers with the enthusiasm to take on new technologies 
and perhaps even change their pedagogic process.  Also, the effort is not yet co-
ordinated and lack of basic data means that policy decisions do not have a strong 
grounding.  Moreover, the cost of implementing ICT infrastructure (computers, 
connecting to the Internet,  etc.) in all South African schools, with the concomitant 
training and maintenance costs, is likely to be enormous.59  The estimated cost of 
bringing access and connectivity to all schools in South Africa, over a 5-year period, 
lies in the range of R40-50 billion (Moodley & Kahn, 2003).  These figures are based 
on the total cost of ownership of the electronic systems, i.e. hardware, software, 
space, security, connectivity, upgrades, training, etc.  It is for this reason that the 
Minister of Education calls for public-private partnerships to pave the way for 
investment in the provision of ICT in education (DoE & DoC, 2001).  Whether the 
private sector will be willing to make such large investments in rolling-out ICT for 
schools is of course a moot point.     
 
Against a background where upwards of 30% of schools lack the most basic 
amenities, universal access to Internet and computers remains a long-term goal 
(Moodley & Kahn, 2003).  Even where free hardware and software have been 
provided, experience shows that the ongoing cost of connectivity remains a barrier.  
The dissemination of ICTs in support of teaching, learning and administration is 
complex and depends critically upon the people involved: learners, teachers and 
administrators are central to effective use of the technologies (Moodley & Kahn, 
2003).  The highest returns on ICTs in education appear to come when ICTs are seen 
as part of a strategy for solving an important problem rather than as an end in itself.  
The desired ICT infrastructure for schools should be defined in terms of pedagogical 
goals, translated to types of ICT usage desired rather than to physical terms such as 
student/computer ratio or number of classrooms connected to the Internet.  Moreover, 
pre-service education of teachers should include lessons on evaluating electronic 
materials for pedagogical value as well as content.  Both infrastructure and teacher 
competencies are required for successful implementation of ICTs in schools.   
 
                                                 
59 SchoolNet South Africa estimates that just under 6,000 schools, out of the 27,100 schools in the 
country, have one or more computers (SchoolNet South Africa, 2003).  
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Successful implementation of ICTs, however, is not simply a technical issue.  It 
requires a vision for education and the specific educational goals that ICTs are to 
support.  For instance, the biggest challenge confronting Gauteng Online is not the 
creation of computer networks, which is being supported with equipment and skills by 
major South African and international ICT companies (GDoE, 2002).   Rather, the 
real challenge will prove to be the incorporation of a common web-based set of 
curricula and the development of a curriculum development methodology, including 
organisational mechanisms and technological tools.  The aim is to facilitate 
curriculum revision and adaptation vis-à-vis the integration of ICTs in learning, 
teaching and assessment.  Another substantive challenge will be teacher training at 
two levels: (i) introduction to the technologies and preparation to operate and manage 
the hardware; and (ii) training in the pedagogical use of the technologies.  The latter 
poses a particular challenge, since it remains a relatively new area of teacher 
education with further research needed into the most effective ways of using ICTs to 
promote learning.  
 
The Computers in Schools document produced by the Education Policy Unit (EPU) of 
the University of the Western Cape (2000) sketched the magnitude of the challenge in 
the context of extreme variation in ICT infrastructure and skills induced by apartheid 
policies.  No miracles derive from the mere presence of ICTs in a school.  Years of 
research on school change show that the implementation plans that work best for any 
school are a function of the attitudes and abilities of the staff, the quality of 
leadership, the role played by parents and the community, and the resources available 
(Elmore, 2000; Fullan, 1999).  Further, successful implementation of ICTs in schools 
is not simply a technical issue.  Quality education does not need to change to 
accommodate the particularities and power of technology.  Instead, technology needs 
to change to accommodate good educational practices. 
 
Even for schools in the highly industrialised countries, the front-end costs of 
developing a high-tech classroom are often prohibitive.  Investments in hardware, 
operating platforms, applications and connections to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
must be weighed against existing infrastructure requirements such as facilities and 
books.  Further complicating the issue is the speed at which technologies become 
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obsolete.  Educators face difficult choices in ensuring that ICT investment is both 
appropriate to the needs as well as self-sustaining.  As one observer notes:  
“Care should be taken to avoid allowing the novelty of technology to drive 
decisions regarding the most appropriate delivery mode…If a country’s 
conventional education or teacher training program is not effective, using a 
new technology to deliver that education or training will not make it any more 
effective” (Potashnik & Capper, 1998:45). 
 
In the South African schooling system the long-term challenge for government is to: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Introduce ICTs into the curriculum, assessment and learning environments, and in 
teaching practice; 
Roll-out infrastructure – including connecting schools to the network, providing 
internal infrastructure within schools, i.e. local area networks (LANs), hardware 
and software, and technical support including maintenance, planning and 
logistical support; 
Make learning material available including software, pedagogical tools and online 
content; 
Emphasise initial and ongoing teacher training in the pedagogical use of ICTs; 
Develop innovative funding opportunities and collaborative opportunities; 
Develop an evaluative and monitoring framework, and undertake a process of 
ongoing assessment and evaluation; 
Develop a strategic framework/model for co-ordinating and implementing ICTs in 
schools on a provincial and national basis; 
Strive for sustainability through: capacity building, continued financial support, 
government ownership and informing policy and curriculum;  
Develop needs-driven applications.  There is a need for more and improved 
interactive educational software, including software which evaluates the learners’ 
strengths, weaknesses and learning personality, and adapts the tuition accordingly; 
and 
Use ICTs for teacher pre- and in-service training.  In interacting with ICTs, 
teachers will gain experience of learning with ICTs and be more prepared to 
integrate it into their teaching as computers start to be diffused into schools. 
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5.2.6 Industrial Policy 
Carmody (2002:270) asserts that the “South African government has identified high 
technology as a strategic sector of the economy as it attempts to move towards an 
‘information society’”.  In line with this the DTI issued a discussion document in 
2001 to inform a new industrial strategy for South Africa, entitled Driving 
Competitiveness: An Integrated Industrial Strategy for Sustainable Employment and 
Growth (DTI, 2001).  The central argument of the document is to extend the 
traditional boundaries of manufacturing strategy so as to embrace upstream design 
and development aspects as well as downstream functions such as marketing.  A 
fundamental theme is that manufacturing firms are facing a myriad of changes 
occasioned, among other things, by changes in ICTs, the use of the Internet by 
suppliers, manufacturers and customers, rapid advances in innovation and changing 
customer demand.  It notes a shift in world trade away from commodity production 
and raw material-intensive, simple manufactured goods to increasingly knowledge-
intensive goods and services.  Accordingly: 
“Our industrial strategy cannot…focus solely on production.  It will seek to 
integrate both backward and forward linkages with production.  Of particular 
importance here will be the development and enhancement of our existing 
capacities in knowledge-driven activities.  This will rest upon the development 
of leading edge logistics – an essential foundation for this integration” (DTI, 
2001:3). 
 
Further, the DTI states that: 
“Government support to all manufacturing firms and sectors will increasingly 
take the form of policies that are designed to enable firms to effectively 
produce and assimilate knowledge.  Government will seek policies which, for 
example, facilitate the more effective use of knowledge on the part of 
internationally competitive raw material-intensive manufacturers.  Such 
policies will aim at further enhancing their competitive position in existing 
activities, but also encourage them to engage in those activities downstream 
and closer to the market, which tend to be more knowledge-intensive, and that 
could generate higher returns, employment and value-added.  For those 
industries that are not currently competitive, policies will similarly 
progressively seek to enhance their competitive position by facilitating the 
more effective production and use of knowledge” (DTI, 2001:1). 
 
These extracts reflect a strategy that will rely increasingly on the application of ICTs, 
and particularly those aspects of ICTs related to knowledge management, so as to 
enhance global competitiveness and increase employment in the country.  The DTI is 
also in the process of developing initiatives geared towards diffusion of ICTs into 
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priority industrial sectors.  The purpose of this project is to provide a better 
information base for those in vertical markets for ICT and also to provide local ICT 
vendors and service providers with better information on what the future ICT 
requirements are likely to be.  Three sector areas have been selected: 
 
1. Traditional sectors such as mining, agriculture and manufacturing; 
2. Service sectors, which would include government services, as well as others such 
as education and tourism; and 
3. ‘New economy’ sectors, which would cover sectors such as telecommunications, 
e-commerce, biotechnology and software manufacture/systems development. 
 
The DTI has also produced an ICT Cluster Strategic Plan (2002) geared towards 
developing the ICT sector as a platform for exploiting growth and job creation 
opportunities.  One important facet of the public policy debate on ICTs in South 
Africa is concerned with maximising the employment benefits of the ‘information 
revolution’.  This notwithstanding, apart from rhetorical commitment to job creation 
in the ICT sector, government has yet to release a policy document which explicitly 
maps out a detailed, co-ordinated framework for creating ICT-related jobs in South 
Africa.  The DTI SAITIS Project released a document entitled Status of IT-Related 
Jobs and Skills (DTI, 2000b), which discusses the issue of creating employment, re-
skilling workers, and dealing with potential job loss in the ICT sector.  The SAITIS 
document, however, does not explicitly propose a detailed programme of action to 
tackle the issue of job creation in the ICT sector head-on. 
 
5.2.7 Electronic Commerce 
In 1998 the Ministry of Communications launched an extensive policy formulation 
process on e-commerce.  The starting point was a discussion paper on e-commerce 
and included a wide range of public and stakeholder consultations.  A major 
component of this policy initiative was a green/white paper process.  The ‘green 
paper’ phase of the process was designed to raise important questions, posed both to 
experts and to users of e-commerce.  This process was expected to involve the 
perspectives of all in South Africa, including the “previously marginalised majority of 
our people” (DoC, 2002b).  The ‘white paper’ phase was supposed to explain the draft 
government policy on e-commerce.  As the lead agency in this policy process, the 
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DoC saw this process as part of a strategy to make South Africa a ‘knowledge-based’ 
society and help create an ‘information economy’ (DoC, 2002b).  The key principles 
driving the e-commerce policy process in South Africa are summarised in Table 5.8. 
 
Table 5.8: Key principles driving the South African e-commerce policy process 
 
Quality of life To improve the quality of life of people through the optimal use of e-
commerce, thus ensuring socio-economic development and facilitating 
equitable development. 
International 
benchmarking 
To ensure international consistency, alignment and harmonisation.  South 
Africa needs to be in line with international treaties and develop an e-
commerce policy that is based on international trends and benchmarks while 
taking cognisance of South Africa’s special requirements. 
Consultative process To be consultative, transparent and to balance the interests of the broader 
spectrum of stakeholders through the solicitation of the public to participate 
in the deliberations. 
Flexibility To be flexible in establishing rules and regulations for governance.  The 
introduction of new measures and elements into law will take place within 
the relevant branches of law. 
Private sector led Where possible, the e-commerce policy should support private sector-led 
initiatives. 
Promoting public-
private sector 
partnerships 
To establish public-private sector partnerships that will promote and 
encourage the development and use of e-commerce.  The private sector will 
remain a critical driving force in the effort to optimise the potential of e-
commerce. 
Supporting SMMEs in 
the ICT sector 
To facilitate the promotion and development of SMMEs and the informal 
sector, and contribute to their speedy adoption of e-commerce. 
Source: Compiled from the DoC (2000a) 
 
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 was promulgated to 
“enable and facilitate electronic communications and transactions in the public 
interest” (DoC, 2002a:1).  Key objectives include: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Promoting universal access to electronic transactions; 
Removal and prevention of barriers to electronic communications and 
transactions; 
Development of electronic transaction services which are responsive to the needs 
of users and consumers; 
Promotion of SMMEs within the electronic transactions environment; 
Promoting legal certainty and confidence in respect of electronic communications 
and transactions; and 
Development of a safe, secure and effective environment for the consumer, 
business and government to conduct electronic transactions (DoC, 2002a). 
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Despite having a very broad definition of e-commerce, the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (DoC, 2002a) deals primarily with 
legal and contractual aspects of e-commerce, including contractual and trade laws, 
taxation, intellectual property rights, consumer protection and security.  Significant 
social issues such as implications for job creation/destruction, use of ICTs in the 
workplace, and representation of workers and disadvantaged sectors of the society are 
almost entirely neglected in the DoC’s approach.  The DoC has been heavily criticised 
for these omissions, especially by COSATU (2002). 
 
Stavrou, May and Benjamin (2000) concluded that for the immediate future e-
commerce will have little impact on people in greatest poverty, although it can be a 
tool to support SMME development if other issues such as training, credit and general 
business support are also dealt with.  The fact that the Internet, apart from being 
expensive to access, is a tool that requires fluency in English, a fairly high level of 
education and computer literacy to use constructively, is conveniently underplayed in 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (DoC, 2002a).  The Internet is 
also problematic as an efficient tool for the utilisation of unskilled labour, the type of 
labour that most of the poor have to offer.  It might have some use as an information 
tool for connecting unskilled workers with employers who have a demand for them, 
but as a direct source of income-generating activities, the Internet is a tool for skilled, 
or at least computer-literate employees.  Poor people’s use of more advanced Internet 
operations such as e-commerce faces an even greater number of barriers.  Poor people 
do not have the requisite credit facilities, they are far from logistics services that could 
deliver goods, and the types of goods that they would want to buy or sell have limited 
outlets online (Moodley, Morris & Velia, 2003).   
 
A major capacity issue, therefore, involves human resource development and 
specialised technical skills.  E-commerce is computer and network intensive, 
requiring skilled programmers and applications development personnel.  Educational 
systems like that in South Africa, which cannot provide sufficient technical training 
will hinder the country’s ability to adapt to e-commerce.  In addition, for business-to-
consumer (B2C) e-commerce and government services online to succeed, consumers 
require both basic literacy and computer skills. 
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The dominant trend in the commercial world of electronic commerce and electronic 
markets is exclusivity (Moodley, 2002a, b).  The majority of business-to-business 
(B2B) e-commerce sites on the Web are ‘walled’, i.e. they are for members only 
(Moodley & Morris, 2003).  Even when these sites are open to all potential buyers 
and sellers, they do not always deliver the information and business support services 
they claim to provide at their home pages (Moodley, 2002a, b).  This is inconsistent 
with the goal of ensuring that the new ICTs offer opportunities for learning and 
participating in the global economy that are inclusive.  It is for these wide range of 
reasons that UNCTAD’s survey of e-commerce use in developing countries, in the 
2002 E-commerce and Development Report, was able to find only a few examples of 
substantive e-commerce development in the Third World, largely serving niche 
markets (UNCTAD, 2002). 
 
5.2.8 Info.com 2025 
The Info.com 2025 programme of the DoC (1998a) was conceptualised as a modular 
approach to the implementation of ICT services and applications.  The objective is to 
showcase the possibilities of ICTs. The programme itself consists of 5 main 
components: 
 
1. Policy management and institutional framework: to create specific institutional 
support for managing the process of policy-making; 
2. Information access and infrastructure: to facilitate the creation of physical 
infrastructure for information access; 
3. Government information technology: to facilitate the development of specific 
Internet-based public service delivery applications; 
4. Education and training: to facilitate and promote education and training through 
the use of ICTs; and 
5. Private sector development: to enhance policies and facilitate activities that have 
direct impact on labour market demand and opportunities for private sector 
entrepreneurship (DoC,1998a). 
 
To date only some of the envisaged pilot projects have been implemented and reasons 
for the partial implementation of the Info.com 2025 are difficult to ascertain.  Several 
factors probably played a role: 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Limited capacity for the conceptualisation and implementation of projects within 
DoC; 
Some programme components and related projects were better conceptualised 
than others, more specifically those projects where the Department had a direct 
responsibility; 
DoC needed the support of many other departments to implement the 2025 
programme.  Without a clear mandate from government to provide the overall co-
ordination for Info.com 2025, overall implementation was difficult; 
The responsibility for some projects has shifted between implementing agencies 
and departments.  In some instances the responsibility has shifted from DoC to 
other departments; and 
The initiation of other priority projects such as the e-commerce policy, 
development of an ICT strategy, and the Telkom IPO may have diverted energy 
and resources away from Info.com projects. 
 
5.2.9 Electronic Government 
ICTs in the public service did not appear to be a central issue during the early years of 
the first democratic government.  This is surprising, as the ANC-led government 
inherited a fragmented public service in which almost every department had its own 
IT infrastructure and IT department.  By 1994 South Africa had 17 wide area 
networks (WANs) at the national level.  These networks were not integrated, did not 
communicate and were largely unable to exchange information and data (Kahn & 
Swanborough, 1999).  Although DPSA was officially responsible for IT policy within 
government, until 1997 there was little progress towards a more integrated approach 
concerning IT in government.  A first document stressing the problematic situation is 
the report by the Presidential Review Commission (PRC) presented in February 1998 
(PRC, 1998).  The PRC was specifically set up by President Mandela to analyse the 
working of government and the administration. 
 
Although there was a massive investment in IT, there was no appreciable benefit in 
the form of greater service delivery or a more efficient and effective public service.  
The PRC summarised the problems as follows: 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
A widespread use of incompatible platforms, networks and applications; 
Information not shared and re-used in any organised manner; 
An unsustainable, broad set of technology skills needed to maintain the systems; 
Unacceptably varied and non-standard priorities and approaches to the use of 
systems, technology and knowledge and information management (KIM)  
practices; and 
Unnecessary duplication of functions and systems between line departments 
(PRC, 1998: Section 6.2.3). 
 
The PRC had this to say: 
“It is clear to the Commission that the Government lacks an overall vision and 
strategy for IMST [Information Management, Systems and Technology] and 
that, in the absence of such a strategy individual departments are finding it 
difficult to define their own IMST strategies.  Most departments are therefore 
pursuing their policy agendas independently, with IT systems being developed 
and/or operated to meet only the specific departmental policy objectives.  In 
the absence of effective policy coordination, IMST strategy is likely to remain 
incoherent.  The cost implications of this situation are enormous” (PRC, 1998: 
Section 6.2.1). 
 
As far as e-government is concerned, the PRC concluded that: 
“The implementation of electronic government is probably the best way to 
build capabilities that enable the public not only to access information but to 
conduct transactions with government departments.  The Government already 
owns most of the infrastructure for the implementation of electronic 
government and the private sector has the technology products.  The 
Commission therefore recommends that Government give serious 
consideration to migrating to completely electronic communication within the 
next five years” (PRC, 1998: Section 6.4.4). 
 
South Africa through the offices of the DPSA participated in the drafting of the report 
entitled Roadmap for E-Government in the Developing World: 101 Questions E-
Government Leaders Should Ask Themselves (Working Group on E-Government in 
the Developing World, 2002).  Further, in April 2001 DPSA produced a discussion 
document entitled Electronic Government – The Digital Future: A Public Service IT 
Policy Framework (DPSA, 2001).  The foreword by the Minister states:  
“The object of the e-Government Policy is the co-ordination of all government 
efforts on information technologies across the three tiers of Government for 
greater impact and enhancement of the delivery of services to all citizens…e-
Government should also present us with an opportunity to roll out 
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comprehensive services to under-serviced areas and areas without services” 
(DPSA, 2001:Foreword). 
 
The DPSA (2001) discussion document underscores the importance of and need for a 
systematic and methodical approach, informed by clear understanding of the 
objectives, affordable scale and interdependence of issues.  To this end, it notes that 
policy should: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Spell out the e-government vision; 
Define clearly how progress is to be measured in terms of the benefits to be 
achieved; 
Set priorities by identifying focus areas for immediate attention; 
Define the generic prerequisites (in areas like human resources, research, 
legislation, etc.) that must be in place for advancements in the key areas to 
succeed; and 
Give specific recommendations on how to deliver results in each focus area. 
 
The DPSA (2001) discussion document identified the following focus areas as being 
essential for the success of e-government policy: 
 
Interoperability of government IT systems including networks, platforms, 
applications and data; 
IT security to provide an environment in which all government electronic 
documents and data are protected from unauthorised access, malicious code or 
denial-of-service attacks; 
Economies of scale so that government can leverage its buying muscle to promote 
compliance with other key IT focus areas; and 
Elimination of duplications to ensure that similar functions, projects and resources 
are used with improved efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Key e-government projects in South Africa include: 
 
The DPSA Gateway Project: This is a citizen services portal.  DPSA maintains 
that all public services provided electronically should be offered via the Gateway.  
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It is claimed that a national backbone of fully integrated, one-stop Gateway 
Service Centres (GSCs) will be established to provide value-added services to 
citizens across all spheres of government (CPSI, DPSA & SITA, 2003).60 
• 
• 
• 
• 
                                                
The Home Affairs National Identification System (HANIS): in the first phase of 
the HANIS project 40 million paper identity records will be converted to digital 
format.  The second phase is to shift from paper-based citizen identity documents 
to an electronic version through the issuing of ‘smart cards’.  It is believed that the 
electronic system will help in combating identity document fraud and that citizens 
will benefit through faster processing of pension and welfare payments. 
Gauteng Online: a project to provide all Gauteng schools with a minimum of 25 
networked computers, free Internet access and an e-mail address for each learner 
as well as a learning portal by 2004.  Likewise, the Western Cape Department of 
Education (WCDoE) has launched its Khanya Project, which aims to deliver 
education in the classroom through technology.  A total of R40 million has been 
approved for the project.  It is envisaged that approximately 100 schools will be 
equipped with computer labs in the 2002 financial year. 
The National Health Information System (NHIS): a project to manage health 
information and epidemiological statistics for policy making and operational 
planning.   
The national Department of Health (DoH) is running a Telemedicine Pilot Project 
aimed at developing a basic cost-effective solution that could be replicated 
throughout the country, with a particular focus on disadvantaged people especially 
in rural areas who have not previously had access to specialist health care.61  The 
NHIS has been tasked with co-ordinating the work.  It is envisioned that after one 
year the provinces, the national office and the NHIS Committee would evaluate 
the Telemedicine Pilot Project and produce a report that will guide further roll-out 
of the project. 
 
 
60 The provincial government of the Western Cape has established the Cape Gateway project, which is 
supposed to be the first step in the staged introduction of e-government in the Western Cape 
(Bridges.Org, 2003). 
61 Quality and cost-effectiveness of telemedicine is a common concern (Heeks, 1999c).  Government 
must weigh the varying needs of the national system in relation to available resources.  Many health 
problems can be addressed through basic infrastructure improvements such as clean water and 
sanitation facilities rather than expensive technical solutions.  As one study notes: “although 
information and education can raise people’s awareness of the problems…information in itself is an 
insufficient remedy if people lack the means to implement what they learn” (Uimonen, 1997:21). 
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The objective of DPSA’s e-government programme is to build comprehensive 
government portals that people can use to find information or to carry out transactions 
without having to deal directly with the various agencies that can be involved in a 
‘life event’ such as setting up a small business.  To succeed in e-government public 
agencies will need to learn to see the citizen as their customer, which represents a 
radical change in mindset for many public agencies.  E-government strategies should 
be guided by the following considerations: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Technology for e-government does not need to be complicated, but it must be fast 
and reliable; 
As long as a large part of the population remains without easy access to the 
Internet, traditional channels such as counter service or the telephone will retain 
an important role;   
The advocates of e-government will need to keep in mind the problems of 
inadequate telecommunications infrastructure in under-serviced areas; poor 
computer and general literacy, and the general lack of awareness of the potential 
of the Internet among historically disadvantaged communities;  
E-government poses a complex challenge that calls for political commitment and 
a clear strategic vision at the highest level. 
 
Although government can use ICTs to improve the quality and efficiency of public 
services and to strengthen government information flows internally (Cloete, 2003a), 
there are simultaneously significant risks: (i) institutional failure, (ii) expense, (iii) 
poor design and (iv) low levels of consumer access (Heeks, 1998).  Another 
complication is the issue of complementarities between government departments and 
services.  Normally, a wide variety of computer-based systems support different 
government activities.  However, these systems are usually implemented as 
components of separate projects responding to specific needs, with little appreciation 
of requirements in other areas and little thought given to critical interrelationships.  As 
a result the information systems are often disparate and segmented, with little or no 
capacity for sharing data.  In addition, they have overlapping and sometimes 
conflicting functionality and provide incomplete coverage, particularly for managerial 
information requirements that normally span several functional areas. 
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As a result of the ANC’s reliance on e-government in its modernisation plans, 
government would do well to pay heed to what Heeks and Bhatnagar (1999) calls the 
‘concept-reality gap’.  This is the gap between technological aspiration and political 
reality which accounts for the disappointing performance of large-scale government 
ICT projects (Heeks, 2000:200).  In a sobering article Kouzmin (2000) cautions 
against an unbridled acceptance of ICTs in government: 
“Failure in IT development is a major reality but an extremely limited 
discourse amongst government and business elites – there are electoral and 
shareholding implications from any candid assessment of high failure rates 
amongst large IT project developments across the public-private sector divide” 
(Kouzmin, 2000:169). 
 
In a similar vein, Bellamy and Taylor caution: 
“[H]eroic scenarios for reinventing government through the application of 
ICTs are fundamentally misleading.  The institutions of governance will 
mould and fashion the revolutionary potential of ICTs into an evolutionary 
reality…The heady images which are so often associated with ICTs, together 
with the technologically determinist expectations that they will transform the 
nature of relationships in and around governance, are balanced by the relative 
insusceptibility to the change of the normative and assumptive worlds which 
suffuse political institutions.  The information polity is, in consequence, an 
arena which will display the same kinds of political compromises and policy 
confusions that characterize other important arenas of society.  For all these 
reasons, the intoxicating visions of government in the information age should 
be allowed to dissipate in the thin air from whence they came (Bellamy & 
Taylor, 1998:170). 
 
The author attended a recent meeting of the Government Information Technology 
Officers’ Council (GITOC) (2003) during which it became clear that the lack of back-
office integration and standardisation, i.e. a common IT infrastructure and architecture 
standard across government, is a major constraint to realising the vision of what 
Taylor, Snellen and Zuurmond (1997:1) refer to as the “administrative holy grail [i.e.] 
the simultaneous delivery of enormous cost savings together with huge gains in the 
quality of service provided”.  E-government is dependent on  departmental IT systems 
which are interoperable so that data and information can be exchanged and processed 
seamlessly across government.  The scale of change required to bring integrated, 
transactional services online is immense.  A major challenge for the South African 
government is to: (i) ensure back-office integration with front-end service delivery; 
(ii) adopt common standards; and (iii) adopt a common IT infrastructure and 
architecture across all government departments and agencies.  Successful service 
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delivery portals require coherent integration of government infrastructure, systems, 
processes and services and must focus on the needs of the citizens.  Further, a key 
success factor in achieving e-government is for all citizens to have access to 
technology and the necessary skills to exploit its use. 
 
5.1.9.1 Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) 
 
The 1995 Task Group on Government Communications (COMTASK) recommended 
that the South African Communication Services (SACS)62 be replaced by a new 
communications structure, viz. the Government Communication and Information 
System (GCIS) (COMTASK, 1996).  Within this agency the responsibility for 
government communications would be decentralised towards the ministerial and 
provincial level.  The GCIS would have departments responsible for media liaison, 
communication services and support, and provincial and community liaison.  It would 
build up strong contacts with the different government branches and with civil 
society.  In general, the GCIS would take responsibility for ‘development 
communications’, especially for disadvantaged communities.  Apart from its co-
ordinating role the GCIS would have the capacity to provide for specific services and 
campaigns and for subcontracting services.   
 
Based on the outcomes of the COMTASK (1996) report, the GCIS was established in 
1998.  It consists of 4 components: 
 
1. Communication Service Agency: responsible for the production and distribution of 
government media.  The department is responsible for the bulk-buying of media 
space, etc; 
2. Media Liaison Section: responsible for the relation between the media and 
government; 
3. Policy, Research and Strategy Section: responsible for research into public 
opinion on the function of government.  This section is also responsible for policy 
development concerning media diversity; 
                                                 
62 SACS, a structure for government communications inherited from the National Party government,  
was for obvious reasons viewed with a great deal of suspicion by the ANC.  
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4. Provincial and Local Liaison Section: responsible for the provision of information 
at the level of the provinces, and thus entails working closely with the provincial 
governments.  It is envisaged that this agency would play an important role in 
terms of development communication and the provision of information through 
ICTs (GCIS, 2000). 
 
According to the Office of Thabo Mbeki, the then Deputy President: 
“The GCIS will develop ways to ensure that there is delivery of information to 
the people of South Africa and that a two-way system is set up to facilitate a 
dialogue between government and provision of information to disadvantaged 
sectors, such as people living in rural areas where information is scant.  
Electronic technology, indisputably the most efficient and most cost-effective 
way to achieve this, will play a major role.  This has been shown in other 
countries with mixed economies and large rural populations to be a highly 
effective way of reaching large numbers of people at relatively low cost 
(Office of the Executive Deputy President, 1997). 
 
The GCIS assumed responsibility for the South African Government Online portal 
site (South Africa Online) in 1999 (GCIS, 2000).  From 1999 the GCIS was mandated 
by Cabinet to establish MPCCs as points for integrated service delivery.  By early 
2001, around 15 telecentres had been established.  The models differ, with some 
owned by government departments, others by community organisations, but all of 
them have a range of different government services.  These include a Home Affairs 
office, welfare payment point, housing or water information, small business and 
employment advice centre, library, post office, training and government information.  
All of them have phones, computers, email and photocopying facilities, which are 
made publicly available.  It is intended that these centres will generate much of their 
running costs, with some support from the government departments involved.  The 
MPCCs are all quite recent, having been established less than 3 years ago; they have 
not been assessed independently, so their impact or sustainability is difficult to gauge. 
 
5.2.10 National Research and Technology Foresight Project 
The National Research and Technology Foresight (NRTF) study was initiated by 
DACST in 1998.  The aim of the study was to help identify those sector-specific 
technologies and technology trends that would best improve the quality of life of all 
South Africans over the following 10-20 years (DACST, 1998).  The project 
encompassed technologies that impact on social issues and wealth creation through 
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product or process development.  The outcomes of the Foresight project will 
supposedly contribute to new directions for science and technology in South Africa.  
Working groups of 20 to 30 people each were formed to represent diverse interests 
and experience in each of the following sectors: ICTs, environment, bio-diversity, 
education, youth, health, mining, energy, business and finance, agriculture, 
manufacturing, tourism and safety. 
 
The aim of the Foresight study was to identify emerging technologies and market 
opportunities that could be beneficial to South Africa in the following 5 years or so.  
The results of the Foresight study were to be used to: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Sharpen choices in allocating funds from the Innovation Fund; 
To lay the basis for sound institutional capacity to conduct Foresight in both the 
government and private sectors; 
Identify priorities for publicly funded research; 
Encourage greater R&D investment in industry; 
Improve technology awareness and uptake in SMMEs; and 
Identify skills shortages in science and technology, and their action initiatives 
(DACST, 1998). 
 
The major finding of the Foresight study was that the next 10-20 years will see a 
fundamental shift towards a ‘knowledge economy’ and an ‘information society’ 
(DACST, 1998).  The results of the study suggested that there are signs of the birth of 
a ‘bio-economy’ driven by developments in bio-technology, and the combination of 
bio-technology and information technology, i.e. bio-informatics.  This economy is 
expected to impact on a number of sectors such as: (i) agriculture (i.e. recombinant 
DNA and genetically modified foods); (ii) health (i.e. transgenic foods, gene therapy 
and micro bio-sensors); and (iii) materials (i.e. molecular mapping and atomic 
architecture).  It is expected that by the year 2010, these developments will change the 
majority of South Africans’ way of life.  According to the study, the key challenge in 
South Africa is one of how the country deals with a declining industrial economy, 
especially its social and economic impacts, and how to prepare the nation’s skills base 
and human resource development for the opportunities and challenges presented by 
the ‘digital and bio-economies’ (DACST, 1998). 
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The ICT Sector Working Group (ICT SWG) of the NRTF undertook international and 
local technology scans which represented snapshots of the ICT sector between 1997-
1998 (DACST, 1999).  The ICT SWG set about defining its scope and mandate by 
using the background of the technology scans to define a mission and a set of sector 
foci.  ICT was seen as: (i) “extraordinarily complex, rapidly changing and all-
pervasive” (DACST, 1999:3); and (ii) a fundamental enabler of economic and social 
activity in all sectors of the economy (DACST, 1999).  An important finding to 
emerge was that: 
“an aggressive national ICT vision is urgently needed to counteract obstructive 
policies, uncoordinated efforts, a lack of funding, inadequate skills and 
training, and the absence of a culture that fosters the development and 
effective use of ICT” (DACST, 1999:1). 
 
Further, the ICT SWG argued that South Africa is lagging behind the developed 
world in technology terms, but has the capability to partner and adapt technology for 
local needs.   
 
5.2.11 PNC on ISAD 
In 2002 the President established the Presidential National Commission on the 
Information Society and Development (PNC on ISAD) and the Presidential 
International Advisory Council on the Information Society and Development (PIAC 
on ISAD).  The PNC on ISAD has a very optimistic view of the potential of ICTs in 
development: 
“A major challenge for the South African government is to ensure the 
development of a more effective ICT sector strategy and policy framework for 
the country in order to harness the potential of ICTs, ensure better governance, 
deepen democracy and accelerate growth and development, especially job 
creation and poverty alleviation for the country, the region and the continent 
and in so doing, create an information society that improves the quality of life 
for all citizens” (PNC on ISAD, 2003a:1). 
 
The PNC on ISAD has been mandated with making recommendations to the President 
on: (i) bridging the ‘digital divide’; (ii) the establishment of an overarching co-
ordination structure for government-led ICT-related initiatives; (iii) an integrated 
structure for fostering co-operation, co-ordination and joint action between local, 
provincial and national government with a view to building the ‘knowledge economy’ 
and the ‘information society’; (iv) priority areas, i.e. SMMEs, e-governance, open 
source software, education and health; (v) appropriate ways of building a rich base of 
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electronic learning materials with local content; (vi) strategies to make government a 
model user of ICTs; and (vii) a champion for the development and implementation of 
ICT strategy (PNC on ISAD, 2003a).   
 
Further, the Commission has been tasked with investigating: 
 
• Current government ICT strategies; 
• Future work to be done on building the ‘information society’; 
• Future skills to enable South Africans to be equal and active citizens in the global 
‘information society’; 
• Strategies to build the national information infrastructure (NII); 
• How to develop and support ICT-related SMMEs; 
• How to encourage the use of ICTs by SMMEs; 
• Policies for creating an environment that encourages, nurtures and rewards 
innovation and a spirit of entrepreneurship; 
• Ways of enhancing e-literacy among the different sectors of society; and 
• The optimal application of ICTs in all sectors for purposes of developing a 
strategy for each sector of the economy (PNC on ISAD, 2003a). 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has described, and analysed wherever possible, a range of government 
ICT policy initiatives between 1994-2003.  It was argued that the overall goals, 
priorities and actions related to such initiatives have to be consistent with the 
superordinate development goals for the country, and accordingly the particular 
circumstances of South Africa, with especially the legacy of the apartheid era being 
kept at the forefront.  The public policy debate on ICTs in South Africa is concerned 
primarily with: (i) promoting growth in ICT industries; (ii) expanding application of 
ICTs in other economic sectors; (iii) maximising the employment benefits of the 
‘information revolution’; and (iv) addressing social problems such as inequality and 
the dislocation associated with diffusion of technology through the economy, with 
some acknowledgement that the regulatory environment needs to be transparent and 
fair.  This ambitious agenda of simultaneously addressing socio-economic 
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development and inequality has been explicitly articulated in most ICT-related 
initiatives in the post-apartheid period.   
 
At national level ICT initiatives fall into two groups.  First, a suite of programmes 
relate to either (i) enhancing the human resources or skills base for the ICT sector; or 
(ii) supporting the development of an ‘information society’, including infrastructure, 
that would incorporate South Africa’s previously marginalised and disadvantaged 
communities.  Improvements in the creation of a physical infrastructure for access to 
information are of central importance and include, for example, the initiation of 
community information centres (community telecentres and Public Internet Terminals 
[PITs] in post offices) designed to increase the access of previously disadvantaged 
people in townships and rural areas to information services.  A second category of 
national level initiatives for supporting the ICT industry relate more firmly to 
expanding the competitiveness of existing enterprises as well as fostering new ICT 
enterprise development, especially in terms of SMME development.   
 
It is evident from the discussion that ICT policy is entering a state of considerable 
flux with a wide range of ICT-related projects, programmes, policies and strategies 
underway by a number of national government departments.  Obviously with this 
wide array of initiatives in a range of different ministries, co-ordination and 
communication between the various initiatives is a critical challenge, as well as the 
need for this all to fit within a broader national development strategy.  The problem, 
however, is that a coherent and co-ordinated response by government that cuts across 
both traditional departmental boundaries and areas of responsibility within 
departments, is lacking.  The lack of an effective co-ordination mechanism at the 
central level, in particular, has meant that national ICT policy is often uncoordinated.  
Systemic inefficiencies impede the elaboration of multi-sectoral programmes and the 
development of a coherent national policy framework.  Poor integration of policy at 
the national level, moreover, is exacerbated at the provincial and local levels, where 
administrative capacity is even more limited.  Thus, leadership on policy formulation 
and implementation is urgently needed, as well as the enforcement of strategic 
synchronisation and co-ordination procedures involving key government departments 
and agencies to minimise wastage of resources, and duplication and fragmentation of 
effort.   
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In Chapter 6 we will use critical discourse analysis to expose the discursive power 
relations and the underlying assumptions and rationale of the South African 
government’s ICT, poverty and development discourse.  The objective is to identify 
some of the major components of the South African government’s discourses on ICTs 
for development and to show how the manner of its deployment in speech and text 
amounts to the creation and systematisation of a set of discursive relations that 
support and extend a markedly Western modernisation-related worldview. 
 
 
 179
Chapter 6 
A Critical Analysis of the South African Government’s ICT, 
Poverty and Development Discourse 
 
6.1 The South African Context  
6.1.1 Income Inequality and Poverty 
South Africa has a medium HDI of 0.702 and is ranked at number 94 in the UNDP’s 
(2001) listing of 162 countries.  Apart from having a mediocre human development 
rating, South Africa is also one of the most unequal societies in the world (Table 6.1).  
In South Africa society is stratified along four major lines of inequality, i.e. class, 
gender, race and ‘spatially’.  Although inter-racial inequality is declining, South 
Africa still has the first or second highest rate of income inequality in the world, and 
this is rising (Stats SA, 2000).63  This narrowing of inter-racial inequality is mainly 
the result of the creation of a new African entrepreneurial and managerial class and 
the absorption of African people into paid employment by the state (Nattrass & 
Seekings, 2000).  An emerging African bourgeoisie is now benefiting from white 
corporate unbundling and the privatisation and commercialisation of state assets 
(Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert & Moodley, 1997). 
 
A Human Poverty Index (HPI) of 20.2 means that poverty affects at least 20.2% of 
the population.  As a result of the AIDS pandemic, life expectancy at birth is only 
47.8 years.  Apartheid policies, by engendering a situation of inequitable access to 
employment, service delivery, infrastructure and resources to the majority black 
population, have resulted in poverty being characterised by a strong racial dimension.  
Further, poverty is geographically concentrated, with the largest share of the poor 
(72%) residing in rural areas, especially the former ‘homelands’.  There is a marked 
tendency for poverty to be more prevalent among female-headed households and 
among children (Klasen, 1997; Aliber, 2003; May & Carter, 2001).  In the context of 
high formal unemployment (generally estimated at between 30-40%) and jobless 
                                                          
63 Brazil’s may be higher. 
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growth, the situation of these households is desperate (Altman, 2003).64  Further, 
Altman (2003) estimates that between 1994 and 2001 the number of underemployed 
citizens increased from 14% to 21%. 
 
Table 6.1: General social data profile for South Africa (2000 figures) 
 
Total population (millions) 42.8 
Urban population (% of total population) 55.0 
Population growth (annual %) 1.6 
GDP (US$ billion) 125.9 
GDP growth (annual %) 3.1 
Human Development Index (HDI) 0.702 
Human Poverty Index (HPI)* 20.2 
Share of consumption  
        Poorest 10% 1.1 
        Poorest 20% 2.9 
        Richest 20% 64.8 
        Richest 10% 45.9 
Inequality measures  
        Richest 10% to poorest 10% 42.5 
        Richest 20% to poorest 20% 22.6 
        UNDP Gini index** 59.3 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 47.8 
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and over) 85.3 
*The HPI is an attempt to capture a broader measure of poverty, by going beyond just money 
or income.  The HPI was computed on the basis of deprivation in longevity, living standards 
and knowledge. 
**The Gini index measures inequality over the entire distribution of income or consumption.  
A value of 0 represents perfect equality and a value of 100 perfect inequality. 
Source: World Bank (2001) Development Indicators Database; UNDP (2001) 
 
Based on a per adult equivalent poverty line of R352 per month, in 1995 61% of 
Africans were poor, 38% of ‘coloureds’, 5% of Indians and 1% of whites (May, 
Woolard & Klasen, 2000).  There is also a strong geographical dimension to the 
incidence of poverty.  Based on the same data set, 72% of those below the poverty 
line reside in rural areas and 71% of all rural people are poor.  Aliber (2003:479-482) 
identifies a number of groups who are likely to be classified as ‘chronically’ poor65, 
viz.: the rural poor, female-headed households, people with disabilities, the elderly, 
retrenched farm workers, cross-border migrants, the ‘street homeless’, and AIDS 
orphans and households with AIDS sufferers.  According to Aliber (2003:482), “at 
least 18-24% of all households nationwide are presently living in chronic poverty or 
                                                          
64 The unemployment data cited by Altman (2003) emerge when the narrow or strict definition of 
unemployment is used, namely where people are considered unemployed only if they are actively 
looking for work. 
65 Aliber (2003:473) argues that the ‘chronically poor’ are intuitively those who are most likely to 
remain in poverty in the absence of outside assistance. 
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are highly susceptible to chronic poverty”.  From this brief discussion of income 
inequality and poverty, it should be clear that after 10 years of democracy, social 
cohesion remains extremely fragile. 
 
There is evidence that countries with significant inequality experience lower growth 
rates than others because lack of access to physical, financial and human assets 
constrains poor people from participating effectively and efficiently in the economy 
(May, 1998).  In an influential study Whiteford and Van Seventer (1999) explored in 
detail the income disparities within South Africa.  The researchers found that the rich 
continue to become richer, while the poorest members of the community, found 
mainly in the black community, become even poorer.  The income of the poorest 40% 
of black households was 20% lower in 1996 than in 1991.  Whiteford and Van 
Seventer (1999) show that the only blacks to benefit significantly from the transition 
to democracy in South Africa are the elite top 10%.  The economic condition of most 
of the remaining black community worsened during the same period. 
 
In 1994 the ANC-led government inherited an economy marked by deep economic 
inequality, high levels of poverty and low living standards characteristic of much 
poorer economies.  Assuming power in 1994, the ANC initially adopted a leftist, basic 
needs-oriented Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994) as 
the popular foundation of its economic policy.  The RDP White Paper, however, 
differed from the RDP Base Document in placing greater emphasis on “financial and 
monetary discipline”, the “establishment of an economic environment conducive to 
economic growth” and “trade and industry policies designed to foster a greater 
outward orientation” (Government of the RSA, 1994:21).  Hence, within a short 
period of time the ANC shifted from its long commitment to structural transformation 
through democratic developmental means towards structural adjustment using neo-
liberal economic means.66  That said, the tripartite alliance partners (i.e. COSATU and 
the SACP) are attempting to constrain the rightward drift of the ANC and to keep it 
accountable to its left wing allies. 
 
 
                                                          
66 In neo-liberalism the main restriction on an inherent tendency for free capitalist economies to grow is 
market failure resulting from perverse governmental policies (Wade & Veneroso, 1998). 
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Within two years of assuming power the ANC had switched to a neo-liberal Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (DoF, 1996) macroeconomic policy 
stressing privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalisation.  The ANC’s alignment 
with the  so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ (Habib & Padayachee, 2000), or what 
Wade and Veneroso (1998) call the ‘Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex’, has 
drastically reoriented its policy from growth through redistribution to redistribution 
through growth.  Questions have been raised about whether an orthodox neo-liberal 
policy is appropriate or legitimate, given South Africa’s long history of inequality, 
poverty and dispossession (Padayachee, Smith & Valodia, 2000; Gibson, 2001; 
Carmody, 2002).  The problem in South Africa, as elsewhere in the Third World, is 
the lack of a viable development programme that achieves economic growth through 
redistributing incomes and satisfying basic needs.  Therefore in the years since the 
1994 elections South Africa has, with some minor exceptions (labour policy, for 
example), followed a fairly orthodox, neo-liberal economic programme (Habib & 
Padayachee, 2000).  This despite the fact that President Mbeki once argued that: 
“globalisation, deregulation and the information society…all originate from 
the developed countries of the North [and as such] reflect the imperatives of 
the economies and levels of development of these countries and 
therefore…serve the purposes of our rich global neighbours” (cited in Van 
Audenhove, 1999:5).   
 
It would appear that the South African government is attempting a compromise 
between globalisation and social democracy (Koeble, 1998; Padayachee, Smith & 
Valodia, 2000).  However, this is being undermined as the state is increasingly 
characterised by embedded or institutionalised dependence on global forces.  As the 
state globalises, the success of government’s development strategy depends on private 
sector actions and investment (Carmody, 2002).  Habib and Padayachee argue that: 
“the ANC’s implementation of neoliberal economic policies has meant 
disaster for the vast majority of South Africa’s poor.  Increasing 
unemployment and economic inequalities associated with the neoliberal 
economic policies have also pushed even more of South Africa’s population 
into the poverty trap” (Habib & Padayachee, 2000:259). 
 
Government’s GEAR macroeconomic strategy has thus far failed to create the 
833,000 formal sector jobs that it claimed it would between 2000-2005, thus putting 
more pressure on government to address poverty directly.  In a context of sluggish 
growth, net job losses and escalating poverty, state expenditure programmes have so 
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far failed to provide an adequate social security net for South Africa’s poorest and 
most vulnerable groups, especially the unemployed, women, children and the elderly 
(May, 2000). 
 
The central thesis of Daniel, Habib and Southall’s book entitled State of the Nation: 
South Africa 2003-2004 (2003) is that South African society is still characterised by a 
‘two-nations’ dichotomy, although the apex of the class structure (i.e. the first nation) 
is undergoing a limited degree of deracialisation.  The second nation continues to be 
poor, marginalised and overwhelmingly black.  The control of the post-apartheid state 
by narrow class interests imposes limitations on the transformation potential of the 
state.  This state of affairs will persist as long as the ANC government remains 
committed to its existing set of economic policy prescriptions. 
 
Sampie Terreblanche in his insightful book A History of Inequality in South Africa: 
1652-2002 (2003), argues that post-apartheid South African society is as unequal, if 
not more so, than before 1994.  His trenchant critique converges with the central 
thesis propounded by Daniel, Habib and Southall (2003), namely that present-day 
South African society is increasingly multiracial and rich at the upper echelons and is 
still overwhelmingly black and poor, disempowered and marginalised at the bottom.  
Terreblanche (2003) refers to the current system as ‘neo-liberal democratic 
capitalism’.  He calls for a policy shift towards social democracy in which the state 
should play a more active role in alleviating poverty, redistributing wealth and 
attending to social welfare. 
 
6.1.2 South African ICT Policy Landscape 
A notable feature of the South African ICT policy landscape is the sheer number of 
major projects and in particular the fact that they are all at relatively early stages of 
development (see Chapter 5).  One reason for this is that South Africa is responding 
rapidly, like many other developing countries, to the recent unprecedented focus on 
the role of ICTs as a vehicle for gaining a competitive advantage in the global 
economy and for social upliftment and poverty alleviation.  Another reason is the 
focus on ICTs as an enabling technology in the country’s macroeconomic strategy and 
development trajectory, and the subsequent visible support at the highest levels of 
government (see Appendix 2). 
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While South Africa has focused extensively on policy formulation over the last few 
years to deal both with issues of redress and to align the country with global trends, 
there is concern that there has not been the capacity within state institutions to 
implement ICT policies, which has resulted often in the undermining of its own policy 
objectives.  A major weakness of the South African ICT policy environment is the 
lack of meaningful co-ordination, leadership and integration of the various efforts 
currently under way.  In addition, there is often a wide gap between vision and action, 
insofar as many of the policy documents are often not successfully translated into 
realistic programmes of action.  A measure of good policy is that it takes into 
consideration the capacity of government to implement decisions.  While often hailed 
as an example of good policy, in practice South African ICT policy has not been 
conducive to implementation and failed to recognise the limitations of government 
institutions responsible for implementation and the fact that South Africa is a 
developing country.  Another weakness is the fragmented nature of ICT policy-
making in South Africa, which often results in duplication of effort.  The lack of an 
integrated national ICT policy with leadership and vision is a serious shortcoming, 
especially considering that a large amount of resources has been invested in ICTs 
since 1994. 
 
Although Gillwald (2000:4) argues that “South Africa appears to be struggling to 
transform itself into an informational society despite considerable political will”, as 
measured by all available ICT indicators, it is evident that South Africa has firmly 
established a leadership role within Africa (DTI, 2000a, b; Creamer, 2001).  
Moreover, President Mbeki has made several statements that the development of 
telecommunications and ICT is a major priority for South Africa in terms of 
eradicating poverty and nurturing sustainable growth and development (Erwin, 2001).  
Finally, two presidential commissions (i.e. the PNC on ISAD and the PIAC on ISAD) 
have been established to ensure that South Africa does not lag behind the rest of the 
world in respect of ICT diffusion and building the ‘information society’.  Both of 
these structures include prominent public and private sector representatives, with the 
PIAC on ISAD including the Chief Executive Officers of major international ICT 
corporations (Dobson, 2001). 
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6.2 Discourse Analysis 
6.2.1 Techno-Centric Optimism 
Table 6.2: Digital optimism (extracts 1-10)67 
 
Extract 1: “Government is determined to promote the diffusion of ICTs as widely as possible 
because there is irrefutable evidence that access to ICTs can have a direct impact on raising 
living standards and quality of life of the poor” (interview transcript). 
Extract 2: “The challenge is to truly and fully mainstream ICTs as a powerful tool of 
accelerated development” (interview transcript). 
Extract 3: “ICTs are developmental because they contribute to building the information 
society in which the lives of the poor are empowered and enriched by access to information 
and knowledge…and they offer social, political and economic opportunities for the poor.  
Therefore this government has made ICTs a top priority for development” (interview 
transcript). 
Extract 4: “The International Advisory Council on Information Society and Development met 
recently in George to discuss, among other things, economic growth and competitiveness, 
research and development and the implementation of an e-government programme…The key 
focus areas were identified.  These are: health and telemedicine; small, medium and micro 
enterprise growth and development; and education.  It was agreed that we would also focus on 
e-government as an overarching and cross-cutting element common to all three areas and 
because e-government is a necessity for the efficient and effective operation of government” 
(Mbeki, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 5: “I am sure you will agree with me that the growth and development of small, 
medium and micro enterprises can and must benefit from the available technology so that we 
are able to expand access to technology to the wider community of our business people to 
encourage business growth and improve the level of competitiveness even among the smaller 
corporations” (Mbeki, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 6: “I have no doubt that the work we are doing and will do in this country, supported 
by the National and International Advisory Councils, will also be of enormous benefit to 
Africa as a whole” (Mbeki, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 7: “At the national level, as we are certainly aware that the effective use of ICT in any 
country impacts strongly on the productivity and competitiveness of that economy as well as 
the ability of government to deliver on its social goals” (Mbeki, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 8: “All our efforts have been directed at ending poverty and broadening access to a 
better life.  In recent years, the focus has also been more specifically on an Integrated 
Sustainable Rural Development Strategy and urban renewal programmes.  The ICT sector in 
particular was identified as having the tools with which we can accelerate our own 
development and also which enable us to participate on a more competitive basis in the world 
economy” (Matsepe-Casaburri, 2003:n.p.). 
Extract 9: “The knowledge revolution could truly belong to everyone and advance our social 
emancipation as South and Southern Africans and eliminate the marginalisation of Africa 
from world development” (Matsepe-Casaburri, 2003:n.p.). 
Extract 10: “[W]orking towards universal access [to ICTs] is a given and a principled 
position, thus the crucial focus on ending poverty and underdevelopment” (Matsepe-
Casaburri, 2003:n.p.). 
 
                                                          
67 The extracts in Tables 6.1-6.8 are derived from the interview transcripts and government documents.  
For references to the latter, see the bibliography.  Further, for the convenience of the reader, Appendix 
2 includes a list of salient government documents that deal with ICT for development. 
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Table 6.3: Digital optimism (extracts 11-20) 
 
Extract 11: “ICTs can and must help to fast-track development, to challenge existing 
definitions, and we will do all we can to meet the challenges that we have inherited as 
Africans and the new ones that arise every day in this new world” (Matsepe-Casaburri, 
2003:n.p.). 
Extract 12: “[E]-government and e-governance may contribute in the process of creating 
digital opportunities for all…The demands on government service delivery today require the 
constant investigation and implementation of innovative mechanisms to deliver public 
services…In today’s world ICT is seen as a basic necessity and is critical in enabling the fast 
tracking of development…The dream to utilise technology as a means to effect government 
service delivery is indeed the best path if we want to achieve accessible government” (Fraser-
Moleketi, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 13: “ICTs are now, more than ever before, a basic need in advancing socio-economic 
development.  Without the use of ICTs, as countries we will lose whatever competitive 
advantage we have in global trade…[We need to] [t]ak[e]…responsibility [for] exploiting the 
opportunities presented by ICTs…to facilitate sustainable development, democracy, 
efficiency and transparency.  Some of these opportunities include the use of ICT in the area of 
education and health” (Fraser-Moleketi, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 14: “[A] critical and pervasive element in economic development in the current age is 
the optimum utilisation of information and communication technology.  In addition to the 
many programmes we have introduced in this area, including tele-centres, we shall as a matter 
of urgency complete the work towards the establishment of an ICT University” (Mbeki, 
2002:n.p.). 
Extract 15: “The vision of the Universal Service Agency is to be the leader in promoting and 
creating an enabling environment for the achievement of universal service and universal 
access to Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) services as an empowerment 
vehicle for disadvantaged communities.  The Universal Service Agency will monitor, 
evaluate and promote the provision of affordable universal service and universal access to 
ICT services for disadvantaged communities in South Africa to facilitate development, 
empowerment and economic growth” (USA, 2002:4). 
Extract 16: “We believe that [the Electronic Communication and Transactions] Bill because 
of its emphasis on disadvantaged communities will go a long way in allowing rural producers 
to participate in international trade and commerce.  It will facilitate active participation in the 
economy by rural men and women who are involved in arts and crafts and cannot afford 
transport to urban centres to market and sell their products.  We envisage that e-commerce 
will bring a large majority of our people into the mainstream economy” (Matsepe-Casaburri, 
2002b:n.p.). 
Extract 17: “For the e-commerce legislation to make an impact on sustainable economic 
growth, all South Africans should become active participants in electronic communication 
and transactions” (Matsepe-Casaburri, 2002c:n.p.). 
Extract 18: “Governments around the world are embracing electronic government.  In every 
region of the globe – from developing countries to industrialized ones – national and local 
governments are putting critical information online, automating once cumbersome processes 
and interacting electronically with their citizens” (Working Group on E-Government in the 
Developing World, 2002:1). 
Extract 19: “The spread of information and communication technology bring hope that 
governments can transform.  And indeed, forward looking officials everywhere are using 
technology to improve their governments” (Working Group on E-Government in the 
Developing World, 2002:6).   
Extract 20: “The recent and dramatic developments in ICTs provide an opportunity to better 
the lives of all the people of South Africa…The result is a community that uses ICTs for 
accelerating the country’s social and economic development” (PNC on ISAD, 2003a:1). 
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The benefits of ICTs for the poor are seen as intuitively self-evident and universally 
valid.  It is clear that government has invested a great deal of faith in the power of 
ICTs in development (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3).  The optimistic view of government 
focuses too heavily on technology potential rather than on adapting appropriate 
information systems to meet the real needs of poor communities in different 
environments.  Further, this rose-tinted view of technology fails to adequately deal 
with the constraints for accessing and applying ICTs by the poor.  What is urgently 
needed is a more integrated framework for understanding both information and ICTs 
in relation to poverty alleviation and development. 
 
Technology alone does not create change.  It takes commitment by people and 
requires a long implementation period.  Further, it takes time for people to 
comprehend the potential benefits of ICT-mediated information, or to be willing to 
trust information that does not derive from personal networks.  Even when initiatives 
are successful (i.e. bring measurable benefits), there remains the issue of financial 
sustainability, lack of local demand for ICT-based information and the problem of 
how to ascertain what value citizens attach to services provided.  Moreover, 
constraints to expansion of the Internet are considerable and include lack of basic 
connectivity to telephone networks, high connection charges and low computer skills.   
 
The optimistic view needs to be tempered in the light of evidence showing that 
learning is a critical feature of technological change (Bell, 1984; Bell & Pavitt, 1993; 
Lall, 1992).  Further, the importance of ICTs for addressing the real information needs 
of the poor has tended to be overstated and there is a danger of the policy debate 
becoming too strongly focused around the capabilities of emerging technologies.  
Government is also guilty of overlooking, or at least underplaying, the constraints that 
make it difficult for the poor to access, assess and apply information through ICTs.  
These include lack of human capabilities (i.e. literacy, English language skills, and 
technical and computer competence); urban/rural inequities; gender inequalities; 
affordability; and  lack of relevant information content. 
 
Discussion in government about e-government suggests that it has grown larger than 
government reform and carries with it greater expectations and possibilities of 
transforming government.  As we have argued in Chapter 4, although ICT has the 
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potential to improve service delivery, enhance government accessibility and citizen 
participation, there are a number of  challenges that could prevent the realisation of 
these anticipated benefits.  Further, it is at a very early stage of its development and 
many forces could intervene to affect its direction.  It is still too soon to predict how 
the role of electronic public service delivery will evolve. 
 
For small entrepreneurs the most valued sources of information are friends, family 
and business networks (Heeks & Bhatnagar, 1999).  By contrast, ICT-mediated 
information often lacks proximity and the element of ‘trust, confidence and security’ 
that is gained through business networking and personal contacts (Duncombe, 1999; 
Duncombe & Heeks, 1999).  ICT-mediated information is also not easily applicable to 
the existing knowledge base and small-scale entrepreneurs will generally lack the 
wider knowledge and experience that are necessary to effectively assess, apply and 
act upon ICT-mediated information. 
 
The information needs of poor households, communities and small-scale enterprises 
should be understood in advance of proposing ICT-based solutions.  Significant 
‘financial opportunity costs’ for poverty alleviation strategies are likely to arise, since 
large amounts of limited resources are being diverted to poorly conceived ICT-related 
investments that might not have a direct impact on the needs of the poor.  There is 
also the risk that introducing digital information systems may supplant existing 
systems that may be more appropriate and more cost effective in terms of access and 
coverage.  Moreover, over-emphasis on technological solutions can have the effect of 
drawing attention away from the underlying causes of poverty such as inadequate 
health and educational facilities.   
 
As part of an integrated development strategy ICTs can contribute to socio-economic 
development, but investments in ICTs alone are not sufficient for development to 
occur.  ICT applications are not sufficient to address problems of rural access without 
adherence to principles of integrated rural development.  Unless there is minimal 
infrastructure development in transport, education, health and social and cultural 
facilities, it is unlikely that investments from ICTs alone will enable rural areas to 
cross the threshold from poverty to growth. 
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Government has over-enthusiastically embraced the application of ICTs and 
telecentres to address the pressing needs of the poor.  The major problem is that there 
is a widespread misunderstanding about how substantial benefits can be derived from 
ICTs for the poor.  Persistent poverty, at both an individual and societal level, has 
deep and systemic roots.  Chronic poverty, limited growth and inequality are 
primarily the result of uneven access to material and financial resources.  The material 
deprivations of the poor are compounded by their lack of access to education, 
information and knowledge; their lack of voice in the institutions and societal 
processes that shape their lives; and their inability to communicate effectively their 
needs, hopes and expectations to those who have control over them.  These 
deprivations are mirrored at the societal level by institutions and markets that function 
poorly, that are often unresponsive to the needs of the disadvantaged and 
disenfranchised, and that are all too frequently captured or are excessively influenced 
by economic, social or cultural elites. 
 
Government’s discourse on ICTs and development is couched in the upbeat ‘we will 
all benefit from this’ language.  Uncritical acceptance of the promise of ICTs for 
development and poverty reduction is quite pervasive in government circles.  There 
are times when it would seem as if government regards ICTs and Internet connectivity 
as the solution for poverty.  Technology is seen as the panacea for development.  The 
technological utopianism of government maintains that the digital world of the new 
ICTs holds the potential for breakthroughs in resolving the social problems of poverty 
and inequality in South Africa.  The isolation of the poor can be ended and radical 
new approaches to poverty and social inequality can develop directly through the 
cyber-world.  The digital world holds potentials for conferring enormous economic 
benefits on society as a whole and its low-income segment in particular.  It is for these 
reasons that government sees exclusion from the digital world as disastrous for those 
excluded. 
 
There are strong expectations in government that the social and economic 
implications of ICTs create a very bright future for the poor.  The difficulty with this 
scenario is that these claims are difficult to substantiate empirically.  The current ICT 
discourse focuses to a great extent on the implications of the adoption of these 
technologies for processes of social change.  Since these processes are difficult, if not 
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impossible, to foresee, it would seem more beneficial to concentrate on the social and 
institutional changes that are required, if the potential for pro-poor human 
development of ICTs is to be guided in the preferred direction.  A major problem for 
policy-makers is the general tendency to adopt and deploy ICTs within pre-existing 
social and institutional (conceptual and organisational) frameworks.  ICTs will not by 
themselves change existing institutional settings.  This will need processes of political 
decision-making that are guided by the genuine aspiration to bring about sustainable 
and democratic human development.  Once it has been accepted that ICTs should be 
(re-)shaped to suit scenarios of preferred futures, then the social and institutional 
changes required for the technologies to achieve the preferred future have to be 
identified and ways to bring about these changes have  to be found.  This is an urgent 
matter because the use of ICTs within conventional social and institutional 
frameworks may not only hamper the realisation of potential benefits, but may also 
reinforce the possible social risks. 
 
6.2.2 Technological Determinism 
There is a distinctive view in government that technology determines the nature of 
society (see Table 6.4).  ICTs have become idolised as a force that can ‘fix’ the 
economy, raise the general standard of living and human well-being in the country, 
and deliver on poverty alleviation.  According to Smith and Marx (1995), it is not 
technology that drives history, but rather the decisions people make about how to use 
technology, as well as the ways in which powerful sponsors influence specific 
innovations.  For help in explaining the social pressures acting upon technology, 
historians (Smith & Marx, 1995) and sociologists (Wajcman, 2002) have drawn on a 
theory called ‘social constructivism’ which calls attention to a large body of 
previously ignored evidence that shows how different cultures have reacted in vastly 
different ways to the same innovation.  Social constructivists have also illuminated 
the ways in which individuals create technologies that reflect their own biases and 
needs.  Technologies as diverse as household appliances, missile-guidance systems 
and computers have resulted from a myriad of social choices, with innovators facing 
open-ended turning points.  
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Table 6.4: Technological determinism 
 
Extract 1: “ICT has vast, untapped potential in fighting the scourge of poverty in our 
country…ICT plays a crucial role in the empowerment of people, and in development in 
general.  It is true that ICT impacts on every aspect of our lives, from the way we work to 
how we live…the ‘digital divide’ needs to be reduced to bring opportunities to countries like 
ours, and to create conditions for maximum benefits from new services that are aimed at 
accelerating development…the…consensus is that universal or all-round access is the 
gateway to economic prosperity.  It…contributes to higher productivity and ultimately general 
well being.  ICT is…a necessity” (Zuma, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 2: “The decision to establish [the Presidential International] Advisory Council [on 
Information Society and Development] was based on the realisation that information and 
communication technologies are key drivers for growth of the economy as well as for socio-
economic upliftment…In this regard, Government should establish a shared vision for the 
ICT sector around which to rally the country” (Ministry of Communications, 2001:n.p.). 
Extract 3: “Information and knowledge are the guarantee of our freedom, the guarantee of 
openness, accessibility, accountability, and the vehicle for social transformation” (Naidoo, 
1998a:n.p.). 
Extract 4: “[We need to]…build a digital, fibre optic, broadband high-speed backbone that 
would build the Internet economy and promote e-commerce…deliver tele-medicine and tele-
education” (Naidoo, 1998b:n.p.). 
Extract 5: “Technology is a potent equalising and transformative force in bridging the legacy 
of apartheid” (Naidoo, 1998c:n.p.). 
Extract 6: “Technology is the master of a country’s destiny…ICTs will be the basis for global 
competitiveness…in essence ICTs determine the prosperity and success of 
countries…including South Africa” (interview transcript). 
Extract 7: “The positive effects of the Internet permeate every aspect of society ranging from 
social, economic, technology, education, health, and welfare to the business and academic 
fields with a common outlook for development and growth” (DoC, 2000a:Section 12.1). 
Extract 8: “E-commerce presents unique opportunities for less developed countries to greatly 
expand their markets both internally and externally…E-commerce technologies carry the 
potential to reshape the geographic boundaries and the location of commercial business 
centres…[physical space]  may become less relevant, as companies and workers conduct 
business with equal effectiveness from almost any location.  Electronic commerce will 
transform and help to shape society as a whole especially in the areas of education, health and 
government services (DoC, 2000a:Section 12.2). 
Extract 9: “Welcome to an African revolution…The modern world demands that, if a country 
wishes to provide a quality social environment, it must have a robust information, 
communication and technology infrastructure” (PNC on ISAD, 2003c:n.p.). 
Extract 10: “E-government is about transformation that helps citizens and businesses find 
new opportunities in the world’s knowledge economy” (Working Group on E-Government in 
the Developing World, 2002:12).   
Extract 11: “ICTs will lead to a more egalitarian society in South Africa…for reinventing 
democracy…as a result of the vastly expanded opportunities for accessing and exchanging 
information…as well as making government services more accessible and responsive ” 
(interview transcript). 
 
For government, the transfer of technology to poor communities is seen as 
unproblematic.  It is not realised that such a transfer would depend not merely on 
technical elements, but on social and cultural factors as well.  Technology is seen as 
neutral, not as an instrument for the creation of cultural and social orders.  The 
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understanding of technology as part of a wider socio-economic system is particularly 
important when the technology is adapted within environments very different from 
those for which it was originally intended (Schumacher, 1973).  When technology is 
transferred from one society to another, it reflects the social values, institutional forms 
and culture of the transferring country. 
 
Greater clarity is needed on the part of government in deciding what community 
telecentre projects are aiming to do.  Community telecentres are a form of technology 
transfer, either from Northern countries to countries of the South, or from richer urban 
to disadvantaged (often rural) areas within a country.  In South Africa telecentres can 
be seen as a form of technology transfer from urban areas to disadvantaged areas 
(both in townships and rural areas).  The approach adopted by government is one of 
‘technology push’.  As international experience has shown, technologies that have 
been transferred to new contexts often do not function as expected (Bell, 1997).  The 
key issue is the degree to which the local context can assimilate and adapt the 
technology for its own ends at a number of levels.  If government does not carefully 
think through these issues, there is a risk that telecentres will fail and waste valuable 
resources.   
 
It would appear that government has latched on to telecentres as a ‘good thing’ rather 
than critically examining the claim that they represent a way of providing a wide 
range of developmental services.  Telecentres are often seen as ends in themselves 
rather than as tools to support services in  areas such as education, health and small 
business support.  Government will need to focus on a number of dimensions: (i) 
What services can telecentres provide that will be of use to the communities they 
serve? (ii) What ICTs are appropriate for rural and poor areas? (iii) What ownership 
and management is appropriate to create a dynamic, socially acceptable and 
sustainable telecentre? and (iv) How much money is required to establish the many 
thousands of telecentres that are required and how can ongoing costs be met? 
 
Government has started with the technology rather than with an integrated 
development strategy.  When considering the use of ICTs for development, it is 
essential to have a clear development strategy at the outset.  Whilst the strategic 
thinking can be informed by an appreciation of the capabilities of ICTs, it is essential 
 193
to have clear poverty-alleviation targets that are specific to the context before the 
form of use of the ICTs is defined.  Additionally, in considering the development 
strategy, it is important to note that bottom-up, demand-driven development 
objectives are usually preferable to top-down, supply-driven objectives, so that goals 
begin with an appreciation of the needs of development recipients, as they would 
themselves express them.   
 
Since the outcomes of ICTs are open-ended, we have no reason to expect the 
emerging socio-technical system built around ICTs to remedy social inequalities in 
our society or to relieve the plight of the poor, any more than other major socio-
technical changes have had such effects in the recent past.  The three previous 
‘communication revolutions’, for example, have had significant impacts on society 
but failed to deliver the optimistic predictions first hoped for.  The railway was 
believed to spark the dictatorship of the proletariat68, the telegraph to engender world 
peace and the television to revolutionise education.  It is highly unlikely then that ICT 
alone will end global poverty.  In the long-term widespread adaptations to the new 
technological system will likely take place, just as broad social adaptations have been 
made to other socio-technological shifts (e.g. railways, automobiles and electricity).  
But these adaptations are unlikely to remedy the fundamental, structurally based 
inequality between the poor and the well-to-do.  Structural inequalities can be solved 
only by attacking them within the larger historical, cultural and socio-economic 
matrix that generated them. 
 
ICTs are seen as an all powerful agent of change, i.e. as a primary causal agent of 
social change.  Government claims that the use of ICTs will relieve people of 
drudgery, improve access to information and result in greater social justice.  In order 
to realise this utopian vision, it is necessary to promote access to ICTs, especially the 
Internet.  Thus, policy initiatives start from the assumption that access to the 
technology is necessarily desirable and hence access is the policy challenge to be met 
in order to realise the socio-economic potential of ICTs.  It is assumed that once 
barriers to access are overcome, poor people will embrace the technology 
wholeheartedly. 
                                                          
68  In Marxist theory the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ refers to the ideal of proletarian supremacy 
following the overthrow of capitalism and preceding the classless state. 
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There are undoubtedly ‘informational developments’ globally, as in South Africa, and 
through interaction with other social developments these will have an impact on how 
the future of such societies shape up in different ways dependent upon different 
historical circumstances.  In government’s ‘utopian scenario’ these developments 
have overwhelmingly positive effects on poverty reduction.  It would appear that 
government is driven by a deterministic perspective on social development: 
technological innovations have  a direct impact on social processes.  There is no space 
for reflection on the myriad of complex ways in which technology and society are 
dialectically linked. 
 
A technological determinist view often dominates the subject of ICTs for poverty 
reduction.  This can be detected at all levels of discussion, both descriptive and 
predictive.  The fact that technologies almost always have unintended and unplanned 
consequences is ignored.  As much in its development as in its application and use, 
technology is intrinsically shaped by its economic, political and social environment 
(Williams & Edge, 1996).  In other words, context matters.  Referring to the Third 
World, Hamelink notes: 
“[S]ince conditions in different countries vary, no global solutions can be 
proposed.  Country studies are needed in order to explore the specific policies, 
programs and technological solutions likely to be effective in specific social 
and economic conditions” (Hamelink, 1997:34). 
 
There is a widespread approach in government that seems blinded by the ‘newness’ 
and novelty of digital ICTs, and which, by emphasising the ‘revolutionary’ character 
of the Internet and related technologies, tends to become (either deliberately or by 
negligence) ahistoric.  The term ‘information revolution’ underscores a notion of 
historical discontinuity.  The emphasis on historical discontinuity runs the danger of 
underestimating the continuities involved in the process, as much in the technological 
innovations as such as in their adaptation in the economic, social and political 
contexts.69  Further, terms like the ‘information society’ and ‘information revolution’ 
tend to imply that the technological discontinuity goes hand in hand with a 
revolutionary discontinuity in social and political relations.  As discussed in Chapter 
                                                          
69 ICTs are based on a long list of technological innovations and evolutions that took place earlier.  
Effectively, ICTs are characterised by a complex process of technological convergence between 
microelectronics, telecommunications, computing and broadcasting.  Thus there is no single historical 
moment that can be named as its starting point (Everard, 2000; Hamelink, 1997). 
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3, the empirical evidence does not live up to the proclaimed epochal dimensions of 
change.  This then raises the question of what should change, thus opening up a wide 
field for ideological preferences of all sorts. 
 
To conceptualise technology and technological change outside of any social, 
economic, political or cultural context can have several consequences.  The first is 
that the approach becomes one of technological determinism, in which the technology 
is seen to act as an autonomous agent that has a direct effect on other social systems.  
Such accounts ignore the social shaping of technology and the fact that technologies 
and social life are interconnected (Schmidt, 2001:1; Groper, 1996).  These approaches 
disregard the political, social and cultural processes that necessarily accompany the 
development of any technological innovation, not least in the form of values, 
judgements and interests in operation that help structure Internet access and use 
(MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999).  Technological development comes to be seen as 
autonomous and self-generating.  Technologies, however, are always situated within 
circuits of human action which provide their context and shape their direction. 
 
6.2.3 Modernisation 
Technological modernity is by definition a positional good.  Since in a capitalist 
economy the central impetus of technological innovation lies in the achievement of 
competitive advantage over other companies or nations, the reproduction of the 
technological divide, though on always-changing levels, is an inherent part of the 
global capitalist system’s normal functioning.  Further, given the far higher 
investments in R&D activities in the industrialised countries, there is little doubt that 
the process of new technological innovations is driven forward at a much faster rate in 
the industrialised countries than in the Third World.  The discourse of the South 
African government proclaiming the ‘digital inclusion’ of Africa in a system that 
hardly allows for an equal inclusion for all is therefore problematic. 
 
Modernisation theory attempts to construct a totalising vision of society which tries to 
provide a rational basis for understanding all aspects of development.  Such theories, 
however, neglect much of the richness and diversity of development by reducing it to 
some fundamental essence.  ICTs are seen as products of ‘rational discourse’ and are  
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Table 6.5: Modernisation 
 
Extract 1: ICTs are very closely tied with globalisation and the new economy.  As such we 
need to integrate ICTs into our manufacturing and services sector…in order to remain 
globally competitive…and to create jobs for the poor.  A modern and efficient economy is 
critically important to generate the jobs and to form the basis for redistribution” (interview 
transcript). 
Extract 2: “The whole global economy operates on the basis of electronic networks of 
information and communication.  South Africa therefore has to ensure that we are at the 
cutting edge of ICTs in order to compete in this new economy.  The risk of not being 
connected is exclusion and marginalisation…this will have dire consequences for any 
redistributive policy” (interview transcript). 
Extract 3: “Accordingly, we have formed two structures to facilitate discussion and common 
action in the area of ICT as part of our quest to develop a modern economy and society.  
These are the Presidential National Commission on Information Society and Development as 
well as the Presidential International Advisory Council on Information Society and 
Development” (Mbeki, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 4: “I am certain that [ICTs] will help us the more effectively to impact on the 
identified area of health especially to improve the lives of our people in the remote areas of 
our country, demonstrating that modern technology provides us with a tool to fight and defeat 
disease and underdevelopment” (Mbeki, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 5: “[T]he recognition of the centrality of the IT sectors in economic development and 
in enabling Africa to leapfrog into the future” (Matsepe-Casaburri, 2003:n.p.). 
Extract 6: “The rollout of telecentres became another way in which the historically 
disadvantaged could be the beneficiaries of modernisation and enable large numbers of people 
in rural areas to have access to telephones and basic ICT” (Matsepe-Casaburri, 2003:n.p.). 
Extract 7: “[T]he need [is] for developing countries to leapfrog development…into the high 
technology of the leading societies and continue along the traditional path of industrial 
development” (Fraser-Moleketi, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 8: “ICTs offer us the possibility to render services in ways that are unimaginable 
without technological intervention.  Services can be rendered on a 24-hour basis thus offering 
citizens a choice as to when and how they intend to interact with government…With ICTs, it 
appears, that possibilities of service delivery are limitless – the choice, convenience and cost 
benefits in the long run make a compelling case for…advanc[ing] the programme of 
modernising government” (Fraser-Moleketi, 2002:n.p.). 
Extract 9: “The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) has embarked on a 
process to develop IT policy for Government to ensure that modern technology is utilised to 
improve systems and infrastructure to enable better service delivery” (Fraser-Moleketi, 2000). 
Extract 10: “We need to broaden the values that underpin the current modernisation…We 
need to…harness the power of the most modern technology to catapult all the citizens into the 
21st Century” (Naidoo, 1998b:n.p.). 
Extract 11: “Information technology (IT) plays the role of a key enabler of this modernisation 
of government…IT brings endless possibilities for improving the internal operational and 
support functions within the realm of government…Information technology is a powerful 
enabler for delivery of services to the public” (DPSA, 2001:4, 7). 
Extract 12: “Africa is lagging far behind in crucial areas such as telephones, broadcasting, 
computers and the Internet…and needs to modernise” (Mbeki, 2001:n.p.). 
Extract 13: “Another important area being addressed under NEPAD is the issue of using 
Information and Communication Technology to leapfrog the development of the continent 
forward.  In order for Africa to benefit from the globalisation process and the information age, 
ICT infrastructure development on the continent is vital” (Mbeki, 2001a:n.p.). 
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thus universal in scope and not bound by particular historical or cultural conditions.  
In modernisation theory Western values are universalised and linked with progress, 
which can be seen as an adjunct of the hegemonic power of the advanced industrial 
countries. 
 
The desire by government to bridge the ‘digital divide’ between rich and poor has led 
in recent years to a number of initiatives to harness ICTs for poverty reduction.  The 
successful experience of East Asian countries has lent support to an ‘ICT-led’ 
development thesis implying that South Africa can adopt ‘leapfrogging’ strategies. 
According to this view, ICTs represent a ‘window of opportunity’ for South Africa to 
move from a situation of ‘limited’ technology to widespread adoption of 
‘sophisticated’ technologies, without going through the stages of technological 
adaptation and learning experienced in the advanced, highly industrialised countries.  
East Asian industrial development, as exemplified by the four dragons (i.e. South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore),  emerged from a unique confluence of a 
particular set of socio-cultural, historical and geo-political factors, many of which are 
not found in present-day South Africa (see Wade, 1990).  Even if the same economic 
institutions were to be duplicated, they are likely to have very different consequences 
in distinct contexts.70  Simply put, the rules of the game have changed since the time 
when the East Asian industrial development began  (Wade, 1996).  Globalisation, for 
example, has involved a profound and comprehensive restructuring of the world 
productive apparatus.  
 
In the government’s discourse ICTs have become inextricably bound up with ideas of 
social progress in the transformation of human nature (see Table 6.5).  There are 
similarities in government’s ICT discourse and the vocabulary of ‘the Enlightenment’, 
the name given to the movement of intellectuals committed to the superiority of 
scientific (or instrumental) rationality in the era, roughly, between 1750 and 1825 
(Marx & Mazlish, 1996).  The ‘Enlightenment Project’ marked the great watershed 
between the feudal era and the emergence of democracy, the market economy or, in a 
word, modernity.  The doctrine of universal progress expressed the belief that history 
                                                          
70 Nor is the endpoint of development institutionally identical.  Even among OECD countries there 
remains a considerable variety in institutional structures and government-business interaction patterns.  
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itself is a record of the steady, continuous, cumulative expansion of human knowledge 
of and power over nature, exemplified above all by advances in science, engineering 
and technology, and that it will result in a general improvement in the human 
condition (Nye, 1990).71 
 
In government’s ICT and poverty alleviation discourse one hears ‘technology’ 
invoked as if it were an entity that possesses autonomy and agency, and an 
independent capacity to change things.  Inherent in it is a capacity to generate 
progress and to determine the direction of social change.  It is not surprising, under 
the circumstances, that many in government invest hope in the new ICTs as a cure-all 
for deprived communities.  If the historical record is any indication, these innovations 
by themselves are most unlikely to ameliorate the deprivations that afflict the poor 
(Marx, 1988; Noble, 1977).  Only by confronting their problems within the larger 
historical, cultural and socio-economic milieu that generated them are the poor likely 
to devise effective ways to use the new technologies.  Meanwhile, the chief lesson to 
be drawn from the history of technological innovation and its social consequences is 
largely cautionary (Smith & Marx, 1995).  Although the new ICTs will effect many 
radical changes in society, it would be foolish to rely on them as a ‘technological fix’ 
for the afflictions of economic injustice, deprivation and inequality.  
 
The mission is modernity, with a liberative dimension: to liberate poor communities 
from ignorance.  This thinking is based on the postulation of an evolutionary scenario 
in which those left behind in the race for progress could, with the aid of government, 
catch up and also become modern and developed.  The discourse of progress is 
constructed on the basis of the ‘information superhighway’72 concept and the false 
polarities of the information ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.  These false and mutually 
exclusive polarities are united in an evolutionary discourse that postulates them as 
sequential stages of development.  The suggestion that technology is a linear 
progressive process is misleading.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
Financial systems, for example, differ substantially between the US and the EU countries, and between 
Japan and other OECD nations. 
71 The universality of the 19th century belief in progress is indicated by the fact that it was embraced by 
both the most ardent apologists for industrial capitalism and by its most cogent critics, the Marxists 
(Marx & Mazlish, 1996). 
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ICTs, it is believed, have the potential to enable South Africa to leapfrog over 
industrialisation into a post-industrial society.  This belief is being driven by a strong 
fear of being left behind and cut off from the global ‘information superhighway’.73  
According to the trickle-down view, there may be inequalities of access and use 
during the early stages of a technology, but it is assumed that these disappear, or are at 
least much reduced, as the technology becomes more widely diffused.  This is not 
unique to the Internet.  Similar claims can be found in much literature and in policy 
statements about industrialisation and modernisation more generally.  Individuals, 
regions and nations will ‘catch up’; those who are not connected now, will or should 
be soon.  The assumption is that the entire world shares a single timeline of 
development in which some groups are further ahead than others along a single, 
shared path.  These views of trickling-down or catching-up are based on the flawed 
premise that growth is evenly distributed. 
 
The expectation that innovations in telecommunications and computer technologies 
would improve industrial performance and increase economic productivity has 
become firmly established among government officials.  The common position is that 
ICTs will allow the country to leapfrog over the industrialisation of the economy into 
a post-industrial society.  Simultaneously, there is a fear of being left behind and cut 
off from the emerging global digital economy.  This ‘threat/opportunity’ duality is 
quite pervasive in government’s discourse on ICTs.  The general belief seems to be 
that without adequate access to the global ‘digital economy’, South Africa cannot 
hope to be economically competitive in world trade.  Thus the competitive position of 
local manufacturing and service industries should be improved.  In South Africa, the 
‘digital rush’ is on to ensure connections with the electronic networks for trade, 
finance, transport and science.  This phenomenon has been inspired by the obvious 
benefits that digital ICTs seem to offer, at least in principle.  This position bypasses 
the question of whether the deployment of ICTs does indeed lead to growth in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
72 In September 1993 the US government launched its National Information Infrastructure (NII) 
initiative.  Although this was a broad and rather vague ‘agenda for action’, it invoked the powerful 
metaphor of the ‘Information Superhighway’ (Kubicek, Dutton & Williams, 1997). 
73 It was the ‘information superhighway’ metaphor which projected the Internet into public 
consciousness in the mid to late 1990s.  The engineering metaphor (of highways) suggests that there 
are policies government can adopt in order to promote access and use, such as training for individuals 
and small businesses, public facilities for those without home or office access, regulation of connection 
costs and investment in infrastructure.  A more organic, evolving metaphor was omitted because it does 
not offer any clear policy prescriptions. 
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economic productivity and, if so, whether such growth will be equitably distributed.  
As discussed elsewhere (Chapter 4), it is very difficult to provide solid empirical 
evidence to support this conclusion. 
 
It may well be an illusion to think that South Africa could catch up or keep pace with 
technological progress among Northern countries, where the rate of technological 
development is very high and is supported by considerable resources.  This is not to 
say that South Africa should not upgrade its ICT systems.  Rather, government should 
not act with the unrealistic expectation that those countries that are ahead are planning 
to wait for us to catch up with them. 
 
Many of the basic tenets of modernisation theory, in revised form, are still very much 
alive in government’s ICTs for development discourse.  A simple unlinear 
progression is invoked, reflecting the teleological nature of modernisation theory.  
The belief is built on the optimism of the 1950s that the transition from tradition to 
modernity is primarily a technical problem.  And that this advance from tradition to 
modernity would be a simple unilinear progression based on importing solutions from 
the advanced industrial West (Hirschman, 1967, 1981).  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
there have been numerous critiques of the ascribed unilinear and teleological nature of 
modernisation theory, especially its view of development as a set of ends or 
achievements, its ideological and ethnocentric character, and its ineffectiveness as a 
policy tool (Higgott, 1980). 
 
In spite of the critiques of the theoretical suppositions of modernisation theory 
(Munck & O’Hearn, 1999), it nevertheless constitutes the dominant worldview of 
government as well as the major international development agencies.  Government 
continues to display an inordinate Comtean74 faith and confidence in the ability of 
positivistic social science to provide ‘technicist’ recipes for controlling and managing 
the trajectories of social change and economic growth in poor communities.  The 
overall teleological evolutionary goal of ICT-based modernisation is never 
questioned.  This faith is based on an undemonstrated and unwarranted assumption of 
                                                          
74 Of or deriving from Auguste Comte (1798-1857), French philosopher and founder of positivism. 
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the government’s ability to control and direct the process of social change in poor 
communities.   
 
6.2.4 Information Society 
 
Table 6.6: Information society 
 
Extract 1: “The information society is upon us and as government we must be prepared to 
meet the challenge.  The promise is for a knowledge-based society which will yield 
considerable benefits for education, health, development, democracy and much more.  
Seamless networking and knowledge flows will be possible…even for the rural poor” 
(interview transcript). 
Extract 2: “Government is looking at ways to build the information society in South 
Africa…particularly strategies to build the NII [National Information Infrastructure] for the 
information society…ways of enhancing e-literacy among the different sectors of 
society…and the optimal application of ICTs in all sectors for purposes of developing a 
strategy for each sector of the economy” (interview transcript). 
Extract 3: “What will decide how the ‘information society’ evolves in South Africa is policy 
regulation, the market and a number of projects from government, business and communities” 
(DoC, 1998b:1). 
Extract 4: “We are at the brink of the 21st Century that will be driven by the information 
society…The economic survival of the country is heavily dependent on our ability to become 
part of the information society.  Sophisticated telecommunication services are a pre-requisite 
for growth, foreign investment and international competitiveness” (Naidoo, 1998c:n.p.). 
Extract 5: “We are committed to using the power of the Internet, to bring our communities, 
our people into the global information society” (Naidoo, 1998d:n.p.). 
Extract 6: “The transition of the global economy from an industrial focus to one based on 
knowledge and information presents numerous opportunities and challenges to countries, 
especially in the developing world” (DoC, 2000a:Section 1.1). 
Extract 7: “We may generally define an Information Society as one that has built the 
necessary capacity to maximally use ICTs to accelerate social and economic development…It 
is in South Africa’s best interests to get connected to the Information Superhighway” 
(interview transcript). 
Extract 8: “There is…a crucial public policy dimension which rests on the shoulders of the 
government…ensuring that this Information Society supports and enhances the objectives of 
development, empowerment, economic development and preserves the constitutional values 
on which the whole national edifice is built” (Mbeki, in PNC on ISAD, 2003c:n.p.). 
 
It has become common practice in government to describe ‘modern’ societies in terms 
of the concept of the ‘information society’ (see Table 6.6).  As discussed in Chapter 3, 
this concept refers in a general sense to increases in available volumes of information, 
the significance of information processing in ever more societal domains and to the 
view that ICTs provide a basic infrastructure upon which societies become 
increasingly dependent.  As mentioned previously (Chapter 3), the concept of the 
‘information society’ is flawed and contested.  It is questionable whether one can 
adequately describe societies with one comprehensive variable only and, even if this 
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were possible, whether information is a more precise category than capital.  Further, it 
should be noted that societies pursue very different paths of development, information 
being only one path. 
 
Table 6.7: Market determinism 
 
Extract 1: “Government-led initiatives have had mixed results…there are several drawbacks 
in terms of financial and technological sustainability.  Private sector initiatives are most 
successful.  In a sufficiently competitive and liberalised market the private sector is most 
effective in providing commercially viable communication services, even in rural or less 
viable areas.  And in areas where providing services is not financially viable, regulators can 
use a number of instruments such as service requirements, special financing mechanisms and 
investment subsidies to provide incentives to the private sector to promote public access” 
(interview transcript). 
Extract 2: “The current wave of globalisation…the trend towards worldwide integration of 
markets…is spurred by the development of information and communication technologies, 
including the Internet, mobile phones and satellite networks…Building the infrastructure for 
the Information Superhighway is a responsibility of both the state and the market.  The private 
sector has both the skills and the capital to provide an impetus for rapid roll-out…with the 
state playing an important role in regulation and monitoring social obligations” (interview 
transcript). 
Extract 3: “It is critical for growth and development that South Africa gets on the Information 
Superhighway…and that we stay there.  We will all benefit from this.  Building the NII 
[National Information Infrastructure] is an absolute imperative.  The private sector should 
lead the deployment of the NII.  Private investment is critically important to construct and 
extend the NII into under-serviced areas.  Competition is the single most important means of 
encouraging that private investment” (interview transcript). 
Extract 4: “Fostering partnerships between government and the private sector…focusing on 
national development priorities such as: growing the economy, job creation, health, rural 
development, agriculture [and] the diversification of production and exports, with a focus on 
market access for goods to industrialised countries” (PNC on ISAD, 2003c:n.p.). 
Extract 5: “It is…therefore important that we work on Public-Private-Partnerships with the 
private sector” (Mbeki, 2001b:n.p.). 
Extract 6: “Beyond the status of an information technology user, industry and trade must 
encourage training, foster internal communication by using modern technologies, invest in 
long term initiatives, and assist schools and hospitals with communication and information 
equipment and systems…” (Mbeki, 1996:n.p.). 
Extract 7: “In the short term, the most viable (and perhaps desired) e-government partners 
may be multinational companies that have proven experience and capabilities to deliver” 
(Working Group on E-Government in the Developing World, 2002:28). 
 
It takes great faith to look forward to the beneficent workings of the ‘information 
superhighway’ for the poor when the stark reality is that the information infrastructure 
is increasingly under corporate/market control (see Table 6.7).  This probably reflects 
the ANC’s shift in policy from its long commitment to structural transformation 
through democratic developmental means, towards structural adjustment using neo-
liberal economic means.  The shift has taken place in a geopolitical context in which 
Left alternatives to free market capitalism, whether communist or social-democratic, 
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have all but disappeared as viable opportunities.  As one commentator has put it: 
“Capital is all-powerful; national policy must pay obeisance or pay the cost” 
(Nattrass, 1996:25).75 
 
While government ratifies the private construction of the NII, it claims that it will not 
ignore the needs of the poor.  A Universal Service Agency (USA) and a dedicated 
Universal Service Fund (USF) together with an independent regulatory authority 
(ICASA) will ensure that the needs of the poor are catered for.  Private ownership and 
competition in the use of the ‘information superhighway’ are government’s basic 
prescriptions for building the NII that promises to carry all the images, messages and 
data flow that the country produces.  While admitting that it has a key leadership role 
to play in NII development, government assumes that the private sector will build and 
run the NII.  Government insists on free and fair competition as a necessary 
prerequisite to the establishment of the ‘information society’.  The apparent 
repositioning of interventionist regulation remains consistent with technological and 
market determinism, as it does not displace the primacy of the competitive market. 
 
This view reflects the consensus of the key actors in international ICT policy-making 
for leaving the construction of the global information infrastructure to private 
initiative and market forces.  This is also reflected in the trend towards 
corporatisation, deregulation and privatisation of telecommunications in developing 
countries (Melody, 1997, 1999).  The current institutional framework with its reliance 
on private initiative, corporate control and market orientation does not support the 
development of ICTs in a direction more suitable to the needs of the poor.  The stakes 
for a democratic society are high and market forces alone will not ensure that societal 
goals are met.  Centuries of capital development have pointed to the inadequacy of 
market forces in providing social needs (Mansell, Samarajiva & Mahan, 2002).  
Without adequate regulatory intervention to ensure accountability to the general 
public, market forces that respond to those groups with purchasing power are bound 
to generate unequal development.  This means that the ‘information superhighway’ 
may well become a ‘blind alley’ for the poor.  
                                                          
75 Nattrass and Seekings argue that since 1994 “South Africa’s growth path has not been especially pro-
poor…[and]…government remains committed to policies that keep the economy growing along an 
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The exploitation of ICTs in a narrow neo-liberal conception has a double impact: (i) 
applied in the economy at large, it tends to empower the rich and fortify big business.  
Conversely it disempowers the poor, making them the outcasts of the ‘information 
club’76; and (ii) within the ICT sector, it tends to exclude disadvantaged people from 
access to important media through prohibitive entry costs and other barriers.  In the 
absence of an active and substantive policy stance covering access, training and 
content development aimed specifically at the poor, it is likely that the new ICTs such 
as the Internet will be a force for income divergence.  On the other hand, it is likely 
that such a programme would be both complex and very expensive.  Depending on 
one’s view of the benefits of direct Internet access for the poor in South Africa, this 
programme could be either a distraction from more important priorities or a vital step 
towards equality of opportunity. 
 
Government believes that the ‘information society’ is a reality.  But this is little more 
than rhetorical posturing.  There appears to be very little substance underlying 
government’s ‘information society’ project.  The policy statements are silent on the 
implications of ICT policy designed to promote rural livelihoods and relieve poverty.  
The trend of planning ICT policy from the perspective of an ‘information society’ as a 
fait accompli leads to a pre-emptive, deterministic policy design process.  The 
complexity of the relationship between ICTs and development (see Chapter 4) and the 
macro-social perspectives of technology dynamics (see Chapter 3) needs to be 
confronted and dealt with.  Otherwise state resources are likely to be wasted 
unnecessarily.  The policy challenge is to ensure that those who have been 
marginalised historically have access to ICTs and to the information that can be 
harnessed from these technologies.  Given the cost and complexity of introducing 
ICTs into government services, the threat of the growing risk of exclusion of those 
who do not have access to government services, and the limited studies to date of the 
cost-effectiveness of the new ICTs in many sectors such as health and education, the 
introduction of ICT should be planned very carefully. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
inegalitarian path, with a large section of the poor being shut out of income-generating activities” 
(Nattrass & Seekings, 2000:494-495). 
76 The phrase ‘information club’ refers to the privileged few who use ICT as an elitist tool and is 
attributed to Dertouzos (1998).  In a provocatively titled article, Korac-Kakabadse, Kouzmin and 
Korac-Kakabadse (2000:171) refer to the ICT insiders as belonging to ‘IT harems’. 
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Much of the discussion in government over the ‘information society’ remains largely 
rhetorical; meanwhile policy initiatives continue to reflect the interests of a range of 
powerful interest groups.  The South African government’s current emphasis on 
information and knowledge largely bypasses the fundamental question as to whether 
information and knowledge are primary resources for social development.  
Government has embraced the popular myths that fuel the uncritical enthusiasm of 
information and knowledge societies.  Important questions are left unanswered: Who 
controls the ‘information society’?  Who benefits, who decides, who participates, and 
who is accountable?  Government’s discourse on the emerging ‘information society’ 
is based upon a series of popular myths, such as: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
More information is better than less information; 
More information creates more knowledge and understanding; 
More information means less uncertainty and more adequate choices; 
If poor people are properly informed they act accordingly; 
More information equals more power (PNC on ISAD, 2003b; GITOC, 2003). 
 
A very popular assumption is that information equals power.  Information becomes a 
source of power only if the necessary infrastructure for its production, processing, 
storage, retrieval and transportation is accessible and when people have the skills to 
apply information to social practice and to participate in social networks through 
which information can be used to further one’s interests.  The assumption proposes 
that poor people were never able to exercise power because they were ill-informed 
and ignorant.  The fact that poor people lack the material and strategic means for 
attaining power is downplayed.  All of these very attractive assumptions about the 
role and effects of information and knowledge are based upon seriously flawed cause-
effect models.  Information and knowledge are conceived as key variables in social 
processes and depending on how they are manipulated, certain social effects will 
occur.  Social science research, however, has taught us that information and 
knowledge sharing do not occur in the linear mode of simple stimulus-response 
models that propose linear, causal relations between information/knowledge inputs 
and social outputs (Hamelink, 1997, 2000). 
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There are two issues which the ‘information superhighway’ concept brings to the fore: 
cultural colonialism and the problem of environmentally sustainable development 
(Hamelink, 1997).  The uniform consumer lifestyle being aggressively marketed 
across the globe is resource- and energy-intensive and tends to disregard local culture 
and values.  This raises the key question for policy-makers, viz. can ICTs be 
developed and deployed in a way benefiting socio-economic development, 
particularly of the poor?  The ‘techno-centric’ perspective of government is liable to 
ignore ICT’s social origins and see decision-makers’ options as limited to reactive 
policies of adapting to technical change.   
 
Whatever its precise meaning may be, the South African government sees the 
‘information society’ as a standard for the country to aspire towards.  There are many 
in government who argue that we are moving towards an ‘information society’ or a 
‘knowledge-based economy’ (PNC on ISAD, 2003a; DTI, 2001:1) in which the role 
and significance of information and knowledge as inputs to economic processes have 
fundamentally changed.  It is argued that this rests on advances in ICTs that are 
leading to a ‘paradigm shift’ (DTI, 2001).  In other words, the rise of ICT 
technologies is coterminous with the move to an ‘information society’.  The idea 
seems to be that there are basic  changes in economic functioning, and changes in the 
economic rules of the game.  However, the term ‘information society’ is used in a 
superficial and uncritical way.  It is never coherently defined and appears to be little 
more than a slogan or a metaphor for technological ‘progress’. 
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6.2.5 Digital Divide 
 
Table 6.8: Digital divide 
 
Extract 1: “Government has given priority to bridging the digital divide between the 
technology haves and the have-nots in South Africa…this will lead to a continued drive 
toward universal and affordable access.  We recognise the advantages of ICTs…to modernise 
the economy and for social progress.  A key challenge is to build an inclusive and democratic 
information society.  Otherwise the poor will be locked out of the information revolution and 
will remain in a state of information poverty.  The gap between the information elites and the 
poor will increase greatly…if we do not diffuse the technology to everybody” (interview 
transcript). 
Extract 2: “Government must become a model user of IT.  We need to establish an ICT-
related overall co-ordination structure in government…and a champion for the development 
and implementation of ICT strategy.  The most pressing concern is how to close the digital 
divide and how to use these technologies to optimise the pace and extent of addressing our 
country’s development challenges” (interview transcript). 
Extract 3: “Although much is being done in attempting to bridge the gap between the 
information haves and the information have-nots, the task remains daunting” (Mandela, 
1998:n.p.). 
Extract 4: “[T]he establishment of the Presidential International Task Force on Information 
Society and Development [will] assist government in narrowing the digital divide with the 
rest of the world” (Matsepe-Casaburri, 2001c:n.p.). 
Extract 5: “The [Electronic Communications and Transactions] Bill seeks to address the 
following policy imperatives…bridging the digital divide by developing a National e-Strategy 
for South Africa…maximising benefits…especially for members from previously 
disadvantaged communities…[and] encouraging electronic communication with government” 
(DoC, 2002:98). 
Extract 6: “The objective is to maximize the benefits the Internet offers by promoting 
universal and affordable access by all to its possible applications, with a view to bridging the 
digital divide” (DoC, 2002:99). 
Extract 7: “Digital divide refers to inequalities in ICTs distribution between developing and 
developed economies.  North-South digital divide is real and needs to be addressed.  It also 
refers to the gap in the information sphere between most developed parts of the country and 
underdeveloped rural parts, including disadvantaged groups.  The challenge is how to narrow 
down the gap between ‘information-haves’ and ‘information have-nots’ through addressing 
inequalities and inequity” (DoC, 2000a:Section 12.2). 
Extract 8: “The [Presidential National Commission on Information Society and Development] 
PNC on ISAD…has been tasked with: recommending strategies on bridging the digital 
divide, advising on the development of an overall government policy framework on ICTs, 
advising on the use of ICTs to optimise the pace and extent of addressing South Africa’s 
development challenges – and thus enhancing South Africa’s global competitiveness, and 
advising on the integration of sector specific ICT strategies” (PNC on ISAD, 2003c:n.p.). 
 
There is a great deal of concern in government circles about the ‘digital divide’ that 
separates individuals who are able to access computers and the Internet from those 
who have no opportunity to do so (see Table 6.8).  Government has identified the 
‘digital divide’ as a key issue of the fin de siècle and the new millennium, and much 
effort has gone into ‘bridging’ that divide by helping poor communities gain access to 
new digital technologies.  Government has tended to propose a technology solution 
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before conducting a proper diagnosis.  These efforts have tended to be top-down, 
technology- and supply-driven, lacking adequate attention either to the broader 
economic, social and policy context into which the technology was being inserted or 
to its sustainability and appropriate use over time.  The community telecentre 
movement, despite some successes, offers abundant examples of this problem (see 
Chapter 5). 
 
The term ‘digital divide’ has been a leitmotif in the international ICT, poverty and 
development debate (see Chapter 4) as well as a feature of the South African 
government’s discourse on ICTs for development.  It is a position of this study that 
the ‘digital divide’ provides an insufficiently rigorous framework for either analysis 
or policy-making.  The concept of the ‘digital divide’ tends to isolate the issue of the 
new ICTs from the much broader question of uneven economic and social 
development within South Africa itself and globally, i.e. between the North and the 
South.  The ‘digital divide’ is not a new phenomenon; rather it continues the 
established patterns of structural inequality, locally, regionally and globally.  Further, 
the notion of the ‘digital divide’ implies a binary division between those who have 
access and those who do not, which does not take into account the qualitative 
dimension of what this ‘access’ might mean.  Hargittai (2002), in her analysis of the 
differences in people’s online activities in the US, suggests five dimensions along 
which qualitative differences in ICTs can be focused: (i) technical means: the 
availability of software, hardware and quality of connectivity; (ii) autonomy of use: 
location of access and freedom to use the medium for one’s preferred activities; (iii) 
use patterns: types of uses and the purpose for which the technology is employed; (iv) 
social support networks: availability of others one can turn to for assistance with use 
or to share the results of use; and (v) skill: an individual’s ability to use the 
technologies effectively. 
 
These efforts to stretch the ‘digital divide’ concept are an implicit criticism of the 
flawed assumption that meaningful access to ICTs entails simply providing computers 
and Internet connections.  By being wedded to a reductionist notion of a ‘digital 
divide’, government attaches overriding importance to the physical availability of 
computers and connectivity, rather than to issues of content, language, education, 
literacy and community and social resources.  Moreover, framing the problem as a 
 209
‘digital divide’ tends to connote ‘digital solutions’, i.e. the provision of more and 
better computers and telecommunications, without engaging the important set of 
complementary resources and complex interventions to support social inclusion, in 
which ICT applications may be enabling elements, but are certainly insufficient when 
simply added to the status quo mix of resources and relationships.  Seen from this 
perspective, the developmental goal is less to overcome the ‘digital divide’, but rather 
to embrace a vision of ICTs as a supporting tool, where appropriate, to enhance the 
human capabilities and expand the human freedoms and choices of the poor.  To 
reiterate, ICTs are not an end in themselves, rather they should be seen as a tool 
(among many others) to reach development goals.  Thus, the perspective shifts from 
the technology to that of human development, underscored by the notions of social 
justice and equity. 
 
6.2.6 The Foucauldian Power-Knowledge Analytic 
Government’s ICT for poverty alleviation discourse is largely one-sided.  This 
tendency towards monologue rather than dialogue is rooted in the unequal power 
relations that still characterise the social production of knowledge.  It almost appears 
as if government perceives poverty as a technical problem, as a matter of rational 
decision-making and management to be entrusted to government functionaries whose 
specialised knowledge allegedly qualifies them for the task.  The coherence of effects 
that the ICT, poverty and development discourse achieves is the key to its success as a 
hegemonic form of representation, viz. the construction of the poor as pre-constituted 
subjects, based on the privilege of the ‘representers’ (see Table 6.9).  Foucault (1979) 
has referred to this as the production of ‘docile bodies’ and it is an example of 
discursive homogenisation.  This entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of 
poor communities in South Africa. 
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Table 6.9: Power-knowledge 
 
Extract 1: “The new ICTs are driving globalisation…the downside is that the gap between the 
information ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ is widening and there is a danger that the poor in 
South Africa will be excluded from the gains of the information society and the knowledge 
economy” (interview transcript). 
Extract 2: “The information revolution promises to change the world like never before.  
Information superhighways are bringing about profound changes in the way people work, 
learn and live…it is inevitable that the rural poor will be affected by these profound changes.  
The task of government is to maximise the opportunities that ICTs offer for the advancement 
of our economy and society.  The approach of government will be to include the 
disadvantaged sectors of the population into the ICT domain.  After all, knowledge is critical 
for emancipating the poor…lack of information and knowledge is the root cause of poverty” 
(interview transcript). 
Extract 3: “[ICTs are an]…unstoppable revolution” (Ministry of Communications, 2001:n.p.). 
Extract 4: “[ICTs are a]…critically necessary condition for economic and social 
development” (Fraser-Moleketi, 2000:n.p.). 
Extract 5: “[There is]…increasing inequity between an ‘information elite’ and a majority 
living in ‘information poverty’” (DoC, 1998b:1). 
Extract 6: “We will ensure that we will put in place a digital, fibre-optic, highspeed 
broadband backbone that links every city and town in our country.  And we will use what is 
the most advanced technology such as the…Internet, to deliver a range of new services that 
will allow all our people, even the poorest of the poor, access to the applications of tele-
medicine, of tele-education, of distance education or electronic commerce” (Naidoo, 
1998d:n.p.). 
Extract 7: “We need to ensure that the path to the Information Society does not widen the gap 
between rich and poor, in developed and developing countries.  The tragic irony we might 
confront, is that this technology which has enormous potential to benefit all humanity could 
serve to entrench and widen this gap” (Mbeki, 1996:n.p.). 
Extract 8: “Government must implement ICTs rapidly…there is no time to waste…You either 
adopt ICTs or perish.  There are not many choices, there is only one way to go…We have to 
use ICTs as a tool for spreading the gains of globalisation to the poor.  Government must 
leverage the power of ICTs to spearhead a sustainable, ‘high road’ growth path which is 
employment-creating, growth-oriented and uplifting of the poor” (interview transcript). 
Extract 9: “One of the distinctive features of rural poverty is lack of information and 
knowledge to develop and escape from the confines of poverty.  The state needs to use ICTs 
as a way of linking the poor to modern modes of agriculture, industry and ways of living...and 
integrating the poor into the modern economy so that they can develop and enjoy the fruits of 
education and improve their livelihoods” (interview transcript). 
 
This chapter has furthered our understanding of developments in ICT policy by 
shifting our attention to the nature of discourse as a mode of social action within the 
policy debate.  The chapter has shown how the South African government actively 
constructs the development of the ‘information society’ and their role within that 
development.  The construction of the debate with reference to the dominant 
discourse discussed has implications beyond the realm of language because it affects 
the ways in which policy solutions are actually derived; and it also, ultimately, has 
implications for the type of ‘information society’ that will be achieved as a result.  
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The power-knowledge analytic enables us to: (i) unravel the intricate connections 
between the production of specific systems of knowledge and the exercise of power in 
its many forms; (ii) examine the relationship between power and knowledge, and the 
implication of government in the reproduction of hegemony, with its imperatives of 
power and social control over poor people; and (iii) explore the increasing growth of 
instrumental rationality as a crucial and perhaps even dominant component of 
modernity. 
 
Government talks extensively about the benefits that the ‘information society’ will 
bring and also constructs the needs of the poor.  The discourses identified function to 
structure a set of discursive norms and conventions whereby a ‘neo-liberal consensus’ 
is manufactured in relation to information policy.  Technological change is defined as 
both a threat and an opportunity.  Thus, a set of distinct binary oppositions 
(information ‘haves and have-nots’; ‘information-poor’ and ‘information-rich’) is 
constructed whereby radical change is presupposed, making it difficult to raise the 
possibility that technological change can be incremental change, and simultaneously 
justifying the call for the abandonment of traditional policy instruments while acting 
as a vehicle for new policy initiatives.  By then constructing both the market and 
technology in a deterministic manner, governmental action becomes largely restricted 
to the role of facilitator in the creation of a free and competitive marketplace.   
 
By utilising discourse analysis, we have shown that not only are the information 
policy outcomes broadly neo-liberal, but also that the discourses described function to 
effectively preclude alternatives to neo-liberalism being enacted within the regulatory 
process.  This draws attention to the importance of discourse use itself as a form of 
social action.  Although the approach of the South African government to 
technological change is capable of delivering certain social and economic benefits, it 
is based upon a set of discourses that act to limit both the scope of debate and the 
resulting goals and aims of information policy initiatives.  In other words, 
constructing the debate in a narrow and deterministic manner can only result in a 
narrowly conceived set of policy solutions which cannot hope to achieve the various 
social and cultural benefits suggested by the technological potential of the new 
technologies.  Paradoxically, it is this wider-ranging set of social and economic 
benefits that is driving the debate forward, giving it urgency and becoming part of the 
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political rhetoric that is used to justify policy changes while, at the same time, the 
political discourse effectively precludes their realisation. 
 
The discourse of technological determinism is continually sustained within the orders 
of discourse that have been established in government.  Rojo and Van Dijk argue: 
“The crucial element in most forms of social and political legitimation is that a 
powerful group or institution…seeks normative approval for its policies or 
actions…In such legitimating discourse, institutional actions and policies are 
typically described as beneficial for the group or society as a whole” (Rojo & 
Van Dijk, 1997:528). 
 
The core elements of the discursive order upon which the hegemony of government 
rests is linked to the establishment of the ‘information-poor’ as an object of legitimate 
intervention, and on the construction and normalisation of the ‘information-poor’ as 
subjects.  Government establishes its ICTs for development approach as pragmatic, 
inevitable and non-ideological, and sets up a direct link between government and the 
problem of ‘information poverty’, thereby silencing detractors and replicating the 
legitimacy of the construction, normalisation and integration of the poor within 
government’s ICT, poverty and development framework.  Further, ICTs are 
neutralised and are regarded as a natural and inevitable extension of international 
market capitalism into the rural arena.  Neutralised like this, ICTs do not threaten but 
actually strengthen and vindicate government’s neo-liberal economic development 
paradigm.   
 
Government’s discourse is characterised by an unproblematic treatment of the role of 
ICTs in development.  There is also evidence of the replication of government’s 
subjugation of technology as instrument of technocratic developmentalism.  The  non-
problematic linking of ICTs to opportunity is manifested in a top-down, technology-
push approach.  The poor are represented as passive ‘information recipients’.  This is 
an example of a masking device, where: 
“the cumulative effect of the transformations is that the direct commander-
commanded relationship has been changed into a relationship wherein the 
commander plays the role of an information giver and the commanded is 
assigned the role of an information receiver” (Ng & Bradac, 1993:163). 
 
Government has defined the problem, viz. ‘information poverty’ in disadvantaged 
rural areas and townships, and the means to address it, viz. community telecentres.  
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The poor are represented as passive and disempowered.  The poor are perceived as 
having ‘needs’ and ‘problems’ but few choices and no freedom to act.  A paternalistic 
attitude toward the poor is discernible.  ICTs for development function as a regime of 
representation.  This regime of technological progress is a quintessential aspect of 
modernity and it is reflected in an objectivist and empiricist stand. 
 
As a result of the power ICTs have gained in government policy-making, a particular 
discourse has been generated which functions in a self-perpetuating fashion, leaving 
no space for critique.  This discourse then goes on to feed the power from which it 
derives its existence.  ICTs are seen as important, powerful and all-pervasive within 
the development agenda.  The wellspring of government support for ICTs is a clear 
indication of the ways in which its role is perceived within the development agenda.  
Government has provided a rationale which extols the virtues of the specific 
characteristics of these technologies making them worthy of investment.  Chief 
among them are that ICTs provide ways in which the marginalised can be integrated 
and that they empower poor people as individuals and as communities.  This resonates 
with Foucault’s analysis of “a new ‘economy’ of power, that is to say, procedures 
which allowed the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, 
uninterrupted, adapted and ‘individualised’ throughout the entire social body” 
(Foucault, 1980:19).  In this sense ICTs not only wield power in themselves, but also 
become exemplary vehicles for the exercise of power within larger structures.  Their 
inherent virtues then become the very ways in which the pervasive aspect of the 
exercise of power is accentuated and operationalised. 
 
With the lure of markets coming into play, commercial organisations too have 
become deeply implicated in the world of agenda setting.  This has resulted in the 
formation of a deep link between the interests of the state and industry.  With the 
image of individual, commercial and government well-being all coming together in 
this way, the idea that everyone benefits is invoked.  The idea is that the ‘information 
revolution’ is inclusive, in the sense that the marginalised and the disadvantaged can 
gain from the possibility of fundamental technological change. For those who wield 
power are not threatened, the status quo remains undisturbed.  In other words, nothing 
changes and the premise “that one can perfectly well conceive of revolutions which 
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leave essentially untouched the power relations which form the basis of the 
functioning of the state” (Foucault, 1980:123) is confirmed. 
 
The knowledge produced remains knowledge defined by government.  To say that 
lack of knowledge and information is the main reason for poverty and 
underdevelopment is an easy way to exclude from the discussion the social, political 
and economic causes of poverty.  This strategy is based on a predetermined definition 
of knowledge which is produced by and for existing power structures, through the 
elites, with the pretence that it is universally applicable.  In practice, all it does is 
further its own cause, while at the same time detracting from issues that are clearly 
more fundamental to the problems of poverty and injustice.  The combined effect of 
unequal social structures and exclusivist state policy effectively prevents the very 
people whom ICTs are meant to serve from being a part of the discourse that is built 
around them.  The authors of the discourse remain the elites, who act as guardians of 
the ‘information society’ ideal. 
 
This strategy effectively shrinks the emancipatory space into a single dominant form.  
As an emancipatory vocabulary, the ICT, poverty and development discourse offers 
answers rather than raises questions.  The exaggerated claims of ICTs contributing 
substantially to create the ‘information society’ ignores the single most important 
reason behind poverty: people are not poor because they are ignorant, but because 
they are trapped in social structures which are unjust, politically, socially and 
economically.  Standardised solutions cannot be effective and emphasising a single 
approach for resolving problems which are deeply embedded within the social fabric 
is not going to achieve much success.  This is especially true if ICTs are seen as the 
solution; then the ‘problems’ must be defined in such a way as to suit those 
‘solutions’ to prove this belief.  The pre-existing solution is then imposed on poor 
communities irrespective of what the real needs and problems of the poor are.  Such 
an approach is not only short-sighted, but it ignores the fact that most problems exist 
in a local context and a ‘one size fits all’ solution is a very limited way of attempting 
to resolve them.  It promotes emancipation by propagating an unbearably normative, 
earnest and ultimately arrogant mode of thinking and speaking about what is good for 
poor people. 
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The ‘information society’ paradigm invokes the sense of the ethic of information, one 
that predetermines the world.  Tucker explains: 
“It is a process whereby the lives of [poor] people, their plans, their hopes, 
their imaginations, are shaped by others who frequently share neither their 
lifestyles, nor their hopes nor their values.  The real nature of this process is 
disguised by a discourse that portrays [ICTs for] development as a necessary 
and desirable process, as human destiny itself” (Tucker, 1999:1). 
 
ICTs are not a natural process, although they have been accorded such a status in 
government discourse.  Regarded as natural, ICT is accepted without question 
because it bears its own legitimisation.  The ‘information society’ is not a trans-
cultural concept that can claim universal validity.  It is, rather, a set of practices, 
beliefs and myths that have been woven into the fabric of Western culture and is 
specific to it.  Such shared beliefs play an important role in mobilising government 
resources and energies for social reproduction and in legitimising the actions of the 
believers.  Development is conceived of as economic growth and industrial 
development, which resonates strongly with modernisation theory.  The instrumental 
rationality of ‘progress’ provides the motivation and legitimisation for transforming 
poor communities in the name of ‘development’.  The central issue here is control 
over the destinies of poor communities through state structures of power and 
ideology. 
 
6.3 Critical Assessment 
It is difficult to see how government will be able to make good on its promise of 
diffusing ICTs to disadvantaged communities, given its continued implementation of 
neo-liberal economic policies.  Government’s failure to pursue an agenda of 
redistribution and economic justice (see Section 6.1.1) brings into question its 
commitment to a pro-poor ICT policy agenda.  For example, in examining the SAITIS 
(2000a, b) document as well as the DTI’s (2001, 2002) industrial strategy, we argue 
that, while the ICT sector development framework may contribute to continued 
economic growth in ICT industries, it pays little attention to the potentially negative 
impacts of ICTs on labour-intensive industry sectors and provides little guidance on 
how to help mitigate the negative impacts of these technologies.   
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Government emphasises economic growth and the deployment of prefigured 
technologies over issues of equity, social development and the need for a broader 
conception of the potential of ICTs.  The rhetoric is consistent with a focus on the 
‘knowledge economy’ in which hardware, software and human capital become 
replacements for raw materials and for certain kinds of workers.  The rhetoric 
privileges the ‘new’ economy and implies that policy should focus mainly on how the 
workforce can acquire new capabilities for managing electronic businesses, since the 
prospects for economic growth depend on reaping benefits from the organisation of 
commerce around networks .  Unless these shortcomings are addressed, national ICT 
policy in South Africa seems likely to further contribute to the disruption of existing 
employment opportunities while contributing to growing inequality. 
 
The concept of the ‘information society’ has been accepted on faith and is regarded as 
a ‘natural’ evolution.  Further, South African government policy regarding the 
‘information society’ is very unclear as to precisely what this conception will entail, 
how it will be implemented and what the real effects might be.  A careful reading of 
the various policy and discussion documents relevant to ICT, poverty and 
development in South Africa (see Appendix 2) reveals the lack of clear 
implementation plans, specific budgets and detailed cost-benefit analyses that extend 
beyond infrastructure provision and telecom market functioning.    
 
Moreover, there is clear evidence of technological determinism, which is steeped in a 
modernisation discourse arranged around political rhetoric and informed by a 
discursive power which rests on the universalisation of a particular, interpreted, 
theorised and valorised regional (i.e. Western)  experience.  The imposition of policy 
legitimacy in terms of linking formalised systems of ideas with a recognised 
interpretation of a dominant Western experience formed within relations of power is 
set down in a hegemonic tradition (pace Gramsci, 1971) and widely accepted as 
proven and universally applicable.   The South African government’s ‘information 
society’ project,  which is phrased in universalistic value formats to marshal broad 
patterns of consent, constitutes an archetypical hegemonic ideological formation.  
There is also a clearly evident fixation on the concept of the ‘digital divide’ in 
government circles.  The fact that the so-called ‘digital divide’ in South Africa is, to a 
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large extent, an outcome and ongoing process of the broader ‘development divide’ is 
ignored.   
 
By and large what emerges from a reading of government’s ICT policy documents is 
a very optimistic view of the benefits to be harnessed from ICTs for poverty 
alleviation in South Africa.77  This is surprising, given the recency of ICT 
developments and the paucity of solid empirical investigation of trends and impacts to 
date.  Very little attention is paid to the costs, risks and constraints that ICT diffusion 
is likely to entail.    The fact that the poor face multiple barriers both to Internet 
utilisation and to benefiting from that utilisation, since they have little to spend on 
communication; live in areas where the Internet is costly and complex to provide; 
have low rates of education and speak languages that are not very well represented on 
the World Wide Web, tends to be played down in policy debates.  At best, this 
selective reading of ICTs for development oversimplifies a complex reality; at worst it 
is likely to result in wasted resources, poorly thought-out projects and false 
expectations.   
 
Policy-makers have stressed that ICTs, by their own dynamic, that is, more or less 
automatically, will generate gains for the poor.  Technologically deterministic and 
optimistic market-led scenarios have tended to dominate.  This is problematic, 
because the reality is that computer networks are deeply embedded in pre-existing 
relationships, with social structures of the real world inscribed in online networks of 
the virtual world (Slack & Williams, 2000; Rantanen, 2001).  Further, a poorly 
informed ICT discourse has given rise to a policy rationale suffering from short-
sightedness and accommodation of market and ‘global’ imperatives.  Such policy in 
effect abdicates decision-making and delegates it to the ‘automatic pilot’ of market 
forces.  To achieve a balanced transition to the conditions of the techno-economic 
paradigm a strong and responsible policy agent is required.  Carefully researched ICT 
prospects and measured steps of a socially accountable policy approach should focus 
on a coherent pro-poor agenda apropos ICTs and development. 
 
                                                          
77 Government sees an array of positive developments emerging from the ‘information society’, with 
increased productivity and better quality employment, decentralised and increased access to political 
decision-making and potential for e-government and e-commerce to improve the lives of the poor. 
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What can be done to influence the direction of government’s ‘information society’ 
project to ensure the development of more just and equitable access to ICTs?  
Strategic issues to consider for ICTs to be pro-poor include inter alia: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ICT policies – currently biased against poor and vulnerable groups in society.  
There is a need for ICT policies specifically targeted at the poor, especially the 
poorest of the poor; 
System design – must consider language, cultural and socio-economic issues, and 
conduct participatory needs assessments to ensure relevant information systems 
and content, as well as most appropriate technologies; 
Capacity building – need to build capacity at all levels;   
Applications – current applications are of limited value to the disempowered and 
marginalised.  There is a need to provide access to information and resources that 
the poor need which should be informed by regular information needs 
assessments.  Moreover, encourage local ownership of content and elicit feedback 
to ensure relevant content; 
Research – prudent understanding of the potential of ICTs for development 
informed by rigorous, independent monitoring, evaluation and documentation in 
order to develop models of best practice. 
 
Government has avoided unpacking the ‘principles, values and norms’ of the 
‘information society’ regime.  Questions that need to be confronted include: 
 
What stakeholder interests will be represented? 
What will be the rules of the ‘information society’ and how will they be decided 
upon and enforced? 
Which societal interests will win and which will lose in the ‘information society’? 
 
The extent to which ICTs will affect the quality of life of the poorest and most 
vulnerable communities and individual actors will depend on a careful consideration 
of factors such as: 
 
High telecommunication costs in rural areas, particularly fixed-line applications; 
Lack of local content and the language barrier; 
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• 
• 
                                                          
High rates of illiteracy in rural areas; and 
Gender bias – new technologies are often seen as men’s exclusive domain. 
 
Finally, a major task of government is to adopt: (i) a more systemic and consistent 
approach across different, traditionally disparate areas of policy-making; (ii) an 
explicit, strategic national vision and understanding of ICT, poverty and development; 
(iii) the institutional means to strategically co-ordinate the implementation of such a 
vision; and (iv) the institutional means to effectively monitor, assess and review ICT, 
poverty and development policy processes.  In order for the vision to be translated 
into reality, government must upgrade and integrate internal, back-office IT 
capabilities (processing, management, mining and warehousing of data), and 
systematically integrate them with front-office systems, to enable integrated service 
delivery, and the monitoring and reporting of progress in real-time (Cloete, 2003a, b). 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
‘Information poverty’ is a process of discursive homogenisation of the poor.  The 
information ‘have-nots’ are perceived as an underdeveloped subjectivity endowed 
with features such as powerlessness, passivity, poverty and ignorance as if waiting for 
government to rescue them with technology.  This image universalises and 
homogenises poor communities in an ahistorical fashion.  It exists as a sign of power 
over the poor rather than a truth about them. This entails specific constructions of the 
‘information-poor’ subject in ways that allow government to exercise power over it.  
For example, government has created a space for ‘information-poor’ subjects in the 
form of community telecentres, which government regulates through systems of 
power. 
 
As Wajcman (2002:348) argues, “governments everywhere legitimate much of their 
policy in terms of a technological imperative”.  Rhetoric and discourse about the 
‘information society’ and the ‘digital divide’ reinforce and frame these very 
arguments.  Common buzzwords such as the ‘information-poor’ and the ‘information-
rich’, the ‘digital divide’78 and the ‘information society’ pervade government’s 
78 As mentioned in previous sections of this study (see, for example, Chapter 4), the ‘digital divide’ is 
not an independent phenomenon, but an integral part of the structure of inequality at all levels: 
international, regional, national and local.  The ‘digital divide’ tends to reproduce the basic elements of 
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discourse.  Endless such repetitions of the same visions, the same possibilities, the 
same projected hopes and the same fears across all the constitutive elements of the 
discourse reveal the paucity of critical insight.  The South African government suffers 
from an undeveloped understanding of the complex relationship between ICT, 
poverty and development.  Government needs to think critically about the social 
implications of ICTs.  An understanding of both their risks and their benefits is 
essential.  Further, there seems to be a conflation of the terms information and 
knowledge.79   
 
ICTs will have an effect only to the extent to which the development strategy is 
effective.  If the underlying poverty alleviation strategy is faulty, then ICTs are 
unlikely to have any impact.  If the interviewees' concerns about the exclusion of the 
poor from the ‘information society’ are to be dispelled, then government needs to 
better understand the relationship between technology and development.  The focus 
for government should not be with the technology itself, but should begin with the 
development strategy.  Only when the poverty-reduction strategy is fully articulated 
should ICTs be used to support its implementation.  The role of ICTs as a powerful 
tool to fight poverty is, at best, a working hypothesis.  Yet, over the last nine years it 
has virtually become part of ‘received wisdom’ and ‘conventional thinking’ in 
government circles. 
 
Contra the South African government, the key to integrating ICTs in the fight against 
poverty, then, is not to begin with ICTs, nor to posit them as an essential need.  Rather 
it is to determine the impediments to poverty alleviation and to reducing inequality in 
society and, thereafter, to ascertain the information, communication and knowledge 
components of these impediments.  In the light of this, the task is to: (i) assess, on the 
basis of global experience, how ICTs, broadly deployed and properly adapted, could 
help address these impediments; and (ii) to develop and implement a strategy for 
encouraging and supporting the deployment of ICTs, in support of, and subordinate 
to, a national poverty-reduction strategy. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the structure of inequality along the lines of traditional patterns of socio-economic stratification.  The 
gap in access to and use of ICTs often follows and reinforces existing inequality and poverty patterns. 
79 Information becomes knowledge when it has been processed and understood by the recipient in a 
way that is useful and it is adapted to the existing knowledge base. 
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Government has a great deal of faith in ICTs, which it believes will amplify material 
progress.  There is a pervading sense in government that the impact of the new ICTs 
will be positive and that the technology itself is the cause of that impact.  Sweeping 
statements are made about the opportunities that ICTs bring for poverty alleviation, 
reflecting a powerful belief in the transformative power of ICTs.  Government has 
turned the Internet into an icon of modern development and ICTs are associated with 
largely positive impacts.  ICTs are strongly associated with modernisation and 
Western rationalism, and are part of a technically-rational and technologically-
determinist agenda that focuses on the ‘digital divide’ and the ‘information society’.  
Government’s emphasis on ICTs as a tool of development could benefit from greater 
focus and discipline, particularly by focusing more concretely on how ICTs, and their 
effective spread and use, could advance the super-ordinate goal of reducing poverty 
and inequality in society.   
 
The next chapter, Chapter 7, will seek to move away from the “heroic scenarios” and 
“intoxicating visions” (Bellamy & Taylor, 1998:170) characterising much of the 
government’s (as well as the wider international development community’s) discourse 
on ICTs for development, and will attempt to re-conceptualise the complex and multi-
layered relationship between ICT, poverty and development. 
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Chapter 7 
Guidelines for Rethinking ICT, Poverty and Development, 
and for Formulating Pro-Poor ICT Policies 
 
7.1 A Strategy for Rethinking ICT, Poverty and Development 
7.1.1 The Social Shaping of Technology 
The idea that technology, specifically ICTs, is the most important cause of social 
change permeates the analysis of the ‘information society’ advocates.  Castells 
(1996), for example, explicitly builds on theories of post-industrialism (Bell, 1973; 
Touraine, 1971), moving beyond a teleological model and giving the analysis a global 
reach.  However, while he explicitly attempts to distance himself from technological 
determinism, he does not entirely succeed (see Chapter 3).  The result is a rather 
reductionist view of the role of technology in society. 
 
Similarly, technologically determinist understandings of the economy and society 
play an increasingly important role in political discourse in South Africa (see Chapter 
6).  The South African government tends to legitimate much of its ICT policy in terms 
of a ‘rational’ technological imperative.  Simple technological fixes are sought for 
complex social problems.  Rhetoric about the ‘digital divide’ serves to camouflage 
pre-existing patterns of social and class inequality.  This study suggests that most 
interpretations of the causes and consequences of the ‘digital divide’ are inadequate.  
Correspondingly, the appropriate actions to alleviate the manifestations of this 
‘divide’ remains to be identified.  Since its initial use in the US to describe uneven 
access to advanced ICTs, and particularly to the Internet (US Department of 
Commerce, 1995), the ‘digital divide’ has become a rhetorical device for: (i) focusing 
policy discussion on how disparities in access to the new ICTs between and within 
countries can be overcome; and (ii) mobilising financial and other resources in an 
effort to remove barriers to wider adoption of the new ICTs.   
 
Much government discourse invokes new ICTs as an autonomous and largely 
unassailable force.  In this process technocratic discourse, globalisation and free 
market economics coalesce into an extremely powerful ideological force.  The view 
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of technology as an external, autonomous force exerting an influence on society 
narrows the possibilities for democratic engagement with ICTs.  It presents a limited 
set of options: (i) uncritical embracing of technological change or (ii) defensive 
adaptation to it. 
 
ICTs are a socio-technical product, patterned by the conditions of their creation and 
use.  A technological system is never merely technical: its real-world functioning has 
technical, economic, organisational, political and even cultural elements.  The idea of 
‘interpretative flexibility’ captures the malleable character of ICTs (Pinch & Bijker, 
1987).  Interpretative flexibility refers to the way in which different groups of people 
involved with a technology can have different understandings of that technology, 
including different understandings of its technical characteristics.  It emphasises that 
there is nothing inevitable about the ways technologies evolve.  Rather, technological 
change is a thoroughly contingent and heterogeneous process. 
 
If we are to attempt a more objective, detached analysis of ICT, poverty and 
development, then it would seem appropriate to move beyond the linear ‘cause and 
effect’ model of technological determinism and explore alternative perspectives on 
society and technology.  There is clearly a pressing need to move beyond the 
limitations of previous analyses if we are to gain a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between ICTs and poverty reduction.  It is worth reconsidering 
Qvortrup’s (1984:7) argument that ICTs “cannot be properly understood if we persist 
in treating technology and society as two independent entities”.  This perspective 
strongly suggests that we move beyond the view that ICTs as a technology is 
independent of society in either their cause or effect.   
 
7.1.2 Development Theory Revisited 
7.1.2.1 Modernisation Theory 
The ICT, poverty and development agenda has been set in the North by international 
donor agencies and multilateral organisations, and has subsequently been carried out 
in the South (World Bank, 1999; DOT Force, 2001).  The ICTs for development 
discourse is teleological in that it views development as uniform, proceeding in stages 
to a common end.  The oft-cited statement by Karl Marx (1963:1718): “The country 
that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its 
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own future”, remains the central thesis of modernisation theory.  Modernisation can 
be seen as a grand-scale social engineering project in the Third World (Corbridge, 
1995; Banuri, 1990a, b).  The central claim of modernisation theory is that 
modernisation is a universal event (Parsons, 1964).  The concept of modernisation is 
rooted in the numerous sets of dichotomies between tradition and modernity well 
known to social science since the 19th century (Feldman & Moore, 1962; Black, 
1966).   
 
The reason why modernisation is regarded as a global event lies in the artefacts of 
modern culture, i.e. mass media.  As Lerner (1958) argues, mass media have 
penetrated every region of the globe and carried the values of modernity and the 
demand for their implementation and outcomes.  Horowitz (1977:4) summarises this 
position: “The motor force in this transition is the infusion or injection of highly 
sophisticated mechanisms of communication, transportation, and information”.  
Eisenstadt (1964:378) states emphatically that modernisation will “open up new 
possibilities for development and creativity – for technological development” in the 
Third World.   
 
The universality and causal chain of modernisation are flawed.  First, modernisation 
research is based not upon knowledge of the Third World, but rather upon attempts to 
make sweeping generalisations from the European experience, more specifically the 
US experience.  The problem is that social change within Third World countries may 
not resemble either the process or end product of economic growth and cultural 
change of the highly industrialised countries of the North (Horowitz, 1977:5).  
Further, modernisation theory deflects attention away from the problems of poverty 
and massive inequities resulting from unequal power relations between the North and 
the South. 
 
Despite the criticisms levelled against modernisation theory, there remains a strong 
view in the South African government’s ICT, poverty and development discourse that 
only through industrialisation and technological progress can South Africa achieve 
overall modernisation; that capital investment is the key ingredient for economic 
growth; that, hence, ability to mobilise ample supplies of capital and the 
entrepreneurship to deploy it are the primary societal constraints to be overcome.  
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This effectively reduces development to growth in per capita income or consumption.  
Thus, there is a discernible bias towards ‘ICTs for economic growth’ in government 
policy documents (DTI, 2000, 2001), a variation on the widespread belief among neo-
liberal economists that growth will ‘trickle down’ to everyone, without any particular 
need to consciously redistribute benefits. 
 
South African state-led interventions attribute to ICTs a hegemonic potency that 
elides their ambivalent nature.  The construction of the category of the ‘information 
poor’; what counts as legitimate and valid information and knowledge; and the ideals 
of technical progress, leapfrogging and catch-up to highly industrialised countries (a 
sine qua non of modernisation theory) are clearly evident in the South African 
government’s discourse on ICTs, development and poverty alleviation (see Chapter 
6).  Unproblematised assumptions of technological determinism and a view of 
technology as an apolitical, neutral tool for development underlie government’s ICT, 
poverty and development discourse.  These assumptions render the poor passive in the 
ICTs for development discourse, thus constraining the potential for ICTs to be used to 
challenge structures of poverty and inequality.  The assumption is that ICTs for 
development is a self-evident process.  Another distinctive feature of the South 
African experience is the unquestioning acceptance of the notion of an ‘information 
society’ by government.   The ‘information society’ is an evocative but poorly defined 
concept.  The term lacks an established definition and is thrown around loosely in 
government circles.  The ‘information society’ thesis remains a conceptually weak 
basis for Third World scholars striving to develop a deep understanding of technology 
and society.   
 
The South African government is particularly concerned with a ‘digital divide’ 
between the information haves and information have-nots.  What this means is that 
access to digital technologies such as the Internet implies use and determines who is 
information rich and who is information poor.  To distinguish between the 
‘information rich’ and ‘information poor’, at any rate, is too crude an analysis as it 
avoids a precise delineation of who these are and fails to consider the range of 
different positions.  Based on the preceding discussion, it would appear that the South 
African government’s ICT, poverty and development discourse remains trapped 
within the straightjacket of Eurocentric, modernist thinking that reinforces an 
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‘othering’ discourse (vide Said, 1995; Gellner, 1992; Appadurai, 1996; Clifford, 
1997). 
 
7.1.2.2 The Post-Structuralist Critique 
Mainstream notions of development, with genealogical ties to both Orientalism (Said, 
1995) and Occidentalism80 (Coronil, 1997:14), are becoming increasingly untenable.  
In recent years we have witnessed a minor tidal wave of books and articles that have 
cast aspersions on the concept and practice of ‘development’ (Sachs, 1992; Rahnema 
& Bawtree, 1997; Esteva, 1992; Shiva, 1991).  Development is viewed as an 
extension of colonialism, backed by an institutional apparatus nearly as hegemonic as 
colonialism in its control of resources, and perhaps more so in its control of 
imaginations.  According to the post-structuralist critiques of development, ideas such 
as ‘progress’, ‘growth’, ‘poverty’ and ‘underdevelopment’, which now possess a 
normative and taken-for-granted salience in popular consciousness as goals worthy of 
engagement through targeted policy interventions, are artefacts of a discourse of 
development that has imposed its normalising and teleological vision on the world.  
Discourse is understood, pace Foucault (1980), as an ensemble of social institutions, 
semiotic categories and practices that regulate the realms of thought, subjectivity and 
action.  It is a continuous process of demarcating what is possible and what is not: of 
positing the sense of limits that constitute social reality.  But discourse is 
simultaneously a mode of productive, as opposed to merely repressive, power.81   
 
It is the position of this study that, while the general critique of development 
presented by post-development theorists is valid in many respects, their 
understandings of development processes are not particularly nuanced.  Escobar 
(1995a), for example, errs in assuming that development is a uniform and largely 
monolithic process.  Many scholars have criticised post-development theorists for 
their: (i) general lack of concern about spatial and semantic disjunctures in processes 
of change; (ii) stilted interpretations of world historical events; (iii) undiscriminating 
                                                          
80 Coronil explains that by Occidentalism he means “the implicit conception of the West animating its 
representation of non-Western societies”; that what is “unique about Occidentalism is that it entails the 
mobilization of stereotypical representations of non-Western societies as part of the West’s self-
fashioning as an imperial power” (Coronil, 1997:14).  In contrast to Orientalism, which is a discourse 
of difference between the West and the Orient (pace Said, 1995), “Occidentalism…was created from 
the beginning as the extension of Europe, not as its otherness” (Mignolo, 2000:106). 
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affirmation of so-called ‘new social movements’; and (iv) stylised representations of 
development, and failure to recognise it as a differentiated, multifaceted and 
ambivalent phenomenon (Schuurman, 1993b; Gardner & Lewis, 1996; Grillo & 
Stirrat, 1997; Simon, 1997; Corbridge, 1998; Edelman, 1999; Blaikie, 2000; Moore, 
2000; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2001).  Despite their intellectual acuity, post-development 
writers often arrive at a surprisingly simplistic conclusion, viz. that to move beyond 
development orthodoxy is to hoist the banner of ‘anti-development’ (Escobar, 
1995a:Chapter 7; Esteva & Prakash, 1998; Rahnema, 1997).  This rejection seems to 
be based on the assumption that ‘development’ is a singular process and it may well 
be another universalism in the guise of difference.   
 
Having said that, the power of the post-development work is the critical gaze it casts 
on Western-led processes of development.  The post-structuralist critique of 
development has highlighted and reminded us of the need for greater self-
consciousness, reflexivity and encouragement of difference and heterogeneity (Slater, 
1997).  Also, it encourages the researcher to challenge conventional practices and 
beliefs which serve to perpetuate inequality and the lack of effective empowerment in 
the name of humanitarian assistance and political ‘feel good’ factors.  Post-
structuralist critiques of development can be progressive provided they “encourage 
new agendas and suggest new ways of doing things” (Blaikie, 2000:1035). 
 
In the hands of the South African government ICTs operate as a powerful discourse, 
which functions both as an ideology and a rhetorical tool.  ICTs have become 
hegemonic as an ideal as well as a set of development practices, which operates to 
exclude alternatives.  National political leaders have imported and implemented 
foreign ICTs for development policies not (only) because they have internalised a 
Western model of development, but because it serves their own neo-liberal interests.  
Constructing the ICTs for development policy debate in a narrow and deterministic 
manner can only result in a narrowly conceived set of policy solutions (see Chapters 
5-6) which cannot hope to achieve the various benefits suggested by the potential of 
the new technologies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
81 It is precisely these limiting and enabling aspects of ‘discourse’ that motivate the author to speak of 
ICT, poverty and development as discourse. 
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Problematising the South African government’s ICT, poverty and development 
discourse should not be seen as a denial of the potential for ICTs to contribute to 
development, but rather it is a critique of the apolitical technological determinism and 
the simplistic modernisation induced idea of technical progress as a linear, ‘stages of 
growth’ development trajectory.  In other words, progress is seen as catching-up to 
Western ideals of an ‘information society’.  Howkins and Valantin encapsulate the 
negative consequences of this model of development: 
“By adopting an uncritical approach most countries gain access at the expense 
of substance.  They can buy other countries’ information, but they cannot 
generate their own.  They fail to make the connection between information 
and development.  They receive information and they expect to receive 
development, without working to make development in their own image” 
(Howkins & Valantin, 1997:8). 
 
Government’s ICT, poverty and development discourse does not sufficiently 
accommodate the realities and voices of those affected by its ICT policies (Chambers, 
1992; Pretty, 1995; Reason, 1994).  It reflects a positivistic82 belief that technology 
can provide a solution to what are distinctly social problems.  When government 
defines the problem of isolated, rural communities as ‘information poverty’ without 
first considering the needs and wishes of the communities targeted, then state 
intervention can have negative repercussions.  The South African government has, for 
example, made very little effort to adapt its community informatics projects to the 
local environment.  As such, the community telecentres often do not link with local 
information patterns, are not geared to meeting local needs and are not widely 
accessible. 
 
7.1.3 Towards a Re-Conceptualisation of ICTs for Poverty Alleviation 
ICTs for development has been a deeply ambivalent process in the Third World.  In 
some instances ICTs for development may carry the promise of transforming 
communities in liberatory ways, while in other cases, it may tighten the noose of 
existing ‘unfreedoms’ or oppression.  In order to tackle issues of poverty, inequality 
and deprivation, a more nuanced understanding of ICT, poverty and development is 
                                                          
82 Positivism sees reality as existing independent of its observer and as directly accessible: observable 
in a neutral, non-influencing and theory-independent manner (Chalmers, 1982).  According to 
Constructivism, however, the world does not exist, or cannot be shown to exist, independently of our 
experience.  There is no reality, but realities as multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and 
experientially based, local and specific in nature (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Chalmers, 1982). 
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required, one that allows us to expose and contest capricious and disempowering 
forms of development, and imagine alternative strategies.  There is, therefore, a 
pressing need to revise and re-imagine the relationship between ICT, poverty and 
development.  The objective is: (i) to stress its multiple accents; (ii) to move away 
from an ICT, poverty and development discourse that presents itself as a detached 
centre of rationality and intelligence (Mitchell, 1995); and (iii) not to succumb to the 
epistemological universalism of the techno-optimists. 
 
This study recognises that the ICT, poverty and development discourse is not a 
monolithic discourse with uniform effects.  Nonetheless, there is an orthodox83 
conception of ICTs for poverty reduction which is pervasive in mainstream 
development interventions and promoted by donor agencies such as USAID, the 
World Bank, etc. as well as national governments such as South Africa’s.  The 
orthodox ICT, poverty and development discourse is rooted in modernisation theory 
and has tended to regard social life as a technical problem.  The challenge for 
progressive scholars is to move away from the ‘Westernisation as modernisation’ 
ICT, poverty and development discourse and its operations as a power-knowledge 
complex and to engage with the question of how to ensure inclusion of the poor in the 
ICTs for development project that is not just another source of domination and 
marginalisation. 
 
It is the position of this study that ICTs for development is neither unambiguously 
‘good’ (a positive signifier), nor is it unambiguously ‘bad’ (a negative signifier), or 
that it is always a process of acquiescence for people who encounter it.  Hence, 
Frissen (1992) characterises ICT as being an intrinsically ‘ambiguous’ technology.  
By this he means that ICTs simultaneously represent opportunities, challenges and 
risks.  For this reason, Bellamy and Taylor (1998:32) argue that “taking polarized 
positions on the impact of ICTs is misguided” as it blocks more complex analysis of 
the opportunities and problems associated with specific technologies.  Rather, ICTs 
for development is always anchored in a particular social, political and economic 
context and its evaluation is, therefore, inseparable from the freedoms it either enables 
                                                          
83 Bourdieu (1977:164) contrasts ‘doxa’ (a state of unquestioning acceptance of social facts) to 
‘orthodoxy’ (a state of imposed ideological uniformity) and ‘heterodoxy’ (a state of ideological 
pluralism and competing possibilities).  
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or curtails.  Further, ICTs for development can, and should be, principally understood 
as enhancing human capabilities (or freedoms) (Sen, 1981, 1999) within specific 
time-space contexts. 
 
Amartya Sen (1999), the Indian Nobel Prize-winning economist, programmatically 
defines development as ‘freedom’ to achieve capabilities and functionings where the 
former signifies the capacities of people to do or be those “important or valuable 
things…that are central to evaluating their lives” (Glover, 1995:122).  These 
alternative concepts for assessing well-being are meant to take us beyond instrumental 
reason, which subordinates means to an end, and the shallow utilitarianism that 
sometimes accompanies it in ICT, poverty and development policy-making, and 
which grants primacy to aggregate welfare over individual outcomes.  The dual 
notions of capabilities and functionings re-group our attention as scholars on: (i) the 
attainment of qualities of life by particular individuals and groups; (ii) rather than 
aggregate benefit, i.e. cost ratios of amorphous populations or average consumption 
growth (assessed through quantities of commodities).  In short, the idea of 
development as freedom foregrounds ethics and, implicitly, the geography of 
development: it asks, how do ICT, poverty and development projects enable or 
compromise the ability of individuals to attain ways of being that are deemed 
important by them in their socio-spatial contexts? 
 
Sen’s recasting of development does have the merit of highlighting the livelihood 
concerns of poor people in a manner that income- or entitlement-based approaches, 
which focus on levels of consumption of commodities or goods, do not (Nussbaum, 
1995; Sen, 1999).  In terms of policy, it suggests that the most effective way to 
resolve social inequities is not necessarily through the transfer of goods and resources 
(a redistributive exercise), but rather through transformations that expand freedom of 
choice or opportunities, i.e. through empowerment.84  Following Sen (1999), the 
nature of development interventions is best measured through their impact on the 
capabilities and functionings of various groups.  Like any normative framework, 
Sen’s (1999) contains some unanswered questions, viz.: 
 
                                                          
84 Empowerment is often about raising the capacities of poor people to confront inequality and 
discrimination at local and national levels. 
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• 
• 
• 
How could an expansion in one person’s freedom of choice affect another 
person’s capability to achieve their functionings? 
How should we evaluate trade-offs between one sort of functioning and another; 
after all, we cannot have it all? 
What are the proper limits to freedom?  For example, does the freedom to own 
property then not also require some constraints on that freedom so that we do not 
generate some of the same inequities that we are against? 
 
Given Sen’s (1999) allegiance to humanistic liberalism, his idea of development as 
freedom is also open to the larger critique of liberal political theory articulated by 
scholars like Wolin (1989) and Brown (1995).  Finally, there is the very perceptive 
point that Kabeer (1999) makes, namely that freedom requires prior identification of 
needs, interests and possibilities, and that these are not always self-evident because of 
the (to use  Bourdieu’s [1977:164] word)  doxic character of social reality.  In short, 
appreciation of one’s agency and apprehension of available opportunities are always 
recursively, or dialectically, linked.  Despite these lingering problems, Sen’s (1999) 
broad notion of development as freedom, which draws attention to such disparate but 
crucial issues as equity, dignity, living standards and human rights, is persuasive in its 
appeal. 
 
Such a re-conceptualisation of ICT, poverty and development involves: (i) ‘putting 
people first’ and expanding choices for the poor and the vulnerable, as well as 
improving their level of well-being; and (ii) focusing on the formation of human 
capabilities such as improved health and the capability to meet basic human needs, 
and the use that people living in poverty make of their acquired capabilities.  Such a 
reflexive understanding of ICTs for development entails a recognition of the deep 
fault lines that divide South African society between rich and poor (see Section 6.1.1). 
 
The South African government’s ICT, poverty and development discourse is framed 
in a rigid modernisation schema informed by an over-optimistic understanding of the 
power and valence of ICTs for development.  However, dealing with the problems of 
chronic poverty and structural inequality requires a fundamental reversal of the 
balance of power and the directionality of decision-making.  Throwing technology at 
the ills of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment is unlikely to have the desired impact.  
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What is needed is a structural analysis of power and exploitation in their various 
forms.  Government has made an unwarranted leap from correlation to a causal 
explanation, i.e. ICTs cause or result in development.   ICTs in and of themselves are 
neither good nor bad - the outcomes are contingent on how the ICTs are used.  The 
aim is to develop a deeper and more balanced understanding of the relationship 
between ICTs and development, and to be critical of and to deconstruct the elements 
of the ‘information society’ and technologically deterministic interpretations of ICTs 
for development. 
 
Contrary to the South African government and the development establishment, access 
to ICTs should not be seen as an end in itself.  The measure of success should be 
progress towards combating poverty rather than the spread of technology or bridging 
the ‘digital divide’.85  By focusing on the ‘digital divide’ that needs to be bridged, the 
South African government has oversimplified the long-standing and complex 
challenges of addressing the root causes of poverty.  The ‘digital divide’ is a symptom 
of much more profound and long-standing economic and social divisions within and 
between societies.  Efforts to increase access to ICTs, unless clearly rooted in, and 
subordinate to, a broader strategy to combat poverty and reduce inequality, risk 
diverting attention and resources from addressing the underlying causes of poverty 
and inequality. 
 
The concept of a ‘digital divide’ separating those with access to computers and 
communications technology from those without is simplistic and can lead to well-
meaning but incomplete attempts at a solution based on merely adding technology to 
a given circumstance.  The problem with the concept of the ‘digital divide’ is that it 
tends to connote digital (i.e. computers and telecommunications) solutions without 
due consideration of the context into which the hardware would be put.  The 
implication is that a computer, by its mere presence, will generate learning or 
development.  The literature on community technology programmes in both 
developed and developing countries clearly show that well-intentioned ICT for 
development programmes often lead in unexpected directions and the worst failures 
                                                          
85 The spread of technology should not be an objective in itself.  Poverty and inequality are the problem 
in South Africa, not a ‘digital divide’. 
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occur when people attempt to address complex social problems with a narrow focus 
on the provision of equipment (Gurstein, 2000; Warschauer, 2003). 
 
ICTs are not a panacea or a ‘magic bullet’, i.e. they do not by themselves solve 
problems of marginalisation, poverty and inequality.  They are one of a set of 
development tools which have the capacity to make the effect of a well-designed, 
integrated development programme more than the sum of its parts.  An important 
caveat is that relevant information might not of itself be sufficient, and that ICTs can 
be used as tools to exert power over others and perpetuate inequality.  Hence, 
improving information flows and communication services is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to ameliorate conditions of poverty.  Therefore, addressing the 
information and communication needs of the poor must form one component of a 
wider strategy to tackle poverty.  This challenge is an integral part of the broader 
challenge of fostering participatory and sustainable approaches to development. 
 
This study argues for a more critical and reflexive discourse, and an empirically 
grounded understanding of problems in view of their situation-specificity and 
complexity.  Such an understanding needs to incorporate temporal, spatial and 
perceptive contexts (Chambers, Pacey & Thrupp, 1989; Giddens, 1984; Burns, 
Baumgartner & DeVille, 1985).  Important questions to be guided by include: 
 
• 
• 
• 
Which problems are addressed, how and by whom? 
To what extent are there barriers to open participation in the discourse?   
And if so, who is excluding whom and on what grounds? 
 
As ICTs for development aims to explore questions of improvement, one needs to 
recognise that different groups living within an area, as well as within and between 
different levels of state institutions, will have different perceptions of the nature of 
problems, different judgements about how to act on their perceptions and different 
views on what constitutes improvement.  This recognition requires the ability to 
accommodate the involvement and views of the different groups involved in ICT 
projects, viz.: 
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• 
• 
• 
Those affected by problematic situations and processes; 
Those involved in adapting and altering them; and 
Those interested in addressing them through research. 
 
Each of these groups must be recognised as stakeholders within the ICT, poverty and 
development discourse.   
 
We use the concept ‘social informatics’86 to challenge the technological determinism 
underpinning the standard ICT for development model.  Social informatics argues that 
technology must be considered within a specific context that includes hardware, 
software, support resources, infrastructure, as well as people in various roles and 
relationships with one another and with other elements of the system.  The technology 
and social system continuously shape each other, like a biological community and its 
environment.  Using the analogy of Freire’s (1972) Pedagogy of the Oppressed, a re-
conceptualisation of ICTs for reducing poverty and inequality should be informed by 
a Social Informatics of the Oppressed.  This could be phrased as follows: ICTs can be 
an empowering technology when they are used to support people’s and communities’ 
control of their own development, where they promote dialogue within and between 
communities, and where they reflect information about the community portrayed as 
equals with the wider world.  
                                                          
 
What then is to be done?  It is to this question that we now turn.  Following Archibugi 
and Pietrobelli (2003:1), the extent to which developing countries like South Africa 
benefit from ICTs will depend strongly on the nature of the technology and of the 
development policies and strategies implemented in the country.  The next section 
will discuss, rather than prescribe, policies that can be put in place to maximise the 
pro-poor potential of government’s ICT policies and projects. 
 
86 Social informatics refers to “the body of research that examines the design, uses and consequences of 
information and communication technologies in ways that take into account their interaction with 
institutional and cultural contexts” (Kling, 2000:217).  Some of the key themes include: the importance 
of social contexts and work processes; socio-technical networks; public access to information and 
social infrastructure for computing support. 
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7.2 Guiding Principles for a National Pro-Poor ICT Strategy 
Harnessing the new ICTs for improving the life chances of less-advantaged groups 
and the quality of social relations within society as a whole requires a conscious effort 
on the part of government.  The UNCSTD study (Mansell & Wehn, 1998) suggested 
that developing countries would be in a stronger position to maximise the potential 
benefits of the new technologies if they establish national or regional ICT strategies.  
Mansell and Wehn (1998) pointed out that such strategies must be underpinned by a 
commitment to action if they are to be effective.  There appears to be an emerging 
consensus on the broad steps that need to be taken to maximise the positive impact of 
ICTs (Mansell, Samarajiva & Mahan, 2002; Mansell, 1999).  Specifically: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Demand aggregation to make provision of ICT services in poor communities 
sustainable; 
Policy and regulation reform; 
Investment in education and training; 
The introduction of regulated competition to speed infrastructure roll-out, increase 
services and bandwidth, and reduce costs; and 
ICT for development applications to be pursued in an integrated manner within a 
national policy framework. 
 
While numerous projects abound aimed at using ICTs to address South Africa’s 
development challenges, these projects tend to be small, early stage, limited in scope 
and with insufficient collaboration amongst groups and agencies in an environment 
where integrated projects stand a greater chance of success.  In addition, South 
African ICT policy to date has been influenced by: (i) a strong technology dimension 
with an emphasis on the installation of necessary infrastructure and equipment; and 
(ii) a view which suggests that if the new ICTs are introduced into poor communities 
as rapidly as possible, then economic development and social benefit will 
automatically be achieved.  There is a tendency in government to perceive 
technological innovations as a means of solving development problems where many 
other methods have failed.  The danger inherent in a technical ‘quick fix’ solution is 
that the technology can become the goal of the project.  Such strategies heighten the 
risk that ICTs are introduced into disadvantaged communities as a ‘Trojan Horse’ of 
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technologically driven social and economic transformation which heightens the risks 
that the poor and vulnerable will be marginalised further. 
 
A different approach is required which appreciates the fundamentally subordinate role 
which technology must play within an integrated poverty-alleviation strategy.  There 
is an increasing need, therefore, to focus on the social dimension, as scepticism grows 
about wasted resources, poorly thought-out projects and false expectations.  As 
Mansell states: 
“Far too often very real damage to human welfare continues to occur when 
ICTs are introduced.  This is often attributable to the fact that these 
technologies are promoted as a panacea for social and economic disadvantage.  
Even more often, it is attributable to haphazard implementation which does 
not take into account realistic factors of local conditions and use” (Mansell, 
1999:44). 
 
An international consensus has emerged on the urgent need for developing countries 
to prepare national ICT strategies to provide a framework to govern the allocation of 
resources among different groups of users and sectors and to establish priorities 
(Harfoush & Wild, 1994).  The UNCSTD (Mansell, 1999) study emphasised the need 
for integrated ICT strategies and the importance of co-ordinated action to maximise 
the positive contributions of investment in the technologies and in capability 
development. 
 
Economic and social development involving the diffusion and use of ICTs is highly 
‘path dependent’ (David, 1975, 1985).  Once a particular path of ICT development 
has begun to gather momentum, it can prove very resistant to radical changes in 
direction.  This does not mean that there are no opportunities to shape the trajectory of 
ICT diffusion and use in South Africa.  However, it does mean that the longer 
decision-makers delay the introduction of strategies that affect investment in ICTs, the 
more likely it is that particular designs and architectures of systems and applications 
will become fixed.  This will make it more difficult to tailor ICT products and 
services to the specific needs of the poor.  A failure to take early steps using co-
ordinated ICT strategies also increases the costs of shifting the trajectory of ICT 
development.  In sum, a failure to shape the structure of ICT production and usage 
can severely restrict future policy options. 
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Conceptualising the potential impact of the new ICTs is problematic for a number of 
reasons.  Among them is the recency of these developments and the paucity of solid 
empirical investigation of trends to date.  The difficulty of placing the new 
technologies within the overall process of technological change arises partly from the 
fact that we are still in the midst of these changes and it is far from clear where these 
processes of change will lead us.  Further, while supply-side factors such as the 
provision of the necessary infrastructure and hardware is fundamental in order for 
poor, mainly rural areas to benefit from this technology, what is even more 
fundamental is the existence of a demand for ICT services and of the necessary skills 
required for exploiting the potential.  Whether expanded access to information will 
also promote empowerment is another question, and not necessarily one for which a 
straightforward answer is possible.  Surrounding resource constraints, institutions and 
values condition the extent to which a new ability to communicate, or to gain access 
to information, is sufficient to increase the ability to shape one’s own destiny.  The 
point is that information alone is often not sufficient to change existing relations of 
power.  However, access to information assumes a central role in empowerment when 
it contributes to social mobilisation. 
 
National ICT strategies that involve a process of participatory, interactive learning 
and planning are critically important.  Further, a better understanding of the role and 
impact of ICTs for poverty alleviation is needed.  A major ingredient for this is the 
presence of a mechanism for ongoing policy review, assessment and monitoring 
(Akhtar, 1995).  This suggests the importance of participatory design; local 
communities need to be involved in the design of universal access programmes by 
participating in decisions about particular information access outlets.  Ultimately, if 
ICTs are to have a positive impact on the lives of the poor, then ICTs must have a role 
in generating information that serves poor people’s struggles to achieve their desired 
ends.  Most importantly, the national ICT strategy should be responsive to the 
opportunities as well as risks and threats related to ICT diffusion in a human 
development context. 
 
The design of the infrastructure needs to encourage ICT development that is 
responsive to the needs of the poorest sectors of the population.  As Mansell and 
Wehn put it:  
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“ICT initiatives must be linked to development goals in a way that leads to 
action and widespread social and economic benefit if they are to be successful 
(Mansell & Wehn, 1998: 115)…If the satisfaction of fundamental human 
needs is the ‘driver’ of the introduction of ICTs there is a greater chance of 
success than if technology is permitted to ‘drive’ applications” (Mansell & 
Wehn, 1998:117). 
 
In terms of the current government ICT policies, poor communities face the risk of 
exclusion because they often lack the economic and social capabilities needed to take 
advantage of innovations in ICTs.  Therefore, investing in the poor’s capabilities to 
use these technologies is of prime importance.  Mansell and Wehn aver that the 
prospects for successful ICT strategies in the Third World involves: 
“a dynamic accumulation of skills and knowledge that has a major impact on 
development goals and aspirations.  The prospects for a major impact differ 
depending on the level of resources that can be committed, the coherence of 
the policy framework in which the strategy is embedded, and the social 
capabilities of the country attempting to implement the strategy.  The countries 
that have been successful in the past in addressing development problems are 
also likely to have success in their development of an ICT strategy.  For other 
countries, an ICT strategy will be as great or a greater challenge than strategies 
in other areas, and the prospects for success are not as good” (Mansell & 
Wehn, 1998:257). 
 
There is a risk that new policies and investment in ICT applications will introduce 
new forces of exclusion.  Some people will be excluded because resources cannot be 
extended to provide access and training to everyone.  ICT strategies will not 
overcome all the ‘dualities’ of development.  Mansell and Wehn (1998:261) argue 
that national ICT strategies “can provide a framework for strengthening the likelihood 
of positive outcomes and minimising the risk of negative outcomes”. 
 
Lack of access will continue to be a substantial problem reflecting the limited 
investment resources for poverty reduction.  The constraints to ‘access’ challenge 
policy-makers to ensure that ICT strategies result in more intensive and effective use 
of what is available.  The challenge is to focus or target strategies toward achieving 
outcomes that are affordable and that will sustain movement toward fulfilling the 
development objectives of reducing poverty and ‘correcting’ massive inequalities.  
Community access initiatives such as telecentres and tele-kiosks are likely to present 
major financial challenges due to the costs of developing the necessary social as well 
as technological capabilities.  Ways will need to be found to ensure that these 
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initiatives are not ‘one-off’ demonstration projects that terminate when programme 
funds are exhausted or with the departure of key people. 
 
Much of the recent attention to the role of ICTs in development has focused on new 
technologies, such as the Internet and mobile phones.  Yet the full range of ICTs is 
relevant in the fight against poverty.  Radio and television are important information 
tools that are much more widespread in South Africa than telephones or the Internet.  
For most of the rural community in South Africa, radio and television broadcasting 
remain the major means of electronic communication.  There has been a tendency by 
government to rush to the ‘high end’, focusing on Internet access in environments 
where even more basic ICTs are still in short supply.  Government should be careful 
not to make diffusion of the technology an objective in itself.  The danger of this view 
is that it turns use of ICTs into an end in itself rather than a means of achieving 
development goals.  Government should see ICTs as a means to an end, not an end in 
itself. 
 
7.2.1 A Strategic National Vision 
The landmark study of ICTs carried out by the UNCSTD in 1995/6 underlined the 
importance of co-ordination when it called for the formulation of national ICT 
strategies (Mansell & Wehn, 1998).  In the South African context this means that 
government departments need to co-operate in order to avoid developing competing 
and overlapping ICT projects.  Government needs to formulate a systematic and 
integrated87 national ICT strategy which captures and reflects the country’s 
development needs and monitor its implementation.  Focusing only on the production 
or acquisition of technology is not sufficient.  Policy-makers must be able to articulate 
a careful and deliberate national vision of what ICTs can do and identify priority 
areas.  This requires a strategic vision of the role of information and communication 
in poverty alleviation, and a clear sense of how ICTs can help realise it.  Plans for 
investment in ICTs bring the best results when they are embedded in, or informed by, 
a vision of the future that is consistent with the local or national environment.   
 
                                                          
87 An integrated strategy, however, if not properly managed, has the potential to cause tensions between 
different government departments, with each department protecting its ‘turf’. 
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The poor have information and communication needs like everyone else yet, given the 
multiple constraints they face, they are often unable to address them.  The poor lack 
access to information that is vital to their lives and livelihoods, such as information 
about: (i) income-earning opportunities; (ii) market prices for the goods they produce; 
(iii) health; (iv) the structure and services of public institutions; and (v) their rights.  
Further, the poor are deprived of instruments for effectively articulating and 
aggregating their interests, learning about their rights and their entitlements to 
government services, and pressuring government at all levels to be responsive to their 
needs and interests.   
 
Moreover, they lack political visibility and voice in the institutions and power 
relations that shape their lives.  Finally, they lack access to: (i) knowledge, education 
and skills development that could improve their livelihoods; and (ii) markets and 
institutions, both governmental and societal, that could provide them with needed 
resources and services.  What is to be done?  The following recommendations can be 
made for a pro-poor ICT strategy.  Government should: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
                                                          
Focus attention on information and communication aspects of poverty and 
appropriate use of ICTs in the development process; 
Address information and communication issues in national poverty reduction 
strategies.   
Promote the integration and subordination of national ICT strategies to national 
poverty reduction strategies88;  
Help the poorest address their information and communication needs;  
Build capacity to engage substantively on ICT-related issues as part of the process 
of developing and implementing national poverty reduction strategies; and 
Monitor, evaluate and document successful and unsuccessful applications in order 
to develop models of best practice. 
 
The most significant development to date has been the convergence between 
computer technology and telecommunications.  For the purposes of this study, ICTs 
are defined as new computer-based technologies such as the Internet that facilitate 
88 In other words, government should not develop separate ‘stand alone’ national ICT strategies. 
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communication and the processing and transmission of information by electronic 
means.  Thus the issue of access refers to the Internet and telephony rather than all 
communication technologies (television, radio and print media), digital and analogue, 
in use today.  Having said that, radio remains a powerful, sustainable technology for 
meeting many of the information needs of the poor.  A policy that promotes access to 
as wide a range of radio (and television) broadcast options as possible is clearly 
important for the development opportunities of the poor.  In addition to community 
radio provision, there also remains a significant role for government in the broadcast 
sector, especially in the delivery of public service content in areas such as education 
and health.  The Internet may well be used as an indirect supporting tool in efforts to 
improve information and communication flows that benefit poor people. 
 
It should be noted that provision of infrastructure is only the first step in exploiting 
ICTs for development.  Without appropriate content, for example, the Internet will not 
be relevant to the poor in South Africa.  The aim of a pro-poor ICT strategy  should 
be to increase communication and the flow of relevant, substantive information in 
ways that benefit the poor and which is a critical component of poverty reduction.  
Given the cost and skills demands of Internet access, it is likely that direct access by 
the poorest will remain limited.  Government should, therefore, work with NGOs and 
civil society groups to address the information and communication needs of the 
poorest and most marginalised, who are least likely to be able to access information 
and communication services.  This would include encouraging intermediaries such as 
NGOs, educators, religious organisations and civil society groups to act as a conduit 
for information available via technologies such as the Internet. 
 
An understanding of the information needs of the poor, including the poorest and 
most marginalised in society, needs to be the starting point for an ICT strategy geared 
to poverty reduction.  It is only once the information requirements of the poor have 
been identified that the government will need to interrogate the role that ICTs can 
play in meeting those requirements.  In this way ICTs are driven by the needs of the 
poor rather than by technological concerns. 
 
Communication should not be just about delivering information to the poor and 
oppressed; it must also be about transmitting information and knowledge from these 
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groups to a wider audience.  It is a truism that the majority of the poor in South Africa 
will not own ICTs for the foreseeable future, and most will not be direct users of 
ICTs.  Thus, a key task for government will be the identification of ICT 
intermediaries, i.e. those who own ICTs and who can act as gatekeepers between 
government and other information providers and the informal information systems of 
the poor.  Heeks explains further: 
“The identity of these intermediaries is critical.  They must be in direct face-
to-face contact with those whom they serve.  They need to demonstrate a ‘fit’ 
of context and purpose with these clients.  Where this is not the case…those 
clients are unlikely to benefit.  Even if the right ICT intermediary is in 
place…they often struggle to sustain themselves.  They face sustainability 
pressures on at least four fronts.  Perhaps the most difficult is financial.  
However, intermediaries must also be able to sustain their human capacities, 
the technology they use, and their purpose” (Heeks, 2002a:7). 
 
Incorporating ICTs must be seen as secondary to a broader poverty reform agenda 
considered on its own merits.  Broadly, this suggests a four-stage process in 
introducing ICTs: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Acceptance by key stakeholders of the need to reform; 
Identification of the agenda for reform; 
Identification of the information systems requirements of the reform; and 
Identification of the role of ICTs, if any, in meeting these requirements. 
 
Impediments to poor people benefiting from ICTs due to lack of skills can be reduced 
both by education and training to increase individuals’ skills and by developing 
applications which are adapted to the needs of low-skilled or illiterate users.  Also, it 
is important not only to ensure that relevant information is available to the poor in 
their own languages, but also that ICTs foster the availability of a variety of sources 
of information, and diverse approaches to the challenges facing the poor, so that they 
can decide for themselves how to meet their needs. 
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7.2.2 Universal Access 
Collective access strategies such as telecentres are probably the most feasible option 
for low-income and impoverished communities.  When considering universal ICT 
access in rural areas for many countries, South Africa included, the focus has been on 
the provision of telecentres.  There is no single definition of a telecentre, but the 
following description provided by Gómez, Hunt and Lamoureux is a useful starting 
point: 
“A common characteristic [of a telecentre] is a space that provides public 
access to ICTs for educational, personal, social and economic development.  
Based on the general premise that not everyone in the world has access to a 
telephone, much less a computer, fax service, Internet connection, or relevant 
information services, telecentres are designed to provide a combination of ICT 
services.  These range from basic e-mail to full Internet/World Wide Web 
connectivity, with additional services that may include fax and word 
processing, to specialised information retrieval or applications such as tele-
medicine or distance education” (Gómez, Hunt & Lamoureux, 1999:2). 
 
The telecentre experience in South Africa illustrates the substantial barriers which 
make difficult the realisation of the benefits of ICTs (see Chapter 5).  This mode of 
delivery faces a variety of specific difficulties, inter alia: sustainability; lack of 
awareness of the potential role of ICTs and of the telecentre itself; lack of funding; 
infrastructural problems; lack of human resources required to successfully maintain 
the centre; and language and cultural difficulties.  Failures of initiatives can be 
frequently traced to the fact that the real needs of users were taken for granted or were 
incorrectly specified.  
 
The increased interest in the ‘information society’ and the ITU’s programme of Multi-
Purpose Community Centres (MPCCs) influenced the Department of 
Communications (DoC) to instruct the Universal Service Agency (USA) to establish 
telecentres.  The idea was that the telecentres should be financially self-sufficient (i.e. 
economically sustainable), and therefore operate on the basis of ‘cost recovery’.  This 
means that poor people must pay for access to ICTs themselves.  Hence, a neo-liberal 
model of community telecentre roll-out was in operation. 
 
Currently, the USA community telecentres are far from being self-sufficient.  The 
USA was not clear how ICTs in disadvantaged areas could be used for development 
purposes and so could not promote a shared aim beyond the rhetoric of universal 
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access to ICTs.  It is important that the telecentre is attached to a strong, credible 
community-based organisation and that it responds to local needs.  Further, active 
community involvement in the governance and management of the telecentre must be 
encouraged and training must be provided to build capacity. 
 
The telecentre roll-out assumed that the project would generate its own revenue.  With 
little training, no subsidy and no support for developing information services, this 
model did not lead to services being offered that were relevant to the needs of 
impoverished areas.  The USA does not have the technical and managerial skills or 
the resources to ensure that its telecentres support human capability development in 
impoverished communities.  The USA’s policy for implementing universal access to 
ICTs through community telecentres appears to be based on a ‘technology push’ 
model, i.e. establishing telecentre projects before ascertaining whether there is a local 
understanding of their role.  The community telecentres tended to focus more on the 
technology than on people.  As a result, the missing link is the connection between 
local needs and the supply of appropriate ICTs.  The telecentres in general benefit the 
local elites, i.e. the wealthier and better educated members of the community. 
 
There needs to be a capacity and a commitment to learn and to act on that learning.  
The community telecentre must be embedded in existing social relations (Loader, 
Hague & Eagle, 2000), and familiarisation and local control of the technology must 
be a prime focus.  Loader, Hague and Eagle (2000) refer to the three pillars of 
community informatics, viz.: (i) access and awareness, (ii) context specific training 
and (iii) support.  To have a strong impact, community-based organisations which are 
already playing a critical role in existing community information patterns need to be 
involved.  Three main policy issues need to be considered: 
 
• 
• 
• 
Providing affordable access to ICTs and the skills to use them; 
Ensuring that the ICTs have a useful role in the local context; and 
Facilitating increases in human capability through community telecentres. 
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7.2.2.1 Providing Access 
The issues here relate to providing access to the technology in ways that minimise 
exclusion.  The primary factors being: (i) physical access; (ii) affordability; (iii) 
discrimination in access; and (iv) skills. 
 
Physical access: Is well-functioning ICT equipment available and physically 
accessible in the community?  Local maintenance skills, local contract to support, 
telephone and electricity connectivity and networks of technical assistance are all 
required for this to be achieved. 
 
Affordability: Does the cost of service act as a barrier for most people to use the 
community telecentres?  If this is the case and the project does not take steps to 
overcome this difficulty, the community telecentre does not support universal 
capability but instead ICT serves to reinforce existing social imbalances.  This is 
dependent on the organisational model of the project, and in most cases cost-recovery 
models do not allow affordable access.  Consequently, some degree of subsidy would 
be required, and aligning the project with existing organisations such as schools 
would be beneficial.   
 
Discrimination in access: Are there groups or individuals in the community who feel 
that they are discriminated against and cannot access the system?  Such discrimination 
could be on the grounds of gender, age, physical ability, etc.  Where there are specific 
barriers to usage, as with people living with a disability, has the project found ways to 
respond to this?  Access to the technology for women is a particular concern and 
factors that restrict access (e.g. childcare and transport) should be considered in 
designing accessible services. 
 
Skills: Do poor people have the skills to use the technology as a tool for what they 
would like to?  Authors like Loader, Hague and Eagle (2000) and Miller (2000) stress 
that having skills to use the technology is central to its successful use.  Loader, Hague 
and Eagle (2000) emphasise that training should be ‘bottom-up and bespoke’, 
meaning that training should be adapted to the local conditions so that people learn to 
do things that they wish to do, using ICTs as a tool rather than learning computer 
skills for its own sake.  The need for building skills does not cease at the end of a 
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course, but ongoing support is needed which is often best provided through peer-to-
peer encouragement and training. 
 
7.2.2.2 Ensuring a Useful Role in a Local Context 
The next set of issues concerns why people would be motivated to use the community 
telecentres.  Does the telecentre provide useful information and services that are 
meaningful locally?  The factors to consider here include: (i) the information 
requested; (ii) trust; (iii) integration with local information patterns; (iv) integration 
with external information systems; (v) responsiveness; and (vi) local information 
creation. 
 
Information requested: Is the information available through the community telecentre 
relevant to meeting local needs?  Each community would have to conduct research on 
what is needed in the area and then attempt to provide the required information, 
whether generated locally or externally.  This includes finding out answers to specific 
questions asked, as well as responding to services requested, such as distance 
education. 
 
Trust:  Do people trust the information that is obtained from the telecentre?  In any 
community certain organisations are more trusted as sources of information than 
others.  It would be best for community telecentres to build on existing trusted sources 
of information, such as schools and religious organisations such as churches (Loader, 
Hague & Eagle, 2000). 
 
Integration with local information patterns: The information supplied through 
community telecentres should also be made available through existing information 
channels in the community, such as community radio, local newsletters and public 
meetings such as civics or religious organisations.   
 
Integration with external information systems: Can the community telecentre be used 
to obtain relevant information from external sources, such as government and 
business?  Here the community telecentre is used as a vehicle for accessing a wider 
world of information through, for example, the Internet. 
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Responsiveness: When people use the community telecentre to contact organisations 
and individuals, do they get an acceptable response?  While this is not under the 
control of the community telecentre per se, it is nonetheless important to know how 
useful the project is in providing a link with the external world. 
 
Local information creation: Does the community telecentre develop local content that 
is made available through electronic systems?  This involves developing information 
regarding the local community and technical skills to make this available.  A separate 
issue is for the community to decide what information should be presented about 
itself.  Once information on the community is made available through the electronic 
networks, the people in the community need to be able to assess how satisfactory the 
information produced is and amend it if necessary. 
 
7.2.2.3 Empowerment 
Does the community telecentre play a role in enhancing the human capability of local 
people to control their own lives?  The following issues are central: (i) right to 
information and access; (ii) empowerment in local needs; (iii) local governance and 
control; and (iv) local learning. 
 
Right to Information and Access: Do people in the community feel they have a right 
to information that they require and believe that they can access it?  This issue refers 
to whether people feel that they are allowed and entitled to receive the information 
they want.  The South African constitution states that “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression, which includes – the freedom to receive or impart information 
or ideas” (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1996:Section 16.1.b). 
 
Empowerment in Local Needs: Do people feel that the community telecentre plays a 
positive role in allowing them to meet their needs?  Do the services offered by the 
community telecentre support the ability of people to do things that they want to do? 
 
Local Governance and Control: Do people in the community feel that they have a 
stake in the telecentre and are able to influence it if and as they wish to?  This refers 
to the management system, and whether it is open to suggestions and direction. 
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Local Learning: Is the community telecentre involved in a process of local learning so 
that it continues to adapt and respond to local needs?  This includes defining aims for 
the telecentre, which should lead to indicators that can be assessed.  Is the information 
made available in such a way that the wider community can assess it and be party to 
the decision on how to act? 
 
7.2.2.4 Universal Service Agency (USA) 
The USA should present the abovementioned issues to the community before 
implementing community telecentres.  Through dialogue, an agreement on which 
issues are relevant to the project should be developed, with agreement on indicators 
on how the different issues would be assessed.  This process should be facilitated, 
with training provided, particularly in local management and research facilitation 
skills.  To be successful, community telecentres should be locally controlled and 
managed, within a framework of external support.   
 
In a national system of community telecentre roll-out, the key is to establish multi-
organisational service networks that work towards the overall goal.  The USA is 
currently not in a position to establish the many thousands of sites that would be 
needed to provide poor, especially rural communities, with access to ICTs.  Rather, 
the USA should see its role as promoting a network of many organisations 
(community, NGOs, business and government) that together serve the ends of policy. 
 
Enhancing human capability expansion necessitates making the technology relevant 
to local use, to embed it in local social relations, which means that there must be local 
control of the project.  However, for this to be successful a range of support systems 
are needed from outside the community.  The USA has a key role to play in training, 
developing services and linkages, and in promoting information flow.  Training 
should be concentrated on information skills to develop local content, computer usage 
and maintenance, research (to identify local needs through participatory techniques) 
and management skills (operational, financial, project and customer service).   
 
The USA should take on the role of linking to national and provincial bodies to 
organise information services for its telecentres.  This would entail developing 
linkages with organisations such as government departments, major NGOs and some 
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private sector organisations to provide services to which the local projects can more 
easily tie into.  Examples would include distance education, small business support 
and health information.   
 
7.2.3 Telecommunications Policy 
Policy solutions are seen as appropriate for addressing the problem of extending 
telecommunications into under-serviced and non-serviced areas, both because: (i) the 
sector is typically distorted by a history of state intervention through ownership, 
restricted entrance and geographical price averaging; and because (ii) the likelihood 
of higher costs for serving rural and remote areas contributes to a restriction of purely 
market-based incentives for telecommunications services provision.  Policies to 
address these problems follow two general strategies: obligations and incentives. 
 
The policy instrument of obligation is typically employed through the licensing 
process.  The community service obligations should be targeted primarily at Telkom, 
but should also include the new fixed-line and mobile service providers.  Incentives 
for providing telecommunication services to poor communities in rural areas can be 
financial, as in the case of subsidies, or may include particular market conditions 
established through special licensing programmes (Cannock, 2001).  Policies that 
provide incentives through subsidies must address both the source and collection of 
the funds as well as the means of distribution.  This process must be handled carefully 
as the calculation and distribution of subsidies can lead to lengthy disputes (Garnham, 
1997).  Sources of funds in existing models include revenue or per-minute-based 
contributions from telecom operators (examples include Peru, US and France), 
contributions based on interconnection charges, and contributions from the 
government’s general fund (e.g. Chile).  For an in-depth discussion of the pros and 
cons of these systems see Wellenius (2001, 2002).   
 
Chile, for example, established a development fund and implemented a competitive 
tender for subsidies for unserved areas.  Despite the liberalisation of 
telecommunications services in the late 1980s, and the resulting increased roll-out and 
reduced tariffs, by the mid-1990s, about 1.5 million people (about 10% of the 
population) still lived in localities without access to telephones (Wellenius, 2001).  To 
address this problem, in 1994 the Chilean government set up a special fund financed 
 250
by the national budget and administered by the telecommunications’ regulator (Bitran 
& Serra, 1998).  A first round list of 1285 rural localities without public payphone 
access were ranked and drawn up and grouped into 46 projects according to 
geographical proximity, technology and level of subsidy likely to be required 
(Wellenius, 2001).  The regulator then invited competitive bids for provision of these 
services.  Operating licences were awarded to the lowest bidder in each case, provided 
they met the minimum technical requirements and were within the maximum subsidy 
level.  The process was highly successful, with bidders making 62 offers for 42 of 46 
projects.  If these obligations are completed successfully, 97% of Chileans should 
have access to basic telecommunications.  The subsidies bid for by operators were 
much lower than expected and hence the Chilean government committed only 48% of 
its 1995 budget for 90% of its programme roll-out (Wellenius, 2001).  Analysis 
indicates that the main factor in driving down the bids was the presence of 
competition among operators in the regions where the 16 projects were located.  The 
net result of the initiative was that only US$2.1 million of public money triggered 
private telecommunications investment of approximately US$40 million for the 
purpose of providing telecommunications network access in remote and low-income 
areas (Wellenius, 2000, 2001). 
 
The distribution of subsidies has been an area of significant innovation in the past 
decade (Cannock, 2001).  Using traditional methods, rural service subsidies are paid 
to incumbent operators based on complicated cost of service calculations.  Since the 
true cost of providing rural service is difficult to ascertain, establishing a fair level of 
subsidy is also difficult.  To circumvent this problem innovative policies that use 
auctions to distribute subsidies have been developed.  Subsidy auctions, particularly 
when combined with the issuance of new licenses, create incentives for greater 
transparency in the calculation of costs and support efforts to increase competition in 
the sector (Cannock, 2001).  This method has been used with some success in both 
Peru and Chile, where reverse auctions were used to issue both licenses and subsidies 
to the firms with the lowest bids. 
 
To be successful this policy instrument must include mechanisms to reduce the risk of 
under-bidding for the subsidies and subsequent default through requirements such as 
performance bonds, as well as guarantees for interconnection of the new entrants 
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(Cannock, 2001).  Furthermore, policy-makers should be aware that bids for subsidies 
may be constructed to protect existing market shares or to develop a presence, instead 
of reflecting the actual costs of service to under-serviced areas. This behaviour was 
observed in the Chilean case, where in the first round some firms bid zero for a 
subsidy to increase their chances of winning a license whereas in subsequent rounds, 
after market positions were solidified, subsidy bids increased significantly (Wellenius, 
2001). 
 
The costs of building the ‘last mile’ of the NII are high (Richardson & Paisley, 1998).  
This means that finance for the extension of services to remote areas must come from 
government sources or from the introduction of price structures that assume a 
contribution of revenues to the costs of network development in low density traffic 
areas.  Looking at telephones, because of the historical concentration of access 
amongst wealthy urban populations, we have seen that telephone roll-out has 
traditionally been a force for divergence in incomes between rich and poor in South 
Africa.  However, technological change (pre-paid mobile telephony)89, policy reform 
and innovative universal access programmes such as that in Chile has made the goal 
of extending telephone access to the majority of the poor an increasingly feasible idea.  
It is clear that the first step in extending telephone access to the poorest remains a 
programme of reform towards well-regulated private, competitive markets, which 
have repeatedly delivered expanded network access at lower cost (Kenny, 2001).  To 
extend access beyond the market, subsidy auctions to provide lowest cost, privately 
provided public access in unserved areas (the model used to reach universal access in 
Chile) have proved affordable and sustainable (Wellenius, 1997). 
 
Universal access in South Africa is a central policy and regulatory challenge.  The 
policy challenge is one of how to ensure that those who have been marginalised 
historically have access to ICTs and to the information that can be harnessed from 
using these technologies.  Initiatives to address access should include targets, 
indicators and benchmarks to support assessments of progress on ICT access.  In 1997 
                                                          
89 The dramatic growth of mobile telephony in rural (and urban) communities in South Africa is an 
interesting case.  Pre-paid mobile tariffs are considerably higher than Telkom’s contract tariffs.  
Further, there is the added up-front cost of purchasing the handset.  What then is the impetus for the 
growth of pre-paid mobile telephony?  There are probably two main reasons.  First, the convenience of 
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the South African government granted Telkom a 5-year exclusivity on the public 
switched telecommunications network on condition that Telkom meet certain 
obligations.  The objective of the exclusivity period was twofold: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
                                                                                                                                                                     
To enable Telkom to restructure itself into an efficient company, and to upgrade 
its network; and 
To bring telephones to previously disadvantaged and marginalised communities. 
 
Telkom was given until May 2002 to attain these targets.  Two months after the 
exclusivity period ended Telkom announced that it had achieved only half of its roll-
out obligations.  What is significant is that: 
 
Nearly half of all residential users experienced problems with their telephone lines 
during the course of a year; 
Telkom fell short of the 2.69 million fixed-line target; 
Telkom connected 505 villages less than it should have; and 
It installed approximately 10,000 fewer replacement lines than it should have 
(Telkom, 2002). 
 
As a result of failing to meet government targets, Telkom is liable to a fine of between 
R8-10 million, which is not a sufficient penalty, considering Telkom’s profits.  Due to 
Telkom’s lack of success to build out the infrastructure adequately after decades of 
monopoly, privatisation and liberalisation of the industry has been proposed by 
government.  Privatisation has been implemented through the introduction of a 
strategic equity partner with the promise of a period of extended monopoly.  The 
rationale for this is that indebted monopolies are not able to access on their own the 
necessary capital, skills and technologies to upgrade and extend their networks and 
prepare for competition.  That said, privatisation is likely to be accompanied by the 
rebalancing of tariffs to bring prices in line with costs, resulting in higher local prices,  
which were previously cross-subsidised by international calls.  The introduction of 
independent regulators such as the Independent Communications Authority of South 
Africa (ICASA) can act as a proxy for price competition during the transitional phase 
 
mobility, the ability of the consumer to control costs and indeed the status of owning a mobile phone.  
Second, it is a reflection of Telkom’s inability to supply fixed telephony to poor communities. 
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through price and tariff regulation.  The problem in South Africa is that ICASA is 
incapacitated by a lack of skills and resources. 
 
South Africa has pursued a policy of privatisation without liberalisation in the fixed-
line telecom sector.  Where alternative access networks have been permitted and the 
provision of service to under-serviced areas been opened up to other players besides 
the incumbent, service roll-out has often been more effective (Melody, 1999).  The 
challenge, therefore, is to create conditions that are sufficiently predictable to secure 
the investment necessary for infrastructure development.  At the same time they must 
engage in the sometimes contradictory task of creating an enabling environment to 
ensure affordable access.  This requires investment in, and development of, regulatory 
skills and capacity without which infrastructure development strategies and 
competition policy will not deliver the intended positive outcomes. 
 
Subsidies to complement user fees are important so that poor households are not 
priced out of the market.  The case of Chile demonstrates that in an open, competitive 
environment a limited government subsidy can result in the private sector extending 
telecommunications access to remote or low-income areas to which, the incumbent 
argued, it was unable to deliver service cost effectively.  The South African 
government can learn from the Chilean experience. 
 
The independent regulatory authority ICASA will need to be strengthened to ensure 
that Telkom90 and the other telecommunications service providers act in a 
developmentally responsible way and are required to use part of their revenue to 
improve conditions in low-income areas.  Currently, ICASA does not have the 
capacity and resources to monitor and enforce the relevant policies to ensure 
affordable access.  Gillwald makes an important point that is relevant here: 
“The introduction of competition, without the regulatory capacity or political 
will to manage a competitive framework, can be entirely counterproductive to 
the achievement of the very goals of liberalisation” (Gillwald, 2002:110). 
 
                                                          
90 Despite Telkom’s claim that that cross-subsidies from international calls and high revenue settlement 
rates were needed to extend services to the under-served, they were not by and large used for this 
purpose. 
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Similarly, in a study of the Eastern European Internet market, the Global Internet 
Liberty Campaign (GILC) concluded: 
“Open and competitive markets make a necessary but not always sufficient 
contribution to securing the public interest objectives of universal access, 
affordable prices, pluralism and diversity.  Indeed, in the absence of 
countervailing regulation, liberalization could worsen the situation.  Tariff 
rebalancing in favour of high volume and long distance users could benefit 
business and urban customers, while resulting in increases to residential and 
rural customers” (GILC, 2000:9). 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter questioned the assumptions and implications of a particular mode of 
development based on the notions of modernity and modernisation, an ideology which 
pervades the South African government’s ICT policy initiatives.  Government seeks 
to present state ICT initiatives as neutral, scientific and outside of political conflicts.   
This discourse masks class interests and does not focus on elite groups and their 
interests in importing development schemes.  By focusing on ‘information poverty’ in 
isolated, rural areas, the discourse casts the poor as ‘ignorant’ and hence devalues 
local knowledge (Chambers, 1999).  ICTs are seen as a technical solution to 
underdevelopment, one in which development is reduced to solving the information 
deficit of the poor.  The net result of which is that the complex and deeply embedded 
political and economic factors which structure and shape poverty and inequality are 
made invisible and are therefore unquestioned.   
 
What is most striking about government’s ICT, poverty and development discourse is 
its association of ICTs with modernisation.  ICTs are seen as a deus ex machina 
solution to the problems of poverty and inequality in South Africa.  This model of 
development undervalues the knowledge and experience of poor people, and ignores 
poor people’s perspectives on their needs and on solutions to their own problems.  
The current ICTs for development discourse of the South African government is 
likely to constrict rather than expand the space of economic and cultural freedoms of 
the poorest and most vulnerable communities in South Africa.   
 
ICTs are seen as a modern technology for re-organising populations in developing 
countries to follow a certain pre-designated trajectory.  This sort of intervention is 
both theoretically dubious and politically dangerous because it robs Third World 
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societies of history and agency.  A re-conceptualisation of the mainstream ICT, 
poverty and development discourse is called for, particularly one which destabilises 
orthodox, totalising worldviews (whether neo-liberal or Marxist) and exposes the 
arbitrariness of entrenched systems of power and domination.  We need to prise apart, 
with the help of theory, systems of domination in order to reveal their operations in 
time and space, and their arbitrariness; we also need to narrate, with the help of 
empirical research, how poor people negotiate and contest (sometimes with adverse 
consequences) the structural conditions of their existence.  A reinterpretation would 
also necessitate an acknowledgement that ICTs for development are human 
constructions and as such “contested, temporal, and emergent”, to borrow from 
Clifford’s (1986:19) discussion on culture.  ICTs for development must be 
contextualised in terms of power structures, and situated in Sen’s well-known 
definition of development as ‘capability expansion’ (Sen, 1984, 1990, 1999). 
 
Chapter 7 has emphasised that the ICTs for development process is contingent, 
depending upon specific circumstances and social practices.  When we add to this the 
polyvalent understandings and disparate impacts across and within areas, we have a 
far more complex and uneven picture of ICTs as a modernisation project.  The 
challenge for the South African government is to maintain a critical and reflexive 
distance from the exaggerated claims of the development industry regarding ICTs for 
poverty alleviation.    What is needed is a growing acceptance of heterodoxies, 
diversities and multiple systems and modes of explanations to countervail the 
monolithic modernist discourses. 
 
Properly conceived and deployed, ICTs have the potential as tools to increase the 
flows of relevant information (i.e. information which the poor actually need) and to 
empower poor people.  Guidelines can be followed to ensure that strategies are 
developed that help to harness ICTs to priorities for poverty amelioration.  This 
chapter offers guidelines for policy-makers to assist in devising national pro-poor ICT 
strategies that will be effective and responsive to development priorities. 
 
The innovation and diffusion of new technologies such as ICTs is never smooth or 
uninterrupted.  Historical practices and routines, and the occurrence of social, 
economic and political events, make the process of innovation highly unpredictable 
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and therefore uncertain.  Decisions about ICTs will have to be taken without a high 
degree of assurance that the results will be beneficial.  The policy implications of this 
study are not conclusive.  It would be risky to prescribe in detail what the South 
African government should do, given the limited and exploratory nature of the 
knowledge that exists on the subject of ICTs for reducing poverty and inequality.  
Instead, Chapter 7 has sketched out several policy issues that can help policy-makers 
think about programme and policy support.  The guiding ‘rule of thumb’ should be for 
policy-makers to pursue ICT policies with substantial equity components, appropriate 
to local needs and resources. 
 
Success is not guaranteed and the price of failure will be high.  The neo-liberal 
approach to ICT policy does not seem to have served the poor and the marginalised 
well.  The time has come to develop a different approach, one that does not rely 
wholly on market forces but that recognises the need for a clear vision and for a 
radically different approach to the achievement of the goal of universal access.  If 
expanding access to ICTs is to play a significant role in national development, it must 
form part of a much broader effort to improve the social welfare and economic 
opportunity of the poor in South Africa. 
 
How ICTs can be used to the benefit of poor communities is a complex question on 
which much local research is needed.  If affordable access is to be available to all, 
ICT policies need to be based on realistic premises, not wishful thinking or simplistic 
generalisations.  It is critically important that government moderates what Heeks 
(1999a) bluntly refers to as an ‘ICT fetish’ and to adopt an enlightened approach to 
ICTs, one which is: 
“information-centred, integral to its environment, integrated with development 
objectives, intermediated, interconnected, and indigenised.  Above all, it must 
be intelligent” (Heeks, 2002a:10). 
 
The next chapter will conclude the study and suggest a number of areas for further 
research. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
8.1 Review of Study 
8.1.1 Methodology 
Discourse analysis is used in this study as a vantage point from which to probe the 
complexities of the ICT for development discourse.  Michel Foucault pioneered the 
analysis of discourse, namely deconstructing the text of a dominant system of thought 
to reveal the inherent power-knowledge structures.  The powerful can influence what 
is considered acceptable knowledge.  Such knowledge happens to be the form of 
knowledge that makes those people more powerful in a self-reinforcing cycle.  In the 
final analysis, power is the right to have one’s definition of reality prevail over other 
people’s definition of reality.  Power defines what counts as knowledge and thereby 
what counts as reality.  In society, knowledge and power are inextricably linked.  As 
Foucault (1977) states, no power is exercised without the extraction, appropriation, 
distribution or retention of knowledge. 
 
The research method (i.e. discourse analysis) adopted was driven by the theoretical 
framework (i.e. critical theory) that was used in the study.  In any research endeavour 
there are always alternative approaches.  The decision to adopt one or a combination 
of approaches ultimately rests with the researcher provided that the approach is 
robust, coherent and defensible.  A discourse analysis approach when handled with 
depth and subtlety can be fruitful if it becomes an instrument of reflexivity (critical 
reflection).91  The methodology adopted in this dissertation is one which is the most 
appropriate for our purpose, i.e. to critically examine government’s discourse on the 
interconnectivity between ICT, poverty and development.   
 
                                                          
91 Of a method or theory that takes account of itself or especially of the effect of the personality or 
presence of the researcher on what is being investigated. 
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8.1.2 Empirical Evidence 
The nub of the South African government’s highly normative and deterministic ICT 
for development agenda is the intrinsic belief that: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Unequal access to ICTs and digital exclusion (qua the digital divide) is the site of 
the major unequalising force in both the South African and world economy today; 
The digital divide in South Africa can be bridged by supplying more ICTs to poor, 
particularly rural and isolated regions; 
ICT is an inherently enabling technology that can leapfrog institutional and 
infrastructural obstacles; 
ICTs can help foster social development and economic growth; 
ICT investment is exempt from normal comparisons of costs and benefits between 
alternative kinds of ICT and non-ICT investments because it reflects a ‘new 
paradigm’ of thinking and because it is not a matter of tradeoffs; 
Evidence of higher failure rates in ICT projects only shows the need for more 
training, or lifting of cultural constraints, or strengthening of political will, and 
does not undermine the priority of ICT investment per se. 
 
Since 1994 the image of the ‘information society’ has been invoked by the South 
African government as a modernising theme to transform society and the economy 
through ICTs.  This fits neatly with the powerful rhetoric of politicians such as Prime 
Minister Tony Blair in the UK and former President Bill Clinton and former Vice-
President Al Gore of the United States on the general theme of modernisation through 
ICTs (Margetts, 1999:Chapter 1; Bellamy & Taylor, 1998:4-10).  The post-apartheid 
South African government has embraced the ideology that ICT represents 
modernisation and it is seen as a key technology for alleviating poverty.  The 
theoretical heritage of this perspective is linked to the modernisation school, which 
assumes that social change is unidirectional, progressive and moves society from 
industrial (or pre-industrial in the case of least developed countries) to post-industrial 
with modern ICT as the engine.   In much of government technicist rhetoric we find 
an implicit belief in an unproblematic causal progression from ICT innovations to 
social change.  Technological complexities, complex social processes and 
independent human agency are not seriously considered. 
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The South African government is attracted to the neutral, instrumental view of 
technology, which is why they build an increasingly central role for it in their vision 
of an ‘information society’.  Government has taken the technological configuration of 
the new ICTs as a ‘given’ or prefigured system that needs to become more widely 
diffused to citizens.  Hence, government rhetoric forecloses an assessment of the need 
for greater variety in the deployment of ICT configurations.  It is the contention of 
this study that the role of ICTs as a powerful tool to fight poverty is, at best, a 
working hypothesis.  Yet over the last nine years it has virtually become part of 
‘received wisdom’ and ‘conventional thinking’ in government circles.  The model of 
ICTs for poverty alleviation that is being pursued by government is part of the 
problem rather than the solution.  The sooner that the government’s ideology is 
demythologised the better.  Tucker puts it best: 
“It distorts our imagination, limits our vision, blinding us to the alternatives 
that human ingenuity is capable of imagining and implementing” (Tucker, 
1999:1). 
 
In terms of government’s development discourse ICTs are elevated “to the status of a 
natural law, objective reality and evolutionary necessity” (Tucker, 1999:1).  
Government needs to engage in a frank and comprehensive diagnosis of the 
information and communication dimensions of South Africa’s development 
challenges.  It means asking the fundamental question: How can we create an 
environment where information flows much more freely and widely, and where 
communication is easier, broader and more inclusive within our society, so as to 
create more participatory and inclusive societal processes?  The answer to this 
question covers two mutually dependent areas: (i) establishing an enabling policy and 
regulatory framework; and (ii) using ICTs appropriately and innovatively within the 
various sectors of society. 
 
Paulo Freire sums up the difference between modernisation and authentic 
development: 
“It is essential not to confuse modernisation with development.  A society 
which is merely modernised without developing will continue – even if it 
takes over some minimal delegation of decision making – to depend on the 
outside country.  This is the fate of any dependent country as long as it 
remains dependent…The basic elementary criterion is whether or not a society 
is a ‘being for itself’.  If it is not the criterion [then this] indicates 
modernisation rather than development” (Freire, 1972:160). 
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The central question becomes one of poor people’s right to define their own 
development in the face of a government who claim a monopoly of truth and 
enlightenment.  Government is seen as ‘saving’ the poor from the misery and 
stagnation emanating from ‘information poverty’ thanks to superior technology.  The 
histories and contextual rationalities of poor communities are subsumed by 
government’s discourse on technological progress.  The South African government’s 
discourse on ICT, poverty and development is therefore in urgent need of 
deconstruction and reconstruction; otherwise it will continue to block other 
imaginaries and ways of understanding.  This study has contributed to this ongoing 
project.  In deconstructing the categories used in the ICTs for development discourse 
it is important to pay greater attention than hitherto to the unequal power relationship 
that prevails in the production of knowledge.  This unequal relationship parallels and 
reinforces the unequal and dependent relationships in the domains of economics and 
politics. 
 
In general, government ICT policies, programmes and projects are being developed in 
isolation with few links between them.  The lack of inter-agency networking calls into 
question the integrative power of ICTs heralded by enthusiastic modernists in 
government.  There is little evidence to suggest that any process of overarching 
transformation is taking place.92  Government’s ICT, poverty and development 
initiatives are dominated by a concept of modernisation, the equation of development 
with modernisation and the construction of a single model of modernity based on the 
experience of a few industrialised countries.  If this model of ICTs for development is 
followed it is believed that South Africa will reach the goal of a similar type of 
‘modern society’.  This type of grand theorisation is prone to problems of reductionist 
bias, whereby simplistic monocausal explanations are sought for complex 
development realities.  With such explanations there is little room for plurality; much 
of the richness and diversity of society that produce different trajectories of 
development is excluded from the analysis. 
 
We question government’s assumption that ICTs are ‘revolutionary’ and that an 
‘information society’ is being forged from a new techno-economic paradigm 
                                                          
92 This is not unique to South Africa.  See, for instance, Margetts (1999) for examples from Britain and 
the US. 
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comprised of ICTs.  Government needs to move away from analytical perspectives 
that are techno-centric and determinist, that focus on historical discontinuity (i.e. the 
‘information revolution’ and the ‘information society’), and that make unwarranted 
claims about the future impact of ICTs on the lives of the poor.  Much more useful is 
the ‘social shaping of technology’ approach, which puts the dynamic interaction 
between social forces and technological innovation into the forefront.  This approach 
calls for proactive policy-making, since it stresses the imperative that the 
technological solutions must be shaped to match the vision of a preferred future.  
ICTs will not by themselves change existing institutional settings.  The use of ICTs 
within the conventional social and institutional framework not only hampers these 
technologies full potential, but may also cause many frustrating social problems. 
 
The assumptions underpinning modernisation theory continue to permeate the ICT 
thinking and policy strategies of government.  The dominant discourse tends to 
address the developmental issues associated with ICTs through the concept of the 
‘digital divide’, focusing on the quantitative disparities between North and South, 
regionally and within the country.  Whereas the concept of the ‘digital divide’ tends to 
imply ‘digital solutions’, the present study has shown that questions raised by the new 
ICTs must be understood in the broader context of human development.  The lack of 
access to ICTs by the poor in South Africa is a reflection of the ‘development divide’ 
with its sharp economic and social cleavages.  Utopian promises that technological 
advances will automatically translate into social progress and ‘digital dividends’ for 
the poor are incorrect.  The fundamental question is not how to maximise the number 
of computers or Internet users in South Africa, but how the new ICTs can contribute 
to the development goals of the poor, as defined by themselves. 
 
The work of Amartya Sen (1999) provides a basis for considering capabilities in a 
much more broader context and for examining whether the dominant configurations 
of ICTs are consistent with a social goal of empowering the poor.  This means that 
much greater attention must be focused on alternative ways in which the poor and 
disenfranchised acquire the capabilities needed to make choices or to express opinions 
about what they value.  Extending the idea of capabilities to the issue of ICT 
development and policy requires a shift away from a focus on the causes and 
consequences of the ‘digital divide’.  It suggests the need for a focus on what the poor 
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are able to do as a result of their interactions with ICTs and what capabilities they are 
able to acquire as a result of those interactions.  Sen’s (1999:293) capabilities 
approach focuses on “the substantive freedom – of people to lead the lives they have 
reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have”, in this instance, through 
the dynamic of the relation between ICTs and poverty reduction. 
 
8.2 Recommendations 
The role for the South African government remains crucial in at least three areas.  
First, government needs to exercise leadership, in co-operation and consultation with 
the private sector, civil society and other stakeholders, in articulating and 
implementing a national strategy for combating poverty, and in that context for 
harnessing ICTs.  Second, government needs to take, and rigorously implement, the 
complex but crucial policy and regulatory measures that will create an enabling 
environment for the broad deployment and effective use of ICTs in all areas of 
economy, society and government.  Third, government has to pay particular attention 
to helping the poorest (especially households in which no one is working) and most 
marginalised gain access to the benefits of ICTs, both directly and indirectly.  In all of 
this ICTs are not the objective in themselves; they are a tool for use within a broader 
strategy to fight poverty.  Mainstreaming ICTs in development means subordinating 
them to this broader purpose. 
 
The study advocates the need for an integrated framework to develop appropriate 
policies of access and diffusion of ICTs within poor communities.  Technology 
should not be treated as a goal in itself, but a means of achieving development goals.  
In this context it should be recognised that even with poor communities there are 
divergent needs for information and technology.  Stress should be placed on 
appropriate information systems that reflect the available resource endowments 
(financial, human and technical) of the poor (Hulme, 2003). 
 
Because of the wide access gap between rich and poor, it is indeed possible that ICTs 
may reinforce, or widen, existing social and economic inequalities in South Africa.  
Within this context there is a consensus that government should play a key role in 
establishing a competitive, private sector-led telecommunications market and in 
 263
promoting supportive measures to enhance the capabilities of the poor for accessing 
and using ICTs.  The former would involve the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector, the privatisation of public monopolies and strengthening 
the capabilities of the independent regulator (Mansell, 1999).  Government can use a 
number of incentives/requirements to catalyse private investment and to ensure that 
the private sector extends public access to communications services even in rural or 
disadvantaged areas (see Chapter 7). 
 
Information policy should become a component of poverty alleviation strategies.  
First, there should be recognition that information is not a static, equitably available 
commodity, but a dynamic process of acquisition, application and use.  Second, 
government should recognise that the effective use of ICTs by the poor may be 
constrained by lack of skills, financial resources and the existence of urban/rural, 
gender and other inequalities.  Moreover, the effectiveness of ICTs must be assessed 
alongside existing information systems and in the context of interaction with pre-
existing organic information environments.  Third, ICTs must focus on strategic 
benefits in areas where complementary investment has already been built.  In this 
sense it should encourage the active participation of community-based intermediaries, 
helping to ensure two-way transmission of information, thus giving the poor a voice.  
Finally, long-term strategies for ICT diffusion among the wider population must be 
centred on revised education policies such as integrating ICT skills into programmes 
of vocationally-based training which emphasise wider information handling skills, 
business and management skills and entrepreneurship training. 
 
Telephony (fixed-line, mobile and public payphones), television, radio and the printed 
media require few formal skills and only mother tongue literacy for effective usage.  
Thus, they are likely to be in greatest demand from the majority of illiterate and semi-
literate users for the foreseeable future.  By contrast, effective use of email and 
Internet requires not only literacy but language skills, predominantly the use of 
English.  It also requires technical and computer literacy, i.e. the ability to operate and 
interact with a computer-based information system.  The lack of skills and human 
resources may be the greatest barrier for diffusion of ICTs among the poor.  Further, 
for ICTs to become relevant for poverty reduction they have to be affordable.   
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Government programmes for ICT adoption and implementation in South Africa have 
tended to take a ‘top-down’ approach.  It is therefore important to minimise the 
‘opportunity cost’ risks associated with ICT investments.  This can be achieved, for 
example, by facilitating the early involvement of users in policy planning, as well as 
the participation and consensus from users and testing of new information systems in 
advance of widespread application. 
 
The expansion of private sector ICT capability is unlikely to assist the very poor 
sufficiently.  NGOs and other donor funded support structures will continue to play a 
role in reaching the poor and giving the poor a voice.  However, for ICTs to be made 
relevant to poor people’s lives, initiatives should become more community-based.  In 
this respect small community-run organisations may provide an appropriate vehicle 
for extending ICT utilisation into the wider community.  Such organisations provide 
the advantages of source proximity, trust and locally contextualised knowledge.   
Creation of local content should be promoted through local institutions such as 
schools, local government and businesses.  The cost effectiveness and potential for 
coverage of local digital content must, however, be weighed against the advantages of 
pre-existing information systems and communication tools. 
 
Building ICT resources over the long term will require school-based education and 
vocational training for young people.  An integrated policy for increased ICT 
investment within education (primary, secondary and tertiary), including teacher 
training and technical support, can ensure effective long-term diffusion and local 
adaptation of ICTs within South Africa. 
 
One approach to the problem of the uneven diffusion of ICTs between rich and poor 
has been the community telecentre.  Telecentres are usually designed to provide a 
combination of ICT services, ranging from email to full Internet and World Wide 
Web connectivity.  Telecentres provide an alternative to the model of one-to-one 
individual access to a computer that predominates in the developed world.  As 
community resources telecentres offer opportunities for development that are 
predicated on improved access to information for whole communities.  Telecentres 
that seek to overcome the barriers to access ICTs in rural areas are still experimental.  
Currently, there is very little experience of the long-term impact of such centres in the 
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context of rural and remote areas in South Africa, and there are many questions to be 
answered before embarking on ambitious and costly programmes at a national level 
(Ernberg, 1998b).  Given the novelty of access to ICTs and the shortage of guidelines 
for establishing and operating community telecentres, many research questions remain 
open as to how this type of innovation can bring equitable access to information 
resources that will contribute to sustainable development among the most 
disadvantaged sections of the population. 
 
To reiterate, widespread benefits are yet to emerge from the existing community 
telecentres.  The primary reason for this is the difficulties associated with the ability 
of top-down national programmes to incorporate the specifics of the local context of a 
poor community.  Technology has to be considered within the complexity of the 
social context into which it is inserted.  Positive outcomes from telecentres are 
associated with effective telecentre management operations that deliver useful and 
useable information to communities that are motivated and empowered to make good 
use of it (Benjamin & Dahms, 2001). 
 
If government is serious about sharing the benefits of access to ICTs with the poor, 
then further provisions have to be implemented in order to address all the dimensions 
of poverty and inequality.  These dimensions include: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Service availability: The services made available through the use of ICTs should 
be freely available to all who might wish to make use of them; 
Awareness: The poor are aware of how they might be able to use ICTs for their 
own benefit; 
Opportunity to learn and use the new ICTs: The poor have the opportunity to 
attain computer literacy; 
Mastery of technologies: The poor understand which tools are best suited for 
which tasks; 
Experience: The poor are able to accumulate sufficient experience with the use of 
ICTs to enable them to fully exploit their potential; 
Skills: The poor have the right skills for performing ICT-related tasks; 
Support: The poor have access to appropriate assistance when they need it to help 
them make good use of ICTs; 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Attitudes: The poor are encouraged to participate in the sharing of benefits 
available from equal access to ICTs; 
Content: Sufficient content is available to enable the poor to gain benefits from 
ICTs; 
Cultural: The other dimensions are adapted as required to the cultures of all 
potential users; 
Disability: The other dimensions are adapted as required so that disability is not a 
barrier to equal access to the benefits of ICTs; 
Linguistic: The other dimensions are adapted as required so that language is not a 
barrier to equal access to the benefits of ICTs; 
Gender: The other dimensions are adapted as required so that gender is not a 
barrier to equal access to the benefits of ICTs; 
Empowerment of Civil Society: Structural, political and governance factors do not 
impede equal access to the benefits of ICTs. 
 
In view of the novelty of applying ICTs to development practice, government would 
do well to take note of the following principles in any ICTs for poverty alleviation 
initiative: 
 
Alone, ICTs are insufficient for significant benefits to emerge; 
ICTs are best deployed to improve processes that are already working reasonably 
well; 
ICTs will not turn bad development practice into good development practice, but 
they can make good development better; 
The application of ICTs in the absence of a development strategy that makes 
effective use of them will inevitably result in sub-optimal outcomes; 
Whilst ICTs provide opportunities for development, desirable outcomes always 
arise from the actions of people and institutions. 
 
Government has initiated the process with the technology rather than with an 
integrated development strategy.  When considering the use of ICTs for development 
it is essential to have a clear development strategy at the outset.  Whilst the strategic 
thinking can be informed by an appreciation of the capabilities of ICTs, it is essential 
to have clear development targets that are specific to the context before the form of 
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use of the ICTs is defined.  Additionally, in considering the development strategy, it is 
important to note that bottom-up, demand-driven development objectives are usually 
preferable to top-down, supply-driven objectives, so that goals begin with an 
appreciation of the needs of the poor, as they would themselves express them.   
 
An information plan is drawn up on the basis of an unambiguous articulation of the 
development strategy.  This will set down the information resources that will be 
required to achieve the development strategy.  Again, this determination can be made 
against an informed background with regard to the capabilities of ICTs, but it should 
not be driven by the mere application of technology.  Finally, a plan for the 
technology can be drawn up that will be capable of delivering the information 
resources required for achievement of the strategy.  This would entail a radical 
departure from government’s technology-driven, top-down and supply-driven ICT 
policy initiatives which often result in sub-optimal outcomes. 
 
Poor communities are not homogenous.  Therefore, the same information system can 
be a success in one community but a failure in another.  Hence, the information 
system and its context must be studied, understood and managed together, not 
separately.  Government ICT initiatives must consider and be shaped by the 
information requirements of poor communities and should address the design, 
delivery and utilisation of community information systems by: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Defining community information requirements based on needs and priorities that 
have been expressed by the communities themselves; 
Igniting community aspirations and empowering communities with appropriate 
skills for fostering local development that is information-based; 
Expanding a community’s social capital through enhanced access to 
communication facilities and information resources; 
Embedding community-based ICT services within existing economic, governance 
and social structures; 
Infusing enhanced capability for information access within communities; 
Achieving sustainability –vis-à-vis  financing, service delivery and operating 
functionality; 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Ensuring that benefits arising are equitably disseminated among the socially and 
economically disadvantaged groups, and not simply appropriated by existing 
elites. 
 
The following actions are necessary to ensure that ICTs have optimal impacts for 
development within poor communities: 
 
Familiarising communities with their existing use and sources of information as 
well as with the gaps that exist between existing and desired information 
resources; 
Alerting communities to the potential application of information to their problem-
solving efforts and to their development aspirations; 
Sensitising communities to the existence and accessibility of information 
resources and to the capabilities of ICTs for accessing and manipulating 
information; 
Empowering communities with information literacy and the skills necessary for 
the mastery of new ICTs; 
Emphasising local language content and ensuring that information is of value to 
poor people in their daily lives; 
Providing interfaces that are easy to use and making sure that aides/intermediaries 
are available at public access points (such as community telecentres)  who can 
assist people without basic computer skills; 
Encouraging the collection, classification, preservation and dissemination of 
indigenous knowledge and cultural information artefacts; 
Fostering appropriate local mechanisms for sustaining the equipment, services 
and operations of community-based ICTs. 
 
Using ICTs in poverty alleviation strategies involves the use of various participatory 
mechanisms for community engagement, including: (i) household surveys; (ii) 
community focus groups; (iii) user committees; (iv) training and orientation sessions; 
(v) demonstrations; and (vi) facilitated community conferences.  These techniques 
comprise a community learning system, whereby the community starts learning about 
its information needs, then begins to satisfy those needs and as a result of the 
experience becomes increasingly capable of understanding and satisfying information 
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needs of a higher order.  The progression can be depicted as an iterative process of 
action: evaluation of outcomes – learning – knowledge – further action. 
 
To recapitulate, the multidimensional model of ICT, poverty and development for 
which this study has argued is one which: (i) rejects modernisation as an inevitable 
direction of social change; (ii) is based on Sen’s (1999) ‘capabilities’ approach, where 
‘capabilities’ should be understood as expanding the freedoms of the poor to construct 
meaningful lives; (iii) advances distributional equity and social justice; (iv) respects 
local diversity and local agendas; (v) is aware of power relations appearing in 
knowledge construction, development priorities, research agendas and goal setting; 
(vi) encourages local and authentic action so that poor people can speak and act for 
themselves; (vii) is sustainable, economically, socially and environmentally; and (viii) 
recognises that development is a continually negotiated and subjectively defined 
process.  In the real world we can rarely avoid trade-offs and hard choices.  Further, 
development processes are dialectical, fraught with contradictions, conflicts and 
unpredictable reversals.  Nonetheless, the seven principles outlined above do have 
resonance at a commonsense level, and taken together, these principles clearly 
suggest new guidelines for the ICT, poverty and development process.   
 
8.3 A Way Forward 
The following resources are required: (i) to make an ICT-based system effective for 
development, and (ii) to turn data into learning, decisions and actions of value: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Data resources: the poor need relevant data to be available in the first place; 
Economic resources: they need the money, the skills and the technology in order 
to access the data; 
Social resources: they need the motivation, confidence and knowledge to access, 
assess and apply the data, and they must trust the source; and 
Action resources: they must be able to act on the learning and decisions made with 
the information.  This will require action inputs (e.g. money, skills, technology 
and raw materials) plus resources like empowerment. 
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If these resources are not available then the socio-technical system will not function 
optimally, and the ICT investments will be wasted.  The disadvantaged remain 
disadvantaged because of inequalities in a broad range of resource endowments 
regardless of whether they can access data using ICTs.  At most, access to data and 
access to ICTs might be necessary, but they are far from sufficient conditions to 
enable effective development.  ICTs are a means to an end, rather than an end in 
themselves.  In very simple terms, this approach has three steps for development 
projects: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
First, identification of the development objectives for the project; 
Second, identification of the information requirements needed to meet those 
objectives; and 
Third, identification of the role that ICTs have to play in meeting those 
information requirements.  
 
ICT can support people-centred, participatory development, but only: 
 
where there is local learning and adaptation to make the system relevant to local 
needs; and 
where the technology is appropriated by the community, with attention given to 
meeting local needs, developing relevant local content and linking ICTs with 
existing information networks. 
 
It cannot be assumed that the ICT-based information system will be beneficial or 
harmful without understanding the local social dynamics and how the technology will 
be used.  This is especially the case since communities are complex and dynamic.  
ICT will be best used where it is embedded in existing social relations, and where it 
serves to extend the capacity of people to perform tasks they would wish to do, even 
in the absence of ICT. 
 
From the literature on technology transfer (Archibugi & Pietrobelli, 2003; Archibugi 
& Michie, 1997), the role of local adaptive assimilation and learning is seen as key to 
successful implementation of technology in new settings.  Learning, however, will not 
come about simply by local control of the technology.  A level of technical 
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competence and an understanding of the technology’s potential is also required before 
local learning can take-off.   
 
In contrast to government’s approach, we argue that the key to integrating ICTs in the 
fight against poverty is not to begin with ICTs, nor to postulate them as an essential 
need.  Rather it is to develop and implement a strategy for encouraging the 
deployment of ICTs, in support of, and subordinate to, a national poverty-reduction 
strategy.  In this way ICTs are driven by development objectives rather than by 
technological concerns.  For community telecentres to be able to support 
development, three main areas need to be considered: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
First, providing affordable access to the ICTs and the skills to use them; 
Second, ensuring that the ICTs have a useful role in the local context; and 
Third, facilitating human capability expansion through the ICT-based systems. 
 
A reconceptualised pro-poor approach to ICTs is one which is: 
 
Centred on information rather than technology; 
Integral to its environment; 
Integrated with development objectives; and 
Interconnected, intermediated and indigenised. 
 
Such an approach potentially has the power to: 
 
Reveal the complexities of existing power relations, making it easier to challenge 
them;  
Restore the agency of those rendered passive in the ICT for development arena;  
Reorient technology to socially embedded, local uses; and  
Break down the binary of developed/underdeveloped, recognising poor people’s 
knowledge and experience, and so opening up the possibility that ‘we’ can learn 
from and with ‘them’.   
 
We argue that ICT for development should be seen more in terms of learning and of 
questioning assumptions and frameworks.  Collective learning as the point of ICT for 
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development places development policy discussions on a different footing: the focus 
shifts to the role of complexity in development.  Complexity is a factor of growing 
importance in development, and this raises the question of whether complexity is 
enabling or disabling.  What is needed is reflexivity with a political edge which refers 
to collective feedback loops that generate and inform collective action geared to 
challenging existing power relations.  It should be seen less in terms of the traditional 
instrumental, project achievement approach.  ICTs may then play a different role.  
They would not be used so much as managerialist tools for the production of 
functional outputs.  They would be used instead more as holistic development tools 
under the control of project clients for self-development, for political-awareness 
raising and for knowledge-building.  In this way, ICTs would themselves contribute to 
development of social resources. 
 
To reiterate, critical theory emphasises ‘emancipatory intent’ because it acknowledges 
that an emancipatory outcome cannot be guaranteed.  Hence the focus is on process 
rather than outcomes.  ICT for development programmes have a better chance of 
success if the poor are seen as autonomous agents of action and if they define a social 
process of change in terms of the growing role of independent autonomous action on 
the part of dominated groups.  Such an exercise will, of necessity, entail a self-
analysis that requires the active participation of social actors engaged in a collective 
struggle concerning political and social issues (Touraine, 1995).  Further, emphasis 
must be placed on institution building and the analysis of the contradictions of action 
and distance between a struggle, a discourse and a movement of opinion (Touraine, 
1981) likely to galvanise a struggle and transform it into a social movement.  But the 
sociological intervention does not merely focus on the analysis of a political discourse 
and a militant organisation: it is also concerned with the struggle represented by the 
action that has brought these about. 
 
The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has become an international model for ‘micro-
credit’ as a poverty alleviation strategy (Amin, Rai & Topa, 2003; Rahman, 1999).  
The Bank provides small loans to the poor for small-scale self-employment activities.  
Because it recognises women’s centrality to the poverty alleviation process – both as 
beneficiaries of it and as active agents in promoting it – the Bank has increasingly 
focused on providing credit to women (Grameen Bank, 2004).  The Grameen Bank 
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primarily focuses on improving women’s economic status, which it views as the  
foundation on which better social and political status can be built.  The Bank’s 
poverty alleviation strategy, however, is grounded in a keen awareness of the cultural 
context, which conditions women’s willingness and ability to respond to economic 
opportunities.   
 
This notwithstanding, borrower sustainability depends upon access to a wider range of 
financial services that smooth household cash flows and increase investment 
opportunities (Wood, 1997; Hashemi & Morshed, 1997).  The Grameen Bank has 
shown some awareness of these issues.  For example, the innovative programme 
developed by the Bank for expanded telecom infrastructure in rural villages, i.e. the 
contract the Bank established for borrowers to buy mobile phones and sell phone 
services in their villages.  As of June 2002, the Bank had granted loans for 14,443 
village pay phones (VPPs) (Grameen Bank, 2002).  Commenting on the Grameen 
telecom experience, Bayes (2001) concludes that: 
“First, pursuance of pragmatic policies can turn telephones into production 
goods, especially through lowering transaction costs, and second, the services 
originating from telephones in villages are likely to deliver (even) more 
benefits to the poor than to the non-poor.  The VPPs also seem to have 
perceptible and positive effects on the empowerment and social status of 
phone-leasing women and their households.  For villagers in general, phones 
offer additional non-economic benefits such as improved law enforcement, 
more rapid and effective communications during disasters, stronger kinship 
bonding, etc.” (Bayes, 2001: 261). 
 
Grameen has been credited with addressing structural determinants of poverty, the 
economic and social status of women, and sources of vulnerability in ways that have 
eluded other ICT for development approaches (Fugelsang & Chandler, 1993; 
Hashemi & Schuler, 1997).  We argue that while the Grameen Bank is not a panacea 
for  poverty alleviation and improving women’s lives, it has increased the income of 
borrowers, led to improvements in specific aspects of their lives and it has potential if 
used in conjunction with other progressive social and economic policies to contribute 
to long-term, sustainable, progressive social change.  Over the long term, however, it 
is clear that there are limits to what can be accomplished within the informal sector.  
Government initiatives will be required to aid in the transition from informal to 
formal sector employment.  Acknowledging this does not in any way invalidate the 
progress made by the Grameen Bank.  It has helped improve people’s living standards 
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in a relatively short period of time.  In conjunction with other policies that create 
greater access to resources for women and the poor, ICT-based micro-credit can be a 
powerful tool for improving the lives of the poor. 
 
The South African government can learn from the bottom-up approach to poverty 
alleviation advocated by the Grameen Bank which provides the poor with direct 
access to resources.  The broader lesson of the Grameen Bank is that providing the 
poor with ICT (such as mobile phones) through a micro-credit scheme has potential 
for improving poor women’s socio-economic status, increasing their empowerment 
and lifting their families out of poverty.  However, it remains true that whether or not 
women can respond to these new opportunities depends on the structural and cultural 
constraints they face. 
 
8.4 Further Research 
Much more analytical research is needed on the impact of ICTs on poverty alleviation 
and inequality in South Africa.  As Edge points out, the social effects of technical 
change are of obvious importance but: 
“more fundamentally, if research is restricted to questions of effects, it can 
contribute only to what may be called ‘reactive’ policy measures designed to 
cope with, or adapt to, the consequences of technical change, rather than 
anticipating (and so influencing) these consequences” (Edge, 1995:26). 
 
The paucity of hard data suggests that much more micro-level research is needed to 
assess the impacts of ICTs on the poor: their employment opportunities, their 
education and skills formation, and their overall empowerment within society.  The 
raw data for these studies may come from the many ICT programmes and projects 
that are being implemented in poor communities.  These studies would also guide 
future implementation of such programmes to avoid the pitfalls of faulty 
conceptualisation and poor implementation and by building on their strong points. 
 
Such research, in order to be useful, needs to take a systemic, contextual view of 
ICTs.  It is hard to think of other questions in development studies that have such 
large potential implications but yet are so understudied and misunderstood.  Only if 
we are able to accurately understand how the new technologies are affecting the poor 
will we know whether they are a force for the reduction of inequality or for its 
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increase, or discover how to harness their powers in the pursuit of greater equity.  
Such research needs to be undertaken systematically and continuously so that a 
broader base of experience can be accumulated and exchanged among those who are 
in a position to develop innovative applications oriented toward social, as well as 
economic, development goals.   
 
Research can play a critical role in generating knowledge about what particular poor 
communities need and about what approaches seem to be most effective in resolving 
specific problems as defined by the communities themselves.  In fact, one of the 
major stumbling blocks to progress in the field of ICT, poverty and development is 
the paucity of information at local and national levels about how different kinds of 
people are using available ICTs and what difficulties they are encountering.  It is 
paradoxical that, in the wider effort to create ‘information societies’, so little attention 
has been given to research.  Any effort on the part of government to strengthen 
national ICT strategies should be reinforced by rigorous, independent research on 
ICT, poverty and development.   
 
Another crucial requirement is the strengthening of institutional capacity for analysis 
and debate on ICT, poverty and development in South Africa.  This will improve the 
quality of information on which effective policy must be based, as well as the solidity 
of the political process that stands behind formulation and implementation of that 
policy.  In other words, improving the environment for analysis and debate on the 
implications of ICTs for poverty alleviation and reducing inequality can be a 
significant element in the ongoing effort to imaginatively rethink mainstream 
development.  
 
Policy decisions about poor people’s entitlements to ICT access should be based upon 
an assessment of whether the poor should be entitled to such access in order to 
develop their capabilities.  There is a need for an evaluation process which is an 
exercise in social choice that requires public discussion, understanding and 
democratic acceptance.  Systematic social science research on the development of 
capabilities required for using ICTs needs to be undertaken.  Further, research that 
would specify how the poor can best use the new ICTs to strengthen their freedoms to 
decide between alternative social choices and which take account of the configuration 
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biases of the new technologies is non-existent at present.  A research agenda that 
would contribute to a debate about the new ICTs that embraces the rights and 
entitlements of the poor is urgently needed. 
 
A number of other areas of future action and research have emerged from the study.  
First, the design of democratic and proactive policies and programmes that make it 
possible to realise the social development potential of ICTs.  A second area is centred 
on the definition of those social and institutional changes that are required to 
maximise the social benefits and to minimise the social risks associated with adoption 
and deployment of ICTs.  Third, a discussion on the design and adoption of ICTs that 
strengthen sustainable and equitable processes of social development, premised on 
human rights and social justice, is called for.  A final area of research involves 
studying the ‘social shaping of technology’ in concrete situations to learn what forces 
shape specific technological changes in a specific environment.  ICT, poverty and 
development research needs to make a conscious effort to move away from positions 
of technological determinism towards a perspective that avoids drawing a 
technology/society distinction, and focus on the social, cultural, political and 
economic contexts where technologies are developed and the ones where they are 
used. 
 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
The ICT for development project needs to shift direction from a focus on 
‘representationalist’ end-states to situated, embodied and emergent processes.  
Frameworks of power should form an integral component of any consideration of 
ICT, poverty and development – indeed, as shown by Foucault (1979) – of the 
capillary coalescence of any ‘knowledge’ frameworks.  As this study has argued, 
Foucault (1972) sees discursive practice as part of the microphysics of power, and as 
fragmented and dispersed (a bricolage) where a network of sites is involved.  Power 
is seen as relational and based in action; in other words, it is situated.  He does not 
focus on an abstract definition of power but rather sees it as constituted in 
relationships within and between localised networks of actions (Foucault, 1972).  He 
emphasises the way in which power and knowledge are inextricably intertwined; co-
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created, in fact (Foucault, 1972).  Technology is often seen as an instrument of power 
that can reproduce and reify certain dominant discursive practices. As Foucault says: 
“There is no knowledge without a particular discursive practice; and any 
discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms” (Foucault, 
1972:183). 
 
A pivotal implication to be drawn from this shift from end-states processes is that the 
fundamental logic of social interaction is driven by poor people’s ongoing need to 
make sense of their situated, unstable and hence always contestable positioning in the 
world. 
 
By conceptualising discourse as social action the study has not only raised a series of 
theoretical concerns, but has also drawn attention to an important and as yet under-
researched domain of empirical knowledge.  In doing so, the study has opened up the 
possibility that scholars interested in social changes associated with ICTs for poverty 
alleviation need to reconsider the discourse deployed within the debate.  A hegemonic 
view of language and a conception of language use as social action do suggest that 
spaces of resistance and opportunities for change can be opened up via dialogue.  
However, although the South African government is supposed to consult widely, there 
is little evidence to suggest that this has resulted in a more broadly based set of 
information policy objectives that are capable of dealing with the social issues 
continually raised by political actors, such as closing the gap between rich and poor.  
That said, a consultation exercise means little unless it is capable of disrupting 
government’s established order of discourse.  
 
The evidence presented in this study can be interpreted as a rejection of the 
exaggerated claims (‘hype’) of the optimists surrounding ICTs for development.  The 
key finding of this dissertation converges with the sentiment echoed by Wade: 
“ICTs are being oversold as the key both to higher efficiency of corporate and 
public organizations and to stronger responsiveness of government to citizen-
customers.  ICT tools can help people learn how to absorb knowledge 
generated elsewhere and combine it with local needs and local knowledge, and 
they can help raise real economic returns to investments: but they are being 
touted in the development community as though they can leapfrog over the 
more familiar development problems” (Wade, 2002:443). 
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The much-used term ‘information society’ tends to ignore the evolutionary character 
of ICT development which has emerged as a result of the technological convergence 
of microelectronics, telecommunications, broadcasting and computing.  It also tends 
to overlook the continuities between the old and new ICTs.  In fact, even now the 
telephone mainline system is the key infrastructure for Internet access. 
 
The current thinking on the role of information and knowledge in processes of social 
development matches exceedingly well the prevailing development paradigm.  
Development is seen as a relationship between interventionists and subjects of 
intervention.  The interventionists transfer resources such as information and 
knowledge as inputs, which they believe will lead to social development as output.  
As Kaplan (1999:5-7) suggests, the conventional development approach assumes that 
development can be created and engineered, that it is linear and predictable, that it has 
a beginning and an end, and ultimately is “the delivery of resources”.  If we 
understand development differently, as Kaplan proposes, the transfer of information 
and knowledge is no longer the key issue.  The core of a different notion of 
development is: 
“the recognition that development is an innate and natural process found in all 
living beings.  It is important for us to understand that as development workers 
we do not ‘bring’ or deliver development, but intervene into development 
processes which already exist” (Kaplan, 1999:11). 
 
This is contrary to the conventional approach where “development is about 
facilitating resourcefulness” (Kaplan, 1999:15), which leads Kaplan (1999:19) to 
conclude that “the whole point of development is to enable people to participate in the 
governance of their own lives”.  If one accepts this position, the present emphasis of 
the South African government on ICT, poverty and development raises the question: 
Whatever happened to putting the poor first and adopting ICT policies that empower 
the poor to manage and control their own lives? 
 
On the whole, government’s ICT initiatives are more technology-driven than user-
oriented.  If the ICT potential for human development is to be successfully exploited, 
the needs and aspirations of users must be central to the whole process of design, 
construction and application.  This is concisely summarised by Mansell and Wehn: 
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“There is substantial evidence that if applications do not reflect user needs or 
involve them in the process of development, they simply will not bring the 
expected benefits.  They are likely to create new problems that will be costly 
to address.  If the specific social, cultural, and economic conditions, the 
expertise and commitment of users, and components of the infrastructure are 
not assembled together, ICT applications will fail to yield benefits” (Mansell 
& Wehn, 1998:97). 
 
The social uses of ICTs in South Africa today are to a large extent guided by the 
political-institutional arrangements within which they operate.  Whether the ICT 
potential will be successfully exploited in support of human development depends 
much more on the institutional organisation of technology than on its technical 
features per se.  The critical implication of this situation is that policy-makers will 
have to make social choices that adjust the technological potential to the needs of 
human development.  The immediate question this raises is which analytical 
perspective will be able to guide the search for these choices. 
 
Following Foucault, Frissen (2000:64) argues that:  
“technology is a cultural artefact in the tradition of modernisation and thus of 
advancing and expanding domination.  Technologies can be seen as strategies 
of discipline, and it is that which makes them so intriguing from the 
perspective of politics and public administration”. 
 
This study has shown how the appropriation and discursive deployment of ICTs, with 
their association with progress and rationality, offer a powerful opportunity to further 
the interests of technocratic, often mainstream stakeholders, acting as a magnifier for 
dominant discursive interests by creating new subjects for objectification.  The ability 
of discourse analysis to expose this effect, identify the various elements of such 
discourse in practice and show how their interaction is systematised into a 
“technology of representation” (Foucault, 1975:104) thus renders it a useful tool for 
ICT, poverty and development researchers. 
 
There is great optimism in government over the potential for ICTs to promote socio-
economic development and alleviate poverty.  Currently, however, there is no 
convincing empirical evidence to support such optimism.  Policy-makers in South 
Africa face the daunting challenge of deciding how to allocate often extremely limited 
resources among many important alternative priorities.  Unfortunately not enough 
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careful analysis of ICTs in developing countries has yet been done to answer pressing 
policy questions.  What is clear, however, is that the potential for ICTs to alleviate 
poverty and promote economic growth in developing countries, including South 
Africa, justifies greater attention and systematic analysis.   
 
This dissertation has focused on the need to deconstruct the ICT, poverty and 
development discourse, exposing its various strands to critical scrutiny.  The task of 
deconstructing and demythologising the ICTs for poverty reduction project is an 
urgent one.  The exclusiveness of the current discourse on ICTs for development 
points to the need for an epistemology based on pluralism, open-ended processes of 
human negotiation and uncertainty rather than on the closure of choice and certainty.  
ICT policy should be recognised as an area of debate and political negotiation rather 
than a neutral instrument for development.   
 
From a development perspective the fundamental questions are how communication, 
information and knowledge can be effectively used as critical elements for poverty 
reduction, and how ICTs can be efficiently mainstreamed in the fight against poverty.  
It is the contention of this study that ICTs should not be conceived as an end in 
themselves.  The measure of success is the progress towards poverty reduction rather 
than the spread of technology or bridging the ‘digital divide’ per se.  It is imperative 
for the state’s ICT for development projects to take the needs of poor communities as 
a starting point rather than imposing external agendas and utopian visions of western 
technology-driven modernity on them.   
 
The driving force for ICT innovation for poverty alleviation can only be poor people’s 
own desire for improving their lives.  This should be a key principle for government 
interventions and initiatives intended to support poverty reduction by knowledgeable 
agents in diverse socio-economic conditions.  Finally, policy-makers must guard 
against ‘technology fundamentalism’, i.e. the idea that investment in ICT alone is the 
only need of developing countries and that it be given priority over all other 
competing development needs.  
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Appendix 1 
Fieldwork Questionnaire 
 
1. What is the relationship between ICTs, poverty and development?   
2. What are the most important challenges as far as ICTs for development in South 
Africa is concerned? 
3. Can ICTs empower the poor? If so, how?  
4. What are the benefits of ICTs for reducing poverty?   
5. Does ICTs pose any risks for the poor and marginalised in South Africa?  
6. What role is the South African government playing in promoting ICTs for 
development? 
7. Please describe and explain some of the ICT projects that your department is 
currently involved in? 
8. How successful are these projects thus far? 
9. Is there anything more that you would like to say regarding ICTs, poverty and 
development? 
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